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2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

1. ‘Principled Resistance’ to ECtHR Judgments: Dogmatic Framework and Conceptual Meaning

verfasst von : Marten Breuer

Erschienen in: Principled Resistance to ECtHR Judgments - A New Paradigm?

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

Resistance of national judges to international court judgments has become more and more frequent and explicit in recent years. This chapter aims to portray the dogmatic framework within which this phenomenon takes place, namely, the principle of supremacy of international law. Beginning with examples from the ICJ and the CJEU, the chapter proceeds to the ECHR framework. Here, the main argument is that there are cases where non-execution is not the result of mere political unwillingness but where there is a legal conflict between the Convention and the national/constitutional identity, leading to a deadlock situation. Those cases are addressed as ‘principled resistance’ cases. The chapter concludes by giving reasons for scrutinizing certain countries and omitting others in the country reports section.

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Nächstes Kapitel Resistance to the European Court of Human Rights: The Institutional and Sociological Consequences of Principled Resistance

See, to name just a few, A von Bogdandy/I Venzke, In Whose Name? A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication (2014); N Hayashi/CM Bailliet (eds), The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals (2017); N Grossman et al (eds), Legitimacy and International Courts (2018); see also KJ Alter/LR Helfer/MR Madsen (eds), International Court Authority (2018). From a human rights perspective, see e.g. A Føllesdal/JK Schaffer/G Ulfstein (eds), The Legitimacy of International Human Rights Regimes. Legal, Political and Philosophical Perspectives (2013); B Calı/A Koch/N Bruch, ‘The Legitimacy of Human Rights Courts: A Grounded Interpretivist Analysis of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 35 Human Rights Quarterly 955–984.

Withdrawal depository notification C.N.805.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10; see M Ssenyonjo, ‘State withdrawal notifications from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: South Africa, Burundi and The Gambia’ (2018) 29 Criminal Law Forum 63–119; see also ‘Burundi becomes first nation to leave international criminal court’, The Guardian of 28 October 2017, online available at <https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/oct/28/burundi-becomes-first-nation-to-leave-international-criminal-court>.

North Gauteng High Court, Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others (Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution Intervening) (83145/2016) [2017] ZAGPPHC 53, 22 February 2017; see M du Plessis/G Mettraux, ‘South Africa’s Failed Withdrawal from the Rome Statute’ (2017) 15 Journal of International Criminal Justice 361–370.

US Supreme Court, Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon, 548 US 331 (2006); Medellín v Texas, 552 US 491(2008); Italian Constitutional Court, Judgment No 238/2014.

Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 30 June 2009, Nos 2 BvE 2/08 et al, BVerfGE 123, 267; Order of 15 December 2015, No 2 BvR 2735/14, BVerfGE 140, 317.

Italian Constitutional Court, Order No 24/2017 of 23 November 2016.

Russian Constitutional Court, Judgment No 12-П/2016 of 19 April 2016; Judgment No 1-П/2017 of 19 January 2017.

G Fitzmaurice, ‘The general principles of international law considered from the standpoint of the rule of law’ (1957 II) 92 Recueil des Cours 1-227, at 85.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.

Treaty between Great Britain and the United States for the Amicable Settlement of all Causes of Difference between the Two Countries of 8 May 1871, in C Parry (ed), Consolidated Treaty Series vol 143 (1977), p 145.

Alabama Claims Arbitration (United States of America v Great Britain), Award of 14 September 1872, 29 Reports of International Arbitral Awards 125–134, at 131; see T Bingham, ‘Alabama Arbitration’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (October 2006).

G Schwarzenberger, International Law, vol I (3rd edn 1957), p 69.

Case of the SS ‘Wimbledon’ (United Kingdom and Others v Germany), Judgment, PCIJ Series A No 1 (1923), p 29.

The Greco-Bulgarian ‘Communities’, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ Series B No 17 (1930), p 32.

Most explicit reference in: Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1988, p 12, para 57; see generally P Tomka/J Howley/V-J Proulx ‘International and Municipal Law before the World Court: One or Two Legal Orders?’ (2015) 35 Polish Yearbook of International Law 11–45, at 17–18, with further references.

See A Arena, ‘The Twin Doctrines of Primacy and Pre-emption’ in R Schütze/T Tridimas (eds), Oxford Principles of European Union Law, vol I: The European Union Legal Order (2018), pp 300–349, at 314.

78 UNTS 277.

Objection made by the government of Ireland (Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, vol I (2009), p 150). Similar objections were made by the governments of Estonia, Finland and the Netherlands (ibid).

999 UNTS 171.

1465 UNTS 85.

Multilateral Treaties (fn 18), pp 190 et seq; see L Langer, Religious Offence and Human Rights. The Implications of Defamation of Religions (2014), p 121.

Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932, Series A/B, No 44, p 24.

See text accompanying fn 63.

GA Resolution 56/83, Annex.

P-M Dupuy, ‘Relations between the international law of responsibility and responsibility in municipal law’ in J Crawford/A Pellet/S Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (2010), pp 173–183, at 175.

For references, see WK Geck, Die völkerrechtlichen Wirkungen verfassungswidriger Verträge (1963), pp 32 et seq; L Wildhaber, Treaty-Making Power and Constitution (1971), pp 149 et seq.

For references, see Geck (fn 26), pp 25 et seq; Wildhaber (fn 26), pp 147 et seq.

Geck (fn 26), p 37.

T Rensmann, ‘Article 46’ in O Dörr/K Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd edn 2018), MN 34; A Verdross/B Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht (3rd edn 1984), § 691; ME Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2009), Article 46 MN 8 (though with the qualification that it ‘does not include the implementation of a treaty once concluded’).

See A Nollkaemper, ‘Rethinking the Supremacy of International Law’ (2010) 65 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 65–85, at 73 (‘Whether or not a particular rule that would be set aside because of the principle of supremacy is a fundamental rule does not make a difference’) (emphasis original).

In this sense also M Bothe, ‘Article 46 Convention of 1969’ in O Corten/P Klein (eds), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties. A Commentary, vol II (2011), MN 11; R Kolb, The Law of Treaties. An Introduction (2016), pp 91–92; FM Palombino, ‘Compliance with international judgments: between supremacy of international law and national fundamental principles’ (2015) 75 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 503–529, at 506; MN Shaw, International Law (7th edn 2017), pp 712–713.

Nollkaemper, ‘Rethinking the supremacy’ (fn 30), p 71.

See B Fassbender ‘Triepel in Luxemburg – Die dualistische Sicht des Verhältnisses zwischen Europa- und Völkerrecht in der “Kadi-Rechtsprechung” des EuGH als Problem des Selbstverständnisses der Europäischen Union’ (2010) 63 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 333–342; more nuanced: J Kokott/C Sobotta, ‘The Kadi Case – Constitutional Core Values and International Law – Finding the Balance?’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 1015–1024, at 1017 et seq; see also A Tzanakopoulos, ‘The Solange argument as a justification for disobeying the Security Council in the Kadi judgments’ in M Avbelj/F Fontanelli/G Martinico (eds), Kadi on Trial. A Multifaceted Analysis of the Kadi Trial (2014), pp 121–134, at 122 et seq.

Case T-315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3649, para 215.

Case T-315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3649, para 226.

Case C-402/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, paras 286 et seq.

Nollkameper, ‘Rethinking the supremacy’ (fn 30), p 78.

See, basically, B Fassbender, ‘Targeted sanctions imposed by the UN security council and due process rights: A study commissioned by the UN office of legal affairs and follow-up action by the United Nations’ (2006) 3 International Organizations Law Review 437–485; further, e.g., M Bothe, ‘Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions against Presumed Terrorists: The Need to Comply with Human Rights Standards’ (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 541–555; L Van den Herik, ‘The Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions Regimes: In Need of Better Protection of the Individual’ (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 797–807.

A Tzanakopoulos, ‘Domestic Courts in international law: The international law function of national courts’ (2011–2012) 34 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 133–168, at 161; see also Tzanakopoulos (fn 33), p 133.

Italian Court of Cassation, Judgment No 5044/2004, International Law Reports 128, 658.

Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012, p 99.

Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 238/2014, especially para 3.4.

M Iovane, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court judgment No 238 and the myth of the “constitutionalization” of international law’ (2016) 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice 595–605, at 605; see also Palombino (fn 31), p 525.

Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 238/2014, especially para 3.3 in fine: ‘At the same time, however, this may also contribute to a desirable – and desired by many – evolution of international law itself’ (translation available at <www.cortecostituzionale.it>). See P De Sena, ‘The judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court on State immunity in case of serious violations of human rights or humanitarian law: a tentative analysis under international law’ (2014) Questions of International Law 17–31, at 27 et seq. For a critical assessment of this part of the decision, see R Kunz, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court and “constructive contestation”’ (2016) 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice 621–627 arguing that due to the reliance on constitutional law reasons, the Constitutional Court is unlikely to contribute to developing further the rules of customary law.

Jones v Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26, para 63.

Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Verbatim Record 2011/17, p 22; commenting on this: M Krajewski/C Singer, ‘Should judges be front-runners? The ICJ, state immunity and the protection of fundamental human rights’ (2012) 16 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1–34.

R Kolb, ‘The relationship between the international and the municipal legal order: reflections on the decision no 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court’ (2014) Questions of International Law 5–16, at 11 & 13.

G Palombella, ‘German War Crimes and the Rule of International Law’ (2016) 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice 607–613, at 607.

M Lando, ‘Intimations of unconstitutionality: The supremacy of international law and judgment 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court’ (2015) 78 Modern Law Review 1028–1056, at 1038.

Federal Constitutional Court, Order of 29 May 1974, No BvL 52/71, BVerfGE 37, 271 (‘Solange I’); see Palombino (fn 31), p 507, referring also to the so-called counter-limits doctrine of the Italian Constitutional Court.

A Peters, ‘Supremacy lost: international law meets domestic law’ (2009) 3 Vienna Journal of International Constitutional Law 170–198, at 194 & 198.

A von Bogdandy, ‘Pluralism, direct effect, and the ultimate say: On the relationship between international and domestic constitutional law’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 397–413, at 412.

A Nollkaemper, ‘Conversations among courts: domestic and international adjudicators’ in CPR Romano/KJ Alter/C Avgerou (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (2013), pp 523–549, at 537.

V Fikfak, ‘Judicial Strategies and their Impact on the Development of the International Rule of Law’ in M Kanetake/A Nollkaemper (eds), The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels. Contestations and Deference (2016), pp 45–66. The distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ review was originally developed in the US context by Mark Tushnet, see M Tushnet, ‘Weak-Form Judicial Review and “Core” Civil Liberties’ (2006) 41 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 1–22; M Tushnet, ‘Dialogic Judicial Review’ (2008/09) 61 Arkansas Law Review 205–216.

Nollkaemper (fn 53), p 537.

US Supreme Court, Medellín v Texas, 552 US 491(2008).

See Palombino (fn 31), pp 508 et seq, according to whom the direct effect fulfils a similar function as the counter-limits doctrine.

Kolb (fn 47), p 12.

A Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (2011), p 198.

Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, at 593–594 (emphasis added).

See generally Arena (fn 16); M Claes, ‘The Primacy of EU Law in European and National Law’ in A Arnull/D Chalmers (eds), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (2015), pp 178–211; for an account of the historical development, see KJ Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law. The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe (2001).

Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI) (United States of America v Italy), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1989, p 15, para 73. See also B Stern, ‘The Elements of an internationally wrongful act’ in J Crawford/A Pellet/S Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (2010), pp 193–220, at 210–211.

Kolb (fn 47), p 9.

See M Breuer, ‘Impact of the Council of Europe on National Legal Systems’ in S Schmahl/M Breuer (eds), The Council of Europe. Its Law and Policies (2017), MN 36.67 et seq.

See generally E Vranes, ‘Lex Superior, Lex Specialis, Lex Posterior – Zur Rechtsnatur der “Konfliktlösungsregeln”’ (2005) 65 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 391–405.

See text accompanying fn 22.

For the different concepts, see e.g. M Avbelj, The European Union under Transnational Law. A Pluralist Appraisal (2018), pp 21 et seq; von Bogdandy (fn 52), pp 399 et seq; N Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (2010).

See M Poiares Maduro, ‘Three Claims of Constitutional Pluralism’, in M Avbelj/J Komárek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (2012), quoting Alexander Somek (p 72): ‘constitutional pluralists give up precisely where an answer is most needed: what happens when the constitutional conflict cannot be prevented or solved?’ (Somek’s contribution in the same volume does not contain the quote: A Somek, ‘Monism: A Tale of the Undead?’ loco citato, pp 343–379). See also Tzanakopoluos (fn 33), p 133, dealing with the CJEU’s Kadi I judgment and arguing that the Solange argument ‘cannot, in and of itself legally “justify” disobedience of SC decisions, even if it may well explain it’.

In this sense also Nollkaemper, ‘Rethinking the supremacy’ (fn 30), p 71; Palombino (fn 31), pp 507–508, against K Schmalenbach, ‘Article 27’ in O Dörr/K Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd edn 2018), MN 3.

Kolb (fn 47), pp 11–12.

Nollkameper, ‘Rethinking the supremacy’ (fn 30), p 67.

Kolb (fn 47), p 13.

N Muižnieks, Annual Activity Report 2016 (2017), p 71.

GIEM Srl and Others v Italy [GC] Appl Nos 1828/06 et al (ECtHR, 28 June 2018), partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, para 70.

See Loizidou v Turkey (Article 50) Appl No 15318/89 (ECtHR, 28 July 1998), on the one hand; Resolution ResDH(2003)190, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 2 December 2003, on the other hand.

Cyprus v Turkey (Just Satisfaction) [GC] Appl No 25781/94 (ECtHR, 12 May 2014).

‘Turkey to ignore court order to pay compensation to Cyprus’, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-cyprus-davutoglu-idUSBREA4C0AX20140513>.

CM/Del/Dec(2016)1250/H46-26 (March 2016); CM/Del/Dec(2016)1259/H46-33 (June 2016); CM/Del/Dec(2016)1265/H46-28 (September 2016); CM/Del/Dec(2016)1273/H46-29 (December 2016); CM/Del/Dec(2017)1280/H46-31 (March 2017); CM/Del/Dec(2017)1288/H46-3 (June 2017); CM/Del/Dec(2017)1302/H46-32 (December 2017); CM/Del/Dec(2018)1318/H46-24 (June 2018); CM/Del/Dec(2018)1324/H46-20 (September 2018); CM/Del/Dec(2018)1331/H46-28 (December 2018).

OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v Russia (Just Satisfaction) Appl No 14902/04 (ECtHR, 31 July 2014).

Russian Constitutional Court, Judgment No 1-П/2017 of 19 January 2017.

See F de Londras/K Dzehtsiarou, ‘Mission impossible? Addressing non-execution through infringement proceedings in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2017) 66 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 467–490, at 472.

J Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtungen der Staaten aus den Urteilen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte (1993), p 366.

See, e.g., A, B and C v Ireland [GC] Appl No 25579/05 (ECtHR, 16 December 2010), paras 229 et seq; Lautsi v Italy [GC] Appl No 30814/06 (ECtHR, 18 March 2011), para 68; SAS v France [GC] Appl No 43835/11 (ECtHR, 1 July 2014), para 157.

See C Grewe, ‘Methods of Identification of National Constitutional Identity’ in A Saiz Arnaiz/C Alcoberro Llivina (eds), National Constitutional Identity and European Integration (2013), pp 37–48, at 40–41; from a political science perspective, see M Hein, ‘Impeding constitutional amendments: why are entrenchment clauses codified in contemporary constitutions?’ (2019) 54 Acta Politica 196–224. See further R Albert/BE Oder (eds), An Unamendable Constitution? Unamendability in Constitutional Democracies (2018).

It must be admitted, though, that ‘constitutional identity’ and ‘national identity’ are not necessarily synonyms; for further analysis, see JL Martí, ‘Two Different Ideas of Constitutional Identity: Identity of the Constitution v Identity of the People’ in A Saiz Arnaiz/C Alcoberro Llivina (eds), National Constitutional Identity and European Integration (2013), pp 17–36.

L Wildhaber, ‘Bemerkungen zum Vortrag von BVerfG-Präsident Prof. Dr. H.-J. Papier auf dem Europäischen Juristentag 2005 in Genf’ (2005) Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 743–744, at 744.

Muižnieks (fn 73), p 8.

GIEM Srl and Others v Italy [GC] Appl Nos 1828/06 et al (ECtHR, 28 June 2018), partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, para 92.

See L Burgorgue-Larsen (ed), L’identité constitutionnelle saisie par les juges en Europe (2011); E Cloots, National Identity in EU Law (2015); A Saiz Arnaiz/C Alcoberro Llivina (eds), National Constitutional Identity and European Integration (2013).

See M Claes, ‘National Identity: Trump Card or Up for Negotiation?’ in A Saiz Arnaiz/C Alcoberro Llivina (eds), National Constitutional Identity and European Integration (2013), pp 109–139, on the one hand, A von Bogdandy/S Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law review 1417–1453, on the other hand.

See L López Guerra, ‘National Identity and the European Convention on Human Rights’ in A Saiz Arnaiz/C Alcoberro Llivina (eds), National Constitutional Identity and European Integration (2013), pp 305–321; D Szymczak, ‘L’identité constitutionnelle dans la jurisprudence conventionnelle’ in L Burgorgue-Larsen (ed), L’identité constitutionnelle saisie par les juges en Europe (2011); E Cloots, National Identity in EU Law (2015), pp 45–60.

See B Peters, ‘The Rule of Law Dimension of Dialogues Between National Courts and Strasbourg’ in M Kanetake/A Nollkaemper (eds), The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels. Contestations and Deference (2016), pp 201–225, at 208–209.

A Føllesdal, ‘Accountability and Authority’ in Council of Europe (ed), The long-term future of the European Court of Human Rights (2014), pp 78–85, at 84.

See de Londras/Dzehtsiarou (fn 81), p 474 (emphasis original).

In a more recent publication, one of the authors makes use of the said concept to qualify the Russian Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence as ‘unprincipled disobedience’, see K Dzehtsiarou/F Fontanelli, ‘Unprincipled disobedience to international decisions: A primer from the Russian Constitutional Court’ (2018) European Yearbook on Human Rights 319–341.

A Donald, ‘Tackling Non-Implementation in the Strasbourg System: The Art of the Possible?’, 28 April 2017, available at <https://www.ejiltalk.org>.

Ibid.

See the contribution by Ed Bates, Chap. 7, in this volume.

Donald (fn 96).

100

See text preceding fn 62.

101

MR Madsen/P Cebulak/M Wiebusch, ‘Backlash against international courts: explaining the forms and patterns of resistance to international courts’ (2018) International Journal of Law in Context 197–220, at 203.

102

In this regard, the understanding coincides with the use of ‘backlash’ as developed by W Sandholtz/Y Bei/K Caldwell, ‘Backlash and international human rights courts’ in A Brysk/M Stohl, Contracting Human Rights. Crisis, Accountability and Opportunity (2018), 159–178, at p 159. Since the model developed by Madsen et al is more elaborate, the following considerations will concentrate on the latter.

103

Madsen/Cebulak/Wiebusch (fn 101), p 205.

104

The case of the Russian Constitutional Court ‘can produce effects that resemble backlash’ (ibid, emphasis only here). But see somewhat more nuanced on p 211: ‘There is no doubt that the Russian case exemplifies strong resistance to an [international court]. But whether this will translate into pushback or backlash depends in practice on how systematically and frequently it will be used’.

105

See text accompanying fn 111 and 135.

106

See de Londras/Dzehtsiarou (fn 81), p 474.

107

See MR Madsen, Chap. 2, in this volume.

108

See R Blackburn/J Polakiewicz (eds), Fundamental Rights in Europe. The ECHR and Its Member States, 1950–2000 (2000); H Keller/A Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights. The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (2008); G Martinico/O Pollicino (eds), The National Judicial Treatment of the ECHR and EU Law. A Comparative Constitutional Perspective (2010); J Gerards/J Fleuren (eds), Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and of the Judgments of the ECtHR in National Case-law. A Comparative Analysis (2014); S Popelier/S Lambrecht/K Lemmens (eds), Criticism of the European Court of Human Rights. Shifting the Convention System: Counter-Dynamics at the National and EU Level (2016). Some books are concerned only with the situation in one particular country: G Repetto, The Constitutional Relevance of the ECHR in Domestic and European Law. An Italian Perspective (2013); KS Ziegler/E Wicks/L Hodson (eds), The UK and European Human Rights. A Strained Relationship? (2015); L Mälskoo/W Benedek (eds), Russia and the European Court of Human Rights. The Strasbourg Effect (2017).

109

See generally, A Müller (ed), Judicial Dialogue and Human Rights (2017), with further references.

110

See, e.g., LR Glas, The Theory, Potential and Practice of Procedural Dialogue in the European Convention on Human Rights System (2016); Lord Kerr, ‘The need for dialogue between national courts and the European Court of Human Rights’ in: S Flogaitis/T Zwaart/J Fraser (eds), The European Court of Human Rights and its Discontents. Turning Criticism into Strength (2013), pp 104–115.

111

Federal Constitutional Court, Order of 14 October 2004, No 2 BvR 1481/04, BVerfGE 111, 307.

112

Görgülü v Germany Appl No 74969/01 (ECtHR, 26 February 2004).

113

Federal Constitutional Court, Order of 14 October 2004 (fn 111); translation available at <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de>.

114

Wildhaber (fn 86), pp 743–744.

115

Russian Constitutional Court, Judgment No 21-П/2015 of 14 July 2015.

116

Italian Constitutional Court, Judgment No 348/2007.

117

Italian Constitutional Court, Judgment No 349/2007.

118

Italian Constitutional Court, Judgment No 49/2015.

119

Italian Constitutional Court, Judgment No 50/2015.

120

See text accompanying fn 40.

121

Austrian Constitutional Court, Case B267/86, VfSlg 11500/1987; English translation according to (1987) 30 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 275–276, at 276.

122

See H Aemisegger, ‘Probleme der Umsetzung der EMRK im schweizerischen Recht’ in: T Jaag/C Kaufmann (eds), 40 Jahre Beitritt der Schweiz zur EMRK (2015), pp 201–229; T Altwicker, ‘Switzerland: The Substitute Constitution in Times of Popular Dissent’ in S Popelier/S Lambrecht/K Lemmens (eds), Criticism of the European Court of Human Rights. Shifting the Convention System: Counter-Dynamics at the National and EU Level (2016), pp 385–411.

123

Text of the initiative: Bundesblatt 2017 5411 (in German), 5079 (in French).

124

See ‘Swiss voters reject “self-determination” initiative’, Financial Times of 25 November 2018, available at <www.ft.com>.

125

Hirst v UK No 2 [GC] Appl No 74025/01 (ECtHR, 6 October 2005); Greens and MT v UK Appl Nos 60041/08, 60054/08 (ECtHR, 23 November 2010).

126

In this sense also: de Londras/Dzehtsiarou (fn 81), pp 475 et seq.

127

ResDH(2018)467, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 6 December 2018.

128

Hutchinson v UK [GC] Appl No 57592/08 (ECtHR, 17 January 2017), dissenting opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, para 35.

129

The prisoners’ voting rights problem is qualified as ‘backlash’ by Sandholtz/Bei/Caldwell (fn 102), pp 166–167.

130

The cases mentioned below are categorised as ‘backlash’ cases by Sandholtz/Bei/Caldwell (fn 102), pp 165–166.

131

Russian Constitutional Court, Judgment No 21-П/2015 of 14 July 2015.

132

Федеральный конституционный закон от 14.12.2015 N 7-ФКЗ «О внесении изменений в Федеральный конституционный закон ‹О Конституционном Суде Российской Федерации›» [Federal Constitutional Law No 7-FKZ of 14 December 2015 ‘On introducing amendments to the Federal constitutional law “On the Constitutional Court of the Russian federation”’], Federal Gazette No 6855 (284); for an English translation, see CDL-REF(2016)006.

133

Interim Opinion No 832/2015, CDL-AD(2016)005; Final Opinion No 832/2015, CDL-AD(2016)016.

134

Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia Appl Nos 11157/04, 15162/05 (ECtHR, 4 July 2013).

135

Russian Constitutional Court, Judgment No 12-П/2016 of 19 April 2016.

136

OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v Russia (Just Satisfaction) Appl No 14902/04 (ECtHR, 31 July 2014).

137

Russian Constitutional Court, Judgment No 1-П/2017 of 19 January 2017.

138

See DH-DD(2017)1342 of 28 November 2017. The Committee of Ministers criticised, however, that the payment did not cover default interest, see CM/Del/Dec(2019)1340/H46-20, para 3.

139

See, e.g., Venice Commission, Opinion 833/2016 on amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland, CDL-AD(2016)001-e; Opinion 860/2016 on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, CDL-AD(2016)026-e.

140

See A von Bodgandy/P Sonnevend (eds), Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area. Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania (2015); RD Kelemen/M Blauberger, ‘Introducing the debate: European Union safeguards against member states’ democratic backsliding’ (2017) 24 Journal of Public Policy 317–320; D Kochenov/A Magen/L Pech, ‘Introduction: The Great Rule of Law Debate in the EU’ (2016) 54 Journal of Common Market Studies 1045–1049; L Pech/KL Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism within: rule of law backsliding in the EU’ (2017) 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 3–47.

141

See, e.g., Venice Commission, Opinion 872/2016 on the Measures provided in the recent Emergency Decree Laws with respect to Freedom of the Media, CDL-AD(2017)007-e; Opinion 875/2017 on the amendments to the Constitution adopted by the Grand National Assembly on 21 January 2017 and to be submitted to a National Referendum on 16 April 2017, CDL-AD(2017)005-e; see also B Saatçioğlu, ‘De-Europeanisation in Turkey: The Case of the Rule of Law’ (2016) 21 South European Society and Politics 133–146; B Fabricius, ‘New threats to the rule of law in Council of Europe member States: selected examples’, AS/Jur (2017) 27, paras 56 et seq (Turkey), 66 et seq (Poland).

142

European Commission, Press Release IP/17/5367 of 20 December 2017.

143

European Parliament, P8_TA-PROV(2018)0340 of 12 September 2018.

144

Ilgar Mammadov v Azerbaijan Appl No 15172/13 (ECtHR, 22 May 2014).

145

See P-Y Le Borgn’, ‘The implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights’, Doc 14340 of 12 June 2017, para 24.

146

Ilgar Mammadov v Azerbaijan Appl No 15172/13 (ECtHR, 22 May 2014), para 100.

147

Sheki Court of Appeal, Decision of 29 April 2016, Case No 1(107)-31/2016; English translation available at DH-DD(2016)705; confirmed by Supreme Court, Judgment of 18 November 2016, Case No 1(102)-1431/2016; English translation on file with the author.

148

Press Release ECHR 390 (2017) of 14 December 2017.

149

Ilgar Mammadov v Azerbaijan (No 2) Appl No 919/15 (ECtHR, 16 November 2017).

150

See information by the Azerbaijani Government of 4 September 2018, DH-DD(2018)816.

151

See: Statement of Secretary General Jagland of 29 April 2016; Le Borgn’ (fn 145), paras 26 et seq; A Destexhe, ‘Azerbaijan’s Chairmanship of the Council of Europe: What follow-up on respect for human rights?’ AS/Jur (2017) 28, paras 70 et seq; Interim Resolution ResDH(2015)43, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 12 March 2015; Interim Resolution ResDH(2015)156, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 24 September 2015; Interim Resolution ResDH(2016)144, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 8 June 2016.

152

This coincides with the qualification by de Londras/Dzehtsiarou (fn 81), p 480 who regard this case as an example of ‘dilatory non-execution’, rather than ‘principled non-execution’.

153

Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC] Appl Nos 27996/06, 34836/06 (ECtHR, 22 December 2009).

154

General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 14 December 1995 (1996) 35 International Legal Materials 89 (the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is contained in Annex 4).

155

See information given in DH-DD(2017)380 of 31 March 2017.

156

D Szymczak, ‘Interdiction des discriminations vs identité constitutionnelle des Etats parties : Quelques considérations à propos de l’arrêt Sejdic et Finci c/ Bosnie Herzégovine’ (2009) 7 Annuaire de Droit Européen 795–826.

157

Paksas v Lithuania [GC] Appl No 34932/04 (ECtHR, 6 January 2011).

158

Lithuanian Constitutional Court, Ruling No KT31-N17/2016 of 22 December 2016, case No 7/2016; English summary available at <http://www.lrkt.lt/en>; see also information given in DH-DD(2017)386 of 3 April 2017.

159

The difference between Paksas and the cases decided by the Russian Constitutional Court is equally underlined by A Padskocimaite, ‘Constitutional Courts an (Non)execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: A Comparison of Cases from Russia and Lithuania’ (2017) 77 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 651–684.

160

DH-DD(2018)1058 of 26 October 2018. In reaction, the Committee of Ministers exhorted all concerned to ‘redouble their efforts to ensure that the necessary constitutional amendments are adopted, at least on the first reading, during the Seimas’ 2019 spring session, ending 30 June 2019’, see Interim Resolution ResDH(2018)469, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 6 December 2018. For most recent information, see DH-DD(2019)503.

161

Alajos Kiss v Hungary Appl No 38832/06 (ECtHR, 20 May 2010).

162

DH-DD(2012)1156; see also the Government’s Revised Action Report, DH-DD(2015)9; for most recent information by the Hungarian Government, see DH-DD(2019)50.

163

See A Peters, ‘Let Not Triepel Triumph – How To Make the Best Out of Sentenza No. 238 of the Italian Constitutional Court for a Global Legal Order’, 22 December 2014, available at <https://verfassungsblog.de>; G Boggero, ‘The Legal Implications of Sentenza No. 238/2014 by Italy’s Constitutional Court for Italian Municipal Judges: Is Overcoming the “Triepelian Approach” Possible?’ (2016) 76 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 203–224.

Titel: ‘Principled Resistance’ to ECtHR Judgments: Dogmatic Framework and Conceptual Meaning
verfasst von: Marten Breuer
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Buch: Principled Resistance to ECtHR Judgments - A New Paradigm?
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-58985-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-662-58986-1

Copyright-Jahr: 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58986-1_1