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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

11. Political Economy Perspectives of the Fall of the Greek Monarchy

verfasst von : George Tridimas

Erschienen in: Democracy and an Open-Economy World Order

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Political economy has researched both autocracy and the emergence of democracy. Autocrats are modelled as state proprietors using taxes and public expenditure to maximize personal consumption subject to the constraints of spending on their own security, on transferring resources to their supporters and on public services to increase output and therefore tax revenue. In studying democratisation the literature examines how and why a typically hereditary and enfranchised elite extend various legal protections and voting rights to the poorer classes of the population. However, research has ignored the fact that in the transition to representative government some countries retained their kings, and therefore a hereditary privilege, as head of state in the form of constitutional monarchy, while others adopted republican orders and abolished the monarchy. Since her foundation modern Greece has swung from monarchy to republic back to monarchy and then republic. What factors does political economy suggest to explain this varied pattern and the demise of monarchy? This is the question addressee by the present study.

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1
During his reign King George was concerned with the position of the monarchy. “The arguments of political parties over the King’s rights and revenue, combined with the spread of brigandage and other disturbances throughout the country, made King George feel ever insecure” Van Der Kiste (1994, p. 21). To those one may add the anxiety which characterised the times after the defeat of 1897 (and which was followed by an unsuccessful attempt against the King’s life, which subsequently generated a wave of sympathy) and the coup of 1909.
 
2
It is thought that even though the actual size of the majority was manipulated, there was sufficient support for Constantine’s return to win in a fair ballot; see Clogg (1986).
 
3
It is again thought a majority of Greeks would have supported the restoration on the hope of bringing a measure of stability, see Clogg (ibid.)
 
4
See Clogg (1986) and Gallant (2001).
 
5
Interestingly, it was King Paul who appointed the relatively unknown Karamanlis as prime minister after the death of the PM A. Papagos before his rightwing party elected a new leader, putting aside the candidatures of more senior ministers of the cabinet. Clogg (1986, p.179) writes “[Karamanlis] had grown increasingly resentful of the prerogatives of the monarchy and of the way in which the armed forces during the post-war period had in effect become a royal fief”.
 
6
A referendum took place to legitimize a new republican dispensation, but as it was held under martial law, the reported 80% vote in its favour is discredited.
 
7
Markesinis (1974) offers a detailed account.
 
8
Two more revisions of the constitution were carried out in 2001 and 2008 but neither amended the articles regarding the structure of government.
 
9
“In autocracies the ruler is absolute. The people are his subjects and he appoints officials to govern them. Their authority springs exclusively from the autocrat; they are his dependents” (Finer 1999, p. 865). “The central procedure of democracy is the selection of leaders through competitive elections by the people they govern.” (Huntington 1991, p.6).
 
10
Reversing the argument, coups and dictatorships are credible ways of establishing institutions that change the distribution of political power in favour of the elite at the expense of the majority.
 
11
See Olsson-Yaouzis (2012) for a review of rational models of revolutions and further elaboration using evolutionary game theory. He shows that revolutions are more likely to break out when a ruler has lost the opportunity to intervene against the revolutionaries at an early stage of the uprising before a critical mass of citizens has turned against him and/or when the ruler has failed to punish the revolutionaries severely.
 
12
Similarly, Greif (2006, p.136) writes: “[a] king’s strength comes not from his army but from the beliefs held by each member of the army that everyone else will obey the king’s orders and that the best response is also to obey.”
 
13
The instability can be illustrated by a simple example. Assume three individuals A, B and C distributing a total of 10 units of income or wealth. Individuals A and B first form a coalition each one gets 5; C is excluded, that is, he gets 0. C then “revolts” and invites B to form a new coalition where B gets 6, C takes 4 units of income and A ends up with 0 (assuming that no income is destroyed in the process). B is better off with this new arrangement (6 > 5) and accepts. But the latter too is unstable. A, the loser, revolts against the new regime and proposes a new settlement giving 7 to C and keeping 3 for himself. C prefers this proposal to the previous one and together with A form the new status-quo. B then has the incentive to revolt and the cycle will be repeated.
 
14
See Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) and Anderton and Carter (2009).
 
15
See Tridimas (2012) for a review.
 
16
Markesinis (1966) argues that during the Nineteenth century George conduct in office aimed to ensure that no politician would command more popular support than himself.
 
17
Interestingly, G. Rallis who in 1980 was elected by the rightwing party to replace Karamanlis as party leader and prime minister when the latter became president of the republic, stated that he had voted for the monarchy but accepted unquestionably the popular verdict.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Political Economy Perspectives of the Fall of the Greek Monarchy
verfasst von
George Tridimas
Copyright-Jahr
2017
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52168-8_11