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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Regulatory Instruments for Public–Private Partnerships

verfasst von : Lisa Chever, Aude Le Lannier

Erschienen in: The Economics of Public-Private Partnerships

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter deals with ex ante and ex post mechanisms enabling to foster transparency and efficiency in PPPs as well as to limit information asymmetries. Ex ante, the authors discuss the advantages and drawbacks of the different award mechanisms. Ex post, they present control and performance incentive tools, with a focus on benchmarking mechanisms.

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Vorheriges Kapitel An Economic Analysis of Public–Private Partnerships

Nächstes Kapitel The Evolution of Financing Conditions for PPP Contracts: Still a Private Financing Model?

Public services such as water, electricity, urban transport, railways, postal services, etc.

This monopolistic nature does not generally extend to the entire industry. It mostly concerns the transport and distribution activities.

Indeed, public authority intervention in these sectors also aims at guaranteeing that every citizen has equal access to these services.

See Chapter “An Economic Analysis of Public–Private Partnerships” of the first part of this book for details about the agency theory.

Firms have access to the same inputs, the firms’ project estimates depend solely on their cost structure, and the environment is risky.

This does not exclude the fact that they may also be the instigators of new theories that develop independently.

For instance, if the value of the contract up for award is high, its realization will require calling on a firm with commensurate financial and human resources. At best, the contracting authority then runs the risk of facing an oligopolistic supply market with only a few companies eligible to apply. Moreover, if these firms anticipate such a situation, it can be in their interest to communicate to divide up the contracts among themselves…

In this sector, most of them are management contracts, with a share of a demand risk borne by the operator.

A firm “captures” a public authority when it exerts an important influence on the latter; the public authority then abnormally protects the interests of the firm.

In practice, this idea is similar to the concept of intuitu personae that is used in the case of PSDs.

Contract renegotiation initiated by the public authority can result from an opportunistic behavior on its part, which potentially and considerably reduces the operator’s profit margins. Such behavior increases uncertainty for operators, who can anticipate that the public authority will probably go back on its initial commitments. See Chapter “Renegotiating PPP Contracts: Opportunities and Pitfalls” in the second part of this book for more details on public opportunism and its consequences on PPP efficiency.

The selected consortia were led by Deloitte Advisory, Depfa Bank, Ernst & Young, and PricewaterhouseCoopers.

See Chapter “Horizontal and vertical agreements in PPPs” of the second part for an analysis of corruption, collusion, and favoritism issues in PPPs.

This “tolerance threshold” makes it possible to take into account hazards that are independent of the operators’ efforts and that could impact their performance (their final supply). If the gap between effective supply and theoretical supply does not exceed this threshold, no penalty is applied. Otherwise, penalties were to be imposed.

For instance, for the metro, the comfort indicator is measured at rush hour based on the share of passengers transported with an occupancy rate below four passengers per square meter, which is the determined contractual threshold used to define the saturation point of a train. This indicator is directly correlated with the level of actual supply.

An information asymmetry can also be advantageous for the public party in some cases, especially when the contract relates to the concession of networks that are better known by the contracting authority than by potential future concessionaires [see for instance Martimort & Sand-Zantman (2006)].

Government Accountability Office (GAO).

As observed by Moszoro and Spiller (2012), cost-plus contracts are viewed as “blank checks” for the partners and are a source of PPP inefficiency. The authors nevertheless highlight the fact that there is at least one exception. Indeed, the PPP set up through a cost-plus contract for the construction of Terminal 5 at Heathrow airport in London was delivered on time and at the cost initially provided for in the contract.

The regulator is able to observe the monopoly’s cost ex post, but it does not know whether this cost is “efficient” or not. Indeed, monopolies often benefit from a technological expertise that gives them an informational advantage compared to the regulator.

This study focuses on the sectors of energy, telecommunications, water, and transport.

The SFA method was initially developed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van Den Broeck (1977). See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2001) for an exhaustive analysis of stochastic frontiers and a description of the various existing SFA methodologies.

See Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) for an explanation of the DEA method. A complete description of the use of the DEA method for purposes of regulatory policies is provided by Thanassoulis (2000a, b). See also Charnes, Cooper, Lewin, and Seiford (1994) and Cooper, Seiford, and Zhu (2004) for an inventory of DEA applications.

Operators may anticipate the fact that a reduction in their costs provides information to the regulator, who will thus be given an incentive to subsequently increase the power of incentive of the regulatory contract (incentive clauses will be re-evaluated over time based on collected information). Firms may also seek to limit their efforts in terms of cost reduction so as to retain their informational advantage as long as possible and thus prevent the contract from “hardening.” This is referred to as a “ratchet effect.”

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Titel: Regulatory Instruments for Public–Private Partnerships
verfasst von: Lisa Chever
Aude Le Lannier
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: The Economics of Public-Private Partnerships
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-68049-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-68050-7

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68050-7_3