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Erschienen in: Small Business Economics 4/2018

15.06.2017

Quality signaling through ex-ante voluntary information disclosure in entrepreneurial networks: evidence from franchising

verfasst von: Farhad Sadeh, Manish Kacker

Erschienen in: Small Business Economics | Ausgabe 4/2018

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Abstract

This paper examines antecedents of ex-ante voluntary information disclosures for standardized contracts in entrepreneurial networks. Entrepreneurs (e.g., franchisors) may make such disclosures to prospective business partners in order to signal profitability of partnering, attract financial and managerial resources, and develop their entrepreneurial networks. In practice, only a fraction of franchisors make financial performance representations (FPRs), an ex-ante voluntary information disclosure to prospective franchisees. We address gaps in the signaling, voluntary information disclosure, franchising, entrepreneurship, and small- and medium-enterprise (SME) literatures. We draw on signaling theory to develop a theoretical framework and investigate factors that influence a franchisor’s disclosure decision. We evaluate hypotheses from our theoretical framework through econometric analyses of multi-sector panel data for the US franchising industry. We estimate a logit model and use lagged independent variables to address our dichotomous independent variable and potential endogeneity, respectively. Our results support the view that firms signal their quality through FPRs to attract potential business partners and expand their entrepreneurial networks. Beyond the extant literature, we find that rigorous partner qualification is another driver of voluntary information disclosure in franchising. Our findings also provide empirical support for the complementary role played by multiple quality signaling mechanisms used by franchisors and yield public policy implications for franchising.

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Fußnoten
1
An earnings claim (an example of voluntary information disclosure by franchisors) is a document that franchisors use to provide some financial information to prospective franchisees. As of July 2007, the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC) has been renamed as Franchise Disclosure Document (FDD) and earnings claims have been renamed as Financial Performance Representation (FPR) by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In this paper, when we refer to previous studies, we use the term “earnings claim” instead of FPR to be consistent with the original source.
 
2
We replicate this study for two reasons. First, many scholars submit that replication is a necessary procedure to verify theoretical insights from empirical studies (Honig et al. 2014; Hubbard et al. 1998; Tsang and Kwan 1999). Second, Michael (2009) empirically tested his model using cross-sectional data from the restaurant industry. Research has shown significant differences between service and retail-type franchise chains (Barthélemy 2008; Perrigot 2006) and across different franchising sectors (Blair and Lafontaine 2005). Our multi-industry multi-year dataset helps to test whether Michael’s (2009) results are supported for other industries.
 
3
Price (2000) examines the effect of contractual payments on the likelihood of making an earnings claim. She reports a positive relationship between contractual payments (including the royalty rate) made by franchisees to the franchisor and the franchisor’s likelihood of making an earnings claim. It should be noted that she views contractual payments (including ongoing fees) as a measure of the franchisee’s investment risk rather than as an indicator of franchisor quality. This perspective may not fully recognize the initial and ongoing services (provided by the franchisor to franchisees) that correspond with initial and ongoing contractual payments.
 
4
This approach of using competing hypotheses has been used in extant research in franchising (e.g., Hendrikse et al. 2015) and entrepreneurship (e.g., Strotmann 2007) and enhances the objectivity and rigor of theory testing (Armstrong, Brodie, and Parsons 2001). It has its roots in the “strong inference” model of inductive reasoning-based scientific inquiry (Platt 1964) and recognizes the limitations of scientific inquiry grounded in single hypotheses (Chamberlin 1897).
 
5
We used this measure since it is suggested as a better measure by Golan et al. (1996) and Kwoka (1979) and allows us to be consistent with Michael (2009). To assess the robustness of our model, we also estimated it using the more common four-firm-concentration measure. Our estimation results revealed that the empirical support for our hypotheses was not affected by this change.
 
6
We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
 
7
Note that some of our hypotheses (H1a, H5a, H5b) are similar to hypotheses first developed and presented by Michael (2009).
 
8
Michael (2009) measured cost of signal and ongoing fees with the number of owned units and royalty rate, respectively.
 
9
We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
 
10
Given the results in our replication model, it can be claimed that the differences between the findings in our enhanced model and those in Michael (2009) are not because of the data used but on account of the augmentation of antecedents included and the amended operationalization of constructs in our enhanced model.
 
11
We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Quality signaling through ex-ante voluntary information disclosure in entrepreneurial networks: evidence from franchising
verfasst von
Farhad Sadeh
Manish Kacker
Publikationsdatum
15.06.2017
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Small Business Economics / Ausgabe 4/2018
Print ISSN: 0921-898X
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-0913
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-017-9892-4

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