Issue Voting and Government Responsiveness to Policy Preferences
Online Appendix

November 11, 2020

Contents

1 List of Issues

Table A1: Issues Included in Study

	Issue
1	Introduce a six-hour working day 1976, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010
2	Nationalize large companies 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985
3	Give men work instead of married women whose husbands already work 1968, 1979
4	Cancel wage-earner funds (Löntagarfonder) 1985, 1988, 1991
5	Give employees more influence over their work 1976
6	Increase the ability of public pension funds to buy stocks 1991, 1973
7	Transfer a portion of corporate profits to wage-earner funds (Status quo question 1982 to 1990, reverse-coded. Possible change: cancel the funds) 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988
8	Give the state representation on the boards of big banks (Status quo question, reverse-coded. Possible change: cancel the representation of state representatives.) 1968
9	Lower payroll taxes 1976
10	Raise the carbon tax on gasoline 2010
11	Keep the wealth tax (Status quo question, reverse coded. Possible policy change: cancel the wealth tax.) 2002, 2006
12	Raise taxes on high incomes 1994
13	Lower taxes on high incomes 1976, 1979, 1985, 1988
14	Limit interest deductions for homeowners 1979, 1982
15	Introduce tax deductions for household services 2006
16	Remove tax deductions for household services 2010
17	Support for the great tax reform completed this year (Status quo question, reverse coded. Possible policy change: cancel the tax reform) 1991
18	Lower marginal rates, raise employer contributions, and limit interest deductions 1982
19	Introduce a sales tax (Status quo question, reverse coded. Possible change: cancel the sales tax.) 1960
20	Introduce a property tax on the most highly taxed houses 2010
21	Raise the tax on large wealth 1991
22	Lower taxes 1960, 1964, 1968, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010
23	Reduce the public sector 1998, 2002, 2006
24	Let private businesses run more childcare 1991
25	Close down unprofitable railway tracks 1976
26	Cancel the 'carer's allowance' for parents 1994, 2010
27	Introduce 'carer's allowance' for parents 1985, 1991, 2006
28	Legalize the use of cannabis 2002
29	Introduce 'Qualifying days' for sickness insurance 1982, 1991

30 Raise wine and liquor prices to limit alcohol abuse and alcohol-related harm in society
1979, 1991, 1994
31 Maintain the 'maximum fee' in childcare.
(Status quo question, reverse coded. Possible policy change: cancel the 'maximum fee'.)
2002
32 Stop selling 'mellanöl' (beer with 3,6% alcohol) in supermarkets
1976
33 Let parents decide how to divide all parental leave days between them
2006
34 Abolish the 'child benefit' for the first child
1960
35 Keep the general law on 'occupational pension'
(Status quo question, reverse coded. Possible policy change: cancel the 'occupational pension').
1960, 1964
36 Raise the retirement age
2010
37 Grant a legal right to a pension through a general pension
1956
38 Reduce compensation from social insurance in case of illness
1985
39 Introduce grades in school earlier than today
2002
40 Teaching about religion should only provide students with knowledge about the religion and not promote Christianity
1968
41 Stop plans to build a bridge over the Öresund (Copenhagen to Malmö)
1991, 1994
42 Stop the construction of new coal plants
1991
43 Keep nuclear power in the long run
1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010
44 Abolish nuclear power in the long term
(Status quo question, reverse coded. The decision was to close down nuclear power in 2010
and the possible change would be to continue allowing it)
1979, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010
45 Dispose of nuclear waste so that it cannot be accessed in the future
1988, 1991, 1994, 1998
46 Forbid plastic bottles and aluminum cans
1991
47 Ban private driving in cities
1979, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006
48 Decrease the Swedish wolf population
2010
49 Build hydropower in the hitherto untouched rivers in northern Sweden
1991, 1976
50 Ban the use of chemical pesticides in forests
1979
51 Stop the expansion of nuclear power
1976
52 Stop the expansion of nuclear power but keep existing nuclear plants
1976
53 Reduce speed limits on the roads
1991
54 Supporting the FRA law (National Defence Radio Establishment)
(Status quo question, reverse coded. Possible change: not to implement the FRA law.)
2010
55 Raise penalties for buying sex
2006
56 Lower the four percent threshold to enter Parliament
1991
57 Require half of MPs to be women
1976, 1979
58 Introduce gender quotas for public boards and committees
1994, 2010
59 Increase voters' ability to vote for individual candidates in Swedish elections
1994, 1998
60 Make Sweden a republic with an elected president
1976, 2010
61 Move more state offices from Stockholm to other parts of the country
1976
62 Parliamentarians should be selected at once directly by voters
1964
63 Stop the immigration of foreign laborers

1976, 2002

64 Accept fewer refugees in Sweden
1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010

65 Introduce a language test to become a Swedish citizen
2002, 2006

66 Allow free download of all movies and music from the Internet
2006

67 Decriminalize all file sharing on the Internet
2010

68 Introduce advertising on TV
1982, 1985, 1988

69 Strengthen the censorship of movies
1968

70 Reduce foreign aid
1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006

71 Sweden should be neutral in its foreign policy
(Status quo question, reverse coded. Possible change: join a military agreement with other countries.)
1991

72 Ban all Swedish arms exports
1985

73 Seek membership in NATO
1998, 2002, 2006, 2010

74 Reduce the debts of third world countries
2002

75 Stop foreign aid to Vietnam
1979

76 Reduce defense spending
1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010

77 Sweden should join the EMU
1998, 2002, 2006, 2010

78 Strengthen Swedish border controls
2002

79 The relationship between the EC and Sweden is good as it is.
(Status quo question, reverse coded. Possible change: join the European Community)
1973

80 Sweden should withdraw from the EU
1998, 2002, 2006, 2010

81 Sweden should join the EU
1994, 1998, 2002, 2006

82 Sweden should try to join the EEC
1968, 1988

83 Prohibit or restrict abortion
1968, 1982, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006,

84 Allow gay couples to adopt children
(Status quo question, reverse coded. Possible change: stop allowing gay couples to adopt).
2002, 2006

85 Allow active euthanasia
1998

86 Prohibit all forms of pornography
1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010

2 Relationship Between Public Opinion and Policy Implementation in Broader Dataset

Figure A1: Public Support For Policy Proposals and their Implementation (SOM and SNES Data)

(a) Overall Public Opinion



(b) Supporters of Government Party(ies)



3 Assessing Issue Voting Using Logistic Regression Models

Table A2: Amount of issue voting

Type	% p¡0.05	Min	Median	Max	Mean
Total	36.6	3.05	10.02	31.26	11.45
Opposition-to-Government	11.9	4.95	9.08	20.19	11.18
Government-to-Opposition	24.8	3.05	10.28	31.26	11.57

Table A3: Models of Issue Voting and Policy Implementation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	−0.52	−0.90	−0.67
	(0.86)	(0.90)	(0.84)
Public Support (%)	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Total IV	−1.42		
	(1.08)		
Opp-to-Gov IV		−3.81	
		(2.95)	
Gov-to-Opp IV			−0.77
			(1.16)
Total Changes	−12.33	−5.27	−9.36
	(11.25)	(12.36)	(11.16)
Total IV*Public Support (%)	0.04		
	(0.03)		
Opp-to-Govt IV*Public Support (%)		0.11	
		(0.07)	
Govt-to-Opp IV*Public Support (%)			0.01
			(0.03)
Total Changes*Public Support (%)	0.33	0.09	0.19
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.25)
N	202	152	178
AIC	236.85	185.69	203.97
BIC	316.25	258.27	280.33
$\log L$	−94.43	−68.85	−77.98

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Figure A2: Types of Issue Voting and the Probability of Policy Implementation

(a) Total Issue Voting



(b) Opposition-to-Government



(c) Government-to-Opposition



4 Assessing Issue Voting Using Linear Regression Models (With Party Identification)

Table A4: Amount of Issue voting

Type	% p¡0.05	Min	Median	Max	Mean
Total	27.0	3.56	6.66	17.30	7.42
Opposition-to-Government	7.6	4.21	5.26	14.60	7.69
Government-to-Opposition	19.3	3.56	6.85	17.30	7.31

Table A5: Models of Issue Voting and Policy Implementation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	−0.58	−0.81	−0.83
	(1.08)	(1.20)	(1.07)
Public Support (%)	−0.01	0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Total IV	−0.81		
	(1.30)		
Opp-to-Gov IV		−5.49	
		(5.15)	
Gov-to-Opp IV			0.42
			(1.40)
Total Changes	−15.49	−11.75	−11.67
	(14.09)	(16.68)	(13.98)
Total IV*Public Support (%)	0.03		
	(0.03)		
Opp-to-Gov IV*Public Support (%)		0.17	
		(0.12)	
Gov-to-Opp IV*Public Support (%)			−0.02
			(0.04)
Total Changes*Public Support(%)	0.31	0.09	0.15
	(0.32)	(0.37)	(0.32)
N	171	138	158
AIC	204.74	163.27	183.78
BIC	280.13	233.52	257.29
$\log L$	−78.37	−57.63	−67.89

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Figure A3: Types of Issue Voting and the Probability of Policy Implementation

(a) Total Issue Voting



(b) Opposition-to-Government



(c) Government-to-Opposition



5 Second-Stage Models Using Continuous Measures of Issue Voting

Table A6: Models of Issue Voting and Policy Implementation with Continuous Measures of Issue Voting

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	0.32*	0.55*	0.24
	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.19)
Public Support (%)	−0.00	−0.01	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Total IV	−0.01		
	(0.01)		
Opp-to-Govt IV		−0.05	
		(0.04)	
Govt-to-Opp IV			−0.02
			(0.02)
Total Changes	−2.44	−3.95	−3.90†
	(1.98)	(3.00)	(2.20)
Total IV*Public Support (%)	0.00†		
	(0.00)		
Opp-to-Govt IV*Public Support (%)		0.00*	
		(0.00)	
Govt-to-Opp IV*Public Support (%)			0.00
			(0.00)
Total Changes*Public Support (%)	0.06	0.09	0.11*
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)
N	202	134	143
R^2	0.08	0.12	0.08
adj. R^2	0.05	0.09	0.04
Resid. sd	0.43	0.44	0.42

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Figure A4: Public Support and the Marginal Effects of Continuous Measures of Issue Voting

(a) Total Issue Voting



(b) Opposition-to-Government



(c) Government-to-Opposition



6 Logistic Regression Models of Policy Implementation

Note that these models use the linear models without controls for party identification for the first stage. These are the first stage results reported in the main text.

Table A7: Logistic Regression Models of Issue Voting and Policy Representation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	-0.52	-0.90	-0.68
	(0.85)	(0.90)	(0.84)
Public Support (%)	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Total IV	-1.38		
	(1.08)		
Opp-to-Govt IV		-4.07	
		(3.01)	
Govt-to-Opp IV			-0.72
			(1.16)
Total Changes	-12.65	-5.70	-9.70
	(11.21)	(12.28)	(11.10)
Total IV*Public Support (%)	0.04		
	(0.03)		
Opp-to-Govt IV*Public Support(%)		0.11 †	
		(0.07)	
Govt-to-Opp IV*Public Support(%)			0.01
			(0.03)
Total Changes*Public Support(%)	0.33	0.10	0.20
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.25)
N	202	151	178
AIC	237.24	185.33	203.72
BIC	316.64	257.74	280.08
$\log L$	-94.62	-68.66	-77.86

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Note that given the nonlinear nature of these models, the coefficient on the interaction term only gives the effect on the linear predictor (Ai and Norton, 2003; Berry, DeMeritt and Esarey, 2010). To assess the effect of the interaction on the probability of implementation, we must consider marginal effects.

Figure A5: Public Support and Marginal Effects of Each Type of issue Voting

(a) Total Issue Voting



(b) Opposition-to-Government



(c) Government-to-Opposition



7 Relationship Between Issue Voting and the Marginal Effect of Public Opinion

We expected issue voting to increase the likelihood that popular policies are implemented. However, as Berry, Golder and Milton (2012) suggest, most theories involving interactions have implications for looking at the relationship the other way around. Not only do we expect issue voting to increase the probability that popular policies are implemented. We also expect public support for a policy change to matter more for the implementation of issue proposals that influence vote choice. In other words, the marginal effect of public support for a change should be larger when issue voting is significant, particularly when opposition-to-government issue voting is significant, than when it is not. The figures below assess these expectations about the other side of the interaction effect and finds that public support for a policy change does in fact matter more when opposition-to-government issue voting is significant. Note that the marginal effects presented below use the dichotomous measure of issue voting assessed using linear models which do not control for party identification.

Figure A6: Issue Voting and the Marginal Effect of Public Support

(a) Total Issue Voting



(b) Opposition-to-Government



(c) Government-to-Opposition



8 Models of Representation of the Preferences of Government Party Supporters

Table A8: Models of Representation of Government Party Supporters

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	0.21	0.11	0.20
	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.14)
Policy Support (%)	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Total IV	−0.22		
	(0.14)		
Opp-to-Govt IV		−0.28	
		(0.34)	
Govt-to-Opp IV			−0.17
			(0.15)
Total Changes	0.44	2.08	0.56
	(1.74)	(2.45)	(1.76)
Total IV*Policy Support (%)	0.01*		
	(0.00)		
Opp-to-Govt IV*Policy Support (%)		0.01	
		(0.01)	
Govt-to-Opp IV*Policy Support (%)			0.00
			(0.01)
Total Changes*Policy Support (%)	−0.01	−0.05	−0.03
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
N	202	151	178
R^2	0.05	0.05	0.02
adj. R^2	0.02	0.01	−0.01
Resid. sd	0.44	0.45	0.43

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

9 Distributions of Public Support for Adopted Policies Among Govt-Party Supporters and Among All Respondents

Figure A7: Distributions of Public Support



10 Issue Voting and the Representation of Post-Election Govt-Party Supporters

Table A9: Models of Implementation Among Post-Election Government-Party Supporters

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	0.23	0.17	0.18
	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.14)
Public Support (%)	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Total IV	−0.13		
	(0.14)		
Opp-to-Govt IV		−0.55	
		(0.41)	
Govt-to-Opp IV			−0.06
			(0.15)
Total Changes	−1.26	−0.24	−0.47
	(1.72)	(2.35)	(1.73)
Total IV*Public Support (%)	0.00		
	(0.00)		
Opp-to-Govt IV*Public Support (%)		0.01†	
		(0.01)	
Govt-to-Opp IV*Public Support (%)			0.00
			(0.00)
Total Changes*Public Support (%)	0.03	−0.00	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
N	202	151	178
R^2	0.06	0.07	0.02
adj. R^2	0.04	0.03	−0.01
Resid. sd	0.43	0.45	0.43

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Figure A8: Policy Support and the Marginal Effect of Issue Voting

(a) Total Issue Voting



(b) Opposition-to-Government



(c) Government-to-Opposition



11 Public Support and Issue Voting for Incumbent and Non-Incumbent Governments

Figure A9: Public Support and Issue Voting



12 The Impact of Issue Voting on Policy Implementation by Year After the Election

The following figures are analogous to Figure 3(a) except they consider whether policies were implemented in each calendar year beginning the year of an election.

Figure A10: Issue Voting, Public Support and Policy Implementation

(a) Election Year



(b) After One Year



(c) After Two Years



(d) After Three Years



(e) After Four Years



13 Assessing the Influence of Individual Issues on the Relationship of Interest

We re-ran Model 2 from Table 2 leaving out one issue at a time and consider the significance of the Opp-to-Gov IV*Public Support (%) interaction coefficient. Figure A11 shows all the p-values. While 12 p-values were above 0.05, the highest p-value was below 0.10 (0.08).

Figure A11: P-Values of Coefficients on Interaction Term



We also produced marginal effects plots (not shown) analogous to Figure 4(b) for all issues with p-values above 0.05 and find confidence intervals that only cover positive values for public support at 50 (%) and above in all cases. Results are thus not due to any one issue.

Moreover, we calculated DFBETA measures of influence for each observation on the Opp-to-Gov IV*Public Support (%) interaction coefficient. Figure A12 shows these values along with dashed lines indicating the conventional cutoff for the absolute value of DFBETA ($\frac{2}{\sqrt{N}}$) (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch, 1980). As we can see, all DFBETA values are far from the cutoffs.

Figure A12: DFBETAs



Finally, we reran Model 2 from Table 2 excluding the two issue proposals in the top-right corner of Figure 3(b) with high opposition-to-government issue voting and public support and which were implemented. These issues look like potentially influential points. Table A10 shows the coefficients and Figure A13 shows the marginal effects. As we can see, the magnitude of the interaction coefficient is essentially unchanged. The p-value on the coefficient does increase from 0.042 to 0.077. However, the marginal effects are similar to those including the full dataset. The exclusion of these likely highly influential points thus does little to the results.

Table A10: Model of Policy Implementation Excluding Two Potentially Influential Points

	Model 1
Intercept	0.33†
	(0.18)
Public Support (%)	−0.00
	(0.00)
Opp-to-Gov IV	−0.74
	(0.52)
Total Changes	−1.34
	(2.44)
Opp-to-Gov IV*Public Support (%)	0.02†
	(0.01)
Total Changes*Public Support (%)	0.03
	(0.05)
N	149
R^2	0.05
adj. R^2	0.02
Resid. sd	0.45

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Figure A13: Marginal Effects Excluding Two Potential Influential Points



14 Models Controlling for Whether the Government is Social Democratic

Social Democratic is a dummy variable coded 1 if the government was formed by the Social Democratic Party.

Table A11: Models of Issue Voting, Public Opinion, and Policy Implementation Controlling for the Partisanship of Government

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	0.13	0.23	0.22
	(0.35)	(0.41)	(0.35)
Public Support (%)	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Total IV	−0.22		
	(0.19)		
Opp-to-Govt IV		−0.75	
		(0.48)	
Govt-to-Opp IV			−0.09
			(0.19)
Total Changes	−0.44	−0.55	−0.95
	(3.33)	(3.88)	(3.28)
Social Democratic	0.19	0.05	0.10
	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.27)
Total IV*Public Support (%)	0.01		
	(0.00)		
Opp-to-Govt IV*Public Support (%)		0.02*	
		(0.01)	
Govt-to-Opp IV*Public Support (%)			0.00
			(0.01)
Total Changes*Public Support (%)	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Social Democratic*Public Support (%)	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
N	202	151	178
R^2	0.04	0.06	0.02
adj. R^2	0.00	0.02	−0.02
Resid. sd	0.44	0.45	0.43

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

15 Models Controlling for Whether the Government is a Minority

Not a Minority is a dummy variable coded 1 if the government was not a minority government.

Table A12: Models of Issue Voting, Public Opinion, and Policy Implementation Controlling Whether the Government was a Minority

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept)	0.33*	0.27	0.31†
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Public Support (%)	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Total IV	−0.23		
	(0.19)		
Opp-to-Govt IV		−0.73	
		(0.47)	
Govt-to-Opp IV			−0.09
			(0.20)
Total Changes	−1.98	−1.28	−1.37
	(2.38)	(2.69)	(2.36)
Not a Minority	−0.03	0.10	−0.07
	(0.24)	(0.30)	(0.24)
Total IV*Public Support (%)	0.01		
	(0.00)		
Opp-to-Govt IV*Public Support (%)		0.02*	
		(0.01)	
Govt-to-Opp IV*Public Support (%)			0.00
			(0.01)
Total Changes*Public Support (%)	0.07	0.05	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Not a Minority*Public Support (%)	−0.00	−0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
N	202	151	178
R^2	0.04	0.08	0.02
adj. R^2	0.01	0.04	−0.03
Resid. sd	0.44	0.45	0.43

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

16 Additional information about the data and policy implementation coding

We exclude the 1956 study, because it did not include any question on overall policy orientations that could be used as a control. It also only asked about one policy issue. We do not include more recent election studies because data on policy implementation are not yet available. Twenty-eight

of the SNES questions were about support for status quo policies. In these cases, we recoded them to be about changes away from the status quo. Results are similar when these issue proposals are removed from the dataset.

Coders determined whether each policy proposal was implemented during the relevant government term. One issue when coding implementation is whether to focus on decisions to implement a policy or actual implementation. We have followed this guideline: If the question explicitly is about whether a decision should be made, we have focused on the decision when making the coding. If the question explicitly asks about implementation, we have focused on implementation when making the coding. For most cases focusing on one or the other does not make any difference, but in some cases it does. One example is the question about whether to close down nuclear power plants. A decision to do so was taken but it is not yet implemented. In such cases we have let the nature of the survey question decide whether to focus on decisions or actual implementation.

About 31 percent of the questions ask about relative changes such as levels of taxation, but the majority of questions concern dichotomous outcomes of, for example, implementation of specific laws. We use both types of questions. Since we aim to measure attitudes towards policy *change*, we have switched the values of variables for questions concerning support for status quo policies. Hence, all opinion variables indicate support for policy change and the implementation variables indicate whether polices were changed.

One research assistant was responsible for working with the opinion data and another was responsible for the implementation data. They provided raw data to us that we carefully evaluated. In order to test intra-coder reliability we asked a second research assistant to code a random subset of 25 percent of the questions. For 78 percent of the questions the answers were identical. For half of the questions with divergent answers they were only partially different and for the other half the answers were completely different. Discrepancies mostly occurred because concepts were defined in different ways or because the assistants had turned to different sources. For those questions we used the most reasonable definition and the most credible source for final coding.

Another important issue is whether the set of policy proposals represent a random sample of the total population of issues. This is hard to say since we lack a clear definition of the true population of issues (Burstein, 2003). For example, should it cover proposals that are "on the agenda" in the public, in the media or among political actors? And how should these agendas be defined? These are important questions but they are out of scope for this paper. For the present study we rely on the judgment of the election study principal investigators who identified the relevant issues in each election.

17 Analyses of Issue Voting and Responsiveness to High-Income Preferences

To rule out the possibility that our results reflect heightened responsiveness to high-income citizens instead of issue voting, we re-run all our analyses using policy preferences of citizens at the 90th percentile. Consistent with work by Gilens (2012) and Schakel (2019), there is a stronger relationship between high-income preferences and policy implementation than between overall preferences and implementation. However, issue voting still conditions the relationship between high-income policy preferences and implementation, showing that our results cannot be explained by unequal representation.

Figure A14: High-Income Public Support and Issue Voting



Figure A15: High-Income Public Support For Policy Proposals and their Implementation



Figure A16: Issue Voting, High-Income Public Support, and Policy Implementation

(a) Proportion Implemented



(b) Raw Data Points



Table A13: Models of Policy Implementation (Using High-Income Preferences)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	−0.67	−1.11	−0.87
	(0.82)	(0.88)	(0.81)
High-Income Support (%)	−0.01	0.00	−0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Total IV	−1.51		
	(1.04)		
Opp-to-Gov IV		−4.12	
		(2.70)	
Gov-to-Opp IV			−0.69
			(1.10)
Total Changes	−12.59	−4.69	−8.89
	(10.83)	(11.93)	(10.73)
Total IV*High-Income Support (%)	0.04†		
	(0.02)		
Opp-to-Gov IV*High-Income Support (%)		0.11†	
		(0.06)	
Gov-to-Opp IV*High-Income Support (%)			0.01
			(0.03)
Total Changes*High-Income Support (%)	0.34	0.08	0.19
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.24)
N	200	150	176
AIC	230.36	180.79	200.03
BIC	309.52	253.04	276.12
$\log L$	−91.18	−66.39	−76.01

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Figure A17: Types of Issue Voting and the Probability of Policy Implementation (by High Income Public Support)

(a) Total Issue Voting



(b) Opposition-to-Government



(c) Government-to-Opposition



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