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Board-Level Worker Representation

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Handbook of Labor, Human Resources and Population Economics

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Abstract

This chapter reviews the literature on board-level worker representation (BLWR). BLWR refers to workers’ legally sanctioned rights to take part in the decisions of their employers’ board of directors as full or consultative members, regardless of their underlying equity investments. It provides information about the incidence of BLWR across countries and the factors that likely contributed to the establishment of this mechanism of employee voice. It reviews theory on the positive and negative impacts of BLWR for workers and firms, summarizes the related empirical evidence, and concludes by pointing to the open gaps as avenues for future research.

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Acknowledgments

Responsible Section Editor: Uwe Jirjahn

The article has benefitted from valuable comments of the editors, the participants of the 36th EBES Conference, Istanbul/Turkey (July 1-3, 2021) and Derek Jones. There is no conflict of interest.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Strategy and Innovation & Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg, Denmark

    Aleksandra Gregorič

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  1. Aleksandra Gregorič
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Correspondence to Aleksandra Gregorič .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. UNU-MERIT & Princeton University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Klaus F. Zimmermann

Section Editor information

  1. University of Trier, Trier, Germany

    Uwe Jirjahn

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Gregorič, A. (2022). Board-Level Worker Representation. In: Zimmermann, K.F. (eds) Handbook of Labor, Human Resources and Population Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57365-6_207-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57365-6_207-1

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-57365-6

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