

Online Appendix

Elite Legitimation and Delegitimation of International Organizations in the Media: Patterns and Explanations

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A1 Text Retrieval and Data Collection Procedure

The text material was retrieved from electronic newspaper databases in a two-step procedure.

First, we used automated searches that enabled us to focus on articles that were likely to contain evaluations of IO legitimacy. Wherever possible, electronic versions of articles available in the Factiva database (global.factiva.com) were used. For the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, we relied on FAZ-BiblioNet; text material from the 1998 *Tagesanzeiger* – which is not available electronically – could not be included. These routines employed search words related to our legitimization objects. For the EU, for instance, the following routine was used:

(EU OR EC OR E.U. OR E.C. OR (European ADJ1 Union) OR Brussels OR (European ADJ1 communit*) OR (European ADJ1 (citizens* OR parliament* OR council* or commission or Court OR treaty OR treaties OR institutions))) OR ECJ OR E.C.J.)

It searches for different variations of the IO name and acronym, its headquarters, which is often used as a synonym for the EU, and its main bodies: the European Parliament, the European Commission, the European Council, and the European Court of Justice. We applied the same logic to construct the search routines for the G8 and the UN. The lists of search words were based on extensive pre-tests, which confirmed that including additional search terms would have been inefficient: If these additional terms had been employed, the searches would have yielded exceedingly large numbers of articles, but a very low share of ultimately relevant ones.

In order to manage the amount of potentially relevant text, we applied an intensity sampling procedure and limited the analysis to information-rich periods.¹ We, therefore, considered legitimacy communication around summit events that focus media attention on the

¹ Patton (2002) defines this method as a selection of cases that manifest the phenomena of interest intensely.

three IOs examined. For the EU, which has more than one summit per year, we chose the summit with the greatest number of hits using the search routine presented above.

To date, there is no reliable automated procedure for identifying the complex semantic relationships and structures underpinning legitimacy evaluations. Hence, the automated search routines were designed to minimize the number of relevant articles not found by the routines (“false negatives”); as a trade-off, the number of ultimately irrelevant articles produced by the search routines (“false positives”) was still considerable. Therefore, a second, manual step of selecting pertinent articles was necessary. To be included in the final corpus, articles had to contain at least one legitimacy evaluation.

Six members of the research team participated in the manual selection of relevant articles and in the identification and coding of legitimacy evaluations. Reliability was tested for the article selection procedure, for the identification of legitimacy evaluations in articles, and for coding each of the legitimization grammar variables. A random sample of approximately ten percent of the corpus was used for these tests. For all steps of the selection and coding process, we achieved high levels of pairwise intercoder reliability (90 percent and more agreement) and a Krippendorff’s α of 0.7 or higher. Next, a random sample of articles was assigned to each member of the coding team for identifying and coding legitimacy evaluations; each evaluation considered relevant by the first coder was checked by a second coder and any discrepancies between first and second coder were resolved by two other members of the team who were not involved in the first and second steps – this departs from the standard content-analytical procedure of reliability testing and coding but, in our view, greatly improves data quality. An overview of this sampling design is presented in Table A1 together with the values of the outcome variables. The table thus shows IO summit venues and dates, the sampling period around these dates, the number of coded legitimacy evaluations per IO-country-year (the indicator for legitimization intensity), legitimacy levels (the indicator for tone, the percentage share of positive legitimacy evaluations), and the patterns of elite legitimacy communication

for each IO-country-year, which is derived from the combination of both indicators. For further details on text retrieval and coding procedures, a detailed codebook may be consulted:

http://www.sfb597.uni-bremen.de/download/en/forschung/B1_Codebook.pdf

A2 Overview of sampling strategy and results

EU	Venue	Date	Period	CH			DE			UK			US		
				Intensity	Tone	Pattern	Intensity	Tone	Pattern	Intensity	Tone	Pattern	Intensity	Tone	Pattern
1998	Vienna	11-12/12	05-16/12	29	13.8	LID	57	22.8	HID	25	28.0	LIL	15	20.0	LID
1999	Berlin	24-25/03	20-31/03	52	44.2	HIL	161	50.3	HIL	115	7.0	HID	41	17.1	HID
2000	Nice	07-10/12	02-13/12	46	28.3	HIL	254	20.9	HID	82	15.9	HID	39	33.3	HIL
2001	Laeken	14-15/12	08-19/12	39	15.4	HID	166	20.5	HID	134	28.4	HIL	15	0.0	LID
2002	Seville	21-22/06	15-26/06	29	20.7	LID	68	16.2	HID	37	27.0	HID	11	18.2	LID
2003	Brussels	12-13/12	06-17/12	60	18.3	HID	190	20.0	HID	184	19.6	HID	22	13.6	LID
2004	Brussels	25-26/03	20-31/03	18	50.0	LIL	83	34.9	HIL	16	31.3	LIL	12	66.7	LIL
2005	Brussels	16-17/06	11-22/06	120	15.0	HID	276	14.5	HID	221	11.8	HID	58	12.1	HID
2006	Lahti*	20/10	14-25/10	12	16.7	LID	66	21.2	HID	44	25.0	HID	5	20.0	LID
2007	Brussels	21-22/06	16-27/06	72	37.5	HIL	168	27.4	HIL	92	28.3	HIL	11	27.3	LID
2008	Brussels	19-20/06	14-25/06	49	4.1	HID	119	31.9	HIL	57	29.8	HIL	21	14.3	LID
2009	Brussels	29-30/10	24-04/11	12	8.3	LID	18	22.2	LID	19	21.1	LID	0	27.3	LIL
2010	Brussels	07/05	01-12/05	22	31.8	LIL	39	15.4	HID	19	21.1	LID	13	15.4	LID
2011	Brussels	08-09/12	03-14/12	39	17.9	HID	58	20.7	HID	44	15.9	HID	6	100.0	LIL
2012	Brussels	28-29/06	23/06-04/07	0	27.3	LIL	22	36.4	LIL	0	27.3	LIL	0	27.3	LIL
2013	Brussels	27-28/06	22/06-03/07	19	42.1	LIL	33	36.4	LIL	52	23.1	HID	20	25.0	LID
Σ	3826			618			1778			1141			289		

A2 continued

Venue		Date	Period	CH			DE			GB			US		
G8				Intensity	Tone	Pattern	Intensity	Tone	Pattern	Intensity	Tone	Pattern	Intensity	Tone	Pattern
1998	Birmingham	15-17/05	09-20/05	10	40.0	LIL	27	11.1	LID	28	25.0	LID	14	42.9	LIL
1999	Cologne	18-20/06	12-23/06	4	50.0	LIL	14	21.4	LID	7	28.6	LIL	0	27.3	LIL
2000	Okinawa	21-23/07	15-26/07	8	12.5	LID	19	21.1	LID	35	5.7	HID	10	80.0	LIL
2001	Genoa	20-22/07	14-25/07	15	13.3	LID	63	27.0	HID	61	11.5	HID	19	5.3	LID
2002	Kananaskis	26-27/06	22-03/07	7	0.0	LID	11	9.1	LID	29	17.2	LID	1	0.0	LID
2003	Évian	01-03/06	28/05-07/06	68	17.6	HID	42	21.4	HID	94	11.7	HID	13	15.4	LID
2004	Sea Island	08-10/06	05-16/06	6	16.7	LID	23	17.4	LID	24	20.8	LID	2	50.0	LIL
2005	Gleneagles	06-08/07	02-13/07	12	58.3	LIL	44	36.4	HIL	80	30.0	HIL	13	30.8	LIL
2006	St. Petersburg	15-17/07	08-19/07	5	40.0	LIL	48	27.1	HID	13	7.7	LID	10	0.0	LID
2007	Heiligendamm	06-08/06	02-13/06	54	25.9	HID	201	26.4	HID	54	13.0	HID	7	14.3	LID
2008	Toyako	07-09/07	05-16/07	5	0.0	LID	1	0.0	LID	53	24.5	HID	4	0.0	LID
2009	L'Aquila	08-10/07	04-15/07	9	11.1	LID	5	0.0	LID	50	18.0	HID	0	27.3	LIL
2010	Huntsville	25-26/06	19-30/06	2	0.0	LID	0	27.3	LIL	26	23.1	LID	0	27.3	LIL
2011	Deauville	26-27/05	21/05-01/06	3	0.0	LID	3	66.7	LIL	8	0.0	LID	0	27.3	LIL
2012	Camp David	18-19/05	12-23/05	0	27.3	LIL	0	27.3	LIL	6	33.3	LIL	0	27.3	LIL
2013	Lough Erne	17-18/06	15-26/06	9	33.3	LIL	7	14.3	LID	18	11.1	LID	0	27.3	LIL
Σ	1404			217			508			586			93		

A2 continued

UN	Venue	Date	Period	CH			DE			GB			US		
				Intensity	Tone	Pattern	Intensity	Tone	Pattern	Intensity	Tone	Pattern	Intensity	Tone	Pattern
1998	NY	21/09-02/10	21/09-02/10	4	25.0	LID	15	53.3	LIL	4	75.0	LIL	15	73.3	LIL
1999	NY	20/09-02/10	20/09-02/10	11	36.4	LIL	25	32.0	LIL	29	34.5	LIL	29	27.6	LIL
2000	NY	12/09-22/09	12-22/09	2	100.0	LIL	3	66.7	LIL	1	0.0	LID	10	30.0	LIL
2001	NY	10-16/11	08-18/11	1	100.0	LIL	19	47.4	LIL	10	0.0	LID	29	13.8	LID
2002	NY	12-20/09	11-21/09	45	88.9	HIL	25	44.0	LIL	56	46.4	HIL	46	71.7	HIL
2003	NY	23/09-02/10	23/09-03/10	22	27.3	LID	42	45.2	HIL	50	72.0	HIL	55	69.1	HIL
2004	NY	21-30/09	21/09-01/10	14	21.4	LID	52	38.5	HIL	46	23.9	HID	23	17.4	LID
2005	NY	14-19/09	14-24/09	46	10.9	HID	114	13.2	HID	84	16.7	HID	45	26.7	HID
2006	NY	19-27/09	18-28/09	11	63.6	LIL	32	12.5	LID	26	30.8	LIL	31	3.2	LID
2007	NY	25/09-03/10	24/09-04/10	15	53.3	LIL	20	20.0	LID	5	40.0	LIL	4	25.0	LID
2008	NY	23-27/09	20/09-01/10	6	66.7	LIL	15	40.0	LIL	1	100.0	LIL	17	35.3	LIL
2009	NY	23-29/09	19-30/09	20	15.0	LID	20	25.0	LID	36	5.6	HID	21	38.1	LIL
2010	NY	23-29/09	21/09-01/10	10	40.0	LIL	10	30.0	LIL	17	17.6	LID	8	25.0	LID
2011	NY	21-27/09	17-28/09	2	0.0	LID	6	0.0	LID	12	41.7	LIL	13	38.5	LIL
2012	NY	25/09-01/10	22/09-04/10	15	20.0	LID	5	0.0	LID	16	18.8	LID	8	0.0	LID
2013	NY	24/09-01/10	21/09-02/10	19	52.6	LIL	9	0.0	LID	2	0.0	LID	24	54.2	LIL
Σ	1428			243			412			395			378		

*EU special summit with Russia. LI = legitimation intensity; LT = legitimacy tone. LIL = low-intensity legitimation; HIL = high-intensity legitimation; LID = low-intensity delegitimation; HID = high-intensity delegitimation.

A3 Communication intensity, tone, and patterns of elite legitimacy communication

		Low-intensity legitimation	Low-intensity delegitimation	High-intensity legitimation	High-intensity delegitimation	Overall
		Intensity≤34.7 Tone≥27.3	Intensity≤34.7 Tone<27.3	Intensity>34.7 Tone≥27.3	Intensity>34.7 Tone<27.3	
All IO- country-years	N (%)	62 (32.3)	68 (35.4)	20 (10.4)	42 (21.9)	192 (100.0)
	Ø Intensity (z score)	10.7 (-0.52)	14.0 (-0.45)	74.7 (0.87)	84.6 (1.08)	34.7 (0.0)
	Ø Tone (z score)	49.4 (1.03)	12.5 (-0.69)	43.6 (0.76)	17.7 (-0.45)	27.3 (0.0)
EU	N (%)	13 (20.3)	16 (25.0)	11 (17.2)	24 (37.5)	64 (100.0)
	Ø Intensity (z score)	13.3 (-0.46)	16.9 (-0.38)	93.0 (1.26)	98.3 (1.38)	59.8 (0.54)
	Ø Tone (z score)	40.9 (0.95)	17.3 (-0.47)	34.0 (0.31)	17.4 (-0.46)	25.0 (-0.04)
G8	N (%)	21 (32.8)	29 (45.3)	2 (3.1)	12 (18.8)	64 (100.0)
	Ø Intensity (z score)	4.5 (-0.65)	12.5 (-0.48)	62.0 (0.59)	68.6 (0.73)	21.9 (-0.28)
	Ø Tone (z score)	38.1 (0.95)	9.9 (-0.81)	33.2 (0.27)	19.2 (-0.38)	21.6 (-0.12)
UN	N (%)	28 (43.8)	23 (35.9)	7 (10.9)	6 (9.4)	64 (100.0)
	Ø Intensity (z score)	14.0 (-0.45)	13.8 (-0.45)	49.4 (0.32)	61.8 (0.59)	22.3 (-0.27)
	Ø Tone (z score)	51.6 (1.14)	12.5 (-0.69)	61.7 (1.61)	16.2 (-0.52)	35.3 (0.37)


A3 Communication intensity, tone, and patterns of elite legitimacy communication, continued

		Low-intensity legitimation	Low-intensity delegitimation	High-intensity legitimation	High-intensity delegitimation	Overall
CH	N (%)	18 (37.5)	18 (37.5)	4 (8.3)	8 (16.7)	48 (100.0)
	Ø Intensity (z score)	9.7 (-0.54)	11.9 (-0.49)	53.8 (0.41)	59.4 (0.53)	22.5 (-0.26)
	Ø Tone (z score)	50.7 (1.21)	12.3 (-0.70)	49.7 (1.05)	15.6 (-0.55)	30.4 (0.19)
DE	N (%)	12 (25.0)	15 (31.3)	7 (14.6)	14 (29.2)	48 (100.0)
	Ø Intensity (z score)	14.2 (-0.44)	14.5 (-0.44)	95.6 (1.32)	117.3 (1.79)	56.2 (0.47)
	Ø Tone (z score)	42.3 (0.87)	11.6 (-0.73)	37.8 (0.49)	20.5 (-0.32)	25.7 (-0.03)
UK	N (%)	11 (22.9)	14 (29.2)	6 (12.5)	17 (35.4)	48 (100.0)
	Ø Intensity (z score)	11.9 (-0.49)	16.4 (-0.39)	78.2 (0.94)	76.0 (0.89)	44.2 (0.21)
	Ø Tone (z score)	42.8 (0.82)	13.1 (-0.66)	39.2 (0.55)	16.2 (-0.52)	24.3 (-0.12)
US	N (%)	21 (43.8)	21 (43.8)	3 (6.3)	3 (6.3)	48 (100.0)
	Ø Intensity (z score)	8.9 (-0.56)	13.8 (-0.45)	46.7 (0.26)	48.0 (0.29)	14.9 (-0.41)
	Ø Tone (z score)	42.2 (1.09)	13.0 (-0.67)	58.1 (1.44)	18.6 (-0.41)	28.9 (0.25)


Explanatory note on patterns of elite legitimacy communication

To operationalize the four patterns of elite legitimacy communication I combine the dimensions of legitimation intensity and tone. For descriptive results on both individual dimensions see the follow figures.

Communication intensity across IOs and countries, 1998-2013 (absolute number of evaluations)



Tone across IOs and countries, 1998-2013 (percent share of positive evaluations)



High-intensity delegitimation is defined by a communication intensity of more than 34.7 evaluations and a tone of less than 27.3 percent of positive evaluations. The 42 cases in this group have an average communication intensity of 84.6 legitimacy evaluations. This exceeds the overall average by more than one standard deviation. The mean tone (17.7 percent) is about half a standard deviation below the overall average. The pattern is exemplified by British elites’ communication about the 2000 Nice (France) summit in which, under the presidency of Jacques Chirac, a new foundational treaty of the EU – the Treaty of Nice – was finalized. It expanded the scope of qualified majority voting and involved a heated debate about the voting weights of member states (Wessels 2001). In the United Kingdom, there was much opposition to giving up the national veto on taxation and social security issues. Therefore, the summit – which raised fears about a European super-state – triggered 82 legitimacy evaluations and highly elite evaluation with a tone of 15.9 percent positive evaluations.

High-intensity legitimation is present, if communication intensity is higher than 34.7 evaluations and if tone exceeds the threshold of 27.3 percent positive evaluations. The 20 cases in this group have an average communication intensity of 74.7 evaluations (almost one standard deviation above the overall average) and a tone of 43.6 percent, corresponding to almost one standard deviation above the overall mean. British elites' evaluations of the UN in the context of the 57th UN General Assembly (in 2002) in New York (USA) illustrate this pattern. In his opening address, then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan reminded of the 9/11 attacks and highlighted the need for multilateral cooperation to prevent terrorism. The run-up to the US invasion of Iraq brought up the role of the UN as a "legitimizing-in-chief" of military intervention (Coleman 2007). 56 legitimacy evaluations and a tone of 46.4 percent positive evaluations accompanied the summit.

Low-intensity delegitimation results from a communication intensity lower than 34.7 evaluations and a tone of less than 27.3 percent positive evaluations. The average communication intensity of the 68 cases in this group is 14.0 evaluations (half a standard deviation below the overall average) and with an average of 12.5 percent positive evaluations, tone is almost one standard deviation below the overall average. German elites' evaluations on the 2002 G8 summit in Kananaskis (Canada) exemplify the pattern. The summit triggered 11 legitimacy evaluations with predominantly negative tone (9.1 percent positive evaluations).

Low-intensity legitimation is defined by a communication intensity lower than 34.7 legitimacy evaluations and a tone of more than 27.3 percent positive evaluations. The 62 cases in this group have an average number of less than eleven legitimacy evaluations (half a standard deviation below the overall average). The mean tone almost reaches 50 percent, more than one standard deviation above the overall mean. A typical example of the pattern is the US elites' evaluation of the 2004 G8 summit hosted by President George W. Bush in Sea Island (USA), which

triggered a mere two legitimacy evaluations (one positive and one negative). The legitimacy of the G8 was no salient issue and there was hardly any explicit contestation. In fact, the articles from which the evaluations are drawn focus on the low turnout of protesters (especially in comparison with the 2003 summit in Évian, France).

A4 Explanatory Variables

A4.1 Indicators on IO Authority

Authority

I operationalize the authority of IOs with the help of data from Hooghe and colleagues on the pooling and delegation of IO authority at IOs (2017). This dataset provides information on the number of tasks delegated to and the number of decisions pooled at IOs for 76 IOs, including the EU and the UN, from 1950 to 2010. From this dataset, I take the overall level of delegation for a given IO-year and the overall level of pooling for a given IO-year. I sum up both scores to calculate the authority variable. As the G8 – as an informal IO – is not part of the dataset, I set the scores for pooling and delegation to zero. Since there are no tasks formally delegated to the G8 and no decisions formally pooled, the overall level of G8 authority is zero. As the time series by Hooghe and colleagues do not provide data for the most recent years of my observation period, I assume the authority of the EU and the UN to remain constant from 2011 to 2013.

Membership

I operationalize the membership of sampled countries in the selected IOs with an indicator variable. A score of one indicates that a country is a member of an IO in a given year.


A4.2 Indicators on national political cultures

To derive indicators of the intensity and tone of national political cultures, I draw on a text corpus of newspaper articles and legitimacy evaluations that focus on the Swiss, German, British, and US political systems in the years 1998-2013. I used the same grammar and coding rules as for the study of legitimacy communication on IOs to identify and code pertinent articles and evaluations. Details on search routines, focusing events, sampling periods, and the coding procedure can be found at http://www.sfb597.uni-bremen.de/download/en/forschung/B1_Codebook.pdf. The subsequent table shows the total number of legitimacy evaluations per country identified in the 1998-2013 period (national intensity) and the percentage shares of positive legitimacy evaluations (national tone).


National political cultures. 1998-2013

		Tone	
		Negative	Positive
		<i>High-intensity delegitimation</i>	<i>High-intensity legitimation</i>
Intensity	High	United Kingdom Intensity: 1601 evaluations Tone: 24.9 percent positive evaluations	United States Intensity: 1761 evaluations Tone: 47.0 percent positive evaluations
	Low	<i>Low-intensity delegitimation</i> Germany Intensity: 1220 evaluations Tone: 37.3 percent positive evaluations	<i>Low-intensity legitimation</i> Switzerland Intensity: 1003 evaluations Tone: 53.5 percent positive evaluations

Domestic communication intensity and tone across countries, 1998-2013 (absolute number of evaluations and percent share of positive evaluations)



Patterns of elite legitimacy communication on domestic regimes, 1998-2013



Note: Pattern classification uses overall mean values of national communication intensity (87.3 evaluations) and tone (40.7 percent positive evaluations).

A4.3 Political events variables

The fine-grained coding schemes presented here were used to code the event contexts and speaker types of each legitimacy evaluation. For the purposes of the empirical analysis, broader categories – as shown in the tables – were used: three event contexts (domestic, security, and institutional) and three speaker types (journalists, government actors, and civil society) were coded. The coding of event contexts was done on the basis of the dominant context identified by the coder in the paragraph in which the legitimacy evaluation was embedded. The explanatory variables derived from the three event contexts and three speaker types are presented as the respective percentage shares in a given IO-country-year.

Classification of event contexts

Event context	Specific event categories
	Foreign policy (general)
Security event	Security and defense policy Public security policy International crime Other security and defense issues
Institutional event	Institutional design (general) Territorial organization/membership Executive and administrative processes Legislative processes Judicial and constitutional processes Electoral processes Budgeting Other intuitional issues
Domestic event	Fiscal and economic policy (general) Monetary policy Financial market policy Trade policy Industrial, regional, structural policy Debt policy Agricultural policy Energy policy Consumer protection policy Infrastructural policy Other economic issues Environmental policy Educational, research and cultural policy Social policy Domestic policy

Classification of elite speakers

Speaker types	Specific speaker categories
Government speakers	Government, administration
	Head of state/government
	Minister/cabinet member
	Military
	Judiciary
	Other holder of a national political office
	Parliamentarians, government party
	Parliamentarians, opposition party
	Member of government/majority party
	Member of opposition/minority party
	Other party members
	European Union representatives
	G8 representatives
United Nations representatives	
Other (inter-)national political actors	
Civil society speakers	NGOs
	Unions
	Business associations
	Other interest group representatives
	Academia
	Arts/Culture
	Religious groups
	Citizens/the people
	Protesters
Other civil society actors	
Journalists	

A5 Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables

Variable	N	Min	Max	Mean	SD
Government speakers	192	0.0	100.0	31.9	26.0
Security events	192	0.0	100.0	25.7	28.1
Institutional events	192	0.0	100.0	43.0	28.9
Authority	192	0.0	0.92	0.52	0.38
National intensity	192	23	200	87.3	38.8
National tone	192	6.8	84.0	40.7	16.5
Membership	192	0	1	0.73	0.45

A6 Classification Table

Observed	Predicted				% correct	
	Low-intensity legitimation	Low-intensity delegitimation	High-intensity legitimation	High-intensity delegitimation		
Model 1						
Low-intensity legitimation	45	13	0	4	72.6	
Low-intensity delegitimation	13	44	1	10	64.7	
High-intensity legitimation	6	6	1	7	5.0	
High-intensity delegitimation	3	15	0	24	57.1	
% overall	34.9	40.6	1.0	24.0	59.4	

A7 Diagnostics

A7.1 Multicollinearity Statistics

Variable	Tolerance	Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
Government speakers	0.641	1.559
Security events	0.488	2.01
Institutional events	0.523	1.912
Authority	0.748	1.338
National intensity	0.446	2.245
National tone	0.456	2.194
Membership	0.750	1.333

Dependent variable patterns of elite legitimacy communication

A7.2 Hausman Test

I ran the Hausman test (Hausman and McFadden 1984) on the full dataset. The p -values for Chi-Square statistics, comparing the vectors of coefficients for each pattern of elite legitimacy communication across the full model and restricted models, are:

Restricted Models	Full Model
Exclude High-intensity delegitimation	NA
Exclude High-intensity legitimation	0.9999
Exclude Low-intensity delegitimation	NA
Exclude Low-intensity legitimation	baseline

A7.4 Robustness Checks

The following tables present robustness checks. For comparison, I list regression coefficients and standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Full Model as presented in the paper

	High-intensity legitimation	Low-intensity delegitimation	High-intensity delegitimation
Authority	1.138*** (0.441)	0.434* (0.245)	0.842*** (0.293)
Membership	1.614** (0.802)	0.449 (0.540)	1.635** (0.664)
National intensity	0.327 (0.452)	0.359 (0.343)	0.327 (0.382)
National tone	-0.187 (0.421)	-0.378 (0.325)	-0.541 (0.398)
Security event	0.260 (0.477)	-0.211 (0.287)	-0.921** (0.437)
Institutional event	1.277** (0.503)	0.380 (0.309)	0.923*** (0.309)
Government speakers	-0.645* (0.356)	-1.311*** (0.292)	-1.344*** (0.375)
-2 LL	393.76		
Chi ²	105.71		
N	192		
McFadden pseudo-R ²	0.212		

For the full model, mean values of legitimation intensity and tone were chosen as cutoff points for classifying elite communication into the four patters. As this procedure is prone to outlier bias, the following table presents the full model with legitimation communication patterns classified on the basis of median communication intensity and tone.

Full Model with median communication intensity (19) and tone (22.2) as cutoff points for pattern classification

	High-intensity legitimation	Low-intensity delegitimation	High-intensity delegitimation
Authority	0.962*** (0.293)	0.505* (0.279)	1.145*** (0.305)
Membership	1.966*** (0.648)	0.569 (0.608)	1.574** (0.660)
National intensity	0.467 (0.381)	0.564 (0.396)	0.620 (0.404)
National tone	-0.304 (0.344)	-0.502 (0.383)	-0.458 (0.388)
Security event	-0.072 (0.332)	-0.133 (0.323)	-0.482 (0.397)
Institutional event	0.762** (0.353)	0.273 (0.329)	0.955*** (0.365)
Government speakers	-0.729** (0.287)	-1.814*** (0.386)	-1.428*** (0.370)
-2 LL	417.4		
Chi ²	113.02		
N	192		
McFadden pseudo-R ²	0.213		

The full model presented in the paper builds on clustered data as legitimacy communication patterns are grouped according to IOs and countries. To probe the robustness of the results, the following table presents multinomial logistic regression coefficients for the model with robust, clustered standard errors for the IO level.

Full Model with robust, clustered standard errors for the IO level.

	High-intensity legitimation	Low-intensity delegitimation	High-intensity delegitimation
Authority	1.138*** (0.155)	0.434 (0.363)	0.842*** (0.111)
Membership	1.614*** (0.584)	0.449 (0.413)	1.635*** (0.308)
National intensity	0.327 (0.908)	0.359* (0.166)	0.327 (0.544)
National tone	-0.187 (0.612)	-0.378** (0.122)	-0.541 (0.742)
Security event	0.261 (0.639)	-0.211 (0.438)	-0.921** (0.390)
Institutional event	1.277** (0.498)	0.380 (0.306)	0.923*** (0.088)
Government speakers	-0.645 (0.467)	-1.311*** (0.319)	-1.344*** (0.087)
-2 LL	417.4		
Chi ²	113.02		
N	192		
McFadden pseudo-R ²	0.213		

The full model presented in the paper builds on cluster data as legitimacy communication patterns are grouped according to IOs and countries. To probe the robustness of results, the following table presents multinomial logistic regression coefficients for the model with robust, clustered standard errors for the country level.

Full Model with robust, clustered standard errors for the country level.

	High-intensity legitimation	Low-intensity delegitimation	High-intensity delegitimation
Authority	1.138** (0.467)	0.434 (0.326)	0.842** (0.367)
Membership	1.614*** (0.191)	0.449 (0.285)	1.635*** (0.277)
National intensity	0.327* (0.176)	0.359* (0.216)	0.327*** (0.042)
National tone	-0.187 (0.127)	-0.378*** (0.095)	-0.541* (0.312)
Security event	0.261 (0.364)	-0.211 (0.469)	-0.921 (0.601)
Institutional event	1.277*** (0.272)	0.380 (0.262)	0.923*** (0.150)
Government speakers	-0.645*** (0.149)	-1.311** (0.640)	-1.344*** (0.092)
-2 LL	417.4		
Chi ²	113.02		
N	192		
McFadden pseudo-R ²	0.213		

The full model presented in the paper could be prone to secular trends. To probe the robustness of my results the following table presents multinomial logistic regression coefficients for the full model based on data for the period 1998-2005. The subsequent table shows multinomial logistic regression coefficients for the full model based on data for the period 2006-2013.

Full Model, 1998-2005.

	High-intensity legitimation	Low-intensity delegitimation	High-intensity delegitimation
Authority	1.021* (0.573)	0.560 (0.426)	1.484*** (0.488)
Membership	1.546 (1.054)	0.862 (0.913)	2.510** (1.034)
National intensity	0.365 (0.505)	-0.116 (0.460)	0.055 (0.493)
National tone	-0.394 (0.458)	0.079 (0.432)	-0.336 (0.499)
Security event	0.428 (0.595)	0.234 (0.490)	0.039 (0.619)
Institutional event	1.366* (0.697)	1.201** (0.549)	2.164*** (0.655)
Government speakers	-0.265 (0.473)	-2.011*** (0.619)	-1.799*** (0.600)
-2 LL	190.134		
Chi ²	70.98		
N	96		
McFadden pseudo-R ²	0.272		

Full Model, 2006-2013.

	High-intensity legitimation	Low-intensity delegitimation	High-intensity delegitimation
Authority	74.414 (13008.542)	0.537 (0.345)	0.473 (0.466)
Membership	236.259 (25904.945)	0.853 (0.816)	1.993* (1.149)
National intensity	-109.740 (14702.095)	0.977* (0.582)	0.220 (0.757)
National tone	185.160 (20547.132)	-0.589 0.585	-1.031 (0.895)
Security event	-29.199 (9472.457)	-0.680 (0.423)	-2.497*** (0.931)
Institutional event	75.959 (8552.946)	-0.183 (0.445)	0.273 (0.562)
Government speakers	-126.985 (14361.505)	-1.260*** (0.395)	-1.494** (0.661)
-2 LL	129.97		
Chi ²	95.926		
N	96		
McFadden pseudo-R ²	0.425		

The model presented in the paper might also be spatially biased. To probe this effect, the following tables provide jackknife estimates

Full Model, excluding the European Union

	High-intensity legitimation	Low-intensity delegitimation	High-intensity delegitimation
Authority	0.236 (0.677)	1.330*** (0.461)	1.076* (0.605)
Membership	16.375 (2460.366)	0.313 (0.748)	1.145 (1.074)
National intensity	1.262* (0.645)	0.516 (0.438)	0.944 (0.517)
National tone	-0.892 (0.571)	-0.575 (0.425)	-1.391** (0.586)
Security event	0.818 (0.792)	-0.774** (0.377)	-1.002 (0.611)
Institutional event	1.499* (0.890)	0.273 (0.353)	1.097** (0.475)
Government speakers	0.158 (0.540)	-1.581*** (0.372)	-1.380*** (0.521)
-2 LL	229.18		
Chi ²	77.014		
N	128		
McFadden pseudo-R ²	0.252		

Full Model, excluding the G8

	High-intensity legitimation	Low-intensity delegitimation	High-intensity delegitimation
Authority	1.415 (2.061)	-4.723** (1.900)	-1.122 (1.944)
Membership	1.213 (0.937)	-0.896 (0.814)	1.383 (0.845)
National intensity	0.240 (0.516)	0.509 (0.431)	0.020 (0.467)
National tone	-0.053 (0.480)	-0.513 (0.423)	0.019 (0.475)
Security event	1.068 (0.699)	-0.305 (0.483)	-0.882 (0.616)
Institutional event	1.896*** (0.691)	0.666 (0.484)	0.806 (0.507)
Government speakers	-0.506 (0.419)	-1.413*** (0.380)	-1.579*** (0.478)
-2 LL	264.54		
Chi ²	79.188		
N	128		
McFadden pseudo-R ²	0.230		

Full Model, excluding the United Nations

	High-intensity legitimation	Low-intensity delegitimation	High-intensity delegitimation
Authority	1.029** (0.476)	0.125 (0.343)	0.598* (0.356)
Membership	1.663 (1.026)	-0.536 (0.808)	1.137 (0.853)
National intensity	-0.455 (0.489)	0.336 (0.518)	0.115 (0.524)
National tone	0.213 (0.626)	-0.455 (0.489)	-0.523 (0.524)
Security event	-0.816 (1.129)	-1.538** (0.609)	-2.124** (0.922)
Institutional event	1.141* (0.607)	0.180 (0.425)	0.868* (0.461)
Government speakers	-1.301* (0.697)	-2.013*** (0.556)	-1.563*** (0.555)
-2 LL	239.98		
Chi ²	95.045		
N	128		
McFadden pseudo-R ²	0.284		

Full Model, excluding Switzerland

	High-intensity legitimation	Low-intensity delegitimation	High-intensity delegitimation
Authority	0.860* (0.477)	0.320 (0.334)	0.721** (0.354)
Membership	1.776 (1.460)	-0.584 (0.995)	1.672 (1.208)
National intensity	0.384 (0.483)	0.125 (0.397)	0.313 (0.406)
National tone	-0.231 (0.444)	-0.401 (0.381)	-0.413 (0.411)
Security event	0.631 (0.552)	0.495 (0.387)	-0.462 (0.487)
Institutional event	1.533** (0.621)	0.683 (0.424)	1.028** (0.450)
Government speakers	-0.774 (0.534)	-2.270*** (0.463)	-1.502*** (0.505)
-2 LL	282.02		
Chi ²	96.564		
N	144		
McFadden pseudo-R ²	0.255		

Full Model, excluding Germany

	High-intensity legitimation	Low-intensity delegitimation	High-intensity delegitimation
Authority	1.280** (0.608)	0.513* (0.274)	0.878*** (0.340)
Membership	1.445 (0.950)	0.394 (0.622)	1.705** (0.796)
National intensity	0.272 (0.529)	0.374 (0.379)	0.339 (0.433)
National tone	-0.242 (0.481)	-0.431 (0.344)	-0.489 (0.422)
Security event	0.451 (0.583)	-0.295 (0.323)	-0.642 (0.478)
Institutional event	1.312** (0.623)	0.264 (0.356)	0.986** (0.442)
Government speakers	-0.531 (0.384)	-1.059*** (0.297)	-1.326*** (0.409)
-2 LL	294.44		
Chi ²	71.527		
N	144		
McFadden pseudo-R ²	0.195		

Full Model, excluding the United Kingdom

	High-intensity legitimation	Low-intensity delegitimation	High-intensity delegitimation
Authority	1.573** (0.628)	0.614** (0.287)	1.235*** (0.393)
Membership	1.737* (0.895)	0.647 (0.590)	2.010*** (0.772)
National intensity	0.293 (0.708)	0.716 (0.500)	-0.304 (0.679)
National tone	-0.027 (0.627)	-0.586 (0.467)	0.069 (0.636)
Security event	0.113 (0.635)	-0.454 (0.347)	-1.586** (0.710)
Institutional event	1.348** (0.616)	0.443 (0.339)	1.109** (0.436)
Government speakers	-0.726* (0.418)	-1.351*** (0.336)	-1.546*** (0.478)
-2 LL	271.34		
Chi ²	93.263		
N	144		
McFadden pseudo-R ²	0.256		

Full Model, excluding the United States

	High-intensity legitimation	Low-intensity delegitimation	High-intensity delegitimation
Authority	0.865* (0.461)	0.041 (0.294)	0.546* (0.329)
Membership	1.521* (0.894)	0.703 (0.666)	1.460* (0.760)
National intensity	0.232 (0.502)	0.299 (0.405)	0.324 (0.430)
National tone	0.006 (0.599)	-0.334 (0.497)	-0.987* (0.582)
Security event	0.040 (0.516)	-0.388 (0.337)	-1.189** (0.504)
Institutional event	1.067** (0.537)	0.229 (0.355)	0.785* (0.403)
Government speakers	-0.734* (0.404)	-0.994*** (0.334)	-1.325*** (0.430)
-2 LL	304.14		
Chi ²	78.651		
N	144		
McFadden pseudo-R ²	0.205		

A8 References

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