

The Curse of Knowledge?
Supplementary material

March 1, 2018

Table A: Countries and number of respondents

Country	Respondents
AU-Australia	1432
AT-Austria	1033
BE-Belgium	2264
CL-Chile	1432
TW-Taiwan	1875
HR-Croatia	1000
CZ-Czech Republic	1532
DK-Denmark	1758
FI-Finland	1505
FR-France	1211
GE-Georgia	1498
DE-Germany	1718
HU-Hungary	1007
IS-Iceland	1497
IN-India	1209
IL-Israel	1204
JP-Japan	1593
KR-Korea (South)	1370
LT-Lithuania	1119
NL-Netherlands	1638
NO-Norway	1459
PH-Philippines	1200
PL-Poland	2112
RU-Russia	1600
SK-Slovak Republic	1156
SI-Slovenia	1010
ZA-South Africa	3124
ES-Spain	1755
SE-Sweden	899
CH-Switzerland	1235
TR-Turkey	1509
UK - United Kingdom	1580
US-United States	1264
VE-Venezuela	1009

Table B: Predicting Self-Regarding Attitudes: Individual Components

	Internal political efficacy 1		Internal political efficacy 2		Political interest		Political media consumption	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Education	0.092*** (0.013)	0.087*** (0.0098)	0.093*** (0.014)	0.11*** (0.011)	0.080*** (0.018)	0.13*** (0.0089)	0.050*** (0.011)	0.065*** (0.0072)
Low corruption (Ref: No corruption)	0.22 (0.23)		-0.032 (0.16)		-0.33 (0.25)		-0.10 (0.18)	
Moderate corruption	-0.021 (0.24)		-0.13 (0.21)		-0.62* (0.25)		-0.22 (0.16)	
High corruption	-0.14 (0.26)		-0.099 (0.30)		-0.57* (0.26)		-0.073 (0.21)	
Very high corruption	0.043 (0.33)		-0.12 (0.17)		-0.93** (0.32)		-0.50 (0.25)	
Low corruption * Education	-0.024 (0.013)		-0.0060 (0.010)		0.010 (0.013)		0.0050 (0.012)	
Moderate corruption * Education	-0.011 (0.013)		-0.0020 (0.013)		0.024 (0.013)		0.012 (0.011)	
High corruption * Education	0.0035 (0.014)		-0.0020 (0.018)		0.016 (0.014)		-0.0026 (0.014)	
Very high corruption * Education	-0.0058 (0.019)		-0.011 (0.011)		0.031 (0.019)		0.014 (0.017)	
Corruption		-0.27 (0.16)		0.069 (0.15)		0.25 (0.16)		0.087 (0.096)
Corruption * Education		0.0020 (0.0081)		-0.0070 (0.0080)		-0.0094 (0.0079)		-0.0043 (0.0045)
Random intercept (var)		0.57 (0.16)		0.69 (0.20)		0.60 (0.18)		0.26 (0.10)
Random slope (var)		0.0016 (0.00046)		0.0012 (0.00034)		0.0017 (0.00042)		0.00057 (0.00021)
Individual-level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-level controls		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Country-fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	33643	32163	33407	31957	34187	32981	34317	33225
Countries	31	29	31	29	31	29	31	29

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models were estimated using (multilevel) ordinal logistic regression. Individual-level controls include: Income, gender, age, age², place of living, marital status, and incumbent support. Country-level controls include GDP per capita (logged), level of democracy, effective number of parties, and electoral system. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table C: Predicting Institutional Attitudes: Individual Components

	External political efficacy 1		External political efficacy 2		Satisfaction with democracy		Personal profit (politicians)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Education	0.077*** (0.011)	0.094*** (0.0084)	0.072*** (0.0096)	0.076*** (0.0096)	0.042** (0.014)	0.045*** (0.0087)	0.073*** (0.012)	0.066*** (0.0090)
Low corruption (Ref: No corruption)	-0.014 (0.14)		-0.26 (0.14)		-0.21 (0.24)		-0.068 (0.23)	
Moderate corruption	-0.27* (0.12)		-0.45** (0.16)		-0.71* (0.35)		-0.33 (0.32)	
High corruption	-0.13 (0.19)		-0.39* (0.17)		-1.19** (0.37)		-0.66 (0.38)	
Very high corruption	-0.22 (0.19)		-0.45 (0.27)		-1.68** (0.50)		-0.48 (0.39)	
Low corruption * Education	-0.016 (0.0091)		-0.0051 (0.0096)		-0.018 (0.013)		-0.024* (0.011)	
Moderate corruption * Education	-0.0091 (0.010)		-0.023* (0.0098)		-0.029 (0.018)		-0.043** (0.016)	
High corruption * Education	-0.040*** (0.011)		-0.061*** (0.011)		-0.053* (0.019)		-0.068*** (0.019)	
Very high corruption * Education	-0.054*** (0.015)		-0.086*** (0.023)		-0.080* (0.029)		-0.13*** (0.018)	
Corruption		-0.20 (0.22)		-0.056 (0.12)		-0.36** (0.13)		-0.089 (0.14)
Corruption * Education		-0.013* (0.0056)		-0.011* (0.0057)		-0.011* (0.0064)		-0.014* (0.0060)
Random intercept (var)		0.75 (0.19)		0.53 (0.18)		0.76 (0.27)		0.72 (0.17)
Random slope (var)		0.00075 (0.00028)		0.0015 (0.00044)		0.0019 (0.00062)		0.0010 (0.000)
Individual-level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-level controls		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Country-fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	34004	32659	34053	32735	33687	31961	33832	32359
Countries	31	29	31	29	31	29	31	29

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models were estimated using (multilevel) ordinal logistic regression, except for models 5-6 which were estimated with OLS and multilevel regression respectively. Individual-level controls include: Income, gender, age, age², place of living, marital status, and incumbent support. Country-level controls include GDP per capita (logged), level of democracy, effective number of parties, and electoral system. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table D: Multilevel Models with the CPI

	Self-regarding attitudes	Institutional attitudes	Voting	NIPP
Education	0.066*** (0.010)	0.065*** (0.0076)	0.14*** (0.026)	0.072*** (0.016)
Corruption	-0.055 (0.064)	-0.12* (0.055)	-0.059 (0.14)	-0.17 (0.099)
Corruption * Education	-0.00031 (0.0033)	-0.0094*** (0.0022)	-0.013* (0.0069)	0.0039 (0.0043)
Random intercept (var)	0.16 (0.0022)	0.20 (0.049)	1.41 (0.66)	0.58 (0.16)
Random slope (var)	0.00043 (0.00013)	0.00039 (0.00011)	0.0034 (0.0016)	0.0013 (0.00037)
Individual-level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	30511	30127	29935	29647
Countries	29	29	28	29

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models 1-2 were estimated using multilevel regression, model 3 was estimated multilevel logistic regression, and model 4 was estimated using multilevel Poisson regression. Individual-level controls include: Income, gender, age, age², place of living, marital status, and incumbent support. Country-level controls include GDP per capita (logged), level of democracy, effective number of parties, and electoral system. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table E: All Observations

	Self-regarding attitudes		Institutional attitudes		Voting		NIPP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Education	0.038** (0.013)	0.063*** (0.0062)	0.029** (0.0093)	0.040*** (0.0056)	0.076*** (0.022)	0.11*** (0.018)	0.022*** (0.0035)	0.078*** (0.0092)
Low corruption (Ref: No corruption)	-0.17 (0.12)		-0.25 (0.14)		-0.23 (0.23)		-0.37** (0.14)	
Moderate corruption	-0.29* (0.13)		-0.41* (0.16)		-0.36 (0.27)		-0.45* (0.18)	
High corruption	-0.34 (0.18)		-0.55** (0.19)		-0.33 (0.25)		-0.67*** (0.18)	
Very high corruption	-0.39 (0.19)		-0.64** (0.22)		-0.084 (0.22)		-0.28 (0.20)	
Low corruption * Education	0.0072 (0.0062)		0.0028 (0.0068)		0.0041 (0.017)		0.021** (0.0067)	
Moderate corruption * Education	0.012 (0.0070)		-0.0086 (0.0068)		-0.00011 (0.022)		0.023* (0.0099)	
High corruption * Education	0.017 (0.011)		-0.023* (0.0094)		-0.012 (0.021)		0.042*** (0.0097)	
Very high corruption * Education	0.014 (0.012)		-0.038** (0.011)		-0.045* (0.019)		0.016 (0.013)	
Corruption		-0.00031 (0.044)		-0.011 (0.057)		0.036 (0.15)		0.0037 (0.087)
Corruption * Education		-0.0015 (0.0024)		-0.0049* (0.0024)		-0.012* (0.0057)		-0.0028 (0.0037)
Random intercept (var)		0.21 (0.062)		0.29 (0.080)		1.67 (0.52)		0.56 (0.15)
Random slope (var)		0.00054 (0.00016)		0.00058 (0.00012)		0.0038 (0.0013)		0.0013 (0.00037)
Individual-level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-level controls		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Country-fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	33923	31393	33891	31007	32914	30864	32929	30490
Countries	33	30	33	30	32	29	33	30

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include all observations (not excluding Russia and Venezuela, or respondents who stated that they have over 30 years of education). Models 1-4 were estimated using OLS and multilevel regression. Models 5-6 were estimated using logistic and multilevel logistic regression. Models 7-8 were estimated using Poisson and multilevel Poisson regression. Individual-level controls include: Income, gender, age, age², place of living, marital status, and incumbent support. Country-level controls include GDP per capita (logged), level of democracy, effective number of parties, and electoral system. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table F: Predicting NIPP: Alternative Modeling

	NIPP	
Education	0.042** (0.015)	0.083*** (0.011)
Low corruption (Ref: No corruption)	-0.33 (0.23)	
Moderate corruption	-0.61** (0.23)	
High corruption	-0.72* (0.28)	
Very high corruption	-0.42* (0.19)	
Low corruption * Education	0.019 (0.013)	
Moderate corruption * Education	0.037** (0.013)	
High corruption * Education	0.048** (0.017)	
Very high corruption * Education	0.029* (0.013)	
Corruption		-0.12 (0.12)
Corruption * Education		0.0026 (0.0054)
$\ln(\alpha)$	-0.53** (0.16)	-0.63*** (0.030)
Random intercept (var)		0.68 (0.19)
Random slope (var)		0.0015 (0.00044)
Individual-level controls	Yes	Yes
Country-level controls		Yes
Country-fixed effects	Yes	
Observations	31206	29647
Countries	31	29

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Both models were estimated using (multilevel) negative binomial regression. Individual-level controls include: Income, gender, age, age², place of living, marital status, and incumbent support. Country-level controls include GDP per capita (logged), level of democracy, effective number of parties, and electoral system. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table G: Relative Education Estimates

	Self-regarding attitudes		Institutional attitudes		Voting		NIPP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Education	0.22*** (0.028)	0.28*** (0.023)	0.17*** (0.021)	0.19*** (0.018)	0.29** (0.10)	0.52*** (0.073)	0.18** (0.059)	0.33*** (0.038)
Low corruption (Ref: No corruption)	-0.064 (0.042)		-0.21*** (0.055)		-0.17* (0.074)		-0.088 (0.067)	
Moderate corruption	-0.12** (0.042)		-0.52*** (0.077)		-0.35*** (0.083)		-0.14* (0.071)	
High corruption	-0.12* (0.045)		-0.83*** (0.092)		-0.49*** (0.080)		-0.10 (0.087)	
Very high corruption	-0.22** (0.070)		-1.08*** (0.11)		-0.65*** (0.071)		-0.046 (0.090)	
Low corruption * Education	-0.0031 (0.022)		-0.029 (0.020)		0.036 (0.076)		0.060 (0.051)	
Moderate corruption * Education	0.022 (0.023)		-0.057* (0.027)		0.033 (0.095)		0.12* (0.053)	
High corruption * Education	0.014 (0.024)		-0.15*** (0.031)		-0.061 (0.087)		0.13* (0.063)	
Very high corruption * Education	0.0098 (0.032)		-0.21*** (0.043)		-0.19* (0.089)		0.061 (0.051)	
Corruption		-0.0095 (0.048)		-0.19*** (0.050)		-0.15 (0.14)		-0.080 (0.072)
Corruption * Education		-0.016 (0.015)		-0.039*** (0.012)		-0.092** (0.035)		-0.00082 (0.019)
Random intercept (var)		0.046 (0.014)		0.12 (0.032)		0.41 (0.12)		0.14 (0.038)
Random slope (var)		0.0061 (0.0017)		0.0064 (0.0019)		0.053 (0.019)		0.017 (0.0051)
Individual-level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-level controls		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Country-fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	32222	30511	32222	30127	31176	29935	31206	29647
Countries	31	29	31	29	30	28	31	29

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Education* is the relative education measure described in the main text (equation 3). Models 1-4 were estimated using OLS and multilevel regression. Models 5-6 were estimated using logistic and multilevel logistic regression. Models 7-8 were estimated using Poisson and multilevel Poisson regression. Individual-level controls include: Income, gender, age, age², place of living, marital status, and incumbent support. Country-level controls include GDP per capita (logged), level of democracy, effective number of parties, and electoral system. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table H: Imputed Data: Main Models

	Self-regarding attitudes		Institutional participation		Voting		Non-institutionalized consumption	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Education	0.043*** (0.0058)	0.047*** (0.0069)	0.029*** (0.0040)	0.027*** (0.011)	0.047*** (0.015)	0.050*** (0.0055)	0.049*** (0.011)	0.055*** (0.0067)
Low corruption (Ref: No corruption)	0.028 (0.088)		-0.13 (0.074)		0.047 (0.20)		-0.21 (0.13)	
Moderate corruption	-0.096 (0.096)		-0.44*** (0.093)		-0.24 (0.20)		-0.21 (0.13)	
High corruption	-0.080 (0.10)		-0.52*** (0.11)		-0.23 (0.19)		-0.10 (0.13)	
Very high corruption	-0.26 (0.14)		-0.58* (0.14)		-0.35* (0.16)		0.20 (0.15)	
Low corruption * Education	-0.0073 (0.0046)		-0.0064 (0.0037)		-0.016 (0.015)		0.012 (0.0076)	
Moderate corruption * Education	-0.0036 (0.0054)		-0.0075 (0.013)		-0.0093 (0.015)		0.014 (0.0075)	
High corruption * Education	-0.0066 (0.0058)		-0.024*** (0.0049)		-0.022 (0.015)		0.0095 (0.0076)	
Very high corruption * Education	-0.0083 (0.0086)		-0.021** (0.0050)		-0.026* (0.013)		0.0047 (0.0092)	
Corruption		-0.038 (0.0035)		-0.11 (0.063)		-0.22 (0.17)		-0.23 (0.18)
Corruption * Education		-0.0017 (0.0035)		-0.0043** (0.008)		-0.0076** (0.0025)		0.0030 (0.0033)
Random intercept (var)		0.17 (0.0028)		0.098 (0.0017)		0.69 (0.016)		0.30 (0.10)
Random slope (var)		0.00051 (0.000012)		0.00052 (0.00022)		0.0018 (0.0070)		0.00060 (0.000013)
Individual-level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-level controls		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Country-fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	47060	42065	47060	42065	45483	42065	47060	42065
Countries	31	29	31	29	31	29	31	29

Note: Data imputed using Stata's 'Chained' procedure. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models 1-4 were estimated using OLS and multilevel regression. Models 5-6 were estimated using logistic and multilevel logistic regression. Models 7-8 were estimated using Poisson and multilevel Poisson regression. Individual-level controls include: Income, gender, age, age², place of living, marital status, and incumbent support. Country-level controls include GDP per capita (logged), level of democracy, effective number of parties, and electoral system. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table I: Multilevel Models: Controlling for country-level inequality

	Self-regarding attitudes	Institutional attitudes	Voting	NIPP
Education	0.070*** (0.0064)	0.048*** (0.0052)	0.13*** (0.018)	0.083*** (0.011)
Corruption	0.0028 (0.076)	-0.083 (0.075)	0.048 (0.19)	-0.12 (0.12)
Corruption * Education	-0.0029 (0.0041)	-0.0089** (0.0033)	-0.022** (0.0084)	0.0014 (0.0053)
Random intercept (var)	0.16 (0.0048)	0.25 (0.094)	1.14 (0.032)	0.62 (0.18)
Random slope (var)	0.00042 (0.00013)	0.00049 (0.00014)	0.0029 (0.000091)	0.0014 (0.00042)
Individual-level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	28663	28330	27898	27874
Countries	27	27	26	27

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models 1-2 were estimated using multilevel regression, model 3 was estimated multilevel logistic regression, and model 4 was estimated using multilevel Poisson regression. Individual-level controls include: Income, gender, age, age², place of living, marital status, and incumbent support. Country-level controls include GDP per capita (logged), level of democracy, effective number of parties, electoral system, and inequality (WDI Gini). *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Full estimates - Interaction models. From table 2 and 3.

Individual-level OLS estimates: Self-regarding attitudes	Coef	SE
Self-regarding attitudes	.	(.)
Individual-level corruption = 2, Low corruption	-0.040	(0.096)
Individual-level corruption = 3, Moderate corruption	-0.173	(0.093)
Individual-level corruption = 4, High corruption	-0.164	(0.106)
Individual-level corruption = 5, Very high corruption	-0.251	(0.140)
Education	0.056**	(0.007)
Low corruption*Education	-0.002	(0.005)
Moderate corruption*Education	0.005	(0.005)
High*Education	0.004	(0.006)
Very high corruption*Education	0.003	(0.008)
Income = 2, Medium income	0.012	(0.018)
Income = 3, High income	0.135**	(0.023)
Age	0.016**	(0.003)
Age^2	-0.000**	(0.000)
Sex of Respondent = 2, Female	-0.265**	(0.015)
Place of living = 2, Urban	-0.058**	(0.017)
Place of living = 3, Small city	-0.088**	(0.021)
Place of living = 4, Village	-0.162**	(0.024)
Place of living = 5, Rural	-0.100**	(0.024)
Married = 1	0.014	(0.012)
Incumbent voter = 1	0.120**	(0.019)
Constant	-0.755**	(0.155)
Country FE	YES	
Observations	32,222	
R-squared	0.233	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Multilevel estimates: Self-regarding attitudes	Coef	SE
Self-regarding attitudes	.	(.)
Corruption	0.015	(0.080)
Education	0.068**	(0.006)
Corruption*Education	-0.002	(0.004)
Income = 2, Medium income	0.014	(0.022)
Income = 3, High income	0.146**	(0.025)
Age	0.021**	(0.003)
Age^2	-0.000**	(0.000)
Sex of Respondent = 2, Female	-0.270**	(0.018)
Place of living = 2, Urban	-0.061**	(0.021)
Place of living = 3, Small city	-0.087**	(0.027)
Place of living = 4, Village	-0.148**	(0.029)
Place of living = 5, Rural	-0.096*	(0.039)
Married = 1	0.015	(0.014)
Incumbent voter = 1	0.134**	(0.018)
Log GDP/capita	0.353*	(0.139)
Country-level corruption	-0.127	(0.067)
Effective number of parties	-0.030	(0.019)
Electoral System Type-3 classes = 2, Proportional	-0.042	(0.073)
Electoral System Type-3 classes = 3, Mixed	-0.133	(0.124)
Observations	30,511	
Number of groups	29	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Individual-level OLS estimates: Institutional attitudes	Coef	SE
Institutional attitudes	.	(.)
Individual-level corruption = 2, Low corruption	-0.118	(0.086)
Individual-level corruption = 3, Moderate corruption	-0.320*	(0.119)
Individual-level corruption = 4, High corruption	-0.374*	(0.138)
Individual-level corruption = 5, Very high corruption	-0.404*	(0.162)
Education	0.042**	(0.004)
Education*Low corruption	-0.007	(0.004)
Education*Moderate corruption	-0.016*	(0.006)
Education*High corruption	-0.036**	(0.007)
Education*Very high corruption	-0.055**	(0.010)
Income = 2, Medium income	0.061**	(0.020)
Income = 3, High income	0.193**	(0.030)
Age	-0.014**	(0.003)
Age^2	0.000**	(0.000)
Sex of Respondent = 2, Female	0.035*	(0.016)
Place of living = 2, Urban	-0.053**	(0.018)
Place of living = 3, Small city	-0.085**	(0.017)
Place of living = 4, Village	-0.083**	(0.024)
Place of living = 5, Rural	-0.014	(0.039)
Married = 1	0.052**	(0.013)
Incumbent voter = 1	0.203**	(0.027)
Constant	0.333**	(0.104)
Country FE	YES	
Observations	32,222	
R-squared	0.318	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Multilevel estimates: Institutional attitudes	Coef	SE
Institutional attitudes	.	(.)
Corruption	-0.075	(0.072)
Education	0.047**	(0.005)
Corruption*Education	-0.008*	(0.003)
Income = 2, Medium income	0.039*	(0.020)
Income = 3, High income	0.212**	(0.028)
Age	-0.014**	(0.003)
Age^2	0.000**	(0.000)
Sex of Respondent = 2, Female	0.024	(0.018)
Place of living = 2, Urban	-0.065**	(0.022)
Place of living = 3, Small city	-0.083**	(0.020)
Place of living = 4, Village	-0.094**	(0.028)
Place of living = 5, Rural	-0.026	(0.045)
Married = 1	0.074**	(0.013)
Incumbent voter = 1	0.231**	(0.036)
Log GDP/capita	0.182	(0.154)
Country-level corruption	-0.150	(0.092)
Effective number of parties	0.043	(0.049)
Electoral System Type-3 classes = 2, Proportional	-0.191	(0.174)
Electoral System Type-3 classes = 3, Mixed	-0.348	(0.203)
Constant	-0.715	(1.264)
Observations	30,127	
Number of groups	29	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Individual-level logistic estimates: Voting	Coef	SE
Voted	.	(.)
Individual-level corruption = 2, Low corruption	-0.218	(0.241)
Individual-level corruption = 3, Moderate corruption	-0.452	(0.268)
Individual-level corruption = 4, High corruption	-0.354	(0.252)
Individual-level corruption = 5, Very high corruption	-0.092	(0.218)
Education	0.073**	(0.023)
Education*Low corruption	0.004	(0.018)
Education*Moderate corruption	0.008	(0.021)
Education*High corruption	-0.010	(0.020)
Education*Very high corruption	-0.043*	(0.019)
Income = 2, Medium income	0.197**	(0.063)
Income = 3, High income	0.253**	(0.060)
Age	0.059**	(0.018)
Age^2	-0.000	(0.000)
Sex of Respondent = 2, Female	0.103*	(0.047)
Place of living = 2, Urban	0.080	(0.067)
Place of living = 3, Small city	0.000	(0.050)
Place of living = 4, Village	0.192**	(0.043)
Place of living = 5, Rural	0.256**	(0.075)
Married = 1	0.436**	(0.081)
Constant	0.252	(0.503)
Country FE	YES	
Observations	31,176	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Multilevel logistic estimates: Voting	Coef	SE
Voted	.	(.)
Corruption	0.075	(0.206)
Education	0.124**	(0.018)
Corruption*Education	-0.018*	(0.009)
Income = 2, Medium income	0.182**	(0.041)
Income = 3, High income	0.257**	(0.046)
Age	0.047**	(0.006)
Age^2	-0.000**	(0.000)
Sex of Respondent = 2, Female	0.015	(0.035)
Place of living = 2, Urban	0.042	(0.058)
Place of living = 3, Small city	0.001	(0.048)
Place of living = 4, Village	0.201**	(0.049)
Place of living = 5, Rural	0.267**	(0.087)
Married = 1	0.450**	(0.036)
Log GDP/capita	0.172	(0.388)
Country-level corruption	-0.177	(0.218)
Effective number of parties	0.084	(0.076)
Electoral System Type-3 classes = 2, Proportional	-0.543	(0.352)
Electoral System Type-3 classes = 3, Mixed	-1.047*	(0.409)
Compulsory voting = 1	0.479	(0.440)
Constant	-1.949	(3.612)
Observations	29,935	
Number of groups	28	

Standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Individual-level Poisson estimates: Non-institutionalized participation	Coef	SE
Non-institutionalized	.	(.)
Individual-level corruption = 2, Low corruption	-0.308	(0.220)
Individual-level corruption = 3, Moderate corruption	-0.566*	(0.226)
Individual-level corruption = 4, High corruption	-0.647*	(0.277)
Individual-level corruption = 5, Very high corruption	-0.356	(0.196)
Education	0.043**	(0.015)
Education*Low corruption	0.017	(0.013)
Education*Moderate corruption	0.033*	(0.013)
Education*High corruption	0.042*	(0.016)
Education*Very high corruption	0.024	(0.013)
Income = 2, Medium income	0.008	(0.026)
Income = 3, High income	0.132**	(0.029)
Age	0.005	(0.004)
Age^2	-0.000**	(0.000)
Sex of Respondent = 2, Female	0.075**	(0.017)
Place of living = 2, Urban	-0.077*	(0.033)
Place of living = 3, Small city	-0.092**	(0.028)
Place of living = 4, Village	-0.174**	(0.042)
Place of living = 5, Rural	-0.045	(0.037)
Married = 1	-0.004	(0.024)
Incumbent voter = 1	-0.048	(0.063)
Constant	-0.109	(0.262)
Country FE	YES	
Observations	31,206	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Multilevel Poisson estimates: Non-institutionalized participation	Coef	SE
Non-institutionalized	.	(.)
Corruption	-0.116	(0.118)
Education	0.082**	(0.010)
Corruption*Education	0.002	(0.005)
Income = 2, Medium income	-0.002	(0.016)
Income = 3, High income	0.120**	(0.016)
Age	0.006*	(0.002)
Age^2	-0.000**	(0.000)
Sex of Respondent = 2, Female	0.068**	(0.013)
Place of living = 2, Urban	-0.110**	(0.019)
Place of living = 3, Small city	-0.098**	(0.017)
Place of living = 4, Village	-0.177**	(0.018)
Place of living = 5, Rural	-0.040	(0.029)
Married = 1	0.007	(0.013)
Incumbent voter = 1	-0.057**	(0.014)
Log GDP/capita	0.392*	(0.167)
Country-level corruption	-0.188*	(0.094)
Effective number of parties	-0.025	(0.035)
Electoral System Type-3 classes = 2, Proportional	-0.117	(0.161)
Electoral System Type-3 classes = 3, Mixed	-0.741**	(0.190)
Constant	-3.189*	(1.571)
Observations	29,647	
Number of groups	29	

Standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, * p<0.05