Institutional Overlap in Global Governance and the Design of Intergovernmental Organizations

Online Appendix

Table A1 Summary statistics of monadic COW IGO data

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
IGO design features					
Secretariat	534	0.916	0.278	0	1
Independent secretariat	534	0.837	0.370	0	1
Voting	534	0.560	0.497	0	1
Monitoring	534	0.240	0.427	0	1
Enforcement	534	0.169	0.375	0	1
Dispute settlement	534	0.305	0.461	0	1
IGO issue areas					
Security	534	0.062	0.241	0	1
Environment	534	0.204	0.403	0	1
Health	534	0.082	0.275	0	1
Human rights	534	0.036	0.185	0	1
Trade and commerce	534	0.296	0.457	0	1
Finance	534	0.116	0.321	0	1
Development	534	0.367	0.482	0	1
Social affairs	534	0.412	0.493	0	1
Technical affairs	534	0.249	0.433	0	1
IGO governance tasks					
Standard setting	526	0.369	0.483	0	1
Implementation	526	0.348	0.477	0	1
Monitoring	526	0.217	0.412	0	1
Funding	526	0.196	0.397	0	1
Capacity building	526	0.281	0.450	0	1
Service provision	526	0.608	0.489	0	1
Agenda setting	534	0.502	0.500	0	1
Information gathering	534	0.815	0.389	0	1

Measuring IGO institutional design

This section provides additional details about the coding of the five institutional design variables included in our data. The variable *secretariat* captures whether an IGO has some kind of secretariat. It refers to an institutional body whose purpose is to assist the organization as a whole or its participants by sharing and circulating information, providing technical assistance, preparing meetings, or similar activities. This secretariat must be a part of the institutional structure of an IGO but does not need to be part of the organization. It can also be provided by another organization. If an institutional body that provides some form of administrative support to the participants in the IGO exists, then *secretariat* is coded 1, otherwise 0.

The variable *monitoring* captures whether an IGO has a monitoring mechanism. It covers any institutional means to observe members' activities with respect to the rules and obligations specified by an IGO. The variable is coded 1 if there is a working group, task force, committee, or other institutional body whose purpose is to collect information about the behavior of the members in an IGO. If there is no evidence for any form of institutionalized monitoring in an IGO, the variable is coded 0. The monitoring can be mandatory or voluntary and conducted by an external auditor as long as it is mentioned as part of an IGO's institutional structure. As for all other design variables in the data, this variable captures institutional design only, not institutional activities or outputs. Thus, whether or not monitoring mechanisms that are in place are actually used or how they are used is not relevant for the coding of this variable. If the organization encourages or authorizes monitoring by its members but does not itself engage in collecting information about participant behavior, the IGO is coded 0 in terms of monitoring.

The variable *enforcement* captures whether an IGO has an enforcement mechanism. The variable is coded 1 if there is an institutional body in an IGO whose purpose is to enforce members' compliance with the rules and standards of the organization. This body can take the form of a working group, a committee, a general assembly, or the chair of an IGO, among others. If there is no evidence for any form of institutionalized enforcement in the IGO, the variable is coded 0. If the organization encourages or authorizes enforcement and sanctioning of non-compliant behavior by its members but does not itself engage in enforcement, *enforcement* is coded 0.

The variable *dispute settlement* captures whether an institutional body exists in an IGO whose purpose is to settle disputes, differences, or misunderstandings among participants. These disputes can be about the implementation of rules or other commitments of the organization. They may also arise in the context of the internal operations of an IGO. *Dispute settlement* is coded 1 if dispute settlement is delegated to a body or procedure as part of the institutional structure of an IGO. If no institutionalized dispute settlement exists in an IGO, the variable is coded 0. If it lacks its own dispute settlement mechanism, an IGO may delegate dispute settlement to another institution (e.g. an international court). If an organization is founded with the purpose to settle disputes (e.g. among states or other actors) but has no internal dispute settlement procedures, then the variable is coded 0. The variable captures an aspect of the institutional structure of an IGO and not its governance function. Dispute settlement as governance function of an IGO is captured by our governance function variables.

The variable *decision-making* captures whether procedures for decision-making are specified in an IGO. It is coded 1 if such rules are explicitly specified as part of the institutional structure of an organization, and 0 otherwise. The variable captures decision-making procedures in general, not only voting in a narrower sense. If an IGO, for example, uses a consensus procedure and does not take votes, then as long as consensus decision-making is specified as decision-making procedure, *decision-making* is coded 1. In other words, the variable acknowledges the existence of decision-making rules as part of the institutional structure of an IGO but does not weigh up one decision-making rule against another.

Table A2 Factor analysis of IGO design features

Panel A				
Factor	**Eigenvalue**	**Difference**	**Proportion**	**Cumulative**
Factor1	1.462	1.253	1.185	1.185
Factor2	0.209	0.209	0.170	1.355
Factor3	0.0005	0.202	0.0004	1.355
Factor4	-0.202	0.034	-0.164	1.192
Factor5	-0.236	.	-0.192	1.000
Panel B				
Variable	**Factor1**			**Uniqueness**
Secretariat	0.328			0.892
Voting	0.595			0.646
Monitoring	0.413			0.829
Enforcement	0.609			0.629
Dispute settlement	0.677			0.541

Notes: Panel A shows that all design elements load onto a single latent factor (with Eigenvalue above one). Panel B shows that the factor loadings are all positive.

Measuring IGO governance tasks

This section provides additional details about the coding of the eight governance task variables included in our data. The variable *agenda-setting* captures whether an IGO is involved in placing an issue or problem on the international agenda. Agenda-setting efforts can include campaigning to increase the awareness of specific target actors, such as governments or other IGOs, as well as the broader public for a given issue or problem. It can also include broader educational efforts to raise awareness of a particular target audience. Thus, awareness raising can be part of agenda-setting. This awareness raising can also take the form of movement building if the campaign for placing an issue on the international agenda involves the creation of a new transnational movement. IGOs that engage in lobbying governments or business to adopt a standard or practice also belong in this category. If an IGO is involved in agenda-setting, the variable *agenda-setting* is coded 1, and 0 otherwise.

The variable *standard-setting* captures whether the task of an IGO involves setting international rules, principles, or standards that aim at shaping the behavior of a target group, such as companies or states. These can be technical standards, codes of conduct, guidelines, or any other form of standard that is geared toward changing the behavior of some target audience. The design of principles to guide some actors' behavior is considered part of standard-setting. If an IGO is directly involved or participates in standard-setting or rule-making as one of its tasks, the variable *standard-setting* is coded 1, and 0 otherwise. If an IGO promotes only a particular type of policy, rule, or standard, or lobbies other actors to make or change rules and standards without being directly involved itself in the rule-making and standard-setting, *standard-setting* is coded 0.

The variable *implementation* captures whether the task of an IGO involves the implementation of existing rules or standards. The rules and standards which the IGO seeks to implement or assists in implementing can originate with the IGO itself or with another IGO, government, or other actor. Implementing IGOs are involved in the design and implementation of activities and programs that are geared toward implementing and ensuring compliance with some international rule or standard. If an IGO is concerned with the implementation of existing international rules, the variable *implementation* is coded 1, otherwise 0.

The variable *monitoring* captures whether the task of an IGO involves monitoring the implementation of international rules or standards or the behavior of specific actors. This is not necessarily the same as having monitoring as an institutional design element. Here, the question is whether the monitoring of the behavior of some actor or group of actors is among the tasks of the IGO. If an IGO conducts surveys to observe the behavior of particular target groups, this may be a case of monitoring. The variable *monitoring* is coded 1 if the task of an IGO involves monitoring, and 0 otherwise. If an IGO monitors only its own participants, we code this as 1. Monitoring in the sense of this variable does not include project monitoring or the assessment of the achievement of benchmarks, etc. We are only interested in the monitoring of behavior of some actors that is geared toward the detection of defection from some rule, standard, or norm.

The variable *funding* captures whether the task of an IGO involves the financing of projects and other activities. These projects and activities can be organized and managed by the IGO or any other actor. These projects and activities can generate material outputs, such as roads, wells or schools, or immaterial outputs, such as knowledge or research. To qualify as a funding IGO, the primary question is whether the IGO is involved in the funding of projects. This may take direct and indirect forms. The provision of funding for projects is an example of direct funding. It may also include indirect funding activities. This may include the garnering of funding or the goal to find new funding for particular issues without actually providing funds itself. Attracting, facilitating, and mobilizing new domestic and foreign investment to further a particular cause would be an example of this. Financing may take the form of one-off fundraising campaigns, sponsorship, donations, or permanent institutional support. We code resource mobilization IGOs as falling in the *funding* category unless the resource mobilization is geared toward a more specific end, such as agenda-setting or capacity-building. If an IGO is involved in the funding of projects and other activities, the variable *funding* is coded 1. If an IGO is not concerned with the funding of projects and other activities, *funding* is coded 0.

The variable *capacity-building* captures whether the task of an IGO involves capacity-building. This capacity-building can be concerned with any actor or group of actors (e.g. civil society organizations, minority groups, etc.). It can be capacity-building for governments in a particular part of the world or capacity-building of a specific group of people, among many others. IGOs that engage in technology transfer would fall into this category. Training in the form of programs that are intended to improve the performance of government officials, staff, or organizations, as well as individual people also constitutes capacity-building by an IGO. If an IGO funds capacity-building, this also constitutes capacity-building. If an IGO engages in capacity-building, *capacity-building* is coded 1, and 0 otherwise.

The variable *knowledge creation* captures whether an IGO is involved in the production of new knowledge and/or the dissemination of information. This includes the development of new thinking, research, expertise, ideas, and policies that are related to or concerned with transnational problems. Here, the question is whether an IGO creates new knowledge and ideas. If this is the case, *knowledge creation* is coded 1, and 0 otherwise. The variable also captures whether the task of an IGO involves the exchange, sharing, and dissemination of information and knowledge and networking among its participants as well as participants and actors that are not participating in the IGO. Bringing experts or people together to learn about a particular problem and creating a platform for the exchange and sharing of ideas and knowledge are all coded as a 1 on this variable. This includes the consolidation and dissemination of good practices, best practices, lessons learned, etc. It also includes the promotion of principles and standards. It can also involve the provision of advice or strategic guidance on a specific issue. It does not include technology transfer, which we code as capacity-building. The building and strengthening of partnerships is also part of the networking function of IGOs.

Finally, the variable *service provision* captures whether the task of an IGO involves the provision of a particular service. Service providing IGOs seek to fill operational gaps left by states and/or other IGOs by distributing resources and services in a particular area. The area might be the entire globe if an IGO does not operate with a specific geographic focus. A service providing IGO focuses on delivering a particular good, such as the collection of waste or the provision of drugs or vaccines. The services may take the form of collective or public goods, but this is not necessarily the case. The service may be provided to the members of the IGO or to a larger group. If an IGO is concerned with the provision of services, the variable *service provision* is coded 1, and 0 otherwise.

Measuring IGO issue areas

To measure the issue areas of world politics in which IGOs are active, we start from the Correlates of War (COW) Project's IGO dataset (Pevehouse et al. 2020). The COW IGO dataset contains 22 indicator variables that capture whether a given IGO is active in one of the following areas: defense, trade, commerce, banking, monetary policy, food and agriculture, development, culture, labor, legal, education, transport, communication, sport, women, tourism, technical, science and technology, human rights, health, environment, and energy. We aggregate these 22 sub-issue areas into nine broader issue areas; namely, security, trade and commerce, finance, development, social affairs, technical, human rights, health, and environment. Table A1 shows how we aggregate the COW Project's issue area coding of IGOs. We use these aggregated issue areas to facilitate the comparison and integration of the COW IGO data with data on other types of global governance institutions, such as transnational public-private governance initiatives (Westerwinter 2021), which we will use in our robustness analyses.

Figure A1 IGO design similarity across issue areas



Figure A2 IGO design similarity for regional IGOs and inter-continental IGOs



Notes: The left panel shows design similarity for new regional IGOs, separately for prior global IGOs (solid line) and regional IGOs (dashed line). The right panel shows the same but for new global IGOs.

Figure A3 IGO design similarity for interventionist IGOs and non-interventionist IGOs



Notes: The left panel shows design similarity for new regional IGOs, separately for prior global IGOs (solid line) and regional IGOs (dashed line). The right panel shows the same but for new global IGOs.

Figure A4 Average overlap across issue areas



Figure A5 Average overlap for regional IGOs and inter-continental IGOs

Regional IGOs



Inter-continental IGOs



Figure A6 Average overlap for interventionist IGOs and non-interventionist IGOs

Non-interventionist IGOs



Interventionist IGOs



Table A3 Correlation table: Membership, governance task, and issue area overlap

	M_{ij}	G_{ij}
G_{ij}	0.0358	
I_{ij}	-0.0018	0.0562

Table A4 Factor analysis on the three overlap dimensions

Panel A		***Panel B***	
Factor	**Eigenvalue**	**Variable**	**Factor1**
Factor1	0.069	M_{ij}	0.095
Factor2	0.004	G_{ij}	0.189
Factor3	-0.064	I_{ij}	0.158

Note: The factor analysis shows that there is no common latent factor (with Eigenvalue above one) for the three overlap dimensions.

Figure A7 Correlation plot: Membership overlap and functional overlap



Note: Functional overlap is defined as the product between issue area and governance task overlap.

Table A5 Top-twenty list of most-overlapping IGO pairs

COWi	Label	Name of IGO i	COWj	Label	Name of IGO j	MGIij	Mij	Gij	Iij
3630	NDF	Nordic Development Fund	3650	NIB	Nordic Investment Bank	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
3585	NVC	Nordic Centre for Welfare and Social Issues	1980	GCRSNC	Guidance Comm. for Road Safety in Nordic Country	0.816	1.000	0.816	1.000
4520	WNF	West Nordic Fund	3650	NIB	Nordic Investment Bank	0.816	1.000	1.000	0.816
3630	NDF	Nordic Development Fund	4520	WNF	West Nordic Fund	0.816	1.000	1.000	0.816
3860	OSPAR	OSPAR Commission	3910	PC	Paris Commission	0.800	0.800	1.000	1.000
125	AMCOW	African Ministers' Council on Water	1310	CAMRSD	Conf. African Ministers for Sustain Development	0.786	0.962	0.816	1.000
3705	NPAFC	North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission	2920	INPFC	International North Pacific Fisheries Commission	0.750	0.750	1.000	1.000
300	BONN	Bonn Agreement	3910	PC	Paris Commission	0.745	0.833	0.894	1.000
3910	PC	Paris Commission	3855	OSLO	Oslo Commission	0.715	0.923	0.775	1.000
980	CAIPA	Centr. Am. Instit. for Public Admin.	2070	INCAP	Instit Nutrition for Cent Am & Pan	0.707	1.000	1.000	0.707
2130	IACW	Inter-American Commission of Women	2110	IACI	Inter-American Children‘s Institute	0.688	0.769	0.894	1.000
1930	SCHENGEN	Group of Schengen	20	ACSSRB	Administrative Center for Soc Security for Rhine Boatmen	0.680	0.833	0.816	1.000
3860	OSPAR	OSPAR Commission	3855	OSLO	Oslo Commission	0.671	0.867	0.775	1.000
380	ABEDA	Arab Bank for Econ. Dev. in Africa	420	AFESD	Arab Fund for Social/Economic Development	0.668	0.944	0.707	1.000
4270	SAAFA	Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa	420	AFESD	Arab Fund for Social/Economic Development	0.668	0.944	1.000	0.707
3100	ISA	Int'l Seabed Authority	2830	ILO	Intl Labour Org	0.667	0.789	0.845	1.000
1820	ETF	European Training Foundation	1680	EIPA	Europ. Institute of Public Admin.	0.667	1.000	0.667	1.000
3100	ISA	Int'l Seabed Authority	2500	ICAO	Intl Civil Aviation Org	0.650	0.758	0.857	1.000
3540	MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	2400	IBRD	World Bank	0.647	0.792	0.816	1.000
1790	ESA	European Space Agency	1800	ESRO	Euro Space Research Org	0.636	0.900	0.707	1.000

Figure A8 Development of common memberships, governance task portfolios, and issue area portfolios, 1815-2014



Note: (Common) membership refers to the number of unique members in both organizations. For issue areas and governance tasks, we use the denominators of the cosine similarities. To make the measures scale-invariant, we express them in relative terms with respect to their values in the first period.

Table A6 Dependent and independent variables: Definition and descriptive statistics

Variable name	Technical definition	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Outcome measure						
IGO design similarity	Cosine similarity of two design profiles between an IGO *i* and a pre-existing IGO *j*; a design profile is a five-dimensional vector of design elements	111,630	0.665	0.229	0	1
Overlap measures						
Membership overlap	Membership overlap of an IGO *i* and a pre-existing IGO *j*, computed as the number of states that are members in both IGOs, divided by the number of (unique) members in both IGOs	140,202	0.065	0.120	0	1
Governance task overlap	Task overlap of an IGO *i* and a pre-existing IGO *j*, computed as the cosine similarity of the governance task profiles of both IGOs; a governance task profile is an eight-tuple of binary tasks	136,419	0.511	0.253	0	1
Issue area overlap	Issue area overlap of an IGO *i* with a pre-existing IGO *j*, computed as the cosine similarity of the issue area profiles of both IGOs; an issue profile is a nine-tuple of binary issue areas	137,443	0.276	0.334	0	1
Overlap	Overlap of an IGO *i* and a pre-existing IGO *j*, computed as the product of membership overlap, governance task overlap, and issue area overlap, as defined above	132,934	0.010	0.036	0	1

Table A7 Summary statistics of dyadic data

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Dependent variables					
IGO design similarity	111,630	0.665	0.229	0.000	1.000
… without decision-making	103,811	0.721	0.227	0.000	1.000
… alternative decision-making	59,347	0.636	0.214	0.000	1.000
… without monitoring	110,688	0.712	0.228	0.000	1.000
IGO design similarity (Jaccard index)	140,603	0.632	0.241	0.000	1.000
Key predictors					
Membership overlap	140,202	0.065	0.120	0.000	1.000
Governance task overlap	136,419	0.511	0.253	0.000	1.000
Issue area overlap	137,443	0.276	0.334	0.000	1.000
Overlap	132,934	0.010	0.036	0.000	1.000
Overlap (shared issue area)	59,853	0.035	0.075	0.000	1.000
Overlap (using major powers)	133,307	0.084	0.362	0.000	8.000
Control variables					
Number of shared issue areas	140,603	0.518	0.657	0.000	7.000
Shared region	140,603	0.280	0.449	0.000	1.000
Number of member states	140,603	2.618	1.154	0.000	5.268
States in system	140,603	4.989	0.306	3.434	5.278
Founding year	140,603	1979.626	18.821	1838	2014
Number of major powers	122,237	1.932	2.002	0.000	9.000
Number of member states	140,603	2.788	1.235	0.000	5.268
Difference in major powers	97,694	-0.738	2.680	-9.000	9.000
Difference in ideal points	57,015	-0.420	1.240	-4.988	5.303
Security	140,603	0.063	0.244	0.000	1.000
Environment	140,603	0.224	0.417	0.000	1.000
Health	140,603	0.065	0.247	0.000	1.000
Human rights	140,603	0.036	0.187	0.000	1.000
Trade and commerce	140,603	0.320	0.466	0.000	1.000
Finance	140,603	0.128	0.334	0.000	1.000
Development	140,603	0.424	0.494	0.000	1.000
Social affairs	140,603	0.385	0.486	0.000	1.000
Technical issues	140,603	0.238	0.426	0.000	1.000
Norm-setting	138,713	0.346	0.476	0.000	1.000
Implementation	138,713	0.343	0.475	0.000	1.000
Monitoring	138,713	0.230	0.421	0.000	1.000
Funding	138,713	0.230	0.421	0.000	1.000
Capacity-building	138,713	0.301	0.459	0.000	1.000
Service provision	138,713	0.597	0.490	0.000	1.000
Agenda-setting	140,603	0.544	0.498	0.000	1.000
Information provision	140,603	0.826	0.379	0.000	1.000
Other variables					
Successful pre-existing IGO	140,603	0.704	0.456	0.000	1.000
Progeny	140,603	0.0006	0.024	0.000	1.000
Regime heterogeneity	135,187	0.754	0.179	0.438	0.988
Global organization	140,603	0.358	0.479	0.000	1.000
Mandate ambiguity	140,603	0.423	0.494	0.000	1.000

Any G7 member	140,603	0.371	0.483	0.000	1.000
Post-Cold War	140,603	0.340	0.474	0.000	1.000
COW coding ambiguity	140,603	0.248	0.432	0.000	1.000

Figure A9 Verifying the distributional assumptions of linear regression



Notes: To verify that distributional assumptions of OLS are met, we obtain the residuals from Model 3 in Table 1 and plot them against the normal distribution. To produce the figure, we sort the residuals and plot the quantile values against the normal density. A 45-degree line would indicate a perfect normal distribution. We find that the empirical distribution of the residuals well approximates this 45-degree line, suggesting that our regressions fulfil the assumptions of the Gauss-Markov theorem.

Table A8 Determinants of IGO design similarity separately for successful and unsuccessful pre-existing IGOs

	Successful pre-existing IGOs			Unsuccessful pre-existing IGOs		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$Overlap_{ij}$	0.121***	0.126***	0.087*	0.112°	0.111°	-0.031
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.091)
Number of shared issue $areas_{ij}$	0.005***	0.003°	0.005*	0.003	0.005°	0.010
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)
$Shared\ region_{ij}$	-0.001	0.004	0.002	0.005	0.004	0.010
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)
$Start\ year_j$		-0.002***	-0.001***		-0.001***	-0.001***
		(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)
Number of $major\ powers_j$		-0.003***	-0.004***		0.003***	0.031***
		(0.000)	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.003)
Number of $member\ states_j$		0.001	0.004*		-0.018***	0.001
		(0.001)	(0.002)		(0.001)	(0.002)
Difference in $major\ powers_{ij}$			-0.003***			0.012***
			(0.000)			(0.001)
Difference in ideal $points_{ij}$			0.001			-0.019***
			(0.001)			(0.004)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time period dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	90968	76295	42101	16659	16070	4682
Within-R2	0.153	0.153	0.146	0.314	0.317	0.178

Notes: Linear regression with fixed effects on IGO *i*. Robust standard errors clustered on IGO *i* in parentheses. "Success" is defined as survival of IGO *j* up until the year in which IGO *i* was created, which allows for cases of IGO mergers and IGO replacements. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A9 Determinants of IGO design similarity using issue-area specific models

	Trade and commerce		Environment		Finance		Development	
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
IGO design similarity								
$Overlap_{ij}$	0.092°	(0.053)	0.119*	(0.053)	0.040	(0.074)	0.109**	(0.042)
Number of shared issue $areas_{ij}$	0.012***	(0.002)	0.006*	(0.003)	0.015***	(0.004)	0.010***	(0.002)
$Shared\ region_{ij}$	-0.003	(0.004)	0.005	(0.005)	0.004	(0.007)	-0.001	(0.003)
1945-54								
1955-64	-0.184**	(0.069)	0.224**	(0.079)	-0.168*	(0.066)	-0.014	(0.079)
1965-74	-0.073	(0.054)	0.071	(0.047)	-0.180**	(0.064)	-0.071	(0.056)
1975-84	-0.032	(0.043)	0.062°	(0.036)	-0.025	(0.038)	-0.120**	(0.045)
1985-94	0.005	(0.027)	-0.011	(0.023)	-0.055*	(0.026)	-0.059°	(0.032)
1995-2004	-0.021	(0.020)	-0.022	(0.014)	-0.036°	(0.020)	-0.076***	(0.020)
2005-14								
$Start\ year_j$	-0.002	(0.001)	0.002*	(0.001)	-0.003**	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.001)
Number of $major\ powers_j$	0.001	(0.002)	0.001	(0.002)	0.015***	(0.005)	-0.002	(0.003)
Number of $member\ states_j$	0.004**	(0.001)	0.002	(0.002)	0.013***	(0.002)	0.002°	(0.001)
Difference in $major\ powers_{ij}$	-0.001	(0.002)	-0.001	(0.002)	0.018***	(0.004)	-0.003	(0.003)
Difference in $ideal\ points_{ij}$	-0.004*	(0.002)	-0.001	(0.002)	-0.006*	(0.003)	-0.002	(0.001)
Fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	16206		10932		7024		21627	
Within-R2	0.104		0.147		0.134		0.114	

Notes: Ordinary Least Squares regression with fixed effects and clustered standard errors on organizations. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A10 Determinants of IGO design similarity using a disaggregated overlap measure and issue area-specific models

	Trade and commerce		Environment		Finance		Development	
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
IGO design similarity								
Membership overlap$_{ij}$	0.021	(0.017)	0.038*	(0.018)	-0.026	(0.024)	0.010	(0.014)
Functional overlap$_{ij}$	0.057***	(0.013)	0.065***	(0.015)	0.105***	(0.023)	0.078***	(0.011)
Number of shared issue areas$_{ij}$	0.001	(0.004)	-0.005	(0.004)	-0.006	(0.006)	-0.006°	(0.003)
Shared region$_{ij}$	-0.004	(0.004)	0.003	(0.005)	0.007	(0.007)	-0.000	(0.004)
1945-54								
1955-64	-0.181**	(0.069)	0.225**	(0.079)	0.113°	(0.058)	-0.019	(0.079)
1965-74	-0.071	(0.054)	0.071	(0.047)	-0.010	(0.044)	-0.072	(0.056)
1975-84	-0.031	(0.043)	0.063°	(0.036)	0.096***	(0.022)	-0.112*	(0.045)
1985-94	0.004	(0.027)	-0.005	(0.023)	0.025	(0.028)	-0.052	(0.032)
1995-2004	-0.018	(0.020)	-0.022	(0.014)	-0.003	(0.017)	-0.070***	(0.020)
2005-14								
Start year$_j$	-0.002	(0.001)	0.002*	(0.001)	0.001	(0.000)	-0.001	(0.001)
Number of major powers$_j$	0.001	(0.002)	0.000	(0.002)	0.009	(0.006)	-0.002	(0.003)
Number of member states$_j$	0.004**	(0.001)	0.002	(0.002)	0.013***	(0.002)	0.002°	(0.001)
Difference in major powers$_{ij}$	-0.001	(0.002)	-0.001	(0.002)	0.012*	(0.006)	-0.003	(0.003)
Difference in ideal points$_{ij}$	-0.004*	(0.002)	-0.000	(0.002)	-0.007*	(0.003)	-0.002	(0.001)
Fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	16206		10932		7024		21627	
Within-R2	0.105		0.148		0.137		0.115	

Notes: Ordinary Least Squares regression with fixed effects and clustered standard errors on organizations. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A11 Determinants of IGO design similarity using alternative overlap measure

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
IGO design similarity						
Overlap (shared issue area)$_{ij}$	0.094***	(0.019)	0.115***	(0.020)	0.076**	(0.023)
Number of shared issue areas$_{ij}$	0.008*	(0.003)	0.008*	(0.003)	0.012*	(0.002)
Shared region$_{ij}$	-0.002	(0.003)	0.001	(0.003)	0.003	(0.005)
Start year$_{j}$			0.001***	(0.000)	-0.003***	(0.004)
Number of major powers$_{j}$			-0.000	(0.001)	0.091***	(0.101)
Number of member states$_{j}$			-0.006***	(0.001)	0.001	(0.010)
Difference in major powers$_{ij}$					0.092***	(0.002)
Difference in ideal points$_{ij}$					0.002	(0.001)
Fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time period dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	49488		42312		22782	
Within-R2	0.137		0.136		0.125	

Notes: Ordinary Least Squares regression with fixed effects and clustered standard errors on organizations. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A12 Determinants of IGO design similarity using alternative overlap measure with major powers overlap

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
IGO design similarity						
$Overlap_{ij*}$	0.006*	(0.002)	0.008***	(0.002)	0.009*	(0.003)
Number of shared issue $areas_{ij}$	0.006***	(0.001)	0.005**	(0.002)	0.006**	(0.002)
Shared $region_{ij}$	0.000	(0.002)	0.004	(0.002)	0.003	(0.003)
Start $year_j$			-0.002***	(0.000)	-0.001***	(0.000)
Number of major $powers_j$			-0.001°	(0.000)	0.003***	(0.001)
Number of member $states_j$			-0.002°	(0.001)	0.003	(0.002)
Difference in major $powers_{ij}$					0.002***	(0.000)
Difference in ideal $points_{ij}$					-0.001	(0.001)
Fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time period dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	107899		92407		46789	
Within-R2	0.159		0.160		0.142	

Notes: Linear regression with fixed effects on IGO *i*. Robust standard errors clustered on IGO *i* in parentheses. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<0.001.

Table A13 Determinants of IGO design similarity using logged overlap measure

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
IGO design similarity						
Log(1+overlap$_{ij}$)	0.118***	(0.025)	0.124***	(0.026)	0.079*	(0.033)
Number of shared issue areas$_{ij}$	0.005***	(0.001)	0.004*	(0.002)	0.005*	(0.002)
Shared region$_{ij}$	-0.001	(0.002)	0.002	(0.002)	0.002	(0.003)
Start year$_{j}$			-0.002***	(0.000)	-0.001***	(0.000)
Number of major powers$_{j}$			-0.001	(0.000)	0.003***	(0.001)
Number of member states$_{j}$			-0.002°	(0.001)	0.003	(0.002)
Difference in major powers$_{ij}$					0.003***	(0.000)
Difference in ideal points$_{ij}$					-0.001	(0.001)
Fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time period dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	107627		92365		46783	
Within-R2	0.159		0.160		0.142	

Notes: Linear regression with fixed effects on IGO *i*. Robust standard errors clustered on IGO *i* in parentheses. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<0.001.

Table A14 Determinants of IGO design similarity using overlap dimensions

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
IGO design similarity						
$Overlap_{ij}$	0.116***	(0.027)	0.129***	(0.028)	0.095**	(0.036)
Membership $overlap_{ij}$	0.011	(0.010)	0.010	(0.010)	0.001	(0.013)
Issue area $overlap_{ij}$	-0.019**	(0.006)	-0.024***	(0.006)	-0.024*	(0.009)
Number of shared issue $areas_{ij}$	0.014***	(0.003)	0.015***	(0.004)	0.015**	(0.005)
Shared $region_{ij}$	-0.002	(0.002)	0.002	(0.002)	0.002	(0.003)
Start $year_j$			-0.002***	(0.000)	-0.002***	(0.000)
Number of major $powers_j$			-0.001	(0.000)	0.004***	(0.001)
Number of member $states_j$			-0.003°	(0.001)	0.003	(0.002)
Difference in major $powers_{ij}$					0.003***	(0.000)
Difference in ideal $points_{ij}$					-0.001	(0.001)
Fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time period dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	107627		92365		46783	
Within-R2	0.159		0.160		0.142	

Notes: Linear regression with fixed effects on IGO *i*. Robust standard errors clustered on IGO *i* in parentheses. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<0.001.

Table A15 Determinants of IGO design similarity using dependent variable without decision-making design component

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
IGO design similarity						
Overlap$_{ij}$	0.070*	(0.029)	0.091**	(0.031)	0.046	(0.033)
Number of shared issue areas$_{ij}$	0.002	(0.002)	0.002	(0.002)	0.002	(0.002)
Shared region$_{ij}$	0.001	(0.003)	0.004	(0.003)	0.009*	(0.004)
Start year$_{j}$			-0.002***	(0.000)	-0.003***	(0.000)
Number of major powers$_{j}$			0.002***	(0.001)	0.002*	(0.001)
Number of member states$_{j}$			-0.012***	(0.001)	-0.004*	(0.002)
Difference in major powers$_{ij}$					-0.001**	(0.000)
Difference in ideal points$_{ij}$					0.009***	(0.001)
Fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time period dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	100385		85889		43219	
Within-R2	0.216		0.220		0.161	

Notes: Ordinary Least Squares regression with fixed effects and clustered standard errors on organizations. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A16 Determinants of IGO design similarity using dependent variable with majoritarian decision-making design component

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
IGO design similarity						
$Overlap_{ij}$	0.155***	(0.043)	0.130**	(0.042)	0.066	(0.049)
Number of shared issue $areas_{ij}$	0.011***	(0.002)	0.009***	(0.002)	0.012***	(0.003)
$Shared\ region_{ij}$	-0.001	(0.003)	0.002	(0.004)	0.009°	(0.005)
$Start\ year_j$			0.002***	(0.000)	-0.002***	(0.000)
Number of major $powers_j$			-0.005***	(0.001)	-0.004***	(0.001)
Number of member $states_j$			0.009***	(0.002)	0.017***	(0.003)
Difference in major $powers_{ij}$					-0.004***	(0.000)
Difference in ideal $points_{ij}$					-0.000	(0.001)
Fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time period dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	58342		50285		27151	
Within-R2	0.163		0.166		0.124	

Notes: Ordinary Least Squares regression with fixed effects and clustered standard errors on organizations. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A17 Determinants of IGO design similarity using alternative dependent variable without monitoring design component

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
IGO design similarity						
$Overlap_{ij}$	0.094***	(0.024)	0.099***	(0.024)	0.071*	(0.034)
Number of shared issue $areas_{ij}$	0.004***	(0.001)	0.005***	(0.001)	0.005***	(0.001)
$Shared\ region_{ij}$	-0.000	(0.002)	0.002	(0.002)	0.002	(0.003)
$Start\ year_j$			-0.002***	(0.000)	-0.001***	(0.000)
Number of major $powers_j$			-0.001	(0.000)	0.009***	(0.001)
Number of member $states_j$			-0.001	(0.001)	0.002	(0.002)
Difference in major $powers_{ij}$					0.007***	(0.000)
Difference in ideal $points_{ij}$					0.001	(0.001)
Fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time period dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	106701		91815		46479	
Within-R2	0.155		0.152		0.139	

Notes: Ordinary Least Squares regression with fixed effects and clustered standard errors on organizations. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A18 Determinants of IGO design similarity using the Jaccard index

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
IGO design similarity (Jaccard index)						
$Overlap_{ij}$	0.111***	(0.029)	0.144***	(0.029)	0.143***	(0.034)
Number of shared issue $areas_{ij}$	-0.007**	(0.002)	-0.007***	(0.002)	-0.010***	(0.003)
$Shared\ region_{ij}$	0.001	(0.003)	0.004	(0.003)	0.005°	(0.003)
$Start\ year_j$			0.001***	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)
Number of major $powers_j$			-0.001	(0.001)	-0.013***	(0.001)
Number of member $states_j$			-0.010***	(0.002)	-0.007***	(0.002)
Difference in major $powers_{ij}$					0.011***	(0.000)
Difference in ideal $points_{ij}$					0.005***	(0.001)
Fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time period dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	132934		115762		53369	
Within-R2	0.197		0.201		0.139	

Notes: Ordinary Least Squares regression with fixed effects and clustered standard errors on organizations. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A19 Element-wise IGO design similarity

	(1) Secretariat		(2) Voting		(3) Monitoring		(4) Enforcement		(5) Dispute settlement	
IGO design similarity										
$Overlap_{ij}$	0.089°	(0.050)	0.277***	(0.045)	0.168*	(0.069)	0.196*	(0.079)	0.218***	(0.060)
Number of shared issue $areas_{ij}$	0.034***	(0.003)	-0.008***	(0.002)	0.057***	(0.004)	0.030***	(0.003)	0.019***	(0.003)
Shared $issue\ profile_{ij}$	-0.009***	(0.003)	0.008*	(0.003)	-0.012**	(0.004)	-0.006	(0.004)	0.002	(0.012)
$Shared\ region_{ij}$	-0.002***	(0.000)	0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.001***	(0.000)	0.002***	(0.000)
$Start\ year_j$	-0.032***	(0.001)	-0.023***	(0.001)	-0.008***	(0.000)	-0.010***	(0.000)	-0.034***	(0.001)
Number of $major\ powers_j$	0.014***	(0.000)	0.054***	(0.002)	0.022***	(0.001)	0.028***	(0.002)	0.054***	(0.002)
Fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time period dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	112840		93775		49765		37372		59872	
Within-R2	0.337		0.248		0.119		0.106		0.171	

Notes: Ordinary Least Squares regression with fixed effects and clustered standard errors on organizations. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A20 Governance task overlap and element-wise IGO design similarity

	(1) Secretariat		(2) Voting		(3) Monitoring		(4) Enforcement		(5) Dispute settlement	
IGO design similarity										
Governance task overlap$_{ij}$	0.219***	(0.008)	0.088***	(0.008)	0.186***	(0.023)	0.123***	(0.022)	0.084***	(0.014)
Number of shared issue areas$_{ij}$	0.030***	(0.003)	-0.007**	(0.002)	0.056***	(0.004)	0.031***	(0.003)	0.018***	(0.003)
Shared issue profile$_{ij}$	-0.013***	(0.003)	0.010**	(0.004)	-0.012**	(0.004)	-0.003	(0.004)	0.005	(0.011)
Shared region$_{ij}$	-0.002***	(0.000)	-0.005***	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.001***	(0.000)
Start year$_{j}$	-0.030***	(0.001)	-0.023***	(0.001)	-0.006***	(0.000)	-0.008***	(0.000)	-0.034***	(0.001)
Number of major powers$_{j}$	0.008***	(0.000)	0.051***	(0.001)	0.017***	(0.001)	0.024***	(0.002)	0.052***	(0.002)
Fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time period dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	115512		95958		50486		37895		61400	
Within-R2	0.350		0.253		0.133		0.114		0.174	

Notes: Ordinary Least Squares regression with fixed effects and clustered standard errors on organizations. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A21 Determinants of IGO design similarity using five-year fixed effects

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
IGO design similarity						
$Overlap_{ij}$	0.118***	(0.025)	0.124***	(0.026)	0.079*	(0.033)
Number of shared issue $areas_{ij}$	0.005***	(0.001)	0.004*	(0.002)	0.005*	(0.002)
$Shared\ region_{ij}$	-0.001	(0.002)	0.002	(0.002)	0.002	(0.003)
$Start\ year_j$			-0.002***	(0.000)	-0.001***	(0.000)
Number of $major\ powers_j$			-0.001	(0.000)	0.003***	(0.001)
Number of $member\ states_j$			-0.002°	(0.001)	0.003	(0.002)
Difference in $major\ powers_{ij}$					0.003***	(0.000)
Difference in ideal $points_{ij}$					-0.001	(0.001)
Fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time period dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	107627		92365		46783	
Within-R2	0.159		0.160		0.142	

Notes: Linear regression with fixed effects on IGO *i*. Robust standard errors clustered on IGO *i* in parentheses. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<0.001.

Table A22 Determinants of IGO design similarity using year-fixed effects

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
IGO design similarity						
$Overlap_{ij}$	0.118***	(0.025)	0.124***	(0.026)	0.079*	(0.033)
Number of shared issue $areas_{ij}$	0.005***	(0.001)	0.004*	(0.002)	0.005*	(0.002)
Shared $region_{ij}$	-0.001	(0.002)	0.002	(0.002)	0.002	(0.003)
Start $year_j$						
Number of major $powers_j$			-0.001	(0.000)	0.001	(0.001)
Number of member $states_j$			-0.002°	(0.001)	0.003	(0.002)
Difference in major $powers_{ij}$						
Difference in ideal $points_{ij}$					-0.001	(0.001)
Fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time period dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	107627		92365		46783	
Within-R2	0.159		0.160		0.142	

Notes: Linear regression with fixed effects on IGO *i*. Robust standard errors clustered on IGO *i* in parentheses. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<0.001.

Table A23 Determinants of IGO design similarity using imputed data on control variables

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
IGO design similarity						
$Overlap_{ij}$	0.118***	(0.025)	0.123***	(0.025)	0.122***	(0.025)
Number of shared issue $areas_{ij}$	0.005***	(0.001)	0.005***	(0.001)	0.005***	(0.001)
Shared $region_{ij}$	-0.001	(0.002)	-0.001	(0.002)	-0.001	(0.002)
Start $year_j$			0.000	(0.000)	0.000°	(0.000)
Number of major $powers_j$			0.001°	(0.000)	0.002*	(0.001)
Number of member $states_j$			-0.002	(0.001)	-0.002	(0.001)
Difference in major $powers_{ij}$					0.002°	(0.001)
Difference in ideal $points_{ij}$					-0.003**	(0.001)
Fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time period dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	107626		107626		107626	
Within-R2	0.159		0.159		0.159	

Notes: Linear regression with fixed effects on IGO *i*. Robust standard errors clustered on IGO *i* in parentheses. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A24 Determinants of IGO design similarity separately for successful and unsuccessful pre-existing IGOs using imputed data on controls

	Successful pre-existing IGOs			Unsuccessful pre-existing IGOs		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$Overlap_{ij}$	0.130***	0.136***	0.137***	0.072°	0.072°	0.065
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Number of shared issue $areas_{ij}$	0.005**	0.004**	0.004**	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Shared $region_{ij}$	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.002	0.002	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Start $year_j$		0.000***	0.000***		-0.000	0.000°
		(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)
Number of major $powers_j$		-0.000	0.001		-0.000	0.003
		(0.000)	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.002)
Number of member $states_j$		-0.001	-0.001		0.000	0.002°
		(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)
Difference in major $powers_{ij}$			0.001			0.004*
			(0.001)			(0.002)
Difference in ideal $points_{ij}$			0.001			-0.017***
			(0.001)			(0.002)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time period dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	82839	82839	82839	24788	24788	24788
Within-R2	0.151	0.152	0.152	0.243	0.243	0.246

Notes: Linear regression with fixed effects on IGO *i*. Robust standard errors clustered on IGO *i* in parentheses. "Success" is defined as survival of IGO *j* up until the year in which IGO *i* was created. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A25 Determinants of IGO design similarity accounting for partial observability of IGO creation

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
IGO dyad creation						
Overlap$_{ij}$	-2.184***	(0.361)	-2.368***	(0.374)	-1.209***	(0.350)
Past creations$_{i}$	-0.006***	(0.002)	-0.006***	(0.002)	-0.004*	(0.002)
Number of shared issue areas$_{ij}$	0.025**	(0.008)	0.025**	(0.008)	-0.003	(0.008)
Shared region$_{ij}$	0.645***	(0.043)	0.714***	(0.046)	0.454***	(0.035)
Number of member states$_{i}$	0.405***	(0.060)	0.405***	(0.060)	0.500***	(0.073)
Start year$_{i}$	-0.018*	(0.007)	-0.015*	(0.007)	-0.035***	(0.010)
States in system$_{i}$	1.388***	(0.197)	1.229***	(0.193)	2.520***	(0.293)
Start year$_{j}$			0.000°	(0.000)	-0.001	(0.001)
Number of major powers$_{j}$			-0.002	(0.003)	-0.078*	(0.032)
Number of member states$_{j}$			0.010***	(0.003)	0.000	(0.006)
Difference in major powers$_{ij}$					-0.090**	(0.034)
Difference in ideal points$_{ij}$					0.063°	(0.037)
IGO design similarity						
Overlap$_{ij}$	0.253***	(0.028)	0.173***	(0.026)	0.149***	(0.035)
Shared region$_{ij}$	0.004**	(0.001)	-0.002	(0.001)	0.002	(0.002)
Number of shared issue areas$_{ij}$	0.002	(0.003)	0.002	(0.003)	0.002	(0.003)
Start year$_{j}$			0.001***	(0.000)	0.002***	(0.000)
Number of major powers$_{j}$			0.002***	(0.000)	-0.008***	(0.001)
Number of member states$_{j}$			0.027***	(0.001)	0.032***	(0.001)
Difference in major powers$_{ij}$					0.001***	(0.000)
Difference in ideal points$_{ij}$					-0.009***	(0.001)
Issue area dummies (Equation 1)	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Governance task dummies (Equation 1)	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Fixed effects (Equation 2)	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations (Equation 1)	176381		152494		72581	
Pseudo-R2 (Equation 1)	0.388		0.387		0.419	

F-statistic (Equation 1)	14.497	15.657	5.070
Observations (Equation 2)	88693	76031	41187
Within-R2 (Equation 2)	0.002	0.021	0.022

Notes: Maximum-likelihood estimation of a system of two equations with fixed effects. Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<.1 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.

Table A26 Determinants of IGO design similarity without fixed effects and additional controls

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
IGO design similarity								
Overlap$_{ij}$	0.121***	(0.032)	0.121***	(0.032)	0.132***	(0.033)	0.122***	(0.032)
Number of shared issue areas$_{ij}$	0.004*	(0.002)	0.004*	(0.002)	0.004*	(0.002)	0.004*	(0.002)
Shared region$_{ij}$	0.001	(0.003)	0.000	(0.003)	0.001	(0.003)	0.001	(0.003)
Security$_i$	-0.045*	(0.020)	-0.042*	(0.020)	-0.049*	(0.021)	-0.045*	(0.020)
Environment$_i$	-0.000	(0.012)	-0.001	(0.012)	-0.000	(0.012)	-0.000	(0.012)
Health$_i$	0.004	(0.013)	0.004	(0.013)	0.009	(0.012)	0.004	(0.013)
Human rights$_i$	-0.020	(0.019)	-0.019	(0.019)	-0.020	(0.020)	-0.020	(0.019)
Trade and commerce$_i$	0.011	(0.011)	0.011	(0.011)	0.011	(0.011)	0.011	(0.011)
Finance$_i$	-0.000	(0.015)	0.001	(0.015)	-0.001	(0.015)	-0.000	(0.015)
Development$_i$	-0.000	(0.011)	-0.000	(0.011)	-0.001	(0.011)	-0.000	(0.011)
Social affairs$_i$	0.001	(0.009)	0.001	(0.009)	-0.001	(0.009)	0.001	(0.009)
Technical issues$_i$	0.013	(0.009)	0.014	(0.009)	0.013	(0.009)	0.013	(0.009)
Norm-setting$_i$	-0.000	(0.012)	-0.001	(0.012)	-0.000	(0.012)	-0.000	(0.012)
Implementation	0.004	(0.011)	0.005	(0.011)	0.003	(0.011)	0.004	(0.011)
Monitoring$_i$	-0.020	(0.014)	-0.018	(0.014)	-0.025°	(0.015)	-0.020	(0.014)
Funding$_i$	0.008	(0.011)	0.007	(0.011)	0.009	(0.011)	0.008	(0.011)
Capacity-building$_i$	-0.004	(0.010)	-0.003	(0.010)	-0.003	(0.010)	-0.004	(0.010)
Service provision$_i$	0.022°	(0.011)	0.022°	(0.011)	0.023*	(0.012)	0.022°	(0.011)
Agenda-setting$_i$	-0.003	(0.010)	-0.002	(0.010)	-0.005	(0.010)	-0.003	(0.010)
Information provision$_i$	0.022	(0.017)	0.021	(0.016)	0.025	(0.017)	0.022	(0.017)
Africa$_i$	0.013	(0.012)	0.014	(0.012)	0.012	(0.012)	0.013	(0.012)
Asia and Oceania$_i$	-0.005	(0.024)	-0.005	(0.024)	-0.006	(0.024)	-0.005	(0.024)
Middle East$_i$	0.015	(0.015)	0.016	(0.015)	0.016	(0.015)	0.015	(0.015)
Europe and North America$_i$	-0.004	(0.014)	-0.004	(0.014)	-0.007	(0.014)	-0.004	(0.014)
Latin America$_i$	0.019	(0.017)	0.021	(0.017)	0.018	(0.016)	0.019	(0.017)
1945-54	-0.098**	(0.037)	-0.105**	(0.038)	0.000	(.)	-0.098**	(0.037)

1955-64	-0.111*	(0.048)	-0.115*	(0.049)	0.018	(0.029)	-0.111*	(0.048)
1965-74	-0.143*	(0.061)	-0.146*	(0.062)	0.023	(0.048)	-0.143*	(0.061)
1975-84	-0.142*	(0.069)	-0.141*	(0.069)	0.045	(0.061)	-0.142*	(0.069)
1985-94	-0.186*	(0.087)	-0.196*	(0.086)	-0.010	(0.082)	-0.186*	(0.087)
1995-2004	-0.155	(0.094)	-0.149	(0.095)	0.016	(0.094)	-0.155	(0.094)
2005-14	-0.167	(0.106)	-0.148	(0.109)	0.011	(0.110)	-0.167	(0.106)
Start year$_j$	0.002	(0.001)	0.003*	(0.001)	-0.000	(0.002)	0.002	(0.001)
Number of major powers$_j$	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.001	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)
Number of member states$_j$	-0.002°	(0.001)	-0.002°	(0.001)	-0.002	(0.001)	-0.002°	(0.001)
Logged density			-0.789	(0.581)				
Logged squared density			0.373	(0.279)				
Preference heterogeneity					-0.155*	(0.068)		
Progeny$_{ij}$							-0.014	(0.026)
Fixed effects	No		No		No			
Observations	92365		92365		89709		92365	
Within-R2	0.017		0.017		0.019		0.017	

Notes: Ordinary Least Squares regression with standard errors clustered on organizations. Significance levels: ° p<0.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A27 Problematic COW IGO cases by COW problem type

Abbreviation	IGO name	Type I	Type II	Type III	Type IV
ACPEU	ACP/EU Joint Assembly	1	0	1	0
INFSMK	Centre for Marketing Information and Advisory Services for Fishery	1	0	0	0
COSAVE	Comité Regional de Sanidad Vegetal del Cono Sur	1	1	0	0
CFC	Common Fund for Commodities	0	1	0	0
AMCO	African Malagasy Coffee Organisation	0	1	0	0
CEC	Commonwealth Economic Committee	0	1	0	0
CELC	Commonwealth Education Liaison Committee	0	1	0	0
AMCOW	African Ministers' Council on Water	1	0	0	0
CTO	Commonwealth Telecom Board	0	0	0	1
CONFEJES	Conférence des ministres de la jeunesse et des sports des pays d'expression français	1	0	0	0
CAMRSD	Conference African Ministers for Sustainable Development	1	0	0	0
COPTAC	Conference of Posts and Telecommunications Administrations of Central Africa	0	1	0	0
CMAEC	Council of Ministers for Asian Economic Cooperation	1	0	0	0
CMHASG	Council of Ministers of Health of Arab Gulf States	0	1	0	0
DBGLS	Development Bank of Great Lake States	0	0	1	0
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States	0	0	1	0
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization	0	0	0	1
ERIA	Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia	0	0	1	0
EMB	Empire Marketing Board	1	0	0	0
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	1	0	0	0
EMPPO	European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation	1	1	0	0
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Agency	1	0	0	0
ECB	European Central Bank	0	0	1	0
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community	1	0	0	0
AFPU	African Postal Union	0	1	0	0
EUFMD	European Commission for the Control of Foot and Mouth Disease	1	0	0	0
ECPTA	European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations	0	1	0	0

EFILWC	European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions	1	0	0	0
ARIPO	African Regional Industrial Property Organization	0	0	1	0
EMI	European Monetary Institute	1	0	1	0
EPFSC	European Postal Financial Services Commission	0	1	0	0
EPA	European Productivity Agency	1	0	0	0
Africare	African Reinsurance Corporation	1	0	0	0
ETF	European Training Foundation	1	1	0	0
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization	0	1	0	0
GEF	Global Environmental Fund	1	0	0	0
ACSSRB	Administrative Center for Social Security for Rhine Boatmen	1	0	0	0
IABE	Ibero-American Office of Education	1	0	0	0
IDC	Imperial Defense Committee	1	0	0	0
APFIC	Asia Pacific Fisheries Commission	1	1	0	0
IACS	Inter-African Committee on Statistics	1	0	0	0
IACI	Inter-American Children's Institute	0	1	0	0
IACW	Inter American Commission of Women	0	1	0	0
IAII	Inter-American Indian Institute	0	1	0	0
IAIAS	Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Science	0	1	0	0
IAIC	Inter-American Investment Corporation	0	1	0	0
IBI	Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics	0	0	1	0
IGCC	Intergovernmental Copyright Committee	1	1	1	0
IOcC	Intergovernmental Oceanographic Committee	1	1	0	0
INFOFISH	Intergovernmental Organization for Marketing Information and Technical Advisory Services for Fishery Products in the Asia and Pacific Region	1	0	1	0
IBEC	International Bank for Economic Co-operation	0	0	1	0
ICCROM	International Center for the Study of the Preservation and the Restoration of Cultural Property	0	0	1	0
AMPTU	Afro-Malagasy Postal and Telecommunications Union	0	1	0	0
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization	0	1	0	1
ICDR	International Commission for the Decennial Revision of the Nomenclature of the Causes of Death	0	0	0	1
ICSEAF	International Commission for South East Atlantic Fisheries	0	0	1	0

IEA	International Energy Agency	0	1	1	0
IFC	International Finance Corporation	0	1	0	0
IFAD	International Fund for Agriculture & Development	0	1	0	0
ILO	International Labour Organization	1	1	0	0
ILZSG	International Lead and Zinc Study Group	0	0	1	0
IMO	International Maritime Organisation	0	1	0	0
IMSO	International Mobile Satellite Organisation	0	0	1	0
IMF	International Monetary Fund	0	1	0	0
IOPCF	International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds	0	0	1	1
IOOC	International Olive Oil Council	0	0	1	0
IRO	International Refugee Organisation	0	1	0	0
RIOPPAH	International Regional Organization against Plant and Animal Diseases	0	1	0	0
ISA	International Seabed Authority	0	0	1	0
ITU	International Telecom Union	0	1	0	0
IUPIP	International Union for Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention)	1	0	0	0
IUPLAW	International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention)	1	0	0	0
ISB	Interstate Bank	0	0	1	0
ISDB	Islamic Development Bank	0	1	0	0
JNOLCRH	Joint Nordic Organization for Lappish Culture and Reindeer Husbandry	0	1	1	0
LAFDO	Latin American Fisheries Development Organisation	0	0	1	0
MARRI	Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative	1	0	0	0
MCPTTC	Multi-Country Posts and Telecommunications Training Centre, Blantyre	1	0	1	0
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	0	1	0	0
NVC	Nordic Centre for Welfare and Social Issues	1	0	0	0
NDF	Nordic Development Fund	1	0	0	0
NERC	Nordic Economic Research Council	1	0	1	0
NIB	Nordic Investment Bank	1	0	0	0
NAPPO	North American Plant Protection Organisation	1	1	1	0
ABEDA	Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa	0	1	0	0
PAP	Pan-African Parliament	1	0	0	0
PAIGH	Pan American Institute of Geography and History	0	1	0	0

PAHO	Pan American Sanitary Bureau	0	1	0	0
ACML	Arab Center for Medical Literature	1	0	0	0
PAPU	Pan African Postal Union	0	1	0	0
AMSC	African and Malagasy Sugar Council	0	1	0	0
PED	Pole European de Development	1	0	0	0
PUASP	Postal Union of Americas, Spain and Portugal	0	1	0	0
RCFC	Regional Commonwealth in the Field of Communications	0	1	0	0
ARCAL	Regional Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science	1	0	0	0
RCC	Regional Cooperation Council	1	0	0	0
SWAPU	South and West Asia Postal Union	0	1	0	0
SITTDEC	South Investment, Trade and Technological Data Exchange Centre	0	0	1	0
AFESD	Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development	0	1	0	0
SAAFA	Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa	1	0	0	0
AGPUNDO	Arab Gulf Program for United Nations Development Organisations	0	1	0	0
IUPNVP	Union for Protection of New Varieties of Plants	1	0	0	0
AIDO	Arab Industrial Development and Mining Organization	0	1	0	0
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization	0	1	0	0
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation	1	1	1	0
UPU	Universal Postal Union	0	1	0	0
WAHC	West African Health Community	1	0	1	0
WAHO	West African Health Organization	0	1	0	0
WMO	World Meteorological Organisation	0	1	0	0
WHO	World Health Organisation	0	1	0	0
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organisation	0	1	0	0
WTOURO	World Tourism Organisation	0	1	0	0
ALO	Arab Labor Organisation	0	1	0	0
AMF	Arab Monetary Fund	0	1	0	0
AOAD	Arab Organization for Agricultural Development	0	1	0	0
AOMR	Arab Organisation for Mineral Resources	0	1	0	0
ARPU	Arab Postal Union	0	1	0	0
AIDC	Asian Industrial Development Council	1	0	1	0
AOPU	Asian-Oceanic Postal Union	0	1	0	0

ABEPSEAC	Association Between EEC and States of East African Community	1	0	1	0
AATA	Association of African Tax Administrators	1	0	1	0
BC	Baltic Council	1	0	0	0
AFEXIMB	African Export Import Bank	0	0	1	0
BIISEF	Banque Internationale d'Information sur les Estats Francophone	1	0	0	0
BOBP	Bay of Bengal Programme Inter-Governmental Organization	0	0	1	0
BCSC	British Commonwealth Scientific Committee	1	0	0	0
CDB	Caribbean Development Bank	0	1	0	0
CXC	Caribbean Examinations Council	0	1	0	0
CPU	Caribbean Postal Union	0	1	0	0
CAIPA	Central American Institute for Public Administration	0	1	1	0

Table A28 Models with reduced COW IGO sample

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
IGO design similarity						
$Overlap_{ij}$	0.104***	(0.029)	0.107***	(0.030)	0.060	(0.038)
Number of shared issue $areas_{ij}$	0.006***	(0.002)	0.005*	(0.002)	0.006*	(0.002)
$Shared\ region_{ij}$	0.001	(0.002)	0.005°	(0.003)	0.006°	(0.003)
$Start\ year_j$			-0.002***	(0.000)	-0.001***	(0.000)
Number of major $powers_j$			-0.000	(0.000)	0.003***	(0.001)
Number of member $states_j$			-0.004*	(0.002)	0.002	(0.002)
Difference in major $powers_{ij}$					0.002***	(0.000)
Difference in ideal $points_{ij}$					-0.001	(0.001)
Fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time period dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	81996		70327		36106	
Within-R2	0.142		0.142		0.132	

Notes: Ordinary Least Squares regression with fixed effects and clustered standard errors on organizations. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A29 The effect of institutional overlap on IGO design similarity across organizations of different geographical scope

	Inter-continental IGOs			Regional IGOs		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	IGO design similarity					
Overlap	0.181***	0.194***	0.167**	0.059*	0.067*	0.003
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.053)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.039)
Time period dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control set	S1	S2	S3	S1	S2	S3
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	39016	33503	16697	68611	58862	30086
Within-R2	0.205	0.207	0.168	0.132	0.132	0.129

Notes: Ordinary Least Squares regression with fixed effects and clustered standard errors on organizations. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A30 The effect of institutional overlap on IGO design similarity across organizations with different levels of mandate ambiguity

	Single-issue IGO			Multi-issue IGO		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	IGO design similarity					
Overlap	0.092**	0.108**	0.029	0.165***	0.173***	0.144**
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.046)
Time period dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control set	S1	S2	S3	S1	S2	S3
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	44171	37915	18904	63456	54450	27879
Within-R2	0.217	0.219	0.192	0.108	0.108	0.099

Notes: Ordinary Least Squares regression with fixed effects and clustered standard errors on organizations. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A31 The effect of institutional overlap on IGO design similarity across organizations with different levels of governance task ambiguity

	Limited task ambiguity			High task ambiguity War		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	IGO design similarity					
Overlap	0.087°	0.101°	0.028	0.126***	0.128***	0.092*
	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.064)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.038)
Time period dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control set	S1	S2	S3	S1	S2	S3
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	25726	22106	9847	81901	70259	36936
Within-R2	0.219	0.224	0.208	0.130	0.130	0.114

Notes: Ordinary Least Squares regression with fixed effects and clustered standard errors on organizations. The sample is split at the median of the number of governance task of IGO *i*. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A32 The effect of institutional overlap on IGO design similarity across organizations with different levels of great power involvement

	Any G7 member			No G7 member		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	IGO design similarity					
Overlap	0.164***	0.191***	0.118*	0.092**	0.087**	0.056
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.055)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.041)
Time period dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control set	S1	S2	S3	S1	S2	S3
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	41357	34933	11805	66270	57432	34978
Within-R2	0.169	0.166	0.150	0.153	0.157	0.138

Notes: Ordinary Least Squares regression with fixed effects and clustered standard errors on organizations. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A33 The effect of institutional overlap on IGO design similarity before and after the Cold War

	Post-Cold War			Cold War		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	IGO design similarity					
Overlap	0.115*	0.110°	0.066	0.120***	0.132***	0.087*
	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.043)
Time period dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control set	S1	S2	S3	S1	S2	S3
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	35966	29573	18896	71661	62792	27887
Within-R2	0.115	0.113	0.108	0.176	0.177	0.156

Notes: Ordinary Least Squares regression with fixed effects and clustered standard errors on organizations. Significance levels: ° p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

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