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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Renegotiating PPP Contracts: Opportunities and Pitfalls

verfasst von : Jean Beuve, Aude Le Lannier, Zoé Le Squeren

Erschienen in: The Economics of Public-Private Partnerships

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter reflects the double-sided view of the economic literature on contract renegotiation. The authors first describe opportunistic behaviors and the solutions to limit them. Second, they present renegotiation as a way to tackle necessary adaptation and incompleteness issues. They identify the contractual and institutional conditions enabling to favor efficient and balanced contracts life span.

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Titel: Renegotiating PPP Contracts: Opportunities and Pitfalls
verfasst von: Jean Beuve
Aude Le Lannier
Zoé Le Squeren
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: The Economics of Public-Private Partnerships
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-68049-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-68050-7

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68050-7_6