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2021 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

29. Paul David Klemperer (1956–)

verfasst von : Huw Dixon

Erschienen in: The Palgrave Companion to Oxford Economics

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Paul Klemperer is a British economist born in 1956 who was an undergraduate at Cambridge University and did his graduate studies at Stanford University, where he obtained a PhD in 1986. He took up a post at St Catherine’s College, Oxford, in 1984, moving to Nuffield College in 1995 when he became the Edgeworth Professor of Economics in 1995. In his early years, his research focused on oligopoly theory, with his main contributions being on switching costs. From 1995, his interests moved on to auction theory and he became involved in applying his ideas to auction design, both as part of a team in the 2000 3G auction in the United Kingdom and later applying his own multi-product auction model to deal with the Bank of England’s auctions of loans to banks with different qualities of collateral assets in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.

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Fußnoten
1
His family did not follow the musical career of his distant relative, the conductor Otto Klemperer.
 
2
They were to marry in 1989 and have three children.
 
3
Klemperer also contributed to the UK government’s 2006 Gowers Review of Intellectual Property.
 
4
Bulow and Klemperer also use a similar marginal revenue approach to examine the effect of price controls on rent-seeking and consumer welfare (see Bulow and Klemperer 2012). They further highlighted the importance of attracting new entrants in their paper “Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?” (Bulow and Klemperer 2009).
 
5
For Klemperer’s view on the state of auction theory at the turn of the century, see Klemperer (1999).
 
6
For example, Park et al. (2011: 118) argue that the ‘results show no evidence to support claims of negative effects of spectrum auctions [on consumers] in the mobile communications market’.
 
7
The crisis is often thought of as beginning with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, but the September 2007 Northern Rock bank run—Britain’s first bank run since the 1800s—was one of the early signs of trouble.
 
8
The software can be downloaded at: http://​pma.​nuff.​ox.​ac.​uk/​.
 
9
In addition to being the main (usually, only) supervisor of around 15 doctoral students who have gone on to Professorships, Klemperer supervised the Master’s theses that were the first research of many other students who went on to distinguished careers, such as Jon Levin, Eric Budish, and Shengwu Li (Professors at Stanford, Chicago, and Harvard, respectively, at the time of writing).
 
Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Baldwin, E. and P. Klemperer (2019). ‘Understanding Preferences: “Demand Types”, and the Existence of Equilibrium with Indivisibilities’. Econometrica, 87(3): 867–932.CrossRef Baldwin, E. and P. Klemperer (2019). ‘Understanding Preferences: “Demand Types”, and the Existence of Equilibrium with Indivisibilities’. Econometrica, 87(3): 867–932.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Beggs, A. and P. Klemperer (1992). ‘Multi-Period Competition with Switching Costs’. Econometrica, 60(3): 651–666.CrossRef Beggs, A. and P. Klemperer (1992). ‘Multi-Period Competition with Switching Costs’. Econometrica, 60(3): 651–666.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Binmore, K. and P. Klemperer (2002). ‘The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences’. Economic Journal, 112(478): C74–C96.CrossRef Binmore, K. and P. Klemperer (2002). ‘The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences’. Economic Journal, 112(478): C74–C96.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bulow, J., J. Geanakoplos and P. Klemperer (1985a). ‘Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements’. Journal of Political Economy, 93(3): 488–511.CrossRef Bulow, J., J. Geanakoplos and P. Klemperer (1985a). ‘Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements’. Journal of Political Economy, 93(3): 488–511.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bulow, J., J. Geanakoplos and P. Klemperer (1985b). ‘Holding Idle Capacity to Deter Entry’. Economic Journal, 95(377): 178–182.CrossRef Bulow, J., J. Geanakoplos and P. Klemperer (1985b). ‘Holding Idle Capacity to Deter Entry’. Economic Journal, 95(377): 178–182.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bulow, J., M. Huang and P. Klemperer (1999). ‘Toeholds and Takeovers’. Journal of Political Economy, 107(3): 427–454.CrossRef Bulow, J., M. Huang and P. Klemperer (1999). ‘Toeholds and Takeovers’. Journal of Political Economy, 107(3): 427–454.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (1994). ‘Rational Frenzies and Crashes’. Journal of Political Economy, 102(1): 1–23.CrossRef Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (1994). ‘Rational Frenzies and Crashes’. Journal of Political Economy, 102(1): 1–23.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (1996). ‘Auctions Versus Negotiations’. American Economic Review, 86(1): 180–194. Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (1996). ‘Auctions Versus Negotiations’. American Economic Review, 86(1): 180–194.
Zurück zum Zitat Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (1998). ‘The Tobacco Deal’. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 29(Microeconomics): 323–394.CrossRef Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (1998). ‘The Tobacco Deal’. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 29(Microeconomics): 323–394.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (1999). ‘The Generalized War of Attrition’. American Economic Review, 89(1): 175–189.CrossRef Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (1999). ‘The Generalized War of Attrition’. American Economic Review, 89(1): 175–189.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (2002). ‘Prices and the Winner’s Curse’. RAND Journal of Economics, 33(1): 1–21.CrossRef Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (2002). ‘Prices and the Winner’s Curse’. RAND Journal of Economics, 33(1): 1–21.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (2009). ‘Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?’. American Economic Review, 99(4): 1,544–1,575.CrossRef Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (2009). ‘Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?’. American Economic Review, 99(4): 1,544–1,575.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (2012). ‘Regulated Prices, Rent Seeking, and Consumer Surplus’. Journal of Political Economy, 120(1): 160–186.CrossRef Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (2012). ‘Regulated Prices, Rent Seeking, and Consumer Surplus’. Journal of Political Economy, 120(1): 160–186.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (2015). ‘Equity Recourse Notes: Creating Counter-Cyclical Bank Capital’. Economic Journal, 125(586): F131–F157.CrossRef Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (2015). ‘Equity Recourse Notes: Creating Counter-Cyclical Bank Capital’. Economic Journal, 125(586): F131–F157.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Cramton, P., R. Gibbons and P. Klemperer (1987). ‘Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently’. Econometrica, 55(3): 615–632.CrossRef Cramton, P., R. Gibbons and P. Klemperer (1987). ‘Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently’. Econometrica, 55(3): 615–632.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Erdil, A. and P. Klemperer (2010). ‘A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions’. Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(2/3): 537–547.CrossRef Erdil, A. and P. Klemperer (2010). ‘A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions’. Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(2/3): 537–547.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Froot, K. and P. Klemperer (1989). ‘Exchange Rate Pass-Through When Market Share Matters’. American Economic Review, 79(4): 637–654. Froot, K. and P. Klemperer (1989). ‘Exchange Rate Pass-Through When Market Share Matters’. American Economic Review, 79(4): 637–654.
Zurück zum Zitat Gilbert, R. and P. Klemperer (2000). ‘An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing’. RAND Journal of Economics, 31(1): 1–21.CrossRef Gilbert, R. and P. Klemperer (2000). ‘An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing’. RAND Journal of Economics, 31(1): 1–21.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (1987a). ‘Markets with Consumer Switching Costs’. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(2): 375–394.CrossRef Klemperer, P. (1987a). ‘Markets with Consumer Switching Costs’. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(2): 375–394.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (1987b). ‘The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs’. RAND Journal of Economics, 18(1): 138–150.CrossRef Klemperer, P. (1987b). ‘The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs’. RAND Journal of Economics, 18(1): 138–150.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (1987c). ‘Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs’. Economic Journal, 97(Supplement): 99–117.CrossRef Klemperer, P. (1987c). ‘Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs’. Economic Journal, 97(Supplement): 99–117.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (1988). ‘Welfare Effects of Entry into Markets with Switching Costs’. Journal of Industrial Economics, 37(2): 159–165.CrossRef Klemperer, P. (1988). ‘Welfare Effects of Entry into Markets with Switching Costs’. Journal of Industrial Economics, 37(2): 159–165.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (1989). ‘Price Wars Caused by Switching Costs’. Review of Economic Studies, 56(3): 405–420.CrossRef Klemperer, P. (1989). ‘Price Wars Caused by Switching Costs’. Review of Economic Studies, 56(3): 405–420.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (1990). ‘How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?’. RAND Journal of Economics, 21(1): 113–130.CrossRef Klemperer, P. (1990). ‘How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?’. RAND Journal of Economics, 21(1): 113–130.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (1992). ‘Equilibrium Product Lines: Competing Head-to-Head May Be Less Competitive’. American Economic Review, 82(4): 740–755. Klemperer, P. (1992). ‘Equilibrium Product Lines: Competing Head-to-Head May Be Less Competitive’. American Economic Review, 82(4): 740–755.
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (1995a). ‘Competition When Consumers Have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade’. Review of Economic Studies, 62(4): 515–539.CrossRef Klemperer, P. (1995a). ‘Competition When Consumers Have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade’. Review of Economic Studies, 62(4): 515–539.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (1995b). ‘Comments on “Putting Auction Theory to Work”’. Discussant’s comments on Paul Milgrom’s 1995 Churchill Lectures, Working Paper, Oxford University. Klemperer, P. (1995b). ‘Comments on “Putting Auction Theory to Work”’. Discussant’s comments on Paul Milgrom’s 1995 Churchill Lectures, Working Paper, Oxford University.
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (1998). ‘Auctions With Almost Common Values: The “Wallet Game” and Its Applications’. European Economic Review, 42(3–5): 757–769.CrossRef Klemperer, P. (1998). ‘Auctions With Almost Common Values: The “Wallet Game” and Its Applications’. European Economic Review, 42(3–5): 757–769.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (1999). ‘Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature’. Journal of Economic Surveys, 13(3): 227–286.CrossRef Klemperer, P. (1999). ‘Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature’. Journal of Economic Surveys, 13(3): 227–286.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (2002a). ‘What Really Matters in Auction Design’. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(1): 169–189.CrossRef Klemperer, P. (2002a). ‘What Really Matters in Auction Design’. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(1): 169–189.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (2002b). ‘The Wrong Culprit for Telecom Trouble’. Financial Times, 26 November: 21. Klemperer, P. (2002b). ‘The Wrong Culprit for Telecom Trouble’. Financial Times, 26 November: 21.
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (2002c). ‘How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions’. European Economic Review, 46(4–5): 829–845.CrossRef Klemperer, P. (2002c). ‘How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions’. European Economic Review, 46(4–5): 829–845.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (2003). ‘Alfred Marshall Lecture: Using and Abusing Economic Theory’. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(2/3): 272–300.CrossRef Klemperer, P. (2003). ‘Alfred Marshall Lecture: Using and Abusing Economic Theory’. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(2/3): 272–300.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (2004a). ‘America’s Patent Protection Has Gone Too Far’. Financial Times, 2 March: 19. Klemperer, P. (2004a). ‘America’s Patent Protection Has Gone Too Far’. Financial Times, 2 March: 19.
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (2004b). Auctions: Theory and Practice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRef Klemperer, P. (2004b). Auctions: Theory and Practice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (2008). ‘A New Auction for Substitutes: Central-Bank Liquidity Auctions, “Toxic Asset” Auctions, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions’. Working Paper, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. Klemperer, P. (2008). ‘A New Auction for Substitutes: Central-Bank Liquidity Auctions, “Toxic Asset” Auctions, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions’. Working Paper, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (2010a). ‘The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods’. Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(2–3): 526–536.CrossRef Klemperer, P. (2010a). ‘The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods’. Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(2–3): 526–536.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (2010b). ‘What Is the Top Priority on Climate Change?’. Chapter 19 in H. Schellnhuber et al. (eds) Global Sustainability: A Nobel Cause. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 233–242. Klemperer, P. (2010b). ‘What Is the Top Priority on Climate Change?’. Chapter 19 in H. Schellnhuber et al. (eds) Global Sustainability: A Nobel Cause. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 233–242.
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. (2018). ‘Product-Mix Auctions’. Working Paper, Nuffield College, Univesity of Oxford. Klemperer, P. (2018). ‘Product-Mix Auctions’. Working Paper, Nuffield College, Univesity of Oxford.
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. and J. McClenahan (1981). ‘Joint Strategic Planning Between Health and Local Authorities’. Omega, 9(5): 481–491.CrossRef Klemperer, P. and J. McClenahan (1981). ‘Joint Strategic Planning Between Health and Local Authorities’. Omega, 9(5): 481–491.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. and M. Meyer (1986). ‘Price Competition vs. Quantity Competition: The Role of Uncertainty’. RAND Journal of Economics, 17(4): 618–638.CrossRef Klemperer, P. and M. Meyer (1986). ‘Price Competition vs. Quantity Competition: The Role of Uncertainty’. RAND Journal of Economics, 17(4): 618–638.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. and M. Meyer (1988). ‘Consistent Conjectures Equilibria: A Reformulation Showing Non-Uniqueness’. Economics Letters, 27(2): 111–115.CrossRef Klemperer, P. and M. Meyer (1988). ‘Consistent Conjectures Equilibria: A Reformulation Showing Non-Uniqueness’. Economics Letters, 27(2): 111–115.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. and M. Meyer (1989). ‘Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly Under Uncertainty’. Econometrica, 57(6): 1,243–1,277.CrossRef Klemperer, P. and M. Meyer (1989). ‘Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly Under Uncertainty’. Econometrica, 57(6): 1,243–1,277.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Klemperer, P. and A. Padilla (1997). ‘Do Firms’ Product Lines Include Too Many Varieties?’. RAND Journal of Economics, 28(3): 472–488.CrossRef Klemperer, P. and A. Padilla (1997). ‘Do Firms’ Product Lines Include Too Many Varieties?’. RAND Journal of Economics, 28(3): 472–488.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bresnahan, T. (1981). ‘Duopoly Models with Consistent Conjectures’. American Economic Review, 71(5): 934–945. Bresnahan, T. (1981). ‘Duopoly Models with Consistent Conjectures’. American Economic Review, 71(5): 934–945.
Zurück zum Zitat Bulow, J. and J. Roberts (1989). ‘The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions’. Journal of Political Economy, 97(5): 1,060–1,090.CrossRef Bulow, J. and J. Roberts (1989). ‘The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions’. Journal of Political Economy, 97(5): 1,060–1,090.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Dixit, A. (1980). ‘The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence’. Economic Journal, 90(357): 95–106.CrossRef Dixit, A. (1980). ‘The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence’. Economic Journal, 90(357): 95–106.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Osborn, A. (2000). ‘Consumers Pay the Price in 3G Auction’. The Guardian, 17 November: 33. Osborn, A. (2000). ‘Consumers Pay the Price in 3G Auction’. The Guardian, 17 November: 33.
Zurück zum Zitat Park, M., S.-W. Lee and Y.-J. Choi (2011). ‘Does Spectrum Auctioning Harm Consumers? Lessons from 3G Licensing’. Information Economics and Policy, 23(1): 118–126.CrossRef Park, M., S.-W. Lee and Y.-J. Choi (2011). ‘Does Spectrum Auctioning Harm Consumers? Lessons from 3G Licensing’. Information Economics and Policy, 23(1): 118–126.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
Paul David Klemperer (1956–)
verfasst von
Huw Dixon
Copyright-Jahr
2021
Verlag
Springer International Publishing
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58471-9_29