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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Permutation-Based Randomised Tournament Solutions

verfasst von : Justin Kruger, Stéphane Airiau

Erschienen in: Multi-Agent Systems and Agreement Technologies

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Voting rules that are based on the majority graph typically output large sets of winners. In this full original paper our goal is to investigate a general method which leads to randomized version of such rules. We use the idea of parallel universes, where each universe is connected with a permutation over alternatives. The permutation allows us to construct resolute voting rules (i.e. rules that always choose unique winners). Such resolute rules can be constructed in a variety of ways: we consider using binary voting trees to select a single alternative. In turn this permits the construction of neutral rules that output the set the possible winners of every parallel universe. The question of which rules can be constructed in this way has already been partially studied under the heading of agenda implementability. We further propose a randomised version in which the probability of being the winner is the ratio of universes in which the alternative wins. We also briefly consider (typically novel) rules that elect the alternatives that have maximal winning probability. These rules typically output small sets of winners, thus provide refinements of known tournament solutions.

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Fußnoten
1
A binary relation \(R\subseteq X\times X\) trichotomous if for all \(a,b\in X\), either aTb, bTa or \(a=b\).
 
2
More precisely, this is one instance of the simple tree. We give a full recursive definition later in this section.
 
3
By permutation here do not mean all possible assignments of alternatives to the leaves: indeed, this would imply that all alternatives are trivially returned, as the tree where all leaves are the same alternative must return that alternative. We are not aware of any work that considers possible winners under some generalised “multiple assignment procedure” of the leaves of a binary tree.
 
4
The question of what tournament rules are implementable by parallel universes in this manner has been studied by Horan [13], who gives necessary and sufficient conditions.
 
5
The top cycle of a tournament is the maximal set of alternatives such that the restriction of the tournament to these alternatives contains a cycle.
 
6
An alternative is undominated if it there is some alternative that does not dominate it.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Permutation-Based Randomised Tournament Solutions
verfasst von
Justin Kruger
Stéphane Airiau
Copyright-Jahr
2018
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01713-2_17