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Erschienen in: Theory and Decision 4/2015

11.02.2015

Purely subjective extended Bayesian models with Knightian unambiguity

verfasst von: Xiangyu Qu

Erschienen in: Theory and Decision | Ausgabe 4/2015

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Abstract

This paper provides a model of belief representation in which ambiguity and unambiguity are endogenously distinguished in a purely subjective setting where objects of choices are, as usual, maps from states to consequences. Specifically, I first extend the maxmin expected utility theory and get a representation of beliefs such that the probabilistic beliefs over each ambiguous event are represented by a non-degenerate interval, while the ones over each unambiguous event are represented by a number. I then consider a class of the biseparable preferences. Two representation results are achieved and can be used to identify the unambiguity in the context of the biseparable preferences. Finally a subjective definition of ambiguity is suggested. It provides a choice theoretic foundation for the Knightian distinction between ambiguity and unambiguity.

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Fußnoten
1
This distinction goes by many names: risk versus uncertainty (Knight 1921); unambiguity versus ambiguity (Ellsberg 1961); precise versus vague probability (Savage 1972), and so forth.
 
2
See, for example Halevy (2007), Machina (2009) and Placido et al. (2011).
 
3
A good reference about biseparable preference is Luce (2000).
 
4
The general criticism of Epstein–Zhang’s definition is in Wakker (2008).
 
5
Kopylov (2007) discusses another possible structure, called mosaic, of collection of unambiguous events.
 
6
The comparison of different approach is discussed in Alon and Schmeidler (2014).
 
7
SEU representation result under our setting is introduced in Kobberling and Wakker (2003).
 
8
The intense discussion appears in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001).
 
9
Note the above theorem will hold if we replace A5\(^*\) by binary comonotonic tradeoff consistency and the A9 by binary tradeoff consistency. This is because as Kobberling and Wakker (2003) show that with weak order, continuity and monotonicity assumptions, A5\(^*\) and A9 imply binary comonotonic tradeoff consistency and binary tradeoff consistency, respectively. We adopt traditional version of Bisymmetry to make the connection with Alon and Schmeidler (2014) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) clear.
 
10
Notice that the midpoint operation \(\langle x;y\rangle \sim ^*\langle y;z\rangle \) defined in (4) is also valid here. The technique tool we provide here is consistent with those used in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) and Alon and Schmeidler (2014), which will make the connection transparent.
 
11
Another view about complementary additivity appears at Wakker (2004). He claims that many departures from ambiguity neutrality are induced by ambiguity insensitivity, not necessarily ambiguity aversion. He further concludes that complementary additivity is actually ambiguous insensitive.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Purely subjective extended Bayesian models with Knightian unambiguity
verfasst von
Xiangyu Qu
Publikationsdatum
11.02.2015
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Theory and Decision / Ausgabe 4/2015
Print ISSN: 0040-5833
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7187
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9489-9

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