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2021 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Regulating Innovation

verfasst von : Markus Schreiber

Erschienen in: Law and Economics of Regulation

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Innovation is one of the main drivers of economic growth. It is therefore no surprise that governments are increasingly trying to promote innovation through legal instruments. For this reason, the contribution analyses the interplay of law and economics in the regulation of innovation. The author examines the economic rationale behind such regulation. He assesses in which cases governments have legitimate reasons to interfere in the market economy in order to promote innovation. Furthermore, the legal possibilities and limits of influencing innovation are examined. In addition, the discussion includes the problems and economic consequences of legislators’ attempts to promote innovation. Finally, the contribution attempts to identify “best practices” for the furtherance of innovation through regulatory means.

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Many attempts have been made in a variety of academic fields to properly define the term “innovation”. See Swann (2009), p. 25: “a bewildering variety of definitions”. A proper discussion is beyond the scope of this contribution. See Schreiber (2019), pp. 12 et seq.

Furman et al. (2002), p. 900; Swann (2009), pp. 234 et seq.; Verspagen (2011), p. 487; OECD (2015), p. 17.

Porter (1990b), pp. 318, 321 et seq.

Which has established, inter alia, the State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation.

For early English-language research on the subject matter, see OTA (1979), p. 45; Stewart (1981); Ashford et al. (1985).

Also cf. the general importance of government action and legal frameworks for economic activity described by Drezner (2008), pp. 33 et seq.

Cf. Stewart (1981), p. 1263; Veljanovski (2010), p. 20.

OECD (2015), p. 27. Also cf. Swann (2009), pp. 257 et seq.; Edler and Georghiou (2007), pp. 956 et seq.; Lundvall and Borrás (2011), p. 613; Schreiber (2019), p. 111.

Encyclopædia Britannica, “Market Failure”, available at www.britannica.com/topic/market-failure.

A market is Pareto-efficient when the resources and goods could not be redistributed without deteriorating at least one market participant’s position, Swann (2009), p. 257.

A market is Kaldor-Hicks-efficient when no redistribution is possible in which the market participants that gain an advantage from the redistribution could (at least in theory) compensate those that suffer from it, and the redistribution would still be (net) advantageous. See Hicks (1939), p. 706.

Also cf. Schreiber (2019), pp. 111 et seq.

Cf. Swann (2009), p. 260; Veljanovski (2010), p. 21.

De Mesquita (2016), p. 100.

For example, when carbon emissions from a German energy utility may have effects on villages in Peru due to their climate change impact, see the ongoing case of Saúl Lliuya v. RWE, Superior Court (Oberlandesgericht) Hamm, case no. 5 U 15/17.

This is also called a “temporal spillover”, see Huber (2017). Also cf. the discussion of the rights of future generations at Gruber (2011) and Mathis (2011).

Ewers (1990), p. 150.

Cf. Fritsch (2018), p. 164, however, also cf. the differentiated analysis; Fritsch (2018), pp. 195 et seq.; Wieddekind (2002), pp. 155 et seq.; Veljanovski (2010), p. 21.

For example, this has been one of the stated goals of the European Union’s harmonization policy towards a liberalized, regulated electricity market, cf. Directive (EU) 2019/944 recital 9, OJ 2019 L 158/125.

These often include an easy-to-read colour scheme and a grade system, e.g. from G (worst efficiency) through A (best efficiency). See, for example, the European Union’s labelling system as implemented under Regulation (EU) 2017/1369, OJ 2017 L 198/1.

Cf. OECD (2015), pp. 26 et seq.

OECD (2015), p. 26, describes this as “inertia”.

Stack and Gartland (2003), A well-known, albeit controversial, example is the QWERTY computer keyboard layout, cf. David (1985) and the criticism at Liebowitz and Margolis (1990). While there is now considerable evidence that the QWERTY layout is actually a poor example of path dependencies, it may still serve as a simple way to illustrate the problem, as readers will immediately think of the many adjustments in keyboard production, software adaptation, user training etc. necessary to switch to a new standard.

This is the term used at OECD (2015), p. 26, to denote those market circumstances that do not constitute neo-classical “market failures”.

Cf. Feintuck (2010); Schreiber (2019), p. 122.

See the Swiss Federal Government’s masterplan to strengthen biomedical research and technology, BAG (2013), pp. 76 et seq. Also cf. the discussion of innovation BAG (2013), pp. 31 et seq.

Such as in Switzerland under Articles 15 et seq. Energy Act (Energiegesetz, SR 730.0).

For a discussion of different monetary and non-monetary incentives for electric vehicles, see Gong et al. (2020). However, one may argue that the lack of a charging infrastructure and the fact the existing infrastructure has been optimised for internal combustion engines constitute a path dependency and thus a “market imperfection” in the sense described above.

Gentechnikgesetz, SR 814.91.

Such as under Art. 27 of the Swiss Federal Constitution (Bundesverfassung, SR 101).

See the discussion in Sect. 3.4 below.

For the example of genome editing, Swiss constitutional law specifically demands that humans and the environment are to be protected from abuses of genome editing, Art. 120 Swiss Federal Constitution. Also cf. Schreiber (2019), pp. 120 et seq.

Cf. Luhmann (2005), pp. 151 et seq. and 155 et seq.

For the Swiss Federal Council, see Art. 182 para. 1 Swiss Federal Constitution.

For the Swiss electricity sector, see Art. 3 para. 2 Electricity Supply Act (Stromversorgungsgesetz, SR 734.7).

Cf. Dingwerth (2005), pp. 71 et seq.

Cf. Jones (1989), pp. 413 et seq.; Maggetti (2010), pp. 2 et seq.

In Switzerland, by the Swiss Agency for Therapeutic Products swissmedic.

In Switzerland, by the Federal Electricity Commission ElCom.

For an exhaustive treatment of the subject, see Luhmann (2005); Also cf. Hirschi (2018), pp. 229 et seq.

E.g., Art. 29 Swiss Federal Constitution, Art. 6 European Convention on Human Rights, SR 0.101.

This is a problem with norms introduced by certain industry associations that, for example, do not include the consumers’ perspective. Cf. Schreiber (2019), pp. 273 et seq.

Hoffmann-Riem and Schneider (1998), pp. 396 et seq.; For an overview of this research area, see the volumes of the series Schriften zur rechtswissenschaftlichen Innovationsforschung. Nomos, Baden-Baden.

This amended categorization has been published in Schreiber (2019), pp. 89 et seq.

For example, any provision that serves an enabling or stimulating function will conflict with any provisions that serve a limiting function, Schreiber (2002), p. 235; Schreiber (2019), p. 90.

By the Nuclear Energy Act, SR 732.1.

Schreiber (2019), p. 91.

See Hofstetter et al. (2014), p. 42.

Hoffmann-Riem and Schneider (1998), pp. 396 et seq.; Schreiber (2002), p. 235; Cf. Schreiber (2019), p. 91.

Cf. Schreiber (2002), p. 242; Hoffmann-Riem and Schneider (1998), p. 396; Also cf. Ashford and Hall (2011), p. 272.

Cf. Hoffmann-Riem and Schneider (1998), p. 396; Schreiber (2002), p. 242.

See Annex II of Regulation (EG) Nr. 1275/2008, OJ 2008 L 339/45, as amended by Regulation (EU) Nr. 801/2013, OJ 2013 L 225/1.

In Switzerland, the Cantonal model laws on energy (Mustervorschriften der Kantone im Energiebereich, MuKEn) include such provisions. See, for example, Art. 1.17 para. 2, Art. 1.29 MuKEn 2014 (available at www.endk.ch/de/energiepolitik-der-kantone/muken). However, the model laws are not directly applicable laws, but only valid to the extent that a Canton incorporates them into its respective law.

Schreiber (2019), pp. 92 et seq.

See Schreiber (2019), pp. 93 et seq.

For a discussion of such new businesses, see Katz (2015) and Tremblay-Huet (2018).

In Switzerland, this is prohibited by constitutional law, Art. 119 para. 2 lit. a Swiss Federal Constitution.

The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol), SR 0.515.105, was signed on 17 June 1925.

Schreiber (2019), pp. 96 et seq.

Bundesgesetz betreffend die Erstellung von Telegraphen- und Telephonlinien, AS 11 251.

Wyssling (1946), pp. 120 and 276.

Schreiber (2019), p. 99.

Hoffmann-Riem and Schneider (1998), p. 397.

For example, the German legislator has introduced a conflict resolution entity for conflicts resulting from the legislation on renewable energy, the Clearingstelle EEG/KWKG, www.clearingstelle-eeg-kwkg.de/.

See Wüstenhagen et al. (2007).

Schreiber (2019), p. 99.

Schreiber (2019), pp. 126 et seq.

In Switzerland, this is implemented inter alia in the Federal Act on certification services in the area of the electronic signature and other digital certificate applications (Bundesgesetz über die elektronische Signatur, SR 943.03).

For a thorough discussion of the innovation-related effects of digital signature regulation (in German), see Schreiber (2002). In Switzerland, the use of digital signatures is governed by the different procedural laws, see AS 2016 4651, pp. 4661 et seq.

Schreiber (2019), pp. 127 et seq.

The word has also been discussed in English-language innovation research, see Kuusi and Meyer (2002).

This term itself has been in academic use since at least the early 1980s, and the underlying ideas may date back to at least the 1960s, see Herschler and Slany (1982).

A society in which the average annual per capita energy consumption is 2000 Watt or less. This Leitbild has first been formulated at the Swiss Federal Technical Institute (Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule) Zurich in the late 1990s, see www.local-energy.swiss/ueber-uns/geschichte.html#/.

Art. 2^ter para. 2 Gemeindeordnung der Stadt Zürich, AS 101.100; Art. 2 para. 2, Art. 3 Energiereglement Stadt Luzern, sRSL 7.3.1.1.1.

For a discussion of US innovation clusters, see Baily and Montalbano (2018).

www.switzerland-innovation.com/start .

The seminal publication on this is Thaler and Sunstein (2008). For a discussion in this Springer series, see Mathis and Tor (2016).

See note 104 supra.

Cf. Stewart (1981), pp. 1322 et seq.; OECD (2015), pp. 122 et seq.; Schreiber (2019), p. 137.

See, for example, the Swiss Federal Act on the Promotion of Research and Innovation, SR 420.1.

Scott (2010).

Cf. Swann (2009), pp. 82 et seq.

Schreiber (2019), p. 138.

See Noel et al. (2019) and Xu et al. (2020).

Cf. Mandel (2005).

However, also see the highly relevant discussion of an alternative, morality-based justification for intellectual property at Merges (2019), pp. 84 et seq.

Cf. Swann (2009), pp. 104 and 107 et seq.

For an overview of the discussion, see Merges (2019) as well as the other contributions in the same volume.

See, despite the criticism they voice with regard to patent protection, Shavell and van Ypersele (2001), p. 527; Also cf. Horowitz and Lai (1996); for innovation to combat climate change, Kim (2011).

Hoffmann-Riem (2016), p. 434; Schreiber (2019), p. 140.

Oppenländer (1977), pp. 369 et seq.; Also cf. Swann (2009), pp. 109 et seq.; Schreiber (2019), p. 140.

Schreiber (2019), p. 140.

Sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.5 supra.

Cf. the critical analysis by Teece and Coleman (1998).

Wieddekind (2002), p. 162.

Ashford et al. (1985), pp. 443 et seq.; also cf. Stewart (1981), pp. 1307 et seq. In the United States, a less traditional example are the State Innovation Waivers under section 1332 of the Affordable Care Act.

Further examples can be found at Schreiber (2019), p. 142.

100

Niederspannungs-Installationsverordnung, SR 734.27.

101

“[…] erweisen sie sich für die technische Entwicklung als hinderlich […]”.

102

Bankenverordnung, SR 952.02.

103

Regarding the former version of the provision (that included a para. 3), see Schreiber (2019), p. 143, with further references.

104

Cf. Schreiber (2019), pp. 143 et seq. As an early historical example; Lundvall and Borrás (2011), p. 600, mention the investments by King Henry VIII in iron cannons.

105

Bundesgesetz über die öffentliche Beschaffung, AS 2020 641. The current version can be found under SR 172.056.1.

106

“Innovationsgehalt”.

107

Veljanovski (2010), p. 32; also cf. Stewart (1981), p. 1310; Schreiber (2019), p. 147.

108

CO₂-Gesetz, SR 641.71. Under the CO₂ Act, the term “Brennstoff” (thermal fuel) includes fossil fuels used for the generation of heat, the production of light, the production of electricity in thermal facilities or the operation of combined heat and power plants, but not motor fuels, Art. 2 para. 1, para. 2 CO₂-Act. However, producers and importers of motor vehicles may be subject to the sanction payments under Art. 10 et seq., Art. 13 CO₂ Act.

109

E.g. § 19^ter Ordinance on Taxes and Fees for Motor Vehicles, Bicycles and Ships (Verordnung über Steuern und Gebühren für Motorfahrzeuge, Fahrräder und Schiffe) of the Canton of Solothurn, BGS 614.62, which exempts “electric vehicles and solar vehicles” from the tax.

110

Cf. Veljanovski (2010), p. 31; Stewart (1981), pp. 1373 et seq.; Schreiber (2019), p. 148.

111

Cf. with regards to the debate in the USA Jaffe et al. (1995), pp. 153 et seq.

112

After Porter (1990a), p. 88; for Switzerland in particular, see Porter (1990b), p. 323; also cf. Ashford and Hall (2011), pp. 276 et seq.; OECD (2011), pp. 54 and 60; Schreiber (2019), pp. 150 et seq.

113

Schreiber (2019), p. 154; also cf. Hettich (2015).

114

Cf. Stewart (1981), pp. 1267 et seq. A similar approach forcing the use of existing, but not yet widely used technology, is sometimes called “action forcing”, see Miller (1995), p. 65.

115

Stewart (1981), pp. 1267 et seq.

116

While the use of cables is commonplace in low-voltage applications, their use in high-voltage distribution lines is still innovative.

117

Art. 15c Electricity Act (Elektrizitätsgesetz, SR 734.0).

118

Cf. Schreiber (2019), pp. 158 et seq.; Stewart (1981), pp. 1264 et seq., 1269.

119

Also see Sect. 4.1.

120

This has been extensively described by German-speaking legal scholars as “regulierte Selbstregulierung”, see Hettich (2014), pp. 269 et seq.; Hoffmann-Riem (2006).

121

Cf. the “negotiated standard setting” described by Stewart (1981), pp. 1341 et seq.

122

As established in Switzerland, for example, by Art. 15 Nuclear Energy Liability Act (Kernenergiehaftpflichtgesetz, SR 732.44).

123

For example, Art. 3 para. 1 lit. a of the Swiss Stem Cell Research Act (Stammzellenforschungsgesetz, SR 810.31) prohibits the production of embryos for the purpose of stem cell research.

124

For example, no patent protection is granted for processes regarding the cloning of humans under Art. 2 para. 1 lit. a of the Swiss Patents Act (Patentgesetz, SR 232.14).

125

See note 149 supra.

126

Art. 12 Energy Act.

127

For a discussion of this new provision, see Gerber (2019).

128

Schreiber (2019), pp. 99 et seq. with further references.

129

In Switzerland, for example, this is stipulated in Art. 5 para. 1 Federal Constitution.

130

For the principle of clarity in the United States, see Re (2019). For the Swiss equivalent, see Schindler (2014), n. 33 et seq.

131

Schreiber (2019), p. 102.

132

Schreiber (2019), p. 102.

133

For Swiss law, see Schindler (2014), n. 36 et seq.

134

For Swiss law, cf. Tschannen et al. (2014), p. 142; Schreiber (2019), p. 103.

135

Schreiber (2019), pp. 107 et seq.

136

As provided for by Art. 27 Federal Constitution.

137

Art. 94 Federal Constitution.

138

BGE 136 I 1 E. 5.5.2; BGE 125 I 182 E. 5c.

139

See the regulatory rationales in Sect. 2 supra.

140

Art. 36 Federal Constitution.

141

For the concept of competitive neutrality, see Lanneau (2017).

142

In Switzerland, state-owned enterprises may not substantially affect the economic freedom of private enterprises, and they must be exposed to the same competitive conditions as private enterprises, BGE 138 I 378 E. 6.3.2; Hangartner (2002), p. 55.

143

Schreiber (2019), p. 75 with further references; also cf. Stewart (1981), p. 1275; Hettich (2014), pp. 213 et seq.

144

Cf. Rustad and Koenig (2003), even though the study contained therein pertains to case law.

145

This will be discussed further below in Sect. 4.2.

146

Stewart (1981), pp. 1354 et seq.

147

Bayerischer Landtag (2013), p. 23.

148

Cf. Hartman (2013).

149

The complexity of trying to assess innovation incentives is exemplified by Mungan (2013).

150

Coase (1960), p. 18: “[…] [T]he governmental administrative machine is not itself costless. It can, in fact, on occasion be extremely costly”.

151

This term is not yet widely used in the English language. For the German equivalent (Interventionskosten), see Eidenmüller (2015), pp. 106 et seq., who also notes the absence of a corresponding discussion in the (primarily American) literature; also cf. Schreiber (2019), pp. 80 et seq.

152

Eidenmüller (2015), pp. 109 et seq.

153

Sacksofsky (2012), pp. 1635 et seq.; Schreiber (2019), p. 81.

154

When measured in MWh of electricity produced per Euro/Swiss Franc invested in support schemes, see the numbers at Schreiber (2019), pp. 81 et seq.

155

Schreiber (2019), p. 82.

156

Cf. the call for a “predictable, legally secure system” for pharmaceutical innovations at Kraus (2014), p. 380; Regarding Kraus’ example of the TRIPS agreement, also cf. Drezner (2008), pp. 176 et seq.

157

See Sect. 4.1 above.

158

See Sect. 4.1 above.

159

This term seems to be used mostly in the German-speaking literature. For a use in English (albeit by native German speakers), see Bergmann et al. (1998), p. 168.

160

Schreiber (2019), p. 84. For example, the former Swiss Energy Ordinance grew from 22 pages in 1998 to 186 pages in 2015 (Hettich 2015, p. 575), and 206 pages in 2017 (Schreiber 2019, p. 84 n. 545).

161

Cf. the—controversial—example of the QWERTY computer keyboard layout, note 107 supra.

162

Markusson (2012), p. 389.

163

Kline (2001), p. 103.

164

See Stack and Gartland (2010), p. 117; van Calster (2008), p. 91.

165

Schreiber (2019), p. 85.

166

www.minergie.ch/.

167

See, for example, Art. 1.30 para. 2 lit. b, Art. 1.51 para. 2, Art. 1.52 para. 1 of the Cantonal Model Laws in the Energy Sector (Mustervorschriften der Kantone im Energiebereich, MuKEn) 2014, available at www.endk.ch/de/energiepolitik-der-kantone/muken. These Model Laws are not directly applicable law, but only valid to the extent that the respective Canton actually implements them into its own law.

168

Schreiber (2019), p. 40.

169

This distinction can be traced back to Schumpeter (1947), p. 152, who seems to distinguish between the invention and the innovation process. The exact terminology and number of steps in the process varies. For an overview, see Godin (2006). Also cf. Stewart (1981), p. 1282.

170

The most detailed treatment of the diffusion process is Rogers (2003).

171

Cf. the legal instruments described in Sect. 3.3 supra.

172

Schreiber (2019), pp. 441 et seq.

173

Cf. Kernighan (2017), p. 142, who describes the Internet as “[…] a free-for-all compared to the controlled environments of traditional phone companies […]” but who also mentions that in recent years, it “[…] is becoming less free-wheeling and more constrained”.

174

See, for example, Dunne (1994).

175

For example, my analysis in Schreiber (2019) has shown that the definition of a “final consumer” in the electricity market is currently the legal provision that most severely hinders the implementation of innovative energy storage technology.

176

Schreiber (2019), pp. 441 et seq.

177

See Sect. 3.4 supra.

178

See Sect. 3.3.3 supra.

179

For Switzerland, see Steiner (2014), p. 162; Schreiber (2019), p. 145; also cf. Edler and Georghiou (2007), pp. 959 et seq.

180

Schreiber (2019), p. 391.

181

In Switzerland, Art. 8 para. 1 Federal Constitution.

182

In Switzerland, Art. 27 and Art. 94 Federal Constitution.

183

For an overview of energy storage technologies, see EASAC (2017), pp. 11 et seq.

184

See § 111 para. 3 of the Austrian Electricity Act 2010 (Elektrizitätswirtschafts- und Organisationsgesetz 2010, Federal Law Gazette I No. 110/2010, as amended by Federal Law Gazette I No. 174/2013), which temporarily exempted these two technologies from the duty to pay electricity grid usage fees. For a discussion of energy storage regulation in the German-speaking countries, see Schreiber (2020).

185

Schreiber (2019), p. 448.

186

In Switzerland, an important example are the SIA norms of the Swiss Society of Engineers and Architects (Schweizerischer Ingenieur- und Architektenverein). The norms are available at www.sia.ch/en/services/sia-norm.

187

The latter is problematic since this essentially passes legislative power to the industry association.

188

Regarding experimental law, see Müller and Uhlmann (2013), pp. 177 et seq.; for a more general treatment of temporary law, see Fagan (2013).

189

Cf. Müller and Uhlmann (2013), p. 181.

190

SINTEG-Verordnung, BGBl. 2017 I 1653, as amended by BGBl. 2019 I 706.

191

§§ 6–9 SINTEG-ordinance. See Schreiber (2019), p. 449.

192

For an empirical study on how regulation and deregulation affect innovation, see Polemis and Tselekounis (2019).

193

Also cf. Schreiber (2019), p. 463.

194

See note 195 supra.

195

Schreiber (2019), pp. 449 et seq.

196

However, many industry associations are still critical of such a move. See, for example, the statement by the UK’s Society of motor manufacturers and traders cited in a report by the BBC from 4 February 2020, “Petrol and diesel car sales ban brought forward to 2035”, available at www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-51366123.

197

Under Art. 12a Nuclear Energy Act (Kernenergiegesetz, SR 732.1), no new general licenses for the construction of nuclear power plants may be granted. Plants already in operation may continue to run as long as the safety requirements under the law are observed (which, under Swiss law, includes the operators’ duty to follow technological developments and, if necessary, upgrade their plants, see Art. 22 para. 2 lit. g and h Nuclear Energy Act).

198

Cf. Locatelli et al. (2013).

199

Schreiber (2019), p. 450.

200

Schreiber (2019), p. 450.

201

It must be noted, however, that the most innovative solar modules are available in a variety of colors, prints and shapes, which helps to blend them into the environment.

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Titel: Regulating Innovation
verfasst von: Markus Schreiber
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Law and Economics of Regulation
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-70529-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-70530-5

Copyright-Jahr: 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70530-5_13