Weitere Artikel dieser Ausgabe durch Wischen aufrufen
The authors thank Professor Mike Peng, Editor-in-Chief of the Asia Pacific Journal of Management, for his many thoughts and suggestions on this paper. His insights on the connection between management and the armed services as well as his knowledge of history provided much inspiration for this work.
Military history has provided a number of useful metaphors for management, such as positioning, blue ocean strategy, defensible perimeters, and fighting the last war, among others. In spite of this rich tradition and the detailed writings on the military, management research has actually made a rather truncated use of military history. This includes the selective use of military metaphors, and a limited number of individual and comparative case studies on diplomatic and military scenarios. It is argued that much more can be learned from military history, though certain well-known metaphors and lessons drawn from major events do not convey what military history actually teaches about those events. To learn from military history, historical events must be studied carefully so proper lessons can be derived from them. This paper examines two major episodes in 20th century military history from World War I and the subsequent interwar period, and how themes derived from these events and used in the management field are not consistent with what the historical record teaches about them. We suggest that a fuller and more careful rendering of historical events and their lessons would be potentially beneficial to management research, and suggest ways in which they can be researched.
Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu diesem Inhalt zu erhalten
Sie möchten Zugang zu diesem Inhalt erhalten? Dann informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:
Ahlstrom, D. 1996. Neglecting a useful technology: The case of dietary protein restriction in chronic renal failure. PhD dissertation, New York University, Stern School of Business, New York.
Ahlstrom, D., & Wang, L. C. 2009. Groupthink and France’s defeat in the 1940 campaign. Journal of Management History, 15(2): 159–177. CrossRef
Albertini, L. 1952. The origins of the war of 1914, 3 Vols. London: Oxford University Press.
Allison, G. T., & Zelikow, P. 1999. Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. London: Longman.
Allison, G. T., Carnesale, A., & Nye, J. S. (Eds.). 1985. Hawks, doves and owls: An agenda for avoiding nuclear war. New York: Norton.
Ansoff, H. I. 1965. Corporate strategy. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Barnard, C. I. 1938. Functions of the executive. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Beaufre, A. 1968. 1940, the fall of France. New York: Knopf.
Beringer, R. E., Hattaway, H., Jones, A., & Still, W. N. 1991. Why the South lost the Civil War. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.
Blight, D. W. 2002. Race and reunion: The Civil War in American memory. Cambridge: Belknap Press.
Bloch, M. 1944. Strange defeat. New York: Norton.
Boar, B. 1995. Sun Tzu and Machiavelli on strategy. Journal of Business Strategy, 16: 16–18. CrossRef
Bond, B., & Alexander, M. 1986. Liddell Hart and De Gaulle: The doctrines of limited liability and mobile defense. In P. Paret (Ed.). Makers of modern strategy from Machiavelli to the nuclear age: 598–623. Oxford: Clarendon.
Boot, M. 2006. War made new. New York: Gotham.
Brandt, L., & Rawski, T. G. (Eds.). 2008. China’s great economic transformation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brodie, B. 1931–1978. Bernard Brodie papers. Los Angeles: UCLA Research Library, Box 2.
Brodie, B. 1954. Unlimited weapons and limited war. The Reporter, 2(9): l8–21.
Brodie, B. 1973. War and politics. New York: Macmillan.
Cairns, J. 1974. Some recent historians and the “strange defeat” of 1940. The Journal of Modern History, 46: 60–85. CrossRef
Carroll, G., & Hannan, M. T. 2000. The demography of corporations and industries. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Chen, M., & Miller, D. 1994. Competitive attack, retaliation and performance: An expectancy valence framework. Strategic Management Journal, 15: 85–102. CrossRef
Clausewitz, C. V. 2004. On war. J. J. Graham (Trans.). New York: Barnes & Noble.
Clegg, S., Kornberger, M., & Pitsis, T. 2005. Managing organizations: An introduction to theory and practice. London: Sage.
Clemons, E. K., & Santamaria, J. A. 2002. Maneuver warfare: Can modern military strategy lead you to victory?. Harvard Business Review, 80: 56–65.
Cohen, E. A., & Gooch, J. 1990. Military misfortunes: The anatomy of failure in war. New York: Free Press.
Cohen, W. I. 1995. The Cambridge history of American foreign relations: Volume 4, America in the age of Soviet power, 1945–1991. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Corum, J. S. 1994. The roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German military reform. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.
Craig, G. A. 1964. The politics of the Prussian army: 1640–1945. New York: Oxford University Press.
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. 1983. The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48: 147–160. CrossRef
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. 1991. Introduction. In W. W. Powell & P. J. DiMaggio (Eds.). The new institutionalism in organizational analysis: 1–38. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Dixon, N. F. 1994. On the psychology of military incompetence, Updated ed. London: Pimlico.
Dougherty, J. E., & Pfaltzgraff, R. L. Jr. 2001. Contending theories of international relations: A comprehensive survey, 5th ed. New York: Longman.
Doughty, R. A. 1985. The seeds of disaster, the development of French army doctrine, 1919–1939. New York: Archon.
Doughty, R. A. 1988. The French armed forces, 1918–1940. In A. R. Millett & W. Murray (Eds.). Military effectiveness, Volume II: The interwar period: 39–69. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
Doughty, R. A. 1990. The breaking point—Sedan and the fall of France 1940. New York: Archon.
Eicher, D. J. 1997. The Civil War in books. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Evans, R. J. 1999. In defense of history. New York: Norton.
Evans, R. J. 2001. Lying about Hitler: History, Holocaust, and the David Irving trial. New York: Basic Books.
Farrar-Hockley, A. H. 1964. The Somme. London: Batsford.
Fayol, H. 1988. General and industrial management, Revised ed. London: Pitman.
Feld, M. D. 1959. Information and authority: The structure of military organization. American Sociological Review, 24: 15–22. CrossRef
Ferguson, N. 2006. The war of the world: Twentieth-century conflict and the descent of the West. New York: Penguin.
Finkelstein, S. 2003. Why smart executives fail: And what you can learn from their mistakes. New York: Portfolio.
Gallagher, G. W., & Nolan, A. T. (Eds.). 2000. The myth of the lost cause and Civil War history. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Géraud, A. 1944. Les fossoyeurs, 2 Vols. The gravediggers of France: Gamelin, Daladier, Reynaud, Pétain and Laval: Military defeat, armistice, counterrevolution (Trans.). New York: Doubleday.
Geyer, M. 1986. German strategy in the age of machine warfare, 1914–1945. In P. Paret (Ed.). Makers of modern strategy from Machiavelli to the nuclear age: 527–597. Oxford: Clarendon.
Gilbert, M. 1994. First World War. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Gildea, R. 2004. Marianne in chains: Daily life in the heart of France during the German occupation. New York: Picador.
Globerman, S., & Shapiro, D. 2009. Economic and strategic considerations surrounding Chinese FDI in the United States. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 26: 163–183. CrossRef
Graff, D., & Higham, R. (Eds.). 2002. A military history of China. Boulder: Westview.
Halliday, F. 2005. The Middle East in international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hamel, G., & Prahalad, C. K. 1994. Competing for the future. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. 1984. Structural inertia and organizational change. American Sociological Review, 49: 149–164. CrossRef
Hanson, V. D. 2002. Carnage and culture: Landmark battles in the rise of Western power. New York: Anchor.
Hitt, M. A., Miller, C. C., & Colella, A. 2006. Organizational behavior: A strategic approach. New York: Wiley.
Horne, A. 1979. To lose a battle—France 1940. New York: Macmillan.
Horne, A. 1984. The French army and politics 1870–1970. London: Macmillan.
House, R. J. 1996. Path-goal theory of leadership: Lessons, legacy, and a reformulated theory. Leadership Quarterly, 7: 323–352. CrossRef
Howard, M. 1964. Lest we forget. Encounter, January: 61–67.
Hsiung, J. C. & Levine, S. I. (Eds.). 1992. China’s bitter victory: The war with Japan, 1937–1945. London: Sharpe.
Hughes, J. M. 2006. To the Maginot line: The politics of French military preparation in the 1920s. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Jackson, J. 2003. The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940. New York: Oxford University Press.
Keegan, J. 1999. The First World War. New York: Knopf.
Keynes, J. M. 1920. The economic consequences of the peace. New York: Harcourt Brace.
Lamond, D. A. 2006. Matters for judgment: Some thoughts on method in management history. Journal of Management History, 12: 237–243. CrossRef
Lewis, B. 2003. The Middle East. London: Phoenix.
Lo, V. H. Y., Ho, C. O., & Sculli, D. 1998. The strategic insights of Sun Tzu and quality management. The TQM Magazine, 10: 161–168. CrossRef
Lupfer, T. 1981. The dynamics of doctrine: The changes in German tactical doctrine during the First World War. Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute.
Mains, S., & Geller, L. W. 2008. Freeing ideas from their silos. S+B Leading Ideas Online, 2/12/08. www.strategy-business.com/li/leadingideas/li00062, Accessed June 5, 2009.
May, E. R. 2000. Strange victory: Hitler’s conquest of France. New York: Hill and Wang.
McGregor, D. 1960. The human side of enterprise. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Meyer, T. H. (Ed.). 1997. Light for the new millennium: Rudolf Steiner’s association with Helmuth and Eliza Von Moltke: Letters, documents and after-death communications (Trans.). London: Steiner.
Michael, J. H. 1995. America in the world: The historiography of US foreign relations since 1941. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mintzberg, H. 1987. Crafting strategy. Harvard Business Review, 65(4): 66–75.
Mintzberg, H. 1994. The rise and fall of strategic planning: Reconceiving roles for planning, plans, planners. New York: Free Press.
Mintzberg, H. 2008. Tracking strategies: Towards a general theory of strategy formation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mintzberg, H., Lampel, J., & Ahlstrand, B. 1998. Strategy safari: A guided tour through the wilds of strategic management. New York: Free Press.
Mintzberg, H., Lampel, J., Quinn, J., & Ghoshal, S. 2003. The strategy process: Concepts, contexts and cases, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Mosier, J. 2001. The myth of the Great War: A new military history of World War I. New York: HarperCollins.
Muller, R. R. 1996. Close air support: The German, British, and American experiences, 1918–1941. In W. Murray & A. R. Millett (Eds.). Military innovation in the interwar period: 144–190. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Murray, M., & Millett, A. R. 2001. A war to be won: Fighting the Second World War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Murray, M., & Sinnreich, R. H. 2006. The past as prologue: The importance of history to the military profession. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Murray, W. 1981. The German response to victory in Poland: A case study in professionalism. Armed Forces & Society, 7: 285–298. CrossRef
Murray, W. 1986. Clausewitz: Some thoughts on what the Germans got right. In M. I. Handel (Ed.). Clausewitz and modern strategy: 267–286. London: Cass.
Murray, W. 1996. Armored warfare: The British, French, and German experiences. In W. Murray & A. R. Millett (Eds.). Military innovation in the interwar period: 6–49. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Murray, W. 2006. Thoughts on military history and the profession of arms. In W. Murray & R. H. Sinnreich (Eds.). The past as prologue: The importance of history to the military profession: 78–94. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Murray, W., & Millett, A. R. (Eds.). 1996. Military innovation in the interwar period. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nicolson, C. 2001. The Longman companion to the First World War: Europe 1914–1918. London: Longman.
Peng, M. W. 2009. Global strategy. 2nd ed. Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage Learning.
Persico, J. E. 2004. Eleventh month, eleventh day, eleventh hour: Armistice day, 1918 World War I and its violent climax. New York: Random House.
Pfeffer, J., & Sutton, R. I. 2000. The knowing-doing gap: How smart companies turn knowledge into action. Cambridge: Harvard Business Press.
Porch, D. 2000. Military “culture” and the fall of France in 1940: A review essay. International Security, 24(4): 157–180. CrossRef
Porter, M. E. 1980. Competitive strategy: Techniques for analyzing industries and competitors. New York: Free Press.
Posen, B. R. 1984. The sources of military doctrine. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Pringle, C., & Kroll, M. 1997. Why Trafalgar was won before it was fought: Lessons from resource-based theory. Academy of Management Executive, 11(4): 73–89.
Rawski, T. J., & Perkins, D. H. 2008. Forecasting China’s economic growth to 2025. In L. Brandt & T. J. Rawski (Eds.). China’s great economic transformation: 829–887. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Redding, G. 2005. The thick description and comparison of societal systems of capitalism. Journal of International Business Studies, 36(2): 123–155.
Ries, A., & Trout, J. 1985. Marketing warfare. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Sbrega, J. 1989. The war against Japan, 1941–1945: An annotated bibliography. New York: Garland.
Schelling, T. C. 1960. The strategy of conflict. London: Oxford University Press.
Schelling, T. C. 1966. Arms and influence. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Schelling, T. C. 2007. Strategies of commitment and other essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Shirer, W. 1970. Collapse of the Third Republic. New York: Cox & Wilson.
Spires, D. J. 1984. Image and reality: The making of the German officer. Westport: Greenwood.
Staw, B. M. 1976. Knee-deep in the big muddy: The effect of personal responsibility and decision consequences upon commitment to a previously chosen course of action. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 16: 27–44. CrossRef
Strachan, H. 2003. The First World War: Volume I: To arms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strachan, H. 2005. The First World War. New York: Penguin.
Sun, T. 1963. The art of war. S. B. Griffith (Trans.). London: Oxford University Press.
Taylor, A. J. P. 1961. The origins of the Second World War. New York: Touchstone.
Thomas, M. 1997. Britain, France and appeasement: Anglo-French relations in the popular front era. Oxford: Berg.
TLS. 1995. The hundred most influential books since the war. TLS, the Times Literary Supplement, October 6: 39–45.
Trachtenberg, M. 1988. The development of American strategic thought, 1945–1969. New York: Garland.
Trachtenberg, M. 1991. History and strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Trumpener, U. 1976. War premeditated? German intelligence operations in July 1914. Central European History, 9: 58–85. CrossRef
Tuchman, B. 1962. The guns of August. New York: Macmillan.
Van Creveld, M. 1982. Fighting power: German and US army performance, 1939–1945. Westport: Greenwood.
Weinberg, G. 2005. A world at arms: A global history of World War II. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Wood, G. 2009. Empire of liberty: A history of the Early Republic, 1789–1815. New York: Oxford University Press.
Worthing, P. M. 2007. A military history of modern China: From the Manchu conquest to Tian’anmen Square. Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International.
Wynne, G. C. 1976. If Germany attacks: The Battle of Depth in the West. Westport: Greenwood.
Young, H. 1976. The misunderstanding of August 1, 1914. Journal of Modern History, 48: 644–665. CrossRef
- Reexamining some management lessons from military history
- Springer US
Neuer Inhalt/© Stellmach, Neuer Inhalt/© BBL, Neuer Inhalt/© Maturus, Pluta Logo/© Pluta, Neuer Inhalt/© hww, Voraussetzungen für wirtschaftliche additive Fertigung/© Marco2811 | Fotolia