Resisting Salafism and the Arabization of Indonesian Islam: a contemporary Indonesian didactic tale by Komaruddin Hidayat

Unless otherwise indicated data included in this paper is based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Indonesia between 1998 and 2015.

Salafism is a revivalist current in Sunni Islam that seeks to establish what is understood the Islam of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions as religious, social and in many instances, political realities (Commins 2009; Meijer 2009). It is rooted in the teachings of the 13th century Hanbalite jurist Ibn Tamiyyah (1263–1328). Wahhabism is a variety of Salafism based on the teachings of the Arabian Hanbalite jurist Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahad (1703–92) (Algar 2002; De Long-Bas 2004). Ibn Tamiyyah advocated literal readings of the Qur’an and Hadith (traditions concerning the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad), stricter implementation of criminal provisions of Shari’ah than was customary in his day and an unconventional interpretation of the doctrine of (the unity or oneness of God) that justifies religious exclusivism. Most traditional Indonesian Muslim scholars (ulama) define tawhid simply as monotheism. One I spoke with in 2016 stated: “The angels only ask one question (about God)” in response to questions about tawhid. This is a reference to the questions the angels Munkar and Nakir ask the departed: “Who is your Lord?” “Who is your Prophet?” and “What is your religion?” The correct answers are “Allah,” “Muhammad” and “Islam” if one is to avoid torment in the grave. This minimalist definition is also the most inclusive because it posits that anyone who accepts the proposition “There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah” is a Muslim. There are, however, many more complex interpretations ranging from monism to detailed specifications of the principles of monotheism. In the kalam (systematic theology) tradition there are complex debates concerning the ontological status of the attributes (sifat) of Allah and their relationship with the divine essence. On these debates see: Martin and Woodward (1997), Van Ess (2006) and Watt (1998). Some Sufis, including Ibn al-Arabi (1165–1240), define tawhid as the “unity of being” (wahdat al-wujud) that denies an existential distinction between Allah and creation because, it is asserted, that all of creation pre-exited in the mind of Allah prior to the moment of creation. Other Sufis maintain that there is a metaphysical distinction between creator and created but that Sufi masters come to share in divine consciousness. This is referred to as the “unity of vision” (wahdat ash-shuhud) (Schimmel 1978). Salafis reject these propositions. Their interpretations of tawhid also hold that the first clause of the Confession of Faith, (shahada), entails more than mere declaration that “There is no god but Allah.” Ibn Tamiyyah specified three essential components of tawhid: Tawhid Rububiyyah (The absolute lordship of Allah), Tawhid Uluhiyyah (The worship only of Allah), Asmaa wa sifaat (Affirmation of the Names and Attributes of Allah) (Cook 2001). Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1992), the founder of the Salafi school that bears his name repeated this tri-partate definition in his highly influential Kitab al-Tawhid. Commins (2009:12) describes it as being: “the core of Sheikh Muhammad’s teaching and the foundation of the Wahhabi canon.” As Memon (1976) observes, he was also a strident critic of Sufism and popular religious practices rooted in local cultures. In contemporary Indonesia the terms are often joined as Salafi-Wahhabi and refer to Muslims who use contemporary Saudi Arabian Islam as a model for belief and practice; who mimic Saudi behavioral patterns including dress and the restriction of women’s roles in public life and who condemn other forms of Islamic religious practice and local cultures as unbelief even if they do not adhere to the Hanbalite school of Muslim jurisprudence.

Indonesian Salafism is socially and politically diverse. On the Tarbiyah movements see Machmudi (2008) and Woodward et al. (2013a, b). There are a wide variety of such movements. Some including Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice and Prosperity Party/ PKS) are political, others seek to isolate themselves from what they think of an irretrievably sinful and corrupt society. PKS rejects most aspects of traditional Indonesian Muslim religious practice but does not call for a carte blanc rejection of Indonesian cultures because to do so would cost them votes. The party has reluctantly embraced local culture to enhance its electoral appeal (Rahmat 2008). There are also apolitical groups who adopt forms of dress (for both women and men) based on conservative Middle Eastern styles. Men wear either thawb (robes) or white cotton pants that do not reach their ankles and matching tunics similar to those worn by South Asian Muslims. Many grow beards. They are often referred to as “long beard, short pants (celana pendek, jenggot panjang).” This practice is motivated by belief that if the hem of a man’s garment touches the ground it is “in the fire.” Women typically wear black robes (abayah) and face veils (niqab). Many will pray only pray in their own mosques, break ties with friends and families and do not interact with others except when seeking to convert them or confronting them as kafir. Many live communally, often eating together from the same dish. Polygamous marriages are common. Many live in abject poverty because most other Indonesians fear them and will not employ them. Some depend on alms distributed by Middle East and Indonesian Muslim charities, others run small shops selling snacks, books, clothing and other “Muslim products.” Others are seemingly well to do and can be seen shopping in supermarkets and upscale malls. Their parents support some university students affiliated with these groups. The young man mentioned here was affiliated with one of these groups consisting primarily of students at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta. There are also mass organizations including Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam who endorse Salafi-Wahhabi understandings of tawhid that do not endorse the emulation of Saudi Arabian cultural practices or social isolation (Federspiel 2009; Nakamura 2012). There are also isolationist Salafis not tied to the tarbiyah movement. Many are associated with pesantren (traditional Islamic boarding school) led by graduates of Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia (Smith and Woodward 2014). There are other Salafis who seek to impose their understanding of Islam on Indonesia through violent means. Jema’ah Islamiyah and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (Jones 2002, Solahudin 2013) are examples.

Nadhlatul Ulama (NU), with approximately eighty million followers, is the largest Indonesian Muslim organization. It was founded in 1926 partly in response to the Wahhabi occupation of Mecca and Medina. NU is led by kyai, charismatic figures combining the attributes of Shar’iah oriented ulama and Sufi syechs. Many kyai are reputed to have great mystical powers. There are more than 15,000 pesantren (boarding schools) affiliated with NU, many of which are linked to Sufi orders. NU piety emphasizes prayers for the dead (tahlilan), pilgrimage to holy graves (ziyarah) and the recitation of salawat (poetry praising the Prophet Muhammad). On NU and the pesantren tradition see: Barton and Fealy (1996), Dhofier (1999) and Woodward et al. (2010).

The story was originally posted on the Internet discussion list KMNU 2000 on November 14, 2008 and since then has been reposted on many Indonesian Blogs. A stable URL is http://​cakshon.​com/​2008/​10/​30/​kiai-hasyim-asyari-dan-bung-hatta/​. The commentary quoted at the beginning of this paper was posted less than an hour after the story itself.

Muhammadiyah is Indonesia’s second largest Muslim organization. It was founded in 1912 and advocates a combination of modernity and especially modern education and a Salafi understanding of Muslim theology and ritual practice (Nakamura 2012).

It is important to note that not all of the violent extremist groups in Indonesia have Salafi theological orientations. Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender’s Front) is an example of a violent group with a traditionalist Sufi orientation (Woodward 2014).

Jacobson, D., Olmsted, M., Deckard, N. and Woodward, M. “Survey of Muslims in Western Europe, West Africa, and Malaysia: Sample Characteristics,” Arizona State University Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict, (2012) https://​csrc.​asu.​edu/​research/​publications/​articles/​survey1-sample A survey conducted by the Lembaga Survey Indonesia in 2010 reported that only 7% of Indonesians are members of or sympathize with the Salafi oriented Muhammadiyah, compared with 40% who are members of or sympathize with the Sufi oriented Nahdlatul Ulama. http://​sangpencerah.​com/​2016/​02/​muhammadiyah-ormas-islam-yang-mampu-bertahan-lebih-100-tahun.​html Another, sponsored by NU indicated that in even in urban areas where they are most common Salafis comprise no more than 10.1% of the Indonesian Muslim population. https://​www.​google.​com/​search?​client=​safari&​rls=​en&​q=​www.​nu.​or.​id/​post/​read/​52495/​hasil-survei-588-muslim-kota-mengaku-nu&​ie=​UTF-8&​oe=​UTF-8

The Muslim World League (Rabita al-Alam al-Islami) is among the most important means Saudi Arabia uses to propagate Wahhabi teachings. It supports Wahhabi schools and missionary efforts across the world. In Indonesia it works closely with Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA) The Institute of Arabic and Islamic Sciences that supports educational efforts and provides scholarships for Indonesian students to study at Saudi Arabian Islamic universities. It also provides financial support for Wahhabi oriented schools and Islamic Centers.

Most Western accounts of contemporary Islam fail to recognize the centrality of concerns about the after life, if they mention them at all. Some of those who oppose the encroachment of Wahhabi Islam on national and local traditions are also resort to the discourse of “hell fire.” At a haul, the annual ceremony commemorating the death of a revered scholar/saint, in Surakarta in 2009 banners picturing a group of sheyks praying for their departed comrade included the following slogan in both Indonesian and Arabic: “Those who do not mourn the death of a scholar are munafik.” Munafik are “hypocrites” who present themselves as Muslims, but actually are not. They too will burn in hell. Most Muhammadiyah and NU scholars I have spoken with do not accept this exclusivist view

Jemaah Islamiah/JI, the group that organized the 2002 “Bali Bombing” is an example. See Abuza (2003), Barton (2005) and Woodward et al. (2013a, b). Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia / HTI is an example of a nonviolent extremist group with similar goals (Ward 2009).

On Laskar Jihad see Hasan (2006).

On the increasingly global character of Indonesian Muslim discourse and the role of Indonesian graduates of Saudi Arabian Universities in the process see Azra (2002). Dewan Dakwah was founded by Mohammad Natsir (1908–1993). Like Mohammad Hatta, Natsir was a Dutch educated Minankabau from West Sumatra. He was simultaneously a strident Indonesian nationalist and a committed Salafi Muslim. He was associated with the Salafi organization Persatuan Islam, (The Unity of Islam) and the Islamic political party Masyumi. He was Indonesia’s Prime Minister in 1950 and 1951. He was imprisoned for participation in an ethno-religious rebellion from 1962 until 1966. He established Dewan Dakwah because the Indonesian government would not reverse its 1960 decision to ban Mayumi. He played a major role in founding the tarbiyah movement. For further details see Federspiel (2009), Liddle (1996) Kahin (2012) and Woodward et al. (2013a, b).

On relationships between this religious orientation and violence in Indonesia see Ahnaf (2006), Jones (2002) and Turmudi (2006).

This is hate speech. For a more extensive discussion of the relationship between hate speech and violence see Woodward (2014). It is important to note that most Indonesian Salafis are not violent and that some of the most violent groups including Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front/FPI) are not Salafi. (Woodward et al. 2013a, b)

Here the term secular refers to people who are less than fully observant Muslims, not secular in the Western sense of being entirely non-religious.

Gadjah Mada is one of Indonesia’s elite secular universities. Islamist student movements are much stronger at secular than they are at Islamic universities. The reason for this is that students at Islamic universities have much deeper understandings of religion than their more secular counterparts and are less easily swayed by simple Islamist teachings. Recruiters for both nonviolent extremist groups such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia the violent Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) focus their efforts on young people from secular or less than fully observant Muslim backgrounds. One former NII recruiter explained that it is difficult, if not impossible, to sway people from pesantren backgrounds or students at Islamic universities and that secular youth were more likely to be convinced that his message was “Islam.” However, recruiters from violent extremist groups such as JI also target students from Salafi backgrounds. Recruiting these people requires a shift in political, but not religious orientation.

There are exceptions to this generalization. The global Ba’alawi and Nasqabhandi Sufi orders are examples. Significantly both intersect with local traditions including NU in Indonesia (Woodward et al. 2013a, b).

On the characteristics of resistance narratives see Myrsiades (1993).

Anabaptist revitalization movements rang from the pacifist of the Amish of North America to the violent campaigns against established religious and political authority in 16th century Germany by Thomas Munster, the self-anointed “Slayer of the Godless.” (Goertz 1996)

For additional detail see Masyharuddin (2010).

On Muslim education in Mecca in the later part of the nineteenth century see Snouck Hurgronje (2007/1899).

For further detail see Rose (1987).

Suara Nahdlatul Ulama, May 10, 2016 http://​www.​nu.​or.​id/​post/​read/​68092/​inilah-naskah-lengkap-deklarasi-nahdlatul-ulama-kepada-dunia

Launching the film “The Blessing Islam Nusantara” At the 15th NU Youth Movement (ANSOR) Congress Pondok Pesantren Sunan Pandanaran, Yogyakarta Indonesia November 26–27, 2015. https://​www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​P-OZ4fkuXds . Indonesian Salafis denounce the concept of Islam Nusantara, which the often refer to as Islam NUsantara, as “anti-Arab” and “anti-Islamic.” http://​www.​yuk-kenal-nu.​net/​2015/​09/​01/​awas-bahaya-islam-nusantara-1/​. Irfan Awwas of the Indonesian Mujahideen Council stated: “Islam Nusantara is not Islam, because its teachings are different from Islam in the Arab world.” Some Salafi Islamists now call for the establishment of Negara Islam Nusantara (Archipelagic Islamic State) in response to the NU initiative.

The length of time a scholar spends in Mecca and Medina was traditionally understood as a measure of piety and learning. This is increasingly less so as Islamic knowledge has become more widely dispersed and because the Saudi Arabian government places limits of what kind of Islam can be taught in the Holy cities. Increasingly Indonesians, other than those attracted to Saudi Wahhabism visit Arabia only to perform the hajj or umrah pilgrimages. Aqil Siraj is an exception. He studied in Saudi Arabia and remained firmly rooted in NU tradition.

Gus Dur is an affectionate nickname for former Indonesian President and revered NU religious leader Abdurrahman Wahid (1940–2009).

Not all Indonesians who study in Saudi Universities are radicalized or accept Wahhabi teachings. For some, exposure to Wahhabi teachings and modes of ritual practice reinforces their traditional faith.

These are the two most common Indonesian critiques of Saudi Arabian Islam. A more subtle critique is that the Saudis do not recognize the distinction between Islam and their own cultural traditions. Another is that they have destroyed many of the historical holy places in Mecca and Medina to build high-rise hotels and shopping malls.

Taken together these comments can be understood as an admonition for young people studying abroad not to become overly westernized or overly Arabized. It also suggests that Indonesians who make a point of wearing Arab clothing are psychologically and perhaps morally weak. The counter examples, Bung Hatta and Kyai Hasyim Asy’ari lived abroad for many years and accumulated vast stores of knowledge but retained their Indonesian identities. The reference to the National Monument (MONAS) is complex. It is an imposing obelisk 132 m in height located in Merdeka (Independence) Square in central Jakarta. Planning for a monument that would rival the Eiffel Tower began in 1954. Construction began in 1961 and was not completed until 1975. A museum located at the base of the monument includes dioramas depicting the history of Indonesia (or the imagination thereof) from prehistoric to modern times. (National Monument Office 1996). MONAS has often been the site of demonstrations by groups of all political and religious orientations, among them FPI and HTI. Hidayat’s comment suggests that it is a paradox that some Indonesians display symbols of a pseudo Saudi Arabian identity at such a prominent symbol of Indonesian identity.

This is a reference to groups including Front Pembela Islam (Front for the Defense of Islam/FPI) and others who use violent tactics in attempts to impose their understandings of Islamic orthodoxy and morality on the Indonesian public. The message is clear and an important theme in Indonesian Muslim discourse. The best way to spread Islam is though acts of kindness, not violence and coercion. One of the frequently cited examples is that of the legendary 15th century Javanese saint Sunan Kudus who is said to have prohibited slaughtering cattle to avoid offending the Hindus he hoped to convert to Islam. To this day the slaughter of cattle is forbidden in the city of Kudus even though the entire population, with the exception of a few Chinese, has long since become Muslim. The “peaceful transition to Islam” is an important part of Indonesian Nationalist mythology. War and conquest also played a part. The same legends that describe Sunan Kudus as be sensitive to the sensibilities of Hindus describe him as having been a military commander in the war that led to the destruction of the last Javanese Hindu kingdom. (Woodward 2014)

The Wali Songo are the nine Sufi saints, among them Sunan Kudus, who according to Javanese texts and oral tradition were instrumental in establishing Islam as the religion of Java in the 15th century. They are said to have employed peaceful persuasion to bring people to Islam. Hundreds of thousands of Javanese and other Indonesians make pilgrimages to their graves every year. (Rinkes 1996; Van Dijk 1998; Woodward 2014)

This is still common practice.

This is an idealized view of the role of kyai in community life. It is true that many kyai served their students and devotees in this way. Many still do. The parents of students and alumnae of pesantren make substantial gifts to Kyai especially on Id al-Fitri at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan. During the New Order period, in which Indonesia’s second president ruled the country with an iron fist, the Indonesian government made substantial contribution to pesantren and kyai in return for political support. The Ministry of Religion also provides substantial support to pesantren. Hidayat presents an idealized view of traditional Islam because many kyai have also been landlords and merchants as well as religious teachers. The idealization of the past is, however, a basic element of revitalization movements. They seek to return to the mythical, not the historical past.

Pesantren became much more closely tied to the state when they began to offer curriculum that enabled them to issue credentials equivalent to those of state middle and secondary schools in the 1980s (Lukens-Bull 2005). In many parts of Indonesia Kyai are still among the most respected authority figures. Since the democratic transition of 1998 politicians have routinely sought their support and endorsement. This was also true in the period leading up to Indonesia’s first contested election in 1955. At that time the Islamic Masyumi party relied on kyai and their families to mobilize support at the village level. People I interviewed who participated in that campaign stated that many villagers thought that it was a religious obligation to vote for the candidate the kyai endorsed. I have been present on several occasions since the democratic transition of 1998 when politicians arrived at a pesantren with a truck filled with enough food to feed one hundred or more people hoping to secure endorsements.

Here Professor Hidayat’s argument is the moral decline of Muslim leadership leads to that of the Muslim community as a whole and consequently to that of the nation.

Aceh is located in North Sumatra. Acehnese are fiercely independent and fervent Muslims. Aceh was one of the first centers of Islam in Southeast Asia. The thirteenth century Italian traveler Marco Polo and the fourteenth century Moroccan Ibn Batutah both mentioned Muslim kingdoms in the region. The Acehnese fought a bitter war against the Dutch (1873–1904). Low level fighting continued against the Dutch continued until the beginning of the Second World War and shifted to armed resistance against the Japanese and later the Indonesian Republic. Peace came to the region only after the 2004 tsunami. Under the terms of an agreement signed in 2005 Aceh was established as an autonomous region (daerah istimewa) governed by Shari’ah. There have been seriously controversies concerning what Shari’ah actually is. Qanun, regulations intended to implement Shari’ah have focused almost exclusively on gender related issues and corporal punishments including canning. The Shari’ah police charged with enforcing these regulations (Wilayatul Hisbah) are notoriously corrupt and have been implicated in numerous cases of sexual assault. There is little support for these regulations especially in rural areas where no more than half of women wear the jilbab/tudung (head coverings). A member of the Shari’ah faculty at a private Islamic university I spoke with in 2010 complained bitterly that “Shari’ah in Aceh is only about women’s clothing, politicians’ sexual fantasies and beating people” and that Shari’ah implementation had done nothing to solve real problems including corruption. He also stated that there are local issues including harborage rights that Shari’ah can not address and that during the struggle against those he described as “Javanese colonialists” the Acehnese had fought for justice, not empty talk. For further details see Aspinall (2009), Feener (2013) and Reid (2007).

Appadurai (1996), Asad (1995), Comaroff and Comaroff (1997).

On the use of the concept of colonialism in contemporary Indonesian Islamic discourse see Woodward (2008).

Mataram was the last major Islamic Sultanate in Java. It was founded in the sixteenth century and in 1749 divided into the two states of Yogyakarta and Surakarta both of which have persisted until the present, though only Yogyakarta retains a semblance of political authority (Ricklefs 1974; Woodward 1989).

Declaring professed Muslims to be unbelievers (takfir) is a common element of extremist discourse in Indonesia and elsewhere and is used to justify violence (Esposito 2002). It is theologically problematic. It is stated in the Qur’an that “If a person says wassalamu alaikum to you to indicate that he is a Muslim, you cannot say to him “you are not a believer” (4:94). There are many Hadith stating that making a false accusation of unbelief makes one an unbeliever (Volpi 2011:273). Historically ulama have been reluctant to employ it as a discursive strategy because of the recognition of the inevitability of disagreement on theological issues (Adang et al. 2015)