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2024 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Populist Government and Judicial Power in Brazil in Times of the Covid-19 Pandemic: A Conflicting Relationship

verfasst von : Eleonora Mesquita Ceia

Erschienen in: The People’s Constitution

Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland

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Abstract

Brazil has joined the wave of right-wing populism, which emerged over the past decade at the international level. With the rise of Jair Bolsonaro to power in 2019, a populist, nationalist, ultraconservative, religious, and neoliberal way of doing politics has taken control of the Brazilian government. Populist movements challenge institutions, notably the Judiciary Power. They question its counter-majoritarian function and accuse their members of not acting in the name of preserving national sovereignty. Such an attitude has been adopted by Bolsonaro’s government towards the Federal Supreme Court (STF), the highest judicial body in Brazil, during the Covid-19 pandemic. This paper offers an analysis of how the institutional crisis has impacted constitutionalism in Brazil. Within its responsibilities for constitutional review, the STF, in some important cases, has succeeded in preventing abuses of power by the federal government. As is shown, the STF has played an important opposition role to radical right populism, by responding to the attacks of Bolsonarism and, consequently, confirming the resilience of the Federal Constitution.

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Vorheriges Kapitel The Judge as a Populist Actor
Nächstes Kapitel Rules of Standing and Populist Constitutionalism: The Case of the Greek Council of State
Fußnoten
1
Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017), p. 6.
 
2
Norris and Inglehart (2019), p. 257.
 
3
Betz (2017), p. 461.
 
4
Solano (2019).
 
5
Bolsonarism is a populist phenomenon, which emerged in Brazil after 2014, as a conservative reaction to the processes of social, economic and cultural change implemented by the Workers’ Party administrations, mainly to advances regarding the protection of minorities. Initially, support came from the upper and middle classes, as well as a significant portion of the military and Evangelical Christians, but over time the working classes also took an interest in Bolsonarism. In common, they feel resentful that political elites neglect their concerns and, consequently, feel represented by Bolsonaro’s anti-leftist, anti-corruption, and anti-system discourse, as well as by his radical defense of the traditional family and good customs. See Rocha and Solano (2021), pp. 24–28.
 
6
Blokker (2021), p. 156.
 
7
Harel (2017) and Mendes (2019), p. 197.
 
8
Blokker (2021), p. 155.
 
9
Blokker (2019).
 
10
Harel (2017).
 
11
Rocha and Solano (2021), p. 21.
 
12
2013 massive demonstrations in Brazil, which demanded improved social public services and more representation, are the object of intense debates among Brazilian scholars, because of their anti-party character, as well as their co-optation by the traditional media and right-wing political groups. Souza (2016), pp. 87–95.
 
13
The Car Wash Operation lasted from 2014 until 2021 and consisted of a set of investigations and criminal procedures to tackle corruption. It involved important organs of the justice system, such as the Federal Police, the Public Prosecutor’s Office and federal tribunals and judges. Alongside a group of federal prosecutors, this lawfare case had as its protagonist the former federal judge, Sergio Moro. All of them heavily criticized him for the serious abuses and violations perpetrated against constitutional rights and principles, as well as for the notorious criminalization of politics, in the conduct of criminal proceedings related to the Lava Jato Operation. See Serrano et al. (2021), pp. 45–48.
 
14
Rocha and Solano (2021), pp. 24–27.
 
15
The impeachment process of Dilma Rousseff had no relation to acts of corruption or crimes of responsibility allegedly perpetrated by the former President, but rather was motivated by the interests of traditional parties supported by the media and the Judiciary to block corruption investigations and terminate the left-wing government of the Workers’ Party. See Reis (2021), pp. 44–48.
 
16
Couto (2021), pp. 42–43.
 
17
Avritzer (2021), pp. 14–17.
 
18
Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017), p. 18.
 
19
Rough translation from the original in Portuguese: “Todos no Brasil têm que entender que estão submissos à vontade do povo brasileiro”. See Couto (2021), p. 45.
 
20
Mendes (2019), p. 186.
 
21
On 12th August 2021 President Bolsonaro stated at an official ceremony: “In the hands of the Armed Forces, the moderating power. In the hands of the Armed Forces the certainty of our freedom and democracy’s protection, as well as the certainty of the full support of the President’s decisions for the good of the nation”. Rough translation by the author from the Portuguese: “Nas mãos das Forças Armadas, o poder moderador. Nas mãos das Forças Armadas a certeza da garantia da nossa liberdade, da nossa democracia, e o apoio total às decisões do presidente para o bem da nação”. See Coletta and Holanda (2021).
 
22
Because of his continuous insults against the press, in June 2022 Bolsonaro was ordered to pay by a regional court decision the sum of 100 thousand Brazilian Reais by way of reparation for collective moral damages. The lawsuit was filed by two unions that represent Brazilian professional journalists and workers in television companies. See Uol (2022).
 
23
In August 2021 Bolsonaro claimed, without presenting any evidence, that Brazil’s electronic voting system was unreliable and, therefore, he suggested he might not accept the results of the 2022 presidential elections. As a consequence, the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court opened an investigation into Bolsonaro’s allegations against the safety of the electronic ballot box. See Teixeira et al. (2021).
 
24
Bolsonaro has restored commemorations of the 1964 coup, which established the civil-military dictatorship that lasted until 1985. These celebrations had been banned in 2011 by President Dilma Rousseff, who was herself jailed and tortured by the military regime. Bolsonaro often pays tribute to dictators and torturers, for example, to Alfredo Stroessner, Augusto Pinochet, and Colonel Carlos Alberto Ustra, who participated in torture sessions during the military dictatorship in Brazil. See Human Rights Watch (2019) and Reuters (2019).
 
25
de Oliveira Othon (2021), p. 94.
 
26
The National Security Law, enacted during the military dictatorship, was revoked in September 2021 and replaced by a new one compatible with the 1988 Constitution.
 
27
Clève (2021).
 
28
Stargardter and Boadle (2020).
 
29
In March 2021, in public appearances in Brasília and Manaus, President Bolsonaro attacked the decisions of mayors and state governors to impose lockdowns and social isolation as restrictive measures to contain the spread of the coronavirus. On some of these occasions he mentioned the possibility of using the Armed Forces to confront the local and regional restrictive measures, which according to him, harm the national economy: “I will just leave a message here: certain people consider that I should declare lockdown. I will not do that. And be sure of one thing: my Army won’t take to the streets in order to force people to stay at home. My Army, which is your Army”. Rough translation by the author from the Portuguese: “Vou só dar um recado aqui: alguns querem que eu decrete lockdown. Não vou decretar. E pode ter certeza de uma coisa: o meu Exército não vai para a rua para obrigar o povo a ficar em casa. O meu Exército, que é o Exército de vocês”. See Galf and Ferreira (2021).
 
30
See Mudde (2013), p. 5.
 
31
Monocratic decisions are “merit trials performed by a single Minister without the participation of the other Court members. The price of the agility of a monocratic ruling usually vis-à-vis the dialogue/debate and the exchange of ideas of a collegiate ruling concentrates the responsibility in an individual, which opens gaps for doubts and questioning regarding the ruling’s partiality and bias. Furthermore, the Monocratic Rulings of the President of the Court are of even greater weight, given that they are merit trials carried out by the Minister who ‘incarnates’ – and embodies, in the polysemy of this word – the authority of the Court”. See Fernandes and Ouverney (2022), pp. 53–54.
 
32
Johns Hopkins University (2022).
 
33
Watanabe and Maia (2021).
 
34
Taylor (2021).
 
35
In April 2021, during an interview, Bolsonaro made clear his position that lockdowns and social isolation, determined by local and regional governments during the pandemic, violated individual liberties. Therefore, he indicated the deployment of the Armed Forces as an option to terminate these restrictions and go against mayors and state governors’ determinations. See Uol (2021).
 
36
Rough translation by the author from the Portuguese: “Nós queremos fazer cumprir o artigo 142 da Constituição. Todo mundo quer fazer cumprir o artigo 142 da Constituição. E, havendo necessidade, qualquer dos Poderes pode, né? Pedir às Forças Armadas que intervenham para restabelecer a ordem no Brasil”. See Mori (2020).
 
37
Article 142 of the Constitution sets forth that “The Armed Forces, comprised of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force, are permanent and regular national institutions, organized on the basis of hierarchy and discipline, under the supreme authority of the president of the Republic, and are intended for the defense of the Country, for the guarantee of the constitutional powers, and, on the initiative of any of these, of law and order”. According to the STF and Legislative branch, this provision does not confer power to the Armed Forces to act as a “moderating power”. Nevertheless, Bolsonaro distorted its meaning, claiming that he had the constitutional power to ask for a military intervention, in order to solve any conflict between the three branches. See Süssekind (2022).
 
38
Marona and Magalhães (2021), pp. 122–124.
 
39
In April 2021, in reaction to the decision of the STF to guarantee the power of mayors and governors to decide over restrictive measures to fight the pandemic, Bolsonaro stated: “It wasn’t me who determined the closure of shops and business establishments. It wasn’t me who determined social isolation and consequently the destruction of jobs. But rather the Supreme Federal Court did determine that mayors and governors could do whatever they wanted, and they are doing that. They preach about the protection of the Constitution so much, but in fact they raped article 5° of the Constitution”. Rough translation by the author from the Portuguese: “Eu não fechei comércio, não determinei que ninguém ficasse em casa, não destruí emprego. Mas o Supremo Tribunal Federal disse que prefeito e governador podiam fazer o que bem entendessem. Estão fazendo. Falam tanto em Constituição, os que defendem a Constituição, e estupraram o artigo 5° da Constituição”. See Poder360 (2021).
 
40
In May 2020, “The 300 of Brazil” organized protests in front of the STF. Its members were carrying torches and some of them wore masks covering the entire face. The demonstrators loudly chanted slogans against the ministers of the STF. See Folha de São Paulo (2020).
 
41
Barroso (2022).
 
42
Freelon (2021).
 
43
Soprana et al. (2020).
 
44
Brasil (2020).
 
45
Marona and Magalhães (2021), p. 125.
 
46
See STF, published on 31.03.2020, ADPF 668 and 669, per Justice Luís Roberto Barroso.
 
47
STF, published on 15.04.2020, ADI 6.341, per Justice Marco Aurélio; STF, published on 09.10.2020, ADPF 672, per Justice Alexandre de Moraes.
 
48
STF, published on 30.04.2020, ADI 6.351, per Justice Alexandre de Moraes.
 
49
STF, published on 21.05.2020, ADI 6.421, 6.422, 6.424, 6.425, 6.427, 6.428 and 6.431, per Justice Luís Roberto Barroso.
 
50
STF, published on 17.12.2020, ADI 6.586 and 6.587, per Justice Ricardo Lewandowski.
 
51
Art. 66 para 1 CRFB/1988 states “If the president of the Republic considers the bill of law, wholly or in part, unconstitutional or contrary to public interest, the president shall veto it, wholly or in part, within fifteen work days, counted from the date of receipt and he shall, within forty-eight hours, inform the president of the Senate of the reasons of his veto”. STF, published on 17.02.2021, ADPF 714, 715 and 718, per Justice Gilmar Mendes.
 
52
STF, published on 23.02.2021, ADPF 770, per Justice Ricardo Lewandowski.
 
53
STF, published on 14.12.2021, ADPF 913, per Justice Luís Roberto Barroso.
 
54
Mudde (2013), pp. 4–5.
 
55
Bugarič and Tushnet (2020).
 
56
Mendes (2022).
 
57
Bustamante and Meyer (2022), pp. 227–228.
 
58
Blokker (2021), p. 153.
 
59
Blokker (2021), p. 154.
 
60
Vieira (2018), p. 135.
 
61
Vieira (2018), pp. 153–160.
 
62
The 1988 constitution demonstrated its rigidity, since for the approval of an amendment proposal it requires three-fifths of members votes of both Houses of the National Congress and no proposal shall be discussed when it aims to abolish the so-called eternal clauses of article 60, paragraph 4, of the Constitution, namely the federative structure of State; the direct, secret, universal and periodic vote; the separation of powers principle; and individual rights.
 
63
Bustamante and Meyer (2022), pp. 230–232.
 
64
Bottini (2021).
 
65
Landau (2018).
 
66
Fournier (2019), pp. 363–367.
 
67
Judicial populism is a phenomenon characterized by the primacy of personalistic individual judges over the court itself, judges who embrace celebrity culture through frequent public appearances at events and interviews. Furthermore, judicial populism encompasses a decision-making style centered on public opinion, which damages a central element of the rule of law, namely the impartiality of judges. See Mendes (2019), p. 197.
 
68
Harel (2017).
 
Literatur
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Betz HG (2017) The new politics of resentment: radical right-wing populist parties in western Europe. In: Mudde C (ed) The populist radical right. Routledge, London & New York, pp 451–468
Blokker P (2021) Populism, constituent power and constitutional imagination. In: Belov M (ed) Between constitutional imagination, normative entrenchment and political reality. Intersentia, Cambridge, pp 149–169
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Metadaten
Titel
Populist Government and Judicial Power in Brazil in Times of the Covid-19 Pandemic: A Conflicting Relationship
verfasst von
Eleonora Mesquita Ceia
Copyright-Jahr
2024
Buch
The People’s Constitution

Print ISBN: 978-3-031-71888-5

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-031-71889-2

Copyright-Jahr: 2024

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71889-2_8

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