Post-Quantum Static-Static Key Agreement Using Multiple Protocol Instances

Some key agreement protocols leak information about secret keys if dishonest participants use specialized public keys. We formalize these protocols and attacks, and present a generic transformation that can be made to such key agreement protocols to resist such attacks. Simply put, each party generates k different keys, and two parties perform key agreement using all \(k^2\) combinations of their individual keys. We consider this transformation in the context of various post-quantum key agreement schemes and analyze the attacker’s success probabilities (which depend on the details of the underlying key agreement protocol) to determine the necessary parameter sizes for 128-bit security. Our transformation increases key sizes by a factor of k and computation times by \(k^2\), which represents a significant cost—but nevertheless still feasible. Our transformation is particularly well-suited to supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman, in which one can take \(k=113\) instead of the usual \(k=256\) at the 128-bit quantum security level. These results represent a potential path forward towards solving the open problem of securing long-term static-static key exchange against quantum adversaries.