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2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

6. Repeat Offenders: Marginal Deterrence and Redemption

verfasst von : Thomas J. Miceli

Erschienen in: The Paradox of Punishment

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter extends the economic model of crime to include a dynamic element—given the reality that many criminals are repeat offenders. Several new issues arise in this context, including marginal deterrence, the possibility of redemption (or rehabilitation) of offenders, whether or not an offender’s criminal record should be considered in setting punishment for a current crime, and the role of prison in incapacitating dangerous repeat offenders. The parable of the Prodigal Son from the New Testament serves as a thematic point of departure for much of the discussion.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Plea Bargaining: Negotiated Justice

Nächstes Kapitel Individual Versus Collective Responsibility: It Takes a Village

If anything, the evidence suggests that prison hardens offenders.

Indeed, neo-classical economics generally avoids questions about varying preferences, preferring instead to treat them as fixed. See, for example, Stigler and Becker (1977).

Also see Shavell (1992), Wilde (1992), Friedman and Sjostrom (1993), and Friehe and Miceli (2014).

The issue is somewhat more complicated because extra deterrence can be achieved by raising either the severity of the sentence or the probability of imposing it. See, for example, Shavell (1992).

This discussion is based on Miceli (2013).

Also see Cooter (1984).

We will return to the use of prison as incapacitation below.

See Agan and Starr (2017).

See Rasmussen (1996), Funk (2004), and Miceli and Bucci (2005).

See, for example, Lott (1992) and Waldfogel (1994).

The subsequent discussion is based on Coşgel and Miceli (2018).

Hart (1982, p. 27) notes a similar trade-off when he observes that “Penalties which we believe are required as a threat to maintain conformity to law at its maximum may convert the offender to whom they are applied into a hardened member of society; while the use of measures of Reform may lower the efficacy and example of punishment on others.”

We will not consider here the use of prison aimed solely at incapacitating offenders. See the discussion below.

For notational simplicity, we will ignore discounting. Thus, costs or benefits in the two periods of a person’s life will be weighted equally.

That is, we proceed by backwards induction.

In technical terms, {Not commit, Not commit} is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

See, for example, Hylton (2005).

There is no need to consider the case where A < g because in that case, no deterrence of rational individuals is ever possible.

It is not necessary to make one punishment maximal and the other zero; all that is required is that the higher sanction be at least equal to g.

Marginal deterrence is literal when the resulting sequence is {Commit, Not commit} and implicit when it is {Not commit, Commit}.

Clearly, therefore, only a period-one sinner can be redeemed.

As above, we don’t need to consider the case of “weak” or nonbelievers—that is, those with A < g—since they are undeterrable.

Remember that the constraint here is simply that s₁ ≥ g. We have set s₁ = A but any combination of s₁ and s₂ = A − s₁ would yield the same basic conclusion provided that the constraint on s₁ is met.

Also see Ekelund and Tollison (2011) on this point.

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Titel: Repeat Offenders: Marginal Deterrence and Redemption
verfasst von: Thomas J. Miceli
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: The Paradox of Punishment
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-31694-5

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-31695-2

Copyright-Jahr: 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31695-2_6