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Group Decision and Negotiation

Erschienen in:

28.07.2017

Power Indices and Minimal Winning Coalitions for Simple Games in Partition Function Form

verfasst von: J. M. Alonso-Meijide, M. Álvarez-Mozos, M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro

Erschienen in: Group Decision and Negotiation | Ausgabe 6/2017

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Abstract

We propose a generalization of simple games to partition function form games based on a monotonicity property that we define in this context. This property allows us to properly speak about minimal winning embedded coalitions. We propose and characterize two power indices based on such coalitions. Finally, the new indices are used to study the distribution of power in the Parliament of Andalusia that emerged after the elections of March 22, 2015.

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We refer to Alonso-Meijide et al. (2013) for a review in the topic.

We can talk about the grand coalition because there is a single embedded coalition of the type (N, P).

A proper subset, \((T,Q)\subsetneq (S,P)\), is a subset \((T,Q)\subseteq (S,P)\) satisfying \((T,Q)\ne (S,P)\).

A multilinear extension procedure is proposed in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2015).

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Titel: Power Indices and Minimal Winning Coalitions for Simple Games in Partition Function Form
verfasst von: J. M. Alonso-Meijide
M. Álvarez-Mozos
M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro
Publikationsdatum: 28.07.2017
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in: Group Decision and Negotiation / Ausgabe 6/2017
Print ISSN: 0926-2644
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9907
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-017-9542-x

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