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Social Choice and Welfare

Erschienen in:

30.08.2016 | Original Paper

Relinquishing power, exploitation and political unemployment in democratic organizations

verfasst von: Carmen Beviá, Luis Corchón, Antonio Romero-Medina

Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare | Ausgabe 3-4/2017

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Abstract

We analyze the evolution of organizations which take decisions on whom to hire and how to share the output by plurality voting. Agents are grouped in three classes, high, medium and low productivity. We study the evolution of political power and show that in some cases, rational agents who value the future may yield political power to another class. This is what we call the relinquish effect. We show that high productivity agents may receive less than their individual output, i.e. exploitation is possible. We also show that high productivity agents may be left out in the cold because their entrance in an organization may threaten the dominance of other classes. We call this political unemployment.

Vorheriger Artikel On seeing and being seen

Nächster Artikel The political choice of social long term care transfers when family gives time and money

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Mavridis and Serena (2015) offered an appealing solution to the problem of multiplicity of Nash equilibrium in voting games when voting is costly.

But there are models of dynamic organizations in which this conclusion does not hold. In Sobel (2001) standards of admission and the average quality of incumbents rise or fall without any bound (which is impossible here because we only have three types). In Corchon (2005) there is free entry and an organization populated by high types may be subject to the entry of many low types whose life is easier under the command of a higher type. In our model there is no free entry.

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Titel: Relinquishing power, exploitation and political unemployment in democratic organizations
verfasst von: Carmen Beviá
Luis Corchón
Antonio Romero-Medina
Publikationsdatum: 30.08.2016
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare / Ausgabe 3-4/2017
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Elektronische ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0989-5

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