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2022 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Regulatory Approach to Anti-Money Laundering in Online Gambling in the UK

verfasst von : Slobodan Tomic

Erschienen in: Financial Technology and the Law

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Dieses Kapitel befasst sich mit dem regulatorischen Ansatz zur Bekämpfung der Geldwäsche (AML) im britischen Online-Glücksspielsektor, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf den Strategien und Durchsetzungsstilen der Glücksspielkommission während des vergangenen Jahrzehnts liegt. Es beginnt damit, den lukrativen Charakter des Online-Glücksspielmarktes und die Herausforderungen durch die Praktiken der Geldwäsche (ML) hervorzuheben. Anschließend wird der institutionelle Aufbau des AML-Regimes im Vereinigten Königreich überprüft, einschließlich der Rolle der Glücksspielkommission und der National Crime Agency (NCA). Darin werden die wichtigsten Prioritäten für Glücksspielanbieter diskutiert, wie etwa die Sorgfaltspflicht für Kunden (Customer Due Diligence, CDD) und die Einreichung verdächtiger Tätigkeitsberichte (SARs). In diesem Kapitel wird auch der Wandel des Regulierungsansatzes der Kommission von einem versöhnlichen hin zu einem straffreieren Stil untersucht, sowie die Bemühungen, die Zusammenarbeit mit der Branche durch Initiativen wie die Gambling Anti-Money Laundering Group (GAMLG) zu fördern. Die Analyse umfasst eine Diskussion der Herausforderungen und potenziellen Lösungen zur Verbesserung der Effektivität der AML-Politik im Glücksspielsektor. Insgesamt bietet dieses Kapitel einen detaillierten und ansprechenden Überblick über die Entwicklung und den aktuellen Stand der AML-Regulierung auf dem britischen Online-Glücksspielmarkt.
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Fußnoten
1
Grand View Research (2020).
 
2
Gambling Commission (2019a), p. 16.
 
3
Projections are that its average annual growth for the period 2020 to 2027 will be 11%; see Grand View Research (2020).
 
4
While HM Treasury and Home Office (2020, p. 131) assessed the overall ML risk in the gambling sector—when compared to other sectors—as low, the Gambling Commission (2020a, p. 4) assesses the online gambling sector as a high-risk area for ML.
 
5
Besides ‘cleaning’ monies gained through criminal activity, the definition of ML in the UK criminal system also covers other activities related to criminal proceeds such as concealment, acquisition, use, and transfer of criminal proceeds; see Section 340 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA).
 
6
Gambling Commission (2020b), p. 12.
 
7
Gambling Commission (2020b), p. 17.
 
8
See, for instance, Laffey et al. (2016).
 
9
See Section 1 of the Gambling (Licensing and Advertising) Act 2014. For further explanations see Chess and Elliott (2021).
 
10
See Financial Action Task Force (2018), p. 128.
 
11
Chess and Elliott (2021).
 
12
Financial Action Task Force (2018), p. 127.
 
13
Financial Action Task Force (2018), pp. 124–125.
 
14
For the latest, legislative review of the Gambling Act, which, at the time of writing, is still in progress, see Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (2020).
 
15
Sections 22 to 28 of the Gambling Act 2005.
 
16
Gambling Commission (2012), p. 18.
 
17
Gambling Commission (2012), p. 17.
 
18
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992).
 
19
For more about the concept of enforcement pyramid see Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), pp. 35–38.
 
20
Regulation 8 of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (MLRs).
 
21
Gambling Commission (2020c), p. 6.
 
22
Gambling Commission (2020c), pp. 6–7.
 
23
Takáts (2011).
 
24
Black (2008).
 
25
See, for instance, Brooks (2012), p. 310.
 
26
Regulation 27(1)(a), (c), (d) of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (MLRs). On certain occasions gambling operators apply enhanced CDD (e.g., if a customer is a politically exposed person or located in a high-risk country) or simplified CDD (this is often the case with UK residents); see Regulations 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37 of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (MLRs).
 
27
Regulation 27(5) of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (MLRs).
 
28
Regulation 27(1)(b) of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (MLRs).
 
29
Sections 330 and 331 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA).
 
30
Gambling Commission (2021), p. 60. See also Brooks (2012).
 
31
Gambling Commission (2021), pp. 16–21.
 
32
Gambling Commission (2021), p. 14.
 
33
For more about risk-based regulation see Hutter (2005).
 
34
Hampton (2005).
 
35
Gambling Commission (2007), p. 6.
 
36
Gambling Commission (2007), p. 6.
 
37
Financial Action Task Force (2018), p. 133.
 
38
Financial Action Task Force (2018), p. 133.
 
39
Financial Action Task Force (2018), p. 133.
 
40
Financial Action Task Force (2018), p. 133.
 
41
Gambling Commission (2013), p. 4. See also Gambling Commission (2015), p. 18.
 
42
Coglianese and Mendelson (2010).
 
43
Gambling Commission (2015), p. 8.
 
44
Gambling Commission (2015), p. 7.
 
45
Kagan (1989), p. 92. See also Gunningham (2010).
 
46
One of such cases is William Hill’s failure to reject repeated bets by its customer worth more than half a million-euro; see Gambling Commission (2018a).
 
47
HM Treasury and Home Office (2020), p. 136.
 
48
National Crime Agency (2017), pp. 46–51.
 
49
Gambling Commission (2015), p. 7.
 
50
This followed several public revelations of casinos’ and bookmakers’ failure to ensure the basic social responsibility protections in offering products to their customers. A survey by the Commission from 2018 indicated that 38% of respondents believed that gambling is associated with crime. Stealing by gambling addicts and ML were cited as the most common criminal activities related to gambling. The survey also showed that more than 70% of participants saw gambling as an activity that could jeopardise family life. Failure to comply with AML standards was thus one piece in the emerging picture of regulatory failure in the gambling market; see Gambling Commission (2019b), p. 5.
 
51
Gambling Commission (2018b), p. 22.
 
52
Gambling Commission (2018b), p. 14.
 
53
Gambling Commission (2018b), pp. 22–27.
 
54
Gambling Commission (2019a), p. 19.
 
55
Gambling Commission (2020b), p. 14.
 
56
Gambling Commission (2020b), p. 14 and 21.
 
57
Gambling Commission (2020b), p. 14.
 
58
Gambling Commission (2018b), p. 14.
 
59
Gambling Commission (2019c), p. 3.
 
60
See Gambling Commission (2019c), p. 13 and Gambling Commission (2019a), p. 14.
 
61
Gambling Commission (2020b), p. 21.
 
62
National Crime Agency (2020a), p. 17.
 
63
National Crime Agency (2020a), p. 17.
 
64
National Crime Agency (2021), p. 5.
 
65
National Crime Agency (2018), pp. 15–18.
 
66
National Crime Agency (2020b), pp. 20–23.
 
67
See National Crime Agency (2017), p. 14 and National Crime Agency (2021), p. 15.
 
68
In 2019–2020 banks submitted more than 400,000 SARs; see National Crime Agency (2020b), p. 9.
For detailed statistics of the SARs produced by gambling operators see HM Treasury and Home Office (2020), p. 137.
 
69
National Crime Agency (2021), p. 5.
 
70
Ross and Hannan (2007).
 
71
Dalla Pellegrina and Masciandaro (2009), p. 3.
 
72
Harvey (2004).
 
73
Gunningham (2011), p. 174.
 
74
See, for instance, Kagan (1989).
 
75
Baldwin and Black (2008).
 
76
Baldwin and Black (2008), p. 69. See also Black and Baldwin (2010).
 
77
Black (2003).
 
78
For a discussion on the difficulty of assessing SARs’ effectiveness, see, for instance, Bourton (2020), pp. 53–55.
 
79
Gold and Levi (1994), p. 64.
 
80
See Levi and Reuter (2006) and Levi and Maguire (2004).
 
81
See, for instance, the paper by Sittlington and Harvey (2018) which discusses how in practice competing incentives among the three sides tend to diminish the effectiveness of the AML policy in the UK.
 
82
Financial Action Task Force (2018), pp. 54–56.
 
83
See Brown (2018).
 
84
See Baldwin and Black (2008) and Black and Baldwin (2010).
 
Literatur
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Metadaten
Titel
Regulatory Approach to Anti-Money Laundering in Online Gambling in the UK
verfasst von
Slobodan Tomic
Copyright-Jahr
2022
Buch
Financial Technology and the Law

Print ISBN: 978-3-030-88035-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-88036-1

Copyright-Jahr: 2022

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88036-1_3