5. Political Institutions and Governmental Performance in Brazilian Democracy

Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi show that the political institutions and parliamentary modus operandi ensure the executive’s capacity to act, in spite of a number of—ultimately only theoretical—inadequacies. In the context of the institutional structure established in 1988, the country showed itself capable of overcoming, at least in part, apparently insurmountable problems as, for instance, currency stabilization, economic growth and redistribution. The negative impact of a fragmented parliament and the personal interests of parliamentarians are not reflected in the functioning of the executive. Instead, the opposite is the case. The executive generally controls the work of the legislative branch and is also very successful with its own legislative initiatives. The analysis shows that the internal variables of the decision making process, i.e., the legislative power of the President and the centralized organization of the legislature, compensate the negative effects. It is clear that the aim of the Constituent Assembly was actually reached: to increase the ability of the government to impose its agenda.