Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1. Frontmatter

2. Chapter 1. An Introduction: Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments in Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, and the US

   Wei-chin Lee

   Abstract

   This chapter surveys and summarizes chapters in this volume in dealing with key developments since 2019, including the Hong Kong Protests, the pandemic crisis, and security concerns and interest calculation of three main players—China, Taiwan, and the US. Additionally, the examination of the nuances, intrigues, and complexities of these issues in each player’s policy deliberation and decision illustrates several thematic implications concerning the primacy of politics even in public health issues, the interconnectivity between domestic politics and external affairs, and each actor’s security predicaments for regime stability and economic prosperity.

3. Hong Kong: Waves of Protests for Democracy and Rights

   1. Frontmatter

   2. Chapter 2. Contesting Identities: Hong Kong’s Protests, Taiwan’s Concerns, and China’s Challenges

      Wei-chin Lee

      Abstract

      Hong Kong government's proposed Extradition Bill in 2019 generated multiple responses locally and internationally. This study examines the historical momentum, political complexity, protest mobilization, and the Hong Kong government's reluctant conciliation measures and forceful police responses that gave demonstrators ample causes to persist. The protests generated spillover effects on Taiwan's electoral dynamics and cross-Strait relations and led to China's predicament in deliberating its response options. In the end, China's enactment of the Hong Kong National Security Law in 2020 was worse than the Extradition Bill protesters had vehemently opposed. The Taiwanese government surely gained benefits from the protest by boosting its electoral support in the 2020 presidential elections, though cross-Strait relations would continue to stall without any sign of reconciliation.

   3. Chapter 3. Authoritarian Crackdown Without Bloodshed: China’s Securitization in Post-NSL Hong Kong

      Yan-ho Lai

      Abstract

      The “One Country, Two Systems” formula in Hong Kong since 1997 used to be an experiment for the People’s Republic of China (China) to promote reunification with Taiwan. However, the degree of self-government, political freedoms, and the rule of law in this semi-autonomous city has drastically deteriorated since China imposed the national security law (NSL) in 2020. This chapter explains how the national security law and its enforcement eco-system become the primary tool of the authoritarian crackdown by both Chinese and Hong Kong authorities. This chapter argues that the NSL has been applied by the executive government to exercise greater interference in the court, to eliminate the significant mobilizing forces from the political opposition, and to further incentivize self-censorship in different sectors, particularly in academia and the education system in Hong Kong, by an enhanced censorship regime. Without provoking or exerting political violence, the NSL and its eco-system have effectively encroached independent institutions, eradicated most of the political opposition, and dismantled the free and open society of Hong Kong since 2020. Should China’s repression of Hong Kong escalate, geopolitical tensions between China and the West would continue, and Taiwanese people would continue to take China’s aggression in Hong Kong as a model of the future of their island’s reunification with China.

4. Taiwan: Riding the Anti-China Tide

   1. Frontmatter

   2. Chapter 4. Threat Perception and Taiwan’s 2020 Presidential Election

      T. Y. Wang, Su-feng Cheng

      Abstract

      Previous literature has shown that the perception of threat is an important determinant of individuals’ behaviors and attitudes. The more threatened people feel, the less likely they are to be cooperative in their policy stand, and the more likely they are to choose a strong leadership in response to the perceived threat. This study assesses how threat perception has affected Taiwan citizens’ policy position on the 1992 Consensus and their electoral decisions. Employing panel data collected before and after Taiwan’s 2020 presidential election, the empirical findings show that voters who possessed a higher level of threat perception were less likely to support the 1992 Consensus. Because the Consensus was the most important issue that separated incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen from the other two candidates in the election, voters with a higher level of threat perception were also more likely to provide electoral support for Tsai due to her projected image as a defender of Taiwan’s sovereignty and democratic way of life. These findings have both important theoretical and policy implications.

   3. Chapter 5. Taiwan Can Help: The Political Impacts and Lessons of Taiwan’s Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic

      Huang-Ting Yan

      Abstract

      The chapter analyzes the reasons that Taiwan has fared better than many other countries during the COVID-19 crisis, and the effects this has on domestic politics, cross-Strait relations, and international affairs. We demonstrate that executive coordination and a temporary power shift to the government in response to COVID-19 mitigated dual-legitimacy problems built into semi-presidentialism. The president, whose legitimacy rests on the will of the population, can then play the role of checks and balances in resolving executive overreach in the pandemic, thus raising individual compliance to government pandemic policies, which in turn will help the government respond quickly to pandemics. The better responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have major political consequences: (1) a government will enjoy greater levels of public trust, while the opposition’s influence will be curtailed; (2) a government can donate epidemic prevention supplies to countries with severe COVID-19 outbreaks, thus enhancing the country’s international reputation and improving diplomatic relations; and (3) a government with higher popularity ratings and strong international support will hold a strong bargaining chip when dealing with diplomatic rivals. This study explores the cause–effect link using different types of mechanistic evidence. The results show that the more resilient role that Taiwan’s President Tsai has played in response to the pandemic has boosted government popularity, strengthening her position on cross-Strait policy “to resist China and protect Taiwan” accordingly. The preliminary findings suggest that the semi-presidentialism system, a perilous constitutional design during normal times, may have advantages in a time of crisis. Future research could apply this theoretical framework to a wider range of questions about patterns of pandemic performance between post-communist Eastern European and Western European countries.

   4. Chapter 6. Taiwan Amid the US–China Rivalry: From the Perspective of a Two-Level Game

      John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, Yi-Tzu Lin

      Abstract

      US–China–Taiwan relations have undergone significant changes in the past several years partly because of the increasing tensions between the US and China and partly because of the changing attitudes of the Taiwanese toward the two big powers. Overall, the positions of the US and China on the Taiwan issue have been relatively stable even though the rising tensions between the US and China set the two countries apart and add a certain degree of urgency to each country’s attitude toward Taiwan. However, Taiwan’s policy toward the US and China has been more volatile depending on which political force gains the governing power on the island. Therefore, a two-level game is warranted in the discussion of the US–China–Taiwan relations with the domestic situation in Taiwan to be treated as a nested game. It is shown in this chapter that Taiwanese attitudes toward the US and China have indeed been divided, and coupled with the changing attitudes of the US and China toward each other, Taiwan may or may not be a median voter in all directions, thus affecting its leverage in the US–China–Taiwan relations.

5. China: Coping with the Turbulent Currents of Challenges

   1. Frontmatter

   2. Chapter 7. The Pandemic Further Sickens US-China Relations

      Denny Roy

      Abstract

      If the US-China relationship had pre-existing health problems, the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020–2022 worsened these problems to a near-fatal level. The Chinese government seemingly weathered the COVID-19 storm at home, but its overbearing damage-control diplomacy largely failed to gain respect for China in the developed world. The continued foreign criticism of China, especially from the United States, produced an angry response from China, which launched a series of shrill rhetorical attacks on the US government. The ruling political party in the USA reciprocated by making China-bashing a prominent feature of America’s November 2020 elections. The increased bilateral acrimony exacerbated previous US-China economic, political, and strategic tensions. Taiwan’s pandemic experience was the opposite; its international prestige unambiguously increased, and it enjoyed an upgraded relationship with Washington.

   3. Chapter 8. China’s Policy Toward Taiwan in the Xi Era

      Ruihua Lin, Shu Keng

      Abstract

      During the last decade of the so-called “Xi Era, the policy of mainland China toward Taiwan has undergone significant changes. According to the author, these changes can be examined from three aspects. First, they reflect the consolidation of the CCP's decision-making power, and the decision-making paradigm for Taiwan policy has evolved from promoting “local pilot initiative” to fully implementing “top-level design.“ Second, the primary approach/practice/plan of mainland China’s policy toward Taiwan has shifted from “promoting reunification by economic means,” which was based on promoting economic and trade exchanges to Taiwan’s benefit, to the absorptive “integrated development” centered on the mainland. Finally, in the international context of Taiwan policy, the United States has gradually shifted from a “balancer” between the two sides of the Strait to an “ally” of Taiwan, while mainland China has abandoned its priority objective of “peaceful reunification” and adopted a two-pronged approach of “carrot and stick,” as a result of the rising confrontation between China and the United States. Changes in the three aspects have further jeopardized cross-Strait exchanges, and tensions on both sides of the Strait have escalated to the point where full-scale conflicts might erupt at any moment.

   4. Chapter 9. A Pyrrhic Victory? The Political Economy of US-China Competition from Trump to Biden

      Zhiqun Zhu

      Abstract

      Economic interdependence has served as an anchor for the post-Cold War US-China relationship. Despite ups and downs in the bilateral relationship, such as following the 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the 2001 mid-air collision of US and China military aircraft, the two countries have been able to manage the relationship due to strong common interest in economic cooperation. However, today even economic cooperation has become increasingly difficult as US-China rivalry intensifies. How have rising political tensions affected economic cooperation since the Trump administration? What political developments on both sides have led to the current situation? This chapter examines the rationale behind growing US-China economic tensions during the Trump and Biden administrations, reviews major actions by both sides that escalated rivalry, and assesses initial outcomes of the intense economic competition. Based on case studies and empirical analysis, this chapter argues that normal competition benefits both sides since “a rising tide lifts all boats,” but zero-sum competition will only hurt both sides. Despite efforts to decouple, the two economies remain joined at the hip. The chapter concludes with some discussions about how the two countries can manage their complex economic relations as strategic rivalry between the two powers deepens.

   5. Chapter 10. Will Taiwan Become the Next Ukraine? Xi Jinping’s Preparation for Armed Reunification

      Suisheng Zhao

      Abstract

      The center of gravity in Xi Jinping’s Taiwan policy has moved from peaceful unification to military coercion. Xi Jinping has set a timetable and intensified military preparation to coerce Taiwan into accepting his terms of unification and take Taiwan by force if needed. Russia’s poor performance in Ukraine has not given Xi a pause but offered lessons about the importance of being well prepared to conquer Taiwan. Xi Jinping has tolerated and used online armed unification opinions to support his military threat. Xi has taken steps to enhance the capacity of the PLA for joint operation and logistic support, tried to minimize economic volubility to the Western sanctions if China launches the war, and tried to deter possible US intervention in the Taiwan contingency. The shift of Xi Jinping’s priority toward military coercion is primarily because of his inflated sense of empowerment supported by China’s new quotient of wealth and military capacities. Another driver is the gloomy outlook of peaceful reunification. For Xi, the Taiwan issue is China’s core national interest and is essentially non-negotiable, important enough to go to war if pushed. China as a “divided nation” simply does not sit well with his China Dream. The prospect of Taiwan becoming the next Ukraine is real.

6. The US: Breaking the Grip of the Rip for Hegemonic Status

   1. Frontmatter

   2. Chapter 11. Competitions and Coalitions: An Emerging US Domestic Nationalist Consensus, Executive Branch Prerogatives, and the Taiwan Strait Tensions

      Dean P. Chen

      Abstract

      The heightening of US-PRC strategic competitions at the international structural level has given rise to an increasingly vocal and influential nationalist coalition, comprised of economic protectionists, security hawks, and American firsters that unite both Democrats and Republicans across bipartisan lines in the US executive and legislative branches. From both the Trump and Biden administrations, we’ve seen their emerging consensus—targeted at Beijing’s enduring state-driven and unfair economic practices, autocratic governance, human rights abuses, and coercive external behaviors—to harden Washington’s pushback on China while championing Taiwan’s democratic resilience, high-tech strength, and socio-economic vitality. This chapter focuses on the growing convergence among the White House and the US Congress in waking up to the reality that years of engagement with the PRC hasn’t changed Beijing’s authoritarian outlook, and it also assesses the changes and continuities in their perceptions and approaches toward the US One-China/strategic ambiguity policy framework amid a more perilous and uncertain Taiwan Strait. Yet, the executive branch’s backing for Taipei isn’t without limitations to avoid a total rupture of US-Chinese relations.

   3. Chapter 12. America Counters China: Congress, Resolve, and Constraints

      Robert Sutter

      Abstract

      The US government hardening against Chinese challenges to American interests, begun in late 2017, represented an unprecedented reversal in the previous fifty years of growing US engagement with China. The hardening emerged erratically in the Donald Trump administration, reached a high point of rising tension during the 2020 US presidential election campaign, and continues strongly during the Joseph Biden administration. Throughout this period, bipartisan majorities in Congress were more resolute than the sometimes erratic or ambivalent presidents. They played a more important role in making and implementing US China policy than in any other period of American history.

      This chapter explains the role of Congress and American domestic politics in driving the hardening of US policy toward China. It examines successes and shortcomings in US policy, seeing important gaps in American competition to China. It forecasts that US hardening toward China will endure in large measure because of strong resolve on the part of bipartisan majorities in Congress.

7. Backmatter