

Online Appendix for “Intergenerational transmission of party affiliation within political families”

This document includes supplementary material in the form of an online appendix for the paper “Intergenerational transmission of political party affiliation”

The materialistic pathway: Formalized

In this subsection we present a more formalized and more extensive version of the materialistic pathway discussed in the main text. As previously explained, this rational choice framework is mostly modification of earlier standard political economics models discussed in chapters 1, 2 and 5 in [Persson and Tabellini \(2000\)](#) which are extended to take into account the intergenerational dimension.

Let us begin by assuming the existence of a continuum of voters, $C = 1, 2, \dots, N$ where voters are intergenerationally linked in a hierarchical manner, such that all voters are both a parent, p , and a child, c , i.e. $\forall v \in C = \{p \wedge c\}$. For simplicity, assume that all children have parents and that all parents have children. Further assume that all voters, $v \in C$, have identical utility functions regardless of being a parent or a child and that they derive utility from two types of goods: private good consumption, y_i , and public good consumption, G , according to the following quasi-linear utility function:

$$U_i = y_i + f(G) \tag{1}$$

Each individual, i , also faces a private budget constraint:

$$y_i = (1 - \tau)w_i \tag{2}$$

w_i is private income and τ is a proportional income tax. Hence, w_i differs for each individual where w_i is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function $F(\bullet)$, so that $E[w_i] = \bar{w}$. The government finance public good provision solely on tax revenues where the public budget may be written as :

$$G = \tau \bar{w} \tag{3}$$

The optimal level of public goods for individual, i , is found by first inserting the budget constraints into (1) and then take the first order condition:

$$\begin{aligned} U_i &= \left(1 - \frac{G}{\bar{w}}\right) w_i + f(G) \\ U_i &= (\bar{w} - G) \frac{w_i}{\bar{w}} + f(G) \\ \frac{\partial U_i}{\partial G} &= -\frac{w_i}{\bar{w}} + f'(G) = 0 \end{aligned}$$

We then solve for optimal G :

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{w_i}{\bar{w}} &= f'(G) \\ G^* &= f_g^{-1} \frac{w_i}{\bar{w}} \end{aligned}$$

f_g^{-1} is the inverse of the function $f(\bullet)$ of the first partial derivative with respect to G . This means that G^* is monotonically increasing in w_i . Also note that voters have single peaked preferences.

Statement A1: An individual, i , demands a higher degree of public good provision (and a higher tax rate) if having a lower relative income and vice versa.

Let us now focus on the link between parents and their children. A child's income level is assumed to depend on predisposed characteristics inherited from the parent, g_i^p , and an exogenous variable ε_i^c which is individual specific. The realizations of g_i^p and ε_i^c are independent events.

$$w_i^c = q(g_i^p) + \varepsilon_i^c$$

g_i^p is best interpreted as all predisposed factors that is positive for future income, such that $q'(g_i^p) > 0$ and $q''(g_i^p) < 0$. This may for instance by genetic factors. Given the assumption that each parent has a child and that all children have parents, the parental wage level thus depends on predisposed characteristics from the grandparents. In essence, the wage level of the child, will depend on the wage level of the parent, but also the grandparents. The variable ε_i is best interpreted as a random chock not attributed to any parental factors. An increase in any predisposed factors will thus lead to a higher income level of the child. The total intergenerational connection in income between parents and their offsprings is determined by the size of ε_i .¹

Statement A2: A child's demand of public good provision will depend on the income level of the parents.

We have now concluded that parents' and childrens' demand for public good provision is connected. A high income parent is more likely to foster a high income child and both of them will demand less public good provision. In a model where political candidates are exogenous from the voters, the voters must map his or her demands to the policy platforms of the politicians. For the sake of keeping the theoretical framework simple, let us assume that there is no agency problem and that the degree of rents equals 0.

Statement A3: An individual with relatively high income prefers a political candidate whose policy platform consists of relatively lower spending on public goods and lower taxes and vice versa.²

The focus of the paper is on political candidacy, meaning that we need to discuss the decision to run for office. This discussion follows the citizen-candidate model framework developed in Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) in which politicians originates from the electorate. Voters and politicians are in this case not two different kind of humans; instead they have similar utility functions.

¹The variable ε_i may be interpreted as various compensatory measures, such as mandatory education.

²The attentive reader would here point out that it is never rational to vote given that the probability of being the decisive voter is extremely small (e.g. the voting paradox). Later researchers have however tried to overcome this problem by incorporating expressive utility into the voting participation choice, see Hillman (2010). Statement A3 would be in line with an explanations where individuals *expressively* vote in accordance with their self-interest. Continuing this line of reasoning, politicians have incentives to cater to the policy preference of the median voter (e.g. the Hotelling–Downs model), see Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957).

Let us assume a three stage game. First, individuals decide whether to become candidates or not. Second, the voters decide and vote (strategically) in an election. Third, the winning candidate implement policy.

The citizen-candidate model has multiple equilibria and many different features which we will not discuss here. Just consider the first stage of the game. Let $W_i(G)$ denote the indirect utility for individual i for a given amount of public good provision. Further assume in line with the citizen-candidate model that there is a cost associated with running for office, which we denote as γ_i . Individual i , will then become a candidate in the first round of the game if

$$W_i^{c,p}(G^*) - W_i^{c,p}(\bar{G}) \geq \gamma_i$$

\bar{G} is the default policy that is implemented if no one is running for office. This tells us that only a subset of all individuals are going to run for office. Connecting this to our earlier discussion, we reach the following statement:

Statement A4: If both the parent and the child find it beneficial to run for office, $W_i^{c,p}(G^*) - W_i^{c,p}(\bar{G}) \geq \gamma_i$, their chosen policy in the last stage of the game will be relatively more similar in comparison to two randomly picked candidates.

What is important to remember is that we only observe the the outcome after the first stage of the citizen-candidate model where individuals have already decided to run for office. We are hence focusing our entire analysis on those where the cost of running, γ , was low enough. According to the theoretical reasoning above, those individuals running for office do so because they want to have their preferred policy implemented. This means that they act according to their utility function and that their choice of policy platform represent their demands for taxes and public goods. Political candidacy serves as a good proxy of true political beliefs in this case.

Assumption: Political parties may be ranked on a ordinal scale from left to right where left-wing parties favor higher taxes and higher public good spending. Right-wing parties favor lower taxes and lower public good spending.

This assumption is uncontroversial, but important for our purpose. Although we may not observe the demands for each individual, we do observe the political affiliation in the data. In this simple framework, the political affiliation is an informative proxy for the underlying demand for redistribution, which in turn is determined by differences in income levels.

The problem is that the cost of voting may be a function of the distance between the child's preferred policy platform and the parent's preferred policy platform. Within the theoretical framework we have discussed here, this would equal to a difference in income which is a result of ε_i^c . In essence, we have self-selection into political candidacy where a child may decide not to run in order not to anger his or her parents (i.e. a high cost of political candidacy). Our empirical analysis will hence be constrained by the fact that we may only use political candidacy as a proxy for political demands for those who we ex-post observe as candidates.

Robustness analysis benchmark results

There are some potential concerns regarding the benchmark results which we address in this robustness section. This analysis is going to focus on the transmission between parents and individuals. The benchmark results presented in Table 1 in the main text were purely descriptive in order to simplify interpretation. Just as we did in the mechanisms section in the main text, we stick to a regression framework for this robustness analysis. Column 1 in Table A1 replicate row 1 in Table 1 in the main text in order to facilitate comparison.

It is possible that the probability of becoming nominated varies across Sweden and also between the different election years. This would be captured by the inclusion of municipal and election year fixed effect. Given that we only using one variable for *SameParty* and we want to interpret the constant, we have instead calculated the probability of running for each political party for people living in the same municipality in the same election year. We then include the probability of running for party *A* in a given election year when *SameParty* equals the party *A* and correspondingly for the other parties. The results are presented in Column 2 in Table A1. The share of individuals running for the same political party as their parents is smaller when taking this baseline probability into account, but still large at 65 %.

It is not uncommon in smaller municipalities where there is not much competition that political parties have difficulties filling their lists before an election. Someone could in such an institutional setting convince his or her child (if over 18 years old) to put the name in the bottom of the party list, to “fill out the slots” without risking being elected in the end. This may be beneficial for the political party since the age of the candidates are printed on the ballot, meaning that the political party can signal to the voters that they do not only consist of old people. If this is the case, the share of individuals running for the same political party as their parents calculated in the last section is not the results of an actual intergenerational transmission, but instead of strategic behavior among certain politicians that are also parents.

We address this concern in three different ways in Table A1. First, we focus on those individuals placed at the top half of the party list in Column 3. For these positions, there should not exist candidates that are only on the list to fill out the slots for symbolic reasons. Looking at Table A1, the intergenerational correlation is very similar to the one estimated in Column 1. Second, we focus specifically on those candidates that are a bit older (defined as over 30) in Column 4, because we believe adults are less likely to stand on a list as a favor to their parents. The share that ran for the same political party as their parents is decreased in comparison to Column 1, but still large at 50 %. This decrease may also be a result of lower actual transmission when an individual becomes older. Third, we

Table A1: Robustness analysis benchmark results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Constant	0.764*** (0.005)	0.649*** (0.009)	0.700*** (0.012)	0.526*** (0.013)	0.526*** (0.015)
Sample	All	All	Top half	Over 30	Other muni
Baseline prob.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R2	0.000	0.018	0.002	0.028	0.008
Observations	14254	14254	7449	7358	4800


The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether an individual was nominated for the same party as their parents. The first column simply illustrates that when this variable is regressed on a constant, the intercept will equal the proportion presented in Table 1. In the second column, we have added a control variable for the share that ran for the same party as the parents, among all politicians who at that time lived in the same municipality as the individual of interest. The other columns use the same specification but adds one of the following sample restrictions: candidates placed at the top half of the ballot (Column 3), candidates who were older than 30 the first they were nominated (Column 4) or candidates that did not live in the same municipality as any of their parents the first time they were nominated (Column 5). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

focus the sample into those who are nominated in the another municipality than the parents. The idea is that we would not expect individuals to run for office as a favor, if their parents are or have been politically active in another municipality. The results are presented in Column 5. Again, the intergenerational transmission is less pronounced in comparison to Column 1, but still large at 50 %. The decrease in Column 5 may also be a proxy for a decrease in the probability of having spent time together with the politician parent during childhood; something we discussed in the mechanism section in the main text.

We have also plotted the estimated intergenerational transmission from parents to their children for all the election years included in our analysis in Figure A1. The take-home message from this figure is that the transmission is present and high for all election years, but that the degree seems to decrease over time.

Figure A1: Benchmark intergenerational correlation for different elections



Does it matter when the parent runs for office? On the one hand, we would expect people to be more strongly affected during early life or during the ‘impressionable years’, when political attitudes and identities are being formed. On the other hand, the act of running for office may have little to do with the total impact that a parent has on its child. Maybe those who are active politicians at one point in life, are just as clear and outspoken about their attitudes, both before and after they were in office. If so, we would not expect the timing of candidacy to matter too much for the political transmission to their children. In Figure A2 we plot the propensity to run for the same party as the parent (smoothed with a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression) over the age of the individual when the parent first ran for office (a negative age means that the person was not born). The results indicate that people may in fact be more affected during late adolescence and early adulthood, but the difference is small and our interpretation of the graph is that the intergenerational transmission is not dependent on the actual act of running for – or being in – office.

Figure A2: Benchmark intergenerational correlation for different ages of parents



In Table 1 in the main text we analyzed all elections simultaneously. Here, we separate between those individuals that have been nominated to parliament (Table A2), to the county councils (Table A3) and to the municipal councils (Table A4).

Table A2: Proportions of individuals affiliated with the same party as family members. Parliament

	Proportion	SE	Observations
<i>Main sample (every candidate with a parent politician)</i>			
Same party as parent	0.797	0.030	158
<i>Every candidate with either a parent, sibling or grand parent politician</i>			
Same party as parent	0.721	0.041	111
Same party as sibling	0.533	0.073	45
Same party as grand parent	0.346	0.112	26

The proportions refer to the share of the candidates to the parliament that ran for the same party as their parent, sibling or grand parent. In the first row, the sample includes every candidate with either one or two parents who have also been nominated for one of the eight parties in the national parliament, regardless of whether any other relatives have ran for office. However, candidates are excluded if the two parents ran for different parties. In rows 2–4, the sample is restricted to those who have *either* one or more parents, siblings or grand parents that have ran for office. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Table A3: Proportions of individuals affiliated with the same party as family members. County councils

	Proportion	SE	Observations
<i>Main sample (every candidate with a parent politician)</i>			
Same party as parent	0.699	0.011	2,108
<i>Every candidate with either a parent, sibling or grand parent politician</i>			
Same party as parent	0.642	0.013	1,553
Same party as sibling	0.550	0.017	995
Same party as grand parent	0.306	0.028	229

The proportions refer to the share of the candidates to the county councils that ran for the same party as their parent, sibling or grand parent. In the first row, the sample includes every candidate with either one or two parents who have also been nominated for one of the eight parties in the national parliament, regardless of whether any other relatives have ran for office. However, candidates are excluded if the two parents ran for different parties. In rows 2–4, the sample is restricted to those who have *either* one or more parents, siblings or grand parents that have ran for office. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Table A4: Proportions of individuals affiliated with the same party as family members. Municipal councils

	Proportion	SE	Observations
<i>Main sample (every candidate with a parent politician)</i>			
Same party as parent	0.775	0.005	11,589
<i>Every candidate with either a parent, sibling or grand parent politician</i>			
Same party as parent	0.736	0.005	8,586
Same party as sibling	0.623	0.007	5,329
Same party as grand parent	0.357	0.016	968

The proportions refer to the share of the candidates to the municipal councils that ran for the same party as their parent, sibling or grand parent. In the first row, the sample includes every candidate with either one or two parents who have also been nominated for one of the eight parties in the national parliament, regardless of whether any other relatives have ran for office. However, candidates are excluded if the two parents ran for different parties. In rows 2–4, the sample is restricted to those who have *either* one or more parents, siblings or grand parents that have ran for office. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Robustness analyses for the mechanism results

In Table A5 we present a variant of Table 2 in the main paper, but where we use logistic regression instead of OLS. In our interpretation of Table 2, we primarily focused on the size of the constants. To create a comparable statistic following a logistic regression, we have calculated the predicted probabilities of running for the same party as the parent, assuming that the value of the explanatory variable (living with the parent or the income-based prediction) is zero. These probabilities are shown at the last row.

The predicted probabilities are similar, but not identical, to the ones presented in Table 2. If anything, the materialistic pathway appears to be slightly more convincing here than in the main paper, with a higher R2 (also relative to other models) and a larger decrease in the predicted probability of running for the same party as the parent when the income-based prediction of doing just that is set to zero. However, the primary take-away is that the conclusions from the main paper still hold.

Table A5: Testing the socialization versus materialistic pathway with logistic regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Lived with parent (share years)			1.980*** (0.197)		
Lived with parent (binary, most years)				1.620*** (0.171)	
Income difference					-0.097 (0.112)
Constant	0.702*** (0.020)	0.988*** (0.034)	-0.944*** (0.200)	-0.594*** (0.174)	1.019*** (0.049)
Sample	All	Rest.	Rest.	Rest.	Rest.
Pseudo R2	0.000	0.000	0.013	0.010	0.000
Observations	39207	7705	7705	7705	7705
Mean p.p. with cov at 0	0.669	0.729	0.280	0.356	0.735

The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether an individual was nominated for the same party as their parents. The sample include candidates with either one or two parents who have also ran for office, but the candidate is excluded if the two parents ran for different parties. Children are coded as living with their parent if they reside within the same county (län). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The results presented in Table A6 come from a similar analysis as was presented in Table 2 in the main text. The difference is that we now define a child as living together with his or her parent if they are both residing in the same SAMS area. SAMS stands for Small Area of Market Statistics and are smaller geographical areas within municipalities in Sweden including approximately 1000 individuals. Because this is a more narrow definition than the one used in the main paper, we here run the risk of counting some children as not living with their parent, even if they are actually living together every second week. It is therefore not surprising that we now get larger constants than we did in Table 2 in the main text.

Table A6: Robustness sociological pathway: Living in same neighborhood as parent during childhood

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lived with parent (share years)			0.276*** (0.026)	
Lived with parent (binary, most years)				0.207*** (0.023)
Constant	0.764*** (0.005)	0.787*** (0.005)	0.526*** (0.026)	0.591*** (0.023)
Sample	All	Rest.	Rest.	Rest.
Adjusted R2	0.000	0.000	0.017	0.012
Observations	14254	8766	8766	8766

The dependent variable is a binary indicator for voting for the same party as the parent. Living with parent is defined at the neighborhood level (SAMS-areas). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

In the main paper, we tested the materialistic pathway by conditioning the propensity to run for the same party on the similarity of the child’s and the parent’s incomes. In a more formal mediation analysis, we would also show the following intermediate steps: 1) That there is an intergenerational correlation with regards to income and 2) that a higher relative income increases the probability that an individual is affiliated with a center-right political party. These propositions are tested in Table A7.

In the first three columns of Table A7, we present the results from regressing the candidate’s relative income at the age of 33 (standardized so that the mean is 0 and the standard deviation 1 within each cohort) on the same measure for the candidate’s parents. The positive coefficients (and the non-zero R2-measures) shows that there exists an intergenerational correlation with regards to income in our data sample. However, an R2 between 0.012 and 0.024 corresponds to a rather weak correlation between 0.11 (mother’s income) and 0.15 (prediction based on both parents). If the father’s income is one standard deviation higher in relative terms in comparison to all other fathers in the sample, this is associated with approximately 0.1 standard deviation higher relative income among the individuals (Column 1).

In Column 4 in Table A7, we focus on the second intermediate step in the materialistic pathway. The dependent variable is here a binary variable taking the value 1 if the individual is nominated for one of the center-right political parties and 0 otherwise. The independent variable is now the individuals’ standardized income, which was the outcome variable in columns 1–3. If income is increased by one standard deviation relative the other individuals at age 33, the probability of running for office for a center-right political party (conditioned on running for office) is increased by 2.2 percentage points. This yields support for the second intermediate step in the materialistic pathway. However, once again the correlation is rather weak, and an R2 of 0.002 corresponds to a correlation coefficient of 0.04. Taken together, this analysis therefore confirms the result in the main paper – the materialistic pathway can only explain a very tiny part of the intergenerational correlation with regards to party choice.

Table A7: Testing the intermediate steps in the materialistic pathway

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	I.Std.Inc.	I.Std.Inc.	I.Std.Inc.	I.CR.Nom
Std. Income father	0.097*** (0.009)		0.083*** (0.009)	
Std. Income mother		0.141*** (0.012)	0.112*** (0.013)	
Sdt. Income ind.				0.022*** (0.005)
Constant	0.099*** (0.015)	0.155*** (0.015)	0.128*** (0.015)	0.605*** (0.008)
Parents	Two	Two	Two	Two
Adjusted R2	0.017	0.012	0.024	0.002
Observations	12605	13183	12254	13582

In the first three columns, the dependent variable is the income of the individual, and in the last column it is a binary indicator for being nominated one of the center-right parties. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level.

Supplementary analyses

In this section we present results from supplementary analyses that were discussed in the main paper.

In the supplementary analysis section in the main paper we discussed the relative importance of mothers and fathers. Does the effect differ depending on which parent it was that ran for office? In Table A8 we regress the usual indicator for running for the same party on a binary indicator of being female, a binary indicator for have a mother that was a politician as well as the interaction between the two. We also restrict the sample to those who only have one parent that has run for office. The main take away from this regression is that the difference between mothers and fathers depends on whether the child is male or female. For men, fathers are more important (as shown by the negative coefficient for ‘Mother’), while the opposite is true for women (the sum of the coefficient for ‘Mother’ and the coefficient for the interaction term is positive).

Table A8: Gender analysis: Testing whether the transmission is different if having the same gender as politician parents.

	(1)	(2)
Individual female	0.002 (0.011)	0.001 (0.011)
Mother politician	-0.021 (0.011)	-0.022* (0.011)
Individual female \times Mother politician	0.059*** (0.015)	0.056*** (0.015)
Constant	0.740*** (0.009)	0.608*** (0.012)
Parents	One	One
Baseline prob.	No	Yes
Adjusted R2	0.002	0.024
Observations	12021	12021

The dependent variable is a binary indicator for being nominated for the same party as the parents. The sample is restricted to candidates who only have one parent that has also run for office. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level.

Table A9 focuses on the rare situation that both of the parents have run in general elections, and also includes those cases when the parents represented parties on different sides of the political spectrum. Whose affiliation matters the most, when this is the case? We regress a binary indicator for representing one of the parties in center-right bloc. Judging from the regression results, it appears as if the mother’s party affiliation has a stronger effect on what choice the child makes. This result holds also when we limit the sample to male candidates.

Table A9: Both parents are politicians: Who matters the most when parents do not belong to the same political party?

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Center-right Mother	0.571*** (0.062)	0.547*** (0.094)	0.589*** (0.088)
Center-right Father	0.343*** (0.061)	0.347*** (0.095)	0.342*** (0.086)
Constant	0.035*** (0.008)	0.053*** (0.013)	0.021** (0.007)
Sample	All	Men	Women
Parents	Two	Two	Two
Adjusted R2	0.794	0.754	0.828
Observations	2508	1260	1248

The dependent variable is running for one of the parties in the center-right bloc. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level.

Table A10 shows the share of candidates that ran for different parties, with the sample in each row defined by what party their parents represented. For example, in the first row we find every candidate whose parents ran for the left party (V). Of these politicians, 70.9 percent ran for the same party as their parents (V), 14.1 percent ran for the Social Democrats (S) and the remaining 15 percent ran for some other party. One could expect that people are more inclined to choose the same party as their parents if the parents represented one of the larger parties. However, the differences between parties are rather small and they do not conform with differences in party size. On the contrary, the largest share that run for the same party as their parents is found in the Christian Democrats (KD), which is one of the smaller parties in our sample.

Table A10: Proportions running for the same political party as their parents

	V	MP	S	C	FP	M	KD	SD
V	70.9	4.8	14.1	1.4	3.0	3.2	0.5	2.2
MP	6.4	70.3	8.1	2.6	3.2	6.2	1.7	1.5
S	7.5	4.3	77.0	2.3	2.5	3.5	1.2	1.7
C	1.7	3.3	4.2	76.0	2.7	6.6	4.1	1.4
FP	3.0	5.8	6.1	4.3	62.3	10.5	7.3	0.8
M	1.6	2.5	4.4	4.6	5.3	75.7	3.8	2.0
KD	1.3	2.3	3.0	2.7	2.7	4.1	82.7	1.1
SD	3.3	6.6	11.5	6.6	1.6	8.2	0.0	62.3

The table shows the share of candidates who represent different parties (columns), grouped by the party that their parent represented (rows). Each row sums to 100 percent and the share who run for the same party as their parents is represented by the bold numbers along the diagonal.

Data availability

This paper employs data that originates from Swedish population registers. The data used is part of a larger data source and it is stored at an encrypted server where we have to log in to run our entire empirical analysis. Given that the data is on the individual level and contain very sensitive information, we are under ethical and contractual obligation not to publish this data or disseminate it to anyone else.

There are however ways to replicate our empirical findings. First of all, any researcher may order the exact same data material from Statistics Sweden (SCB). You may find additional information (in Swedish) how to proceed here: http://www.scb.se/sv_/Vara-tjanster/Bestalla-mikrodata. In order to do order data, you first need to apply for and obtain permission from a Swedish Ethical Review Board. To facilitate replication we provide a list of the main variables that we have used in the analysis below and we also make all dofiles and Stata-logs available.

Second of all, a researcher interested in replicating our findings may come to Sweden and replicate our findings on site by using the same secured remote server system that we use. This requires that the researcher in question reach out to us beforehand given that we need to apply to a Ethical Review Board to add another researcher temporally to the group of people allowed to process the data.

Variables used in the main analysis

Below is a list of the main variables that we used in the data analysis.

Serial number individual: Research project specific individual indicator

Serial number mother: Research project specific serial number mothers

Serial number father: Research project specific serial number fathers

Serial number siblings: Research project specific serial number siblings. One indicator each.

Serial number grandparents: Research project specific serial number grand parents. One indicator each.

First year: First year of political nomination for the individual.

First year father: First year of political nomination for the father.

First year mother: First year of political nomination for the mother.

First year sibling: First year of political nomination for the sibling(s). One variable each.

First year grandparents: First year of political nomination for the grandparent(s). One variable each.

Top half: Placed on the top half of a party list. Binary variable

Over 30: Over age 30 first time of political nomination. Binary variable

Moderate party: Indicator for being nominated for the Moderate Party. One indicator for individuals, siblings, father, mothers and grandparents in separate dummy variables. Includes information on nomination to which political assembly (parliament, county or municipality)

Christian Democrats: Indicator for being nominated for the Christian Democrats. One indicator for individuals, siblings, father, mothers and grandparents in separate dummy variables. Includes information on nomination to which political assembly (parliament, county or municipality)

Liberal Party: Indicator for being nominated for the Liberal Party. One indicator for individuals, siblings, father, mothers and grandparents in separate dummy variables. Includes information on nomination to which political assembly (parliament, county or municipality)

Center Party: Indicator for being nominated for the Center Party. One indicator for individuals, siblings, father, mothers and grandparents in separate dummy variables. Includes information on nomination to which political assembly (parliament, county or municipality)

Green Party: Indicator for being nominated for the Green Party. One indicator for individuals, siblings, father, mothers and grandparents in separate dummy variables. Includes information on nomination to which political assembly (parliament, county or municipality)

Social Democrat: Indicator for being nominated for the Social Democratic Party. One indicator for individuals, siblings, father, mothers and grandparents in separate dummy variables. Includes information on nomination to which political assembly (parliament, county or municipality)

Left Party: Indicator for being nominated for the Left Party. One indicator for individuals, siblings, father, mothers and grandparents in separate dummy variables. Includes information on nomination to which political assembly (parliament, county or municipality)

Sweden Democrat: Indicator for being nominated for the Sweden Democrat. One indicator for individuals, siblings, father, mothers and grandparents in separate dummy variables. Includes information on nomination to which political assembly (parliament, county or municipality)

Center-right individual: Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual ever nominated for the center-right bloc. This includes the Moderate party, the Christian Democrats, The Liberal Party and the Center Party.

Center-right father: Dummy variable equal to 1 if father ever nominated for the center-right bloc

Center-right mother: Dummy variable equal to 1 if mother ever nominated for the center-right bloc

Gender: 0 if male and 1 if female

Income, standardized individual: Standardized income individual for each cohort for the first year after 33

Income, standardized father: Standardized income father for each cohort for the first year after 33

Income, standardized mother: Standardized income mother for each cohort for the first year after 33

Predicted income: The probability of being nominated for one of the eight political parties in parliament conditional on the relative position in the income distribution. One variable for each political party.

Income difference: A variable between 0 and 1 measuring the income difference in percentiles between individuals and parents. Measured at age 33

Age at first nomination: Age at first year the individual was nominated for political office.

Living with politician parent dummy: Dummy variable of living with political parent. Based on county and SAMS (two variables).

Share years living with politician parent: Share of years, 0–18 living with politically nominated parent. Defined as living in the same county or SAMS (two variables).

Same party: Variable equal to 1 if the parent and child has been nominated for the same political party and 0 otherwise. Similar variables for siblings and grandparents. One variable for each political party.

Party Share: The probability of being nominated for a political party in a given municipality in a given election year. One variable for each of the eight political parties in parliament.

Big 8 Party individual: Indicator variable for belonging to one of the eight political parties represented in the parliament. Individual.

Big 8 Party mother: Indicator variable for belonging to one of the eight political parties represented in the parliament. Mother

Big 8 Party father: Indicator variable for belonging to one of the eight political parties represented in the parliament. Father.

Big 8 Party sibling: Indicator variable for belonging to one of the eight political parties represented in the parliament. Sibling.

Big 8 Party grandparent: Indicator variable for belonging to one of the eight political parties represented in the parliament. Grandparent.

Big 8 Party all relatives: Indicator variable for belonging to one of the eight political parties represented in the parliament. All relatives.

Other party individual: Indicator variable for belonging another party other than the eight political parties represented in the parliament. Individual.

Other party mother: Indicator variable for belonging another party other than the eight political parties represented in the parliament. Mother.

Other party father: Indicator variable for belonging another party other than the eight political parties represented in the parliament. Father.

Other party sibling: Indicator variable for belonging another party other than the eight political parties represented in the parliament. Sibling(s).

Other party grandparent: Indicator variable for belonging another party other than the eight political parties represented in the parliament. Grandparent(s).

Any: Indicator variable for having any mother, father, sibling, grandparent. One indicator for each.

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