Online Appendix

Rank Effects in Political Promotions

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This supplementary material includes additional discussion, tables and figures to accompany paper "Rank Effects in Political Promotions". Online Appendix A includes additional tables to Section 3. In Online Appendix B, we present descriptive analysis on political promotions. We evaluate the validity and robustness of our main results in Online Appendix C. Additional rank effect results are organized in Online Appendix D. Online Appendix E reports rank effect results using chairman of local council as the outcome variable. Finally, Online Appendix F includes auxiliary tables and figures to Section 8.

Online Appendix A: Additional Tables to Section 3

To illustrate how absolute majority and coalition-governed local governments differ from each other in terms of dividing the top positions in local politics, we show the distribution of share of chairmen of municipal boards by party and party rank in Table A1. A key observation from the table is that when a party gets an absolute majority in the municipality, it gets the board chair in 98 percent of cases, whereas in the case of no absolute majority, the largest party gets the board chair only in 66 percent of cases. In the first case, also the second largest and sometimes even the third largest party are able to obtain the board chair.

According to our data, if there is an absolute majority, it tends to get also the position of council chairman. If there is no absolute majority in the municipality, the council chair is most often a politician from the second largest party. These patters indicate that coalition formation and between-party political competition and bargaining in the leadership selection process are likely to be important in determining which party gets the desired positions. This also suggests that the determinants of promotions may be very different also within the parties, depending on whether there is an absolute majority or not, because other parties may have a say on that in the case that coalitions are needed for making policy decisions. Therefore, it is interesting to analyze the rank effects also conditional on the absolute majority or the lack of it.

Municipalities with and without absolute majorities differ from each other also in other dimensions. They are compared with respect to some characteristics in Table A2. First notion is that municipalities with absolute majorities tend to be smaller than those without absolute majorities. The pressure to promote the most popular politicians to political power is likely to be larger in smaller communities in which voters more often have some type of direct connection to the local politicians. Municipalities with absolute majorities have often less political competition which could result in smaller rank effects, as we discuss in the theory section. It is reasonable to assume that when a party with absolute majority appoints the board or council chairman, it may do so without hearing what other parties have to say about the matter (see Table A1). Inter-party bargaining in the case of no absolute majorities could shape also intra-party political promotions and push the parties towards nominating their most popular candidates or to following more salient nomination procedures.

Table A1. Share of chairmen of board by party and party rank.

Party/Rank	Any	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	Row N
Panel A: Absolute majority in municipality									
Any	1.000	0.984	0.016	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	558
Center Party	0.860	0.874	0.000	-	-	-	-	-	480
Social Democratic Party	0.011	0.004	0.444	-	-	-	-	-	6
National Coalition Party	0.011	0.002	0.556	-	-	-	-	-	6
Left Alliance	0.000	0.000	0.000	-	-	-	-	-	0
Green Party	0.000	0.000	0.000	-	-	-	-	-	0
True Finns	0.000	0.000	0.000	-	-	-	-	-	0
Swedish Party	0.111	0.113	0.000	-	-	-	-	-	62
Christian Democrats	0.000	0.000	0.000	-	-	-	-	-	0
Other	0.007	0.007	0.000	-	-	-	-	-	4
Column N	558	549	9	0	0	0	0	0	-
Panel B: No absolute majority in municipality									
Any	1.000	0.669	0.268	0.051	0.009	0.002	0.000	0.001	878
Center Party	0.421	0.559	0.166	0.067	0.000	0.000	-	0.000	370
Social Democratic Party	0.207	0.187	0.260	0.244	0.000	0.000	-	0.000	182
National Coalition Party	0.294	0.194	0.494	0.578	0.250	0.000	-	0.000	258
Left Alliance	0.021	0.010	0.043	0.044	0.000	0.000	-	0.000	18
Green Party	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-	0.000	0
True Finns	0.009	0.000	0.017	0.022	0.375	0.000	-	0.000	8
Swedish Party	0.032	0.044	0.000	0.022	0.125	0.000	-	0.000	28
Christian Democrats	0.007	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.007	0.018	-	1.000	6
Other	0.009	0.005	0.013	0.022	0.000	0.500	-	0.000	8
Column N	878	587	235	45	8	2	0	1	-

Notes: Table includes only municipalities in which the chairman of municipal board is an elected politician. There are 42 cases in which a non-elected politician has been appointed. Only party lists with one elected winner and one elected runner-up are included.

Table A2. Comparison of municipalities with and without absolute majorities.

Variable	Absolute majority in municipality		No absolute majority in municipality		Difference
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	
Population	4630	3755	19346	47406	-14717***
Center Party seat share	53.59	21.20	31.48	15.90	22.10***
National Coalition Party seat share	9.23	8.35	20.49	9.86	-11.24***
Social Democratic Party seat share	12.39	9.57	22.63	9.78	-10.24***
True Finns seat share	3.42	6.26	4.40	6.51	-0.98**
Green Party seat share	0.47	1.46	3.08	4.19	-2.62***
Left Alliance seat share	6.50	7.99	7.90	7.52	-1.40*
Swedish Party seat share	9.10	25.21	2.95	10.04	6.15***
Christian Democratic Party seat share	2.22	3.67	3.55	4.18	-1.33***
Other parties seat share	3.09	9.74	3.52	7.08	-0.43
Herfindahl index for party seat shares	4719	1394	2778	681	1941***
Council size	24.05	6.56	33.29	13.03	-9.24***
Voter turnout	66.24	6.07	63.08	5.96	3.16***

Notes: Number of observations is 539 for municipalities with absolute majorities and 937 for municipalities without absolute majorities. Differences in means are tested using a t test adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Online Appendix B: Descriptive Analysis

In this Online Appendix, we report several descriptive analyses to accompany our causal analysis in the main text. We begin by providing a comparison between the winners and runners-up in Table B1. We notice immediately that more popular candidates are more likely to obtain important positions in local government, but at the same time, candidates with higher vote ranks are different from those with lower ranks in many other dimensions as well. For example, they are more successful in the elections measured by the number of votes and vote share, and also more likely to be incumbents, have university education, have higher earnings and have higher socio-economic status. These differences indicate that winners could be more competent than runners-up or runners-up more competent than third-ranking candidates, and hence more likely to get promoted to top positions also for other reasons than their rank or electoral performance more generally. It is, therefore, likely that they will differ also in many relevant unobservable characteristics. This calls for a valid research design if we are interested in the causal effect of rank on political promotions.

Table 2 of the main text provides a comparison between board chairmen, all elected politicians and all candidates in elections. The latter two groups exclude board chairmen. Tables B2-B4 verify whether the differences remain in a regression setting.

In several parts of the analysis, we report also deviations in policy positions regarding public sector size or redistribution. These measures have been computed as candidates' policy positions' Euclidian distances from their party-group median using selected questions from voting aid application by the Finnish public broadcasting company, Yle. Voting aid applications are interactive questionnaires the purpose of which is to assist voters in choosing a candidate with similar policy preferences to theirs. Our definition of the indices relies on Savolainen (2015) who identifies voting aid application questions that are related to public sector size and redistribution. The questions used to construct our indices are listed in the end of this Appendix.

Table B1. Descriptive statistics on winners and runners-up.

Variable	Winners			Runners-up			Difference
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	
Chairman of municipal board	1352	0.36	0.48	1352	0.18	0.38	0.19***
Number of votes	1352	252	536	1352	165	288	87**
Vote share (within municipality)	1352	5.12	2.29	1352	3.73	1.60	1.39***
Vote share (within party)	1352	12.74	5.76	1352	9.08	3.31	3.66***
Chairman of municipal board (t-1)	963	0.14	0.35	963	0.05	0.22	0.09***
Chairman of local council (t-1)	963	0.11	0.32	963	0.06	0.23	0.06***
Incumbent (t)	1352	0.74	0.44	1352	0.71	0.45	0.03
Incumbent (t-1)	1352	0.51	0.50	1352	0.41	0.49	0.10***
Member of parliament	1352	0.09	0.28	1352	0.03	0.16	0.06***
Age	1352	48.70	10.24	1352	48.80	10.72	-0.09
Wage income during election year	1063	33897	27247	1062	30228	21895	3669**
Female	1352	0.31	0.46	1352	0.33	0.47	-0.02
University education	1172	0.26	0.44	1150	0.22	0.41	0.04*
Unemployed	1351	0.01	0.12	1352	0.01	0.09	0.01*
Student	1351	0.01	0.10	1352	0.01	0.08	0.01
Entrepreneur	1351	0.27	0.44	1352	0.29	0.45	-0.01
High professional	1351	0.31	0.46	1352	0.28	0.45	0.03
Municipal employee	1063	0.20	0.40	1063	0.20	0.40	0.00
Deviation in policy position, public sector size	210	2.33	0.99	185	2.54	0.97	-0.21**
Deviation in policy position, redistribution	210	2.17	0.91	185	2.25	0.85	-0.07
National Coalition Party	1352	0.19	0.39	1352	0.19	0.39	
Social Democratic Party	1352	0.14	0.34	1352	0.14	0.34	
Center Party	1352	0.59	0.49	1352	0.59	0.49	
True Finns	1352	0.01	0.07	1352	0.01	0.07	
Left Alliance	1352	0.01	0.11	1352	0.01	0.11	
Swedish Party	1352	0.06	0.24	1352	0.06	0.24	
Christian Democrats	1352	0.00	0.05	1352	0.00	0.05	
Green Party	1352	0.00	0.00	1352	0.00	0.00	
Rest	1352	0.01	0.09	1352	0.01	0.09	

Notes: Sample includes winners and runners-up from parties that nominate the board chairman in the 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012 Finnish municipal elections. Only party lists with one elected winner and one elected runner-up are included. Income during the election year is expressed in euros and is not observed for the 2012 elections. Deviations in policy positions are observed only for a subset of candidates in 2012 elections. Differences in means are tested using a t test adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Table B2. Predicting board chairman status, board chairs and winners.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Vote share (within party)	0.013***	-0.013***	-0.005
	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Chairman of municipal board (t-1)	0.161***	0.259***	0.160**
	[0.022]	[0.032]	[0.068]
Chairman of local council (t-1)	-0.037	-0.094*	0.011
	[0.035]	[0.055]	[0.085]
Incumbent (t)	0.131***	0.229***	0.139*
	[0.025]	[0.041]	[0.078]
Incumbent (t-1)	0.027	0.008	0.066
	[0.022]	[0.036]	[0.067]
Member of parliament	-0.352***	-0.494***	-0.584***
	[0.039]	[0.051]	[0.088]
Age	0.002**	0.007***	0.002
	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.003]
Female	-0.016	-0.052	-0.026
	[0.022]	[0.033]	[0.056]
Wage income during election year		0.000	
		[0.000]	
University education		0.005	0.019
		[0.035]	[0.059]
Unemployed		0.004	-0.279
		[0.117]	[0.270]
Student		-0.085	-0.064
		[0.152]	[0.381]
Entrepreneur		0.111***	0.016
		[0.036]	[0.069]
High professional		0.082**	0.029
		[0.039]	[0.068]
Municipal employee		-0.063	
		[0.041]	
Deviation in policy position, public sector size			-0.045*
			[0.026]
Deviation in policy position, redistribution			0.007
			[0.028]
N	1659	1029	315
R^2	0.49	0.28	0.22

Notes: The outcome is chairman of municipal board. Samples used in the OLS regressions include all winners and board chairmen from the party that nominates the board chair. Municipal employee status and wage income during election year are not observed for 2012 elections, and deviations in policy positions are observed only for a subset of candidates in 2012. All specifications control for party fixed effects (coefficients not reported). Standard errors clustered at municipality level reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively.

Table B3. Predicting board chairman status, all elected candidates.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Rank = 1	0.216***	0.180***	0.229***
	[0.020]	[0.024]	[0.049]
Rank = 2	0.061***	0.061***	0.071**
	[0.012]	[0.017]	[0.032]
Rank = 3	0.032***	0.027*	-0.012
	[0.011]	[0.014]	[0.024]
Vote share (within party)	0.009***	0.011***	0.011***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Chairman of municipal board (t-1)	0.453***	0.444***	0.365***
	[0.022]	[0.028]	[0.051]
Chairman of local council (t-1)	0.039**	0.029	0.079*
	[0.019]	[0.025]	[0.045]
Incumbent (t)	0.029***	0.031***	0.031***
	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.011]
Incumbent (t-1)	0.017***	0.016**	0.027**
	[0.005]	[0.007]	[0.013]
Member of parliament	-0.226***	-0.233***	-0.317***
	[0.026]	[0.029]	[0.053]
Age	0.000	0.001**	0.000
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Female	-0.015***	-0.014***	-0.015
	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.010]
Wage income during election year		0.000	
		[0.000]	
University education		0.010	0.014
		[0.009]	[0.014]
Unemployed		0.007	-0.032
		[0.016]	[0.029]
Student		-0.002	0.004
		[0.014]	[0.029]
Entrepreneur		0.012*	0.006
		[0.007]	[0.015]
High professional		0.008	
		[0.008]	
Municipal employee		-0.007	0.002
		[0.006]	[0.015]
Deviation in policy position, public sector size			-0.012**
			[0.005]
Deviation in policy position, redistribution			-0.004
			[0.006]
N	12929	7860	2163
R^2	0.30	0.27	0.33

Notes: The outcome is chairman of municipal board. Samples used in the OLS regressions include all elected candidates from the party that nominates the board chair. Municipal employee status and wage income during election year are not observed for 2012 elections, and deviations in policy positions are observed only for a subset of candidates in 2012. All specifications control for party fixed effects (coefficients not reported). Standard errors clustered at municipality level reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively.

Table B4. Predicting board chairman status, all candidates.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Rank = 1	0.179***	0.220***	0.104***
	[0.014]	[0.022]	[0.021]
Rank = 2	0.056***	0.085***	0.020
	[0.010]	[0.016]	[0.018]
Rank = 3	0.030***	0.042***	-0.022
	[0.008]	[0.014]	[0.014]
Vote share (within party)	0.004***	0.006***	0.006***
	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Chairman of municipal board (t-1)	0.462***	0.432***	0.441***
	[0.021]	[0.028]	[0.048]
Chairman of local council (t-1)	0.066***	0.036	0.147***
	[0.018]	[0.023]	[0.044]
Incumbent (t)	0.018***	0.016***	0.017**
	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.008]
Incumbent (t-1)	0.012***	0.012**	0.014
	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.009]
Member of parliament	-0.168***	-0.212***	-0.199***
	[0.023]	[0.027]	[0.046]
Age	0.000	0.000*	0.000
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Female	-0.006***	-0.005***	-0.009**
	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.004]
Wage income during election year		0.000*	
		[0.000]	
University education		0.003	0.010
		[0.004]	[0.007]
Unemployed		0.004	0.001
		[0.003]	[0.007]
Student		0.005	0.002
		[0.003]	[0.008]
Entrepreneur		0.004	0.000
		[0.003]	[0.007]
High professional		0.002	0.003
		[0.003]	[0.006]
Municipal employee		-0.004*	
		[0.002]	
Deviation in policy position, public sector size			-0.005**
			[0.002]
Deviation in policy position, redistribution			-0.002
			[0.003]
N	34664	20609	5411
R^2	0.29	0.29	0.30

Notes: The outcome is chairman of municipal board. Samples used in the OLS regressions include all candidates from the party that nominates the board chair. Municipal employee status and wage income during election year are not observed for 2012 elections, and deviations in policy positions are observed only for a subset of candidates in 2012. All specifications control for party fixed effects (coefficients not reported). Standard errors clustered at municipality level reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively.

To construct the policy position indices, we use two types of questions from to voting aid application. First, in two questions a respondent can choose one or two alternatives and some of these are related to our policy preference indices. We assign each relevant alternative either value 0 or 1. These questions are (index indicated for the relevant answers):

Let us assume that your municipality is financially troubled. You must save and there is a trade-off between the services for the elderly and the children. What will you do?

- I cut from the services from the elderly.

- I try to cut even-handedly from both kinds of services.

- We should save but I still propose issuing more debt. *Redistribution index*

Which of the following options should be mainly used in order to balance the municipal budget in your municipality? Choose two of the following options:

- Cutting down services. *Public sector size index*

- Increasing user fees or introduction of new ones. *Redistribution index*

- Raising taxes. *Redistribution index*

- Selling off municipal property. *Public sector size index.*

- Developing the business in the municipality.

- Issuing more debt. *Redistribution index*

Second, we use questions where the answer is given using a five-step scale from "completely disagree" to "completely agree". We assign each response a numerical value between 1 and 5. These questions are:

Public sector size index:

- The old should have a universal right to a retirement home similar to one enjoyed now by children and daycare.

- Privatization of municipal health care would increase efficiency and lower the costs.

- If one of the parents is at home, we should limit the right of the family to have their child placed in daycare.

- The five-year long dismissal period for the municipal employees in conjunction with a municipal merger is too long.

- Municipal employees should not be nominated as municipal board members.

Redistribution index:

- We should increase the health care user fees in my municipality.

- It is nowadays too easy to be admitted to social welfare.

- We should raise the property tax rate in my municipality.

- The municipal user fees should be made more progressive in income.

# Online Appendix C: Robustness and Validity of the Main Results

This Online Appendix discusses the validity and robustness of our main results. First, we show that the results obtained using both local linear and quadratic polynomials are robust to bandwidth selection in Figure C1. These graphs do not give reason to doubt either the non-significant results or the significant results we find. For the very smallest bandwidths, estimates of the primary effect tend to converge towards zero and estimates of the runner-up effect increase but they also tend to have very wide confidence intervals and low number of observations. Hence, we do not believe that this is particularly concerning.

Second, we verify that the covariates do not jump at the cut-off. Municipality and party level covariates are balanced by construction, as the forcing variable are defined within party lists and we only include cases with one winner and one runner-up per municipality, so we will concentrate on candidate level variables. These include number of votes, vote share within municipality and party, lagged outcome variables (council or board chairman t-1), age, incumbency status t and t-1, being elected in the national parliament, gender, income during the election year, dummy for being a municipal employee, and socioeconomic characteristics (dummies for university degree, student, unemployed, high professional and entrepreneur). The placebo outcomes show no robust and mainly insignificant jumps at the threshold (Table C1). The significant jumps in some rare specifications can be due to multiple testing or outliers close to the threshold.

Third, we estimate primary effect at fake cut-offs using the sample in which we find any effects, i.e. the sample excluding municipalities with absolute majorities (Figure C2). We demonstrate that significant primary effect of the estimated magnitude is found only at the true cutoff and not systematically anywhere. This test supports the validity of our design and suggests that the estimated effect is real and not present, for example, only due to such curvature in the relationship between the forcing variable and the outcome that the regressions function is not able to capture.

The estimations reported in the main text do not control for observables. In the case of regression discontinuity design, this is not needed. However, including additional covariates to the regressions serves as a good validity check. If the RDD truly works as it should, then the covariates ought not to change the estimates; they should only increase precision. We check that this is the case by re-estimating the primary effect including covariates that are observed for all candidates. Table C2 reports the results controlling for incumbency status, lagged incumbency status, being an MP, gender and party affiliation.

Panel A: Full sample

Panel B: Absolute majority

# Panel C: No absolute majority

Notes: Figures show RDD estimates from local linear and quadratic estimations (black line) for various bandwidths. Vertical line marks the MSE-optimal bandwidths. Dashed lines mark the 95 % confidence intervals.

Figure C1. All bandwidths graph for the primary effect.

Table C1. Covariate smoothness.

Covariate	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Number of votes	1.634	-1.232	2.046	0.594
	[1.027]	[1.560]	[1.638]	[2.199]
Constant	277.058	221.748	315.098	251.719
N	526	910	664	1114
R^2	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01
Bandwidth	0.07	0.15	0.10	0.20
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Vote share (within party)	-0.035*	-0.046**	-0.007	-0.029
	[0.019]	[0.023]	[0.030]	[0.034]
Constant	3.307	3.415	3.179	3.282
N	626	1048	782	1244
R^2	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07
Bandwidth	0.09	0.18	0.12	0.24
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Vote share (within municipality)	-0.007	-0.005	-0.01	-0.011
	[0.007]	[0.009]	[0.011]	[0.011]
Constant	9.919	10.146	9.940	9.932
N	726	1186	736	1196
R^2	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.05
Bandwidth	0.11	0.23	0.11	0.23
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Chairman of municipal board (t-1)	0.049	0.035	0.052	0.045
	[0.049]	[0.041]	[0.061]	[0.046]
Constant	-0.021	0.038	-0.048	0.015
N	312	554	462	770
R^2	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.02
Bandwidth	0.06	0.12	0.09	0.19
	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
Chairman of municipal council (t-1)	0.039	0.002	0.045	0.013
	[0.084]	[0.050]	[0.094]	[0.056]
Constant	0.093	0.073	0.095	0.073
N	312	552	524	854
R^2	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01
Bandwidth	0.06	0.12	0.11	0.22
	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
Incumbent (t)	-0.198**	-0.071	-0.319***	-0.128
	[0.087]	[0.062]	[0.117]	[0.083]
Constant	0.813	0.772	0.848	0.798
N	482	828	580	998
R^2	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.00
Bandwidth	0.07	0.13	0.08	0.17
	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)
Incumbent (t-1)	-0.013	0.003	-0.154	-0.039
	[0.091]	[0.063]	[0.133]	[0.099]
Constant	0.393	0.403	0.446	0.398
N	626	1054	614	1024
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Bandwidth	0.09	0.18	0.09	0.18
	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)
Member of parliament	-0.005	0.014	-0.006	0.017
	[0.049]	[0.036]	[0.055]	[0.040]
Constant	0.064	0.051	0.065	0.054
N	434	752	696	1140
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Bandwidth	0.06	0.12	0.11	0.21
	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)
Winner (t-1)	0.096	0.059	0.105	0.067
	[0.070]	[0.051]	[0.086]	[0.064]
Constant	0.094	0.124	0.079	0.120
N	534	922	714	1160
R^2	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.04
Bandwidth	0.08	0.15	0.11	0.21
Bandwidth selection method	0.5 * MSE(1)	MSE(1)	0.5 * MSE(2)	MSE(2)
Specification	Local linear		Local quadratic	

Covariate	(37)	(38)	(39)	(40)
Age	0.887	0.799	0.679	0.423
	[2.217]	[1.659]	[2.498]	[1.926]
Constant	46.302	47.626	45.889	47.513
N	514	878	756	1220
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Bandwidth	0.07	0.14	0.12	0.24
	(41)	(42)	(43)	(44)
Female	0.08	0.028	0.094	0.025
	[0.109]	[0.072]	[0.129]	[0.086]
Constant	0.368	0.345	0.386	0.364
N	486	852	718	1168
R^2	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00
Bandwidth	0.07	0.13	0.11	0.22
	(45)	(46)	(47)	(48)
University education	0.036	-0.009	0.062	0.025
	[0.107]	[0.074]	[0.133]	[0.095]
Constant	0.223	0.221	0.223	0.209
N	429	734	562	952
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
Bandwidth	0.07	0.14	0.10	0.20
	(49)	(50)	(51)	(52)
Unemployed	0.039	0.024	0.055	0.031
	[0.041]	[0.025]	[0.053]	[0.034]
Constant	0.027	0.017	0.032	0.023
N	510	870	658	1096
R^2	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01
Bandwidth	0.07	0.14	0.10	0.19
	(53)	(54)	(55)	(56)
Student	0.01	0.017	-0.005	0.013
	[0.025]	[0.018]	[0.032]	[0.024]
Constant	0.017	0.010	0.024	0.015
N	512	878	618	1038
R^2	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
Bandwidth	0.07	0.14	0.09	0.18
	(57)	(58)	(59)	(60)
Entrepreneur	0.003	0.006	0.000	0.004
	[0.065]	[0.047]	[0.095]	[0.063]
Constant	0.238	0.249	0.227	0.243
N	682	1132	776	1234
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Bandwidth	0.10	0.20	0.12	0.24
	(61)	(62)	(63)	(64)
High professional	0.023	-0.065	0.052	-0.063
	[0.106]	[0.076]	[0.126]	[0.088]
Constant	0.278	0.338	0.252	0.336
N	454	794	682	1130
R^2	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00
Bandwidth	0.06	0.12	0.10	0.20
	(65)	(66)	(67)	(68)
Municipal employee	0.029	0.012	0.053	0.019
	[0.087]	[0.064]	[0.112]	[0.083]
Constant	0.255	0.234	0.286	0.252
N	392	660	476	776
R^2	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
Bandwidth	0.07	0.13	0.09	0.17
	(69)	(70)	(71)	(72)
Income (election year)	1924	3835	-1331	4038
	[3205]	[3125]	[4884]	[3367]
Constant	29754	29555	29883	28677
N	404	674	468	768
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
Bandwidth	0.07	0.14	0.09	0.17
Bandwidth selection method	0.5 * MSE(1)	MSE(1)	0.5 * MSE(2)	MSE(2)
Specification	Local linear		Local quadratic	

Notes: Sample includes winners and runners-up from parties that nominate the board chairman, excluding absolute majorities. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively.

Notes: Figures show RDD estimates from local linear and quadratic estimations (black line) at artificial cut-off points using MSE-optimal bandwidths computed at the true cut-off. Dashed lines mark the 95 % confidence intervals.

Figure C2. Placebo thresholds graph for Table 1, Panel C.

Table C2. Primary effect results including covariates.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Full sample					
Primary effect	0.191***	0.128*	0.083*	0.147	0.106*
	[0.020]	[0.069]	[0.048]	[0.091]	[0.062]
N	2704	772	1388	1022	1730
R^2	0.12	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.09
Bandwidth		0.06	0.12	0.08	0.16
Panel B: Absolute majority in municipality					
	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Primary effect	0.075***	-0.020	-0.033	-0.008	-0.039
	[0.029]	[0.092]	[0.063]	[0.125]	[0.087]
N	1030	292	542	344	644
R^2	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.10
Bandwidth		0.05	0.10	0.06	0.13
Panel C: No absolute majority in municipality					
	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Primary effect	0.265***	0.247**	0.145**	0.295**	0.214**
	[0.026]	[0.095]	[0.067]	[0.133]	[0.089]
N	1674	546	940	650	1084
R^2	0.15	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.10
Bandwidth		0.08	0.15	0.10	0.19
Specification	OLS	Local linear		Local quadratic	
Bandwidth		0.5 * MSE(1)	MSE(1)	0.5 * MSE(2)	MSE(2)

Notes: The outcome is being chairman of municipal board. Sample includes winners and runners-up from the party nominating the board chair. All specifications control for current and lagged incumbency status, being an MP, gender and party affiliation. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively.

Online Appendix D: Additional Rank Effect Results

This Online Appendix reports additional results on rank effects briefly discussed in Section 6 of the main text. First, Table D1 investigates one potential mechanism through which the rank effects could operate. A crucial question is whether the parties promote winners to political power because they fear that voters would punish them for not doing so. In order to see if this is the case, we estimate the effect of not nominating the winner as board chairman after election t on change in nominating party's vote share between elections held in t and $t+1$ (measured in percentage points), controlling for municipality, year and party fixed effects. We do not find that the voters would punish the parties if the winner does not get promoted to political power. This means that the primary effect unlikely arises from parties' vote-seeking behavior. Therefore, it is more likely that some kind of democratic norms are behind the rank effects.

Second, we show there are no further rank effects on promotions to board chairman (Figure D1 and Table D2). Ranking second or third versus third or fourth does not improve chances of promotion to this position. These auxiliary results, hence, do not provide any additional support to the hypotheses we outline. For detailed information on how the RDD figures and empirical results reported in tables are produced, we refer to the main text.

**Table D1.** Effect of nominations on change in vote shares.

	(1)	(2)
Panel A: Full sample		
Board chairman not winner	-0.452	0.282
	[0.643]	[1.005]
N	844	379
R^2	0.09	0.07
Panel B: Absolute majority in municipality		
	(3)	(4)
Board chairman not winner	-0.664	0.476
	[1.213]	[1.677]
N	363	193
R^2	0.17	0.09
Panel C: No absolute majority in municipality		
	(5)	(6)
Board chairman not winner	0.164	-0.582
	[0.716]	[1.629]
N	481	186
R^2	0.13	0.19
Sample	Full	Only close elections

Notes: The outcome is change in (party's) vote share between elections in t and $t+1$. Sample includes only parties that nominate the board chair after elections held in t. Close elections sample includes only elections in which the absolute value of the running variable is smaller than or equal to 0.10. All specifications control for municipality fixed effects, year fixed effects and party fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively.

Figure D1. RDD graph on becoming the chairman of municipal board, 2nd and 3rd ranks.

Table D2. Estimated effect of ranking second or third, dependent variable chairman of municipal board.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Panel A: Full sample				
2nd vs. 3rd	0.011	0.005	0.023	0.005	0.023
	[0.068]	[0.043]	[0.089]	[0.054]	[0.066]
N	938	1548	1282	1986	1548
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Bandwidth	0.04	0.08	0.06	0.13	0.08
	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
3rd vs. 4th	0.049	0.001	0.078	-0.003	0.062
	[0.054]	[0.036]	[0.072]	[0.045]	[0.054]
N	897	1503	1281	1961	1503
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	
Bandwidth	0.03	0.07	0.05	0.10	0.07
	Panel B: Absolute majority in municipality				
	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
2nd vs. 3rd	0.095	0.027	0.130	0.025	0.121
	[0.109]	[0.071]	[0.121]	[0.079]	[0.110]
N	358	616	588	826	616
R^2	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Bandwidth	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.13	0.07
	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
3rd vs. 4th	0.035	-0.001	0.126	0.043	0.033
	[0.073]	[0.050]	[0.132]	[0.084]	[0.076]
N	354	612	336	574	612
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	
Bandwidth	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.06
	Panel C: No absolute majority in municipality				
	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
2nd vs. 3rd	-0.025	-0.002	-0.032	0.005	-0.020
	[0.084]	[0.052]	[0.105]	[0.066]	[0.080]
N	600	986	836	1258	986
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Bandwidth	0.05	0.10	0.08	0.15	0.10
	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
3rd vs. 4th	0.048	0.007	0.088	0.006	0.024
	[0.065]	[0.045]	[0.094]	[0.060]	[0.065]
N	647	1031	803	1237	1031
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	
Bandwidth	0.04	0.08	0.06	0.11	0.08
Specification	Local linear		Local quadratic		Local linear (bias-corrected)
Bandwidth	0.5 * MSE(1)	MSE(1)	0.5 * MSE(2)	MSE(2)	MSE(1)

Notes: The outcome is being chairman of municipal board. Samples include 2nd and 3rd or 3rd and 4th ranking candidates from the party nominating the board chair. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively.

Online Appendix E: Rank Effects for Council Chairmen

Are there any rank effects present in the case of promotions to council chairmanship, the second-most important position in local politics? We study this question in this appendix. We begin by providing some correlational evidence in Table E1. The pattern of the results is very similar to what we report in Online Appendix B. Ranks are positively correlated with getting promoted. Moreover, political experience appears to be a very robust predictor of political promotions.

We then turn into causal analysis. First, we plot an RDD graph for the primary effect on getting promoted to council chairman in Figure E1. It seems like there is only a very small upward jump at the cutoff. This notion is verified in Table E2. Throughout the specifications, the estimates are quite close to zero. Note that the amount of observations is now slightly higher than in the primary effect analysis of our main text. This is due to 42 board chairmen being nominated even though they did not participate the elections. The council chairmen always have to be elected politicians. While we can put rather wide confidence intervals around the estimates, the overall pattern of the results suggests that there is no primary effect on promotions to council chairman. Despite there being no primary effect on promotions to council chair, could there be a runner-up effect when a party obtains both important positions in local politics? We turn to this question in Figure E2 and Table E3. We fail to detect any statistically significant effects. This may partially derive from lack of statistical power. It appears that the point estimates are larger when there is no absolute majority in the municipality, but the standard errors are so large that we cannot distinguish any of the estimates from each other.

Given the sample size limitations, we relax the sample restriction and look at all parties that nominate the council chairman. That is to say, unlike in the analysis discussed above, we also include parties that nominate only the council chairman. While the point estimates do not change much from those presented in Table E3, we seem to win something in terms of statistical power. We find a statistically significant runner-up effect in the case of no party holding an absolute majority of seats (see Table E4). Moreover, ranking 3rd versus 4th enhances politician's chances of being promoted to chairman of municipal council in the sample of municipalities without absolute majorities, but the effects do not extend beyond that. Ranking 4th versus 5th does not make a political promotion any more likely (Figure E4 and Table E5). Thus, these auxiliary results provide some supports to *Hypothesis 1* and *2* discussed in our main text.

Table E1. Predicting council chairman status, all candidates.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Rank = 1	0.242***	0.260***	0.392***
	[0.019]	[0.022]	[0.045]
Rank = 2	0.062***	0.078***	0.093***
	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.029]
Rank = 3	0.024**	0.040***	0.067***
	[0.010]	[0.012]	[0.023]
Vote share (within party)	0.003*	0.015***	0.011*
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.007]
Chairman of municipal board (t-1)	0.007***	0.114***	-0.076*
	[0.001]	[0.027]	[0.044]
Chairman of local council (t-1)	0.079***	0.506***	0.323***
	[0.021]	[0.028]	[0.051]
Incumbent (t)	0.472***	0.021***	0.038***
	[0.022]	[0.005]	[0.012]
Incumbent (t-1)	0.021***	0.022***	0.020
	[0.004]	[0.007]	[0.016]
Member of parliament	0.021***	0.012	-0.132*
	[0.005]	[0.041]	[0.072]
Age	-0.017	0.001**	0.001
	[0.037]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Female	0.000	-0.005	-0.020*
	[0.000]	[0.005]	[0.011]
Wage income during election year	-0.009**	0.000***	
	[0.004]	[0.000]	
University education		0.023**	0.030*
		[0.009]	[0.016]
Unemployed		-0.007	-0.025
		[0.014]	[0.059]
Student		0.006	0.065
		[0.013]	[0.040]
Entrepreneur		-0.005	0.029*
		[0.007]	[0.017]
High professional		-0.002	0.012
		[0.008]	[0.013]
Municipal employee		-0.005	
		[0.006]	
Deviation in policy position, public sector size			-0.001
			[0.006]
Deviation in policy position, redistribution			-0.010
			[0.007]
N	12247	7516	1908
R²	0.19	0.38	0.23

Notes: The outcome is chairman of municipal council. Samples used in the regressions include all elected candidates from the party that nominates the council chair. Municipal employee status and wage income during election year are not observed for 2012 elections, and deviations in policy positions are observed only for a subset of candidates in 2012. All specifications control for party fixed effects (coefficients not reported). Standard errors clustered at municipality level reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively.

Figure E1. Primary effect on promotions to council chairman.

Table E2. Estimates of the primary effect on promotions to council chairman.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Full sample						
Primary effect	0.260***	0.023	0.017	-0.037	0.039	0.046
	[0.022]	[0.068]	[0.048]	[0.102]	[0.069]	[0.063]
N	2788	1068	1816	1182	1940	1816
R^2	0.08	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	
Bandwidth		0.09	0.17	0.10	0.19	0.17
Panel B: Absolute majority in municipality						
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Primary effect	0.156***	0.002	0.019	0.003	0.035	0.013
	[0.032]	[0.118]	[0.082]	[0.153]	[0.103]	[0.113]
N	1076	312	568	442	742	568
R^2	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	
Bandwidth		0.05	0.10	0.08	0.15	0.10
Panel C: No absolute majority in municipality						
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Primary effect	0.326***	0.017	0.044	-0.052	0.053	0.062
	[0.029]	[0.109]	[0.076]	[0.148]	[0.102]	[0.096]
N	1712	538	954	670	1140	1712
R^2	0.11	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.04	
Bandwidth		0.08	0.16	0.10	0.20	0.16
Specification	OLS	Local linear		Local quadratic		Local linear (bias-corrected)
Bandwidth		0.5 * MSE(1)	MSE(1)	0.5 * MSE(2)	MSE(2)	MSE(1)

Notes: The outcome is being chairman of municipal council. Sample includes winners and runners-up from the party nominating the council chair. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively.

Figure E2. Runner-up effect on promotions to council chairman.

Table E3. Estimates of the runner-up effect on promotions to council chairman.

	Panel A: Full sample					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Runner-up effect	0.060***	0.093	-0.006	0.164	-0.002	0.099
	[0.022]	[0.107]	[0.066]	[0.140]	[0.084]	[0.103]
N	1140	410	694	580	896	694
R^2	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	
Bandwidth		0.03	0.07	0.05	0.11	0.07
	Panel B: Absolute majority in municipality					
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Runner-up effect	0.067***	0.058	-0.038	0.104	-0.052	0.119
	[0.025]	[0.125]	[0.083]	[0.137]	[0.089]	[0.127]
N	890	282	490	506	744	490
R^2	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	
Bandwidth		0.03	0.06	0.06	0.12	0.06
	Panel C: No absolute majority in municipality					
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Runner-up effect	0.032	0.207	0.035	0.118	0.306	0.225
	[0.052]	[0.175]	[0.123]	[0.470]	[0.229]	[0.175]
N	250	122	170	92	156	170
R^2	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.06	0.03	
Bandwidth		0.05	0.10	0.04	0.08	0.10
Specification	OLS	Local linear		Local quadratic		Local linear (bias-corrected)
Bandwidth		0.5 * MSE(1)	MSE(1)	0.5 * MSE(2)	MSE(2)	MSE(1)

Notes: The outcome is being chairman of municipal council. Sample includes runners-up and third-ranking candidates from parties nominating both the board and council chairman. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively.

Figure E3. Runner-up effect on promotions to council chairman, party gets both important positions.

Table E4. Runner-up effect on promotions to council chairman.

|	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Full sample						
Runner-up effect	0.089***	0.097*	0.053	0.094	0.054	0.088
	[0.015]	[0.057]	[0.039]	[0.067]	[0.045]	[0.057]
N	2538	970	1630	1496	2103	1630
R^2	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	
Bandwidth		0.05	0.09	0.08	0.16	0.09
Panel B: Absolute majority in municipality						
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Runner-up effect	0.072***	0.073	-0.027	0.152	-0.034	0.036
	[0.024]	[0.112]	[0.070]	[0.159]	[0.099]	[0.108]
N	946	346	608	446	722	608
R^2	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	
Bandwidth		0.04	0.07	0.05	0.10	0.07
Panel C: No absolute majority in municipality						
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Runner-up effect	0.100***	0.172**	0.118**	0.189*	0.149**	0.163**
	[0.019]	[0.081]	[0.054]	[0.100]	[0.066]	[0.081]
N	1592	434	810	678	1073	810
R^2	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	
Bandwidth		0.04	0.08	0.06	0.12	0.08
p-value for difference		0.47	0.10	0.84	0.12	0.35
Specification	OLS	Local linear		Local quadratic		Local linear (bias-corrected)
Bandwidth		0.5 * MSE(1)	MSE(1)	0.5 * MSE(2)	MSE(2)	MSE(1)

Notes: The outcome is being chairman of municipal council. Sample includes runners-up and third-ranking candidates from the party nominating the council chairman. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in brackets. p-value refers to testing the difference of the estimates in Panels B and C. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively.

Figure E4. RDD graph on becoming the chairman of municipal council, 3rd and 4th ranks.

Table E5. Estimated effect of ranking third or fourth, dependent variable chairman of municipal council.

	Panel A: Full sample				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
3rd vs. 4th	0.05	0.041	0.056	0.044	0.052
	[0.048]	[0.034]	[0.059]	[0.042]	[0.049]
N	1016	1678	1448	2032	1678
R2	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Bandwidth	0.04	0.08	0.06	0.13	0.08
	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
4th vs. 5th	0.027	-0.007	0.054	-0.018	0.038
	[0.053]	[0.033]	[0.067]	[0.040]	[0.058]
N	584	1059	943	1520	1059
R2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	
Bandwidth	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.04
	Panel B: Absolute majority in municipality				
	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
3rd vs. 4th	-0.065	-0.093	-0.036	-0.131	-0.103
	[0.103]	[0.072]	[0.152]	[0.090]	[0.124]
N	200	362	314	526	362
R2	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.02	
Bandwidth	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.05	
	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
4th vs. 5th	0.041	-0.026	0.094	-0.022	0.059
	[0.080]	[0.055]	[0.122]	[0.077]	[0.096]
N	226	414	316	520	414
R2	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02	
Bandwidth	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.04
	Panel C: No absolute majority in municipality				
	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
3rd vs. 4th	0.186**	0.097*	0.290**	0.169**	0.195**
	[0.081]	[0.058]	[0.118]	[0.079]	[0.084]
N	404	766	506	894	1512
R2	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	
Bandwidth	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.07	0.06
	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
4th vs. 5th	0.029	-0.008	0.044	-0.005	0.039
	[0.063]	[0.037]	[0.072]	[0.044]	[0.066]
N	386	700	674	1036	1447
R2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Bandwidth	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.08	0.05
Specification	Local linear		Local quadratic		Local linear (bias-corrected)
Bandwidth	0.5 * MSE(1)	MSE(1)	0.5 * MSE(2)	MSE(2)	MSE(1)

Notes: The outcome is being chairman of municipal council. Samples include 3rd 4th or 4th and 5th ranking candidates from the party nominating the council chair. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively.

Online Appendix F: Additional Results to Section 8

This Online Appendix includes robustness checks for results and comparisons of politicians' policy positions briefly discussed in Section 8.

First, we verify the robustness of the primary effect on promotions to board chairman using varying bandwidths, splitting the sample by median external or internal competition (Figure F1). Figure F2 provides a similar graph for the party analysis.

In the main text, we speculate that one possible explanation for the cross-party differences in primary and runner-up effects could be that they are policy- and office-oriented to a different degree. In order to evaluate whether this explains our findings, we examine whether board chairmen's policy positions deviate less from the party median than the party list winner's positions. While it appears in Table F1 that board chairmen are closer to the party median than party list winners, we cannot make any clear distinction between left- and right-wing blocs. This may also again be due to small number of observations for the left-wing politicians. Nevertheless, it appears less likely that our findings could be explained by differences in the degree of policy- vs. office-orientation. We also show in Table F2 that both the board chairmen and party list winners are much closer to party median than other elected or all other candidates, but the pattern is similar across the left-right dimension again.

Panel A: High external competition


Panel B: Low external competition

Notes: Figures show RDD estimates from local linear and quadratic estimations (black line) for various bandwidths. Vertical lines mark the MSE-optimal bandwidths. Dashed lines mark the 95 % confidence intervals.

Figure F1. Robustness of competition results to alternative bandwidths.

Panel A: Right−wing parties

Linear

Quadratic

Panel B: Left−wing parties

Linear

Quadratic

Notes: Figures show RDD estimates from local linear and quadratic estimations (black line) for various bandwidths. Vertical lines mark the MSE-optimal bandwidths. Dashed lines mark the 95 % confidence intervals.

Figure F2. Robustness of party results to alternative bandwidths.

Table F1. Deviations from median policy positions by party blocs.

	Panel A: Right-wing parties		
	Board chairmen	Party list winners	
Variable	Mean	Mean	Difference
Deviation in policy position, public sector size	2.27	2.60	-0.33***
Deviation in policy position, redistribution	2.18	2.33	-0.15*
N	194	271	
	Panel B: Left-wing parties		
	Board chairmen	Party list winners	
Variable	Mean	Mean	Difference
Deviation in policy position, public sector size	2.40	2.73	-0.33
Deviation in policy position, redistribution	2.26	2.23	0.04
N	26	31	

Notes: Sample includes politicians from the parties that nominate the board chairman, excluding municipalities with absolute majorities. Difference in means is tested using t test adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively.

Table F2. Policy positions by ideology, elected and all candidates.

	Panel A: Right-wing parties	
	Elected candidates	All candidates
Variable	Mean	Mean
Deviation in policy position, public sector size	2.59	2.70
Deviation in policy position, redistribution	2.35	2.42
N	1876	4906
	Panel B: Left-wing parties	
	Elected candidates	All candidates
Variable	Mean	Mean
Deviation in policy position, public sector size	2.57	2.76
Deviation in policy position, redistribution	2.24	2.40
N	203	700

Notes: Sample includes politicians from the parties that nominate the board chairman (excluding the board chairmen).

References for Appendices

Savolainen, Riikka. 2015. Does Political Experience Influence Policy Positions? Mimeo, Aalto University.