Preventing Political Violence Against Civilians

There is a depressing familiarity to news reports of terrorist attacks showing scenes of devastation and death, and screaming, grieving victims. But these awful images tend to be decontextualised from the politics and history of the conflict, and instead focus on the individual attacks in isolation: where it happened, the number of dead and injured, who claimed responsibility and so forth. For most Western viewers it is just another attack, unless of course there is something particularly newsworthy about it: huge numbers of dead, someone famous or powerful is killed, or it happens in an American or European city. The extreme violence used in such high profile attacks is designed by militants to strike where people feel safe, and to terrorise them. The lack of explanation or predictability further disempowers the victims, frightens them and leaves them with a sense of having no control. This achieves militants’ aims because it makes the people they are attacking feel unsafe and in turn highlights the impotence of the militants’ opponents, who are shown to be unable to protect their own. The militants forcibly insert themselves into the equation. The typical reaction of opponents or the state is that of vengeance and retaliation, to show strength and military might. However, in conflicts more familiar with the consequences of tit-for-tat violence, the families are frequently heard plaintively asking that there be no retaliation.

‘We acknowledge our mistake and guilt … we offer our apology and condolences to the victims’ families. We accept full responsibility for what happened in the hospital and will pay blood money for the victims’ families.’ These were the words of Qasim Al-Raymi, the military leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. He made the video after 52 people were killed by Al-Qaeda in a Sana’a military compound and hospital in Yemen in December 2013. It was a rare apology. But it came after public outrage in Yemen for the killings of doctors, nurses and patients in the hospital. The attack was captured on CCTV and broadcast on state television. It showed a gunman walking through the hospital shooting people who were unarmed. The apology reflects the fact that even Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula realises the need for public support in local and national conflicts.

Internationally the name of the Provisional IRA is instantly recognised. This is due to its longevity as a militant nationalist organisation, and the extensive coverage it has been given over the years in news broadcasts, movies and American drama series. In Northern Ireland it has been the dominant nationalist militant group, primarily because it has killed more people than any other grouping and the involvement of its political wing, Sinn Féin, was regarded as central to the success of the peace process. But it also operated in accordance with the existing political opportunities and constraints, mobilising structures and cultural framing present during the conflict. Although the Provisional IRA was very successful in framing the conflict in terms that reflected favourably and emphasised the fact that its primary target was the British Army, it did kill civilians. What is apparent from the analysis of trends in the data collated for the databases for this book, is that there were two distinct time periods when ACV by the Provisional IRA escalated: Wave One from 1971–1976 and Wave Two from 1987–1993. What was it about these two time periods that resulted in the escalation of the use of political violence?

In the early 2000s during the Second Intifada, awful scenes in the aftermath of suicide bombings of strewn body parts being collected outside pizzerias and nightclubs in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem became synonymous with Hamas in Western news reports. However during this period the frequency of militant attacks and lethality was matched, and at times surpassed, by the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. Notably both groups explicitly targeted Israeli civilians and carried out high levels of ACV, unlike the IRA in Northern Ireland which was more constrained. However, in common with the IRA, their attacks were carried out in a situation of contentious politics and were in interaction with the political structures, the mobilising structures and cultural framing of the time. Analysis of the data compiled for the databases showed two distinct escalations, termed Wave One, from 1993–1997, and Wave Two, from 2000–2005. Wave One occurred while Hamas was outside of the political system during the Oslo Accord peace years, and Wave Two was the time period of the Second Intifada which saw exceptional levels of violence being carried out by both the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and the Palestinian militant groups, with utterly devastating results.

This chapter discusses the implications and challenges that have emerged from the case studies, as well as the findings and conclusions of the research as a whole. It examines the similarities and differences between the case studies and militant groups, and compares them in order to examine the political opportunities and constraints, the mobilising structures and the cultural framing of both case studies. The two case studies, with their different outcomes, made it possible to examine when conflicts escalate and when conflicts can be resolved. It also allowed from an examination of when there are high and low levels of ACV.