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Erschienen in:
2008 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Preliminaries
Erschienen in: Models in Cooperative Game Theory
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Let
N
be a non-empty finite set of agents who consider different cooperation possibilities. Each subset
S
⊂
N
is referred to as a
crisp coalition
. The set
N
is called the
grand coalition
and ∅ is called the
empty coalition
. We denote the collection of coalitions, i.e. the set of all subsets of
N
by 2
N
. For each
S
∈ 2
N
we denote by |
S
| the number of elements of
S
, and by
e
S
the characteristic vector of
S
with (
e
S
)
i
= 1 if
i
∈
S
, and (
e
S
)
i
= 0 if
i
∈
N
\
S
. In the following often
N
= {1, . . . ,
n
}.