nach oben

Public Choice

Erschienen in:

10.01.2018

Politics, entertainment and business: a multisided model of media

verfasst von: Alejandro Castañeda, César Martinelli

Erschienen in: Public Choice | Ausgabe 3-4/2018

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

We offer a model of media as a multisided platform, providing entertainment and news to viewers, commercial opportunities to advertisers, and political influence to politicians, thanks to the presence of influenceable voters among the media audience. We characterize a political economic equilibrium, determining simultaneously media choices and politicians’ electoral positions. We show that as the value of political influence increases, the media transitions from catering to commercial advertisers to selling political influence, resulting in policy choices that hurt influenceable voters.

Vorheriger Artikel The likelihood of social choice violations in rank sum scoring: algorithms and evidence from NCAA cross country running

Nächster Artikel Revenge: John Sherman, Russell Alger and the origins of the Sherman Act

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Nur mit Berechtigung zugänglich

We do not specify details of the trade between viewers and advertisers as it is not the focus of the current paper; see for instance Anderson and Coate (2005). The assumption that advertisers appropriate all the gains form trade is immaterial. Otherwise, the value of watching the media for viewers has to be amended to include not only an entertainment but also a commercial motive.

In practice, media can both slant the content of news and provide explicit or implicit political propaganda. In terms of the model, what is important in either case is that it yields electoral benefits for politicians and a nuisance for viewers.

The actual format of the auction is not important–since the value of the political space for politicians is common knowledge, and is the same for both politicians, a first prize auction, a second price auction, or simply a posted price would lead to the same results. See Fang (2002) and Bikhchandani et al. (2013).

Our assumption that media’s entertainment value is larger for poorer consumers is consistent with evidence that the number of hours spent watching TV is negatively correlated with income; see, e.g., Dooe (2013), who uses US data from the General Social Survey (NORC 2014). Similarly, TV watching in Mexico is concentrated in the lower socioeconomic levels, with the most watched programs being news and soap operas (IBOPE AGB 2009).

We use D to denote the differential operator.

For the Figure, we let F be a uniform distribution on \([\underline{\upomega }_1,\overline{\upomega }_1] = [1,2]\), let \({\upomega }_2=1\), and let G be a standard uniform distribution. We also let the income parameter and the nuisance parameter of the viewers’ payoffs be given by \(\uplambda = \upgamma =1/2\), and the political influence of media be given by \(\updelta =4\). We can calculate \(\overline{a}_c=1/3\) and \(\overline{a}_e=1/4\).

For simplicity, we have viewers and advertisers becoming active whenever they are indifferent. This is without loss of generality, since on the equilibrium path the sets of indifferent viewers and advertisers are zero measure.

Anderson, S., & Coate, S. (2005). Market provision of broadcasting: A welfare analysis. Review of Economic Studies, 72(4), 947–972.CrossRef

Armstrong, M. (2006). Competition in two-sided markets. RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3), 668–691.CrossRef

Bernhardt, D., Krasa, S., & Polborn, M. (2008). Political polarization and the electoral effect of media bias. Journal of Public Economics, 92, 1092–1104.CrossRef

Besley, T., & Prat, A. (2006). Handcuffs for the grabbing hand? Media capture and government accountability. American Economic Review, 96(3), 720–736.CrossRef

Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, J., & Riley, J. G. (2013). The analytics of uncertainty and information (2nd ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Chan, J., & Stone, D. F. (2013). Media proliferation and partisan selective exposure. Public Choice, 156(3), 467–490.CrossRef

Coyne, C., & Leeson, P. (2004). Read all about it! Understanding the role of media in economic development. Kyklos, 57(1), 21–44.CrossRef

Coyne, C., & Leeson, P. (2009). Media as a mechanism of institutional change and reinforcement. Kyklos, 62(1), 1–14.CrossRef

DellaVigna, S., & Kaplan, E. (2007). The Fox News effect: Media bias and voting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(3), 1187–1234.CrossRef

Di Tella, R., & Franceschelli, I. (2011). Government advertising and media coverage of corruption scandals. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3(4), 119–151.

Dooe, M. (2013). Behind the data: TV viewing and income. http://www.marketplace.org/topics/wealth-poverty/income-upshot/behind-data-tv-viewing-and-income.

Duggan, J., & Martinelli, C. (2011). A spatial theory of media slant and voter choice. Review of Economic Studies, 78(2), 640–666.CrossRef

Durante, R., Pinotti, P., & Tesei, A. (2017). The political legacy of entertainment TV. CEPR Discussion Paper 10738.

Fang, H. (2002). Lottery versus all-pay auction models of lobbying. Public Choice, 112(3), 351–371.CrossRef

Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. (2006). Media bias and reputation. Journal of Political Economy, 114(2), 280–316.CrossRef

Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J., (2015). Media bias in the marketplace: Theory. In S. Anderson, J. Waldfogel & D. Stromberg (Eds.), Handbook of media economics (Vol. 1A). North Holland (forthcoming).

Gentzkow, M., Shapiro, J., & Sinkinson, M. (2011). The effect of newspaper entry and exit on electoral politics. American Economic Review, 101(7), 2980–3018.CrossRef

Groseclose, T., & Milyo, J. (2005). A measure of media bias. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(4), 1191–1237.CrossRef

Hillman, A., & Samet, D. (1987). Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders. Public Choice, 54(1), 63–82.CrossRef

IBOPE AGB. (2009). Anuario 2008 2009: Audiencias y medios en México.

Leeson, P. (2008). Media freedom, political knowledge, and participation. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(2), 155–169.CrossRef

MacKinlay, A. C. (1997). Event studies in economics and finance. Journal of Economic Literature, 35, 13–39.

Mcmillan, J., & Zoido, P. (2004). How to subvert democracy: Montesinos in Peru. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(4), 69–92.CrossRef

Mullainathan, S., & Shleifer, A. (2005). The market for news. American Economic Review, 95(4), 1031–1053.CrossRef

NORC. (2014). GSS General Social Survey. http://www3.norc.org/GSS+Website/.

Prat, A. (2014). Measuring media power. In CEPR DP10094.

Prat, A., & Stromberg, D. (2013). The political economy of mass media. In D. Acemoglu, M. Arellano, & E. Dekel (Eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Tenth World Congress. Applied Economics (Vol. 2, pp. 135–187). New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2003). Platform competition in two-sided markets. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(4), 990–1029.CrossRef

Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2006). Two-sided markets: A progress report. RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3), 645–667.CrossRef

Tullock, G. (1967). Toward a mathematics of politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Tullock, G. (1975). On the efficient organization of trials. Kyklos, 28(4), 745–762.CrossRef

Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent seeking. In J. Buchanan, R. Tollison, & G. Tullock (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent seeking society (pp. 3–16). College Station: Texas A&M.

Weyl, E. G. (2010). A price theory of multi-sided platforms. American Economic Review, 100(4), 1642–1672.CrossRef

Titel: Politics, entertainment and business: a multisided model of media
verfasst von: Alejandro Castañeda
César Martinelli
Publikationsdatum: 10.01.2018
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Public Choice / Ausgabe 3-4/2018
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-017-0496-y

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 3-4/2018

The likelihood of social choice violations in rank sum scoring: algorithms and evidence from NCAA cross country running

Budget institutions and taxation

Politically sustainable targeted transfers

Between-group contests over group-specific public goods with within-group fragmentation

Giuseppe Eusepi and Richard E. Wagner: Public debt: an illusion of democratic political economy

African chiefs: comparative governance under colonial rule