10. Restricting the Use of Cash in the European Monetary Union: Legal Aspects

Most notorious are the quarrels over the use of cash for paying the special contributions to finance the public law broadcasting system in Germany (Rundfunkanstalten) regardless of its actual use; based upon Section 9 para 2 sentence 2 RBStV (Rundfunkgebührenstaatsvertrag) in conjunction with Section 10 para 2 of the by-laws of the respective public law broadcasting institution; critically, see Norbert Häring, “Beitragsservice reagiert auf Handelsblatt-Experiment”, Handelsblatt, 16 June 2015. The conduct of the system was recently justified by an unpublished decision of the Administrative Court of Munich of 1 June 2016, docket no M 6 K 15.5638 (VG München, Urteil vom 1. Juni 2016, Az. M 6 K 15.5638). A decision of a superior court is, however, lacking.

See, for example, Benjamin Angel and Aliénor Margerit, “Quelle est la portée du cours légal de l’euro?”, (2009) 532 Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne, p. 587, at 588; Norbert Häring, “Bargeld auf dem Rückzug”, Handelsblatt 26 January 2016, p. 29. A detailed overview of the various limits and restrictions for using cash, enacted by several Member States of the EU is given in a paper by the research service of the German federal parliament (Wissenschaftliche Dienste, Deutscher Bundestag Ausarbeitung WD 4 – 3000 – 043/16, p. 8 et seq.). The thresholds range from 1500 to 15,000 euros or its equivalent for the non-euro states; preparation to introduce such a limit in Germany was disclosed by the Federal Ministry of Finance, Börsen-Zeitung, 4 February 2016, p. 6, but later denied (Deutscher Budestag, printed matter 18/7794 of 04/03/2019, p. 23) and postponed for a legislative act of the EU (Deutscher Bundestag, Committe of petitions, 26/04/2017, hib 269/2017).

“Press release of 4 May 2016:

Today the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) concluded a review of the denominational structure of the Europa series. It has decided to permanently stop producing the 500 € banknote and to exclude it from the Europa series, taking into account concerns that this banknote could facilitate illicit activities. The issuance of the 500 € will be stopped around the end of 2018, when the 100 € and 200 € banknotes of the Europa series are planned to be introduced. The other denominations—from 5 € to 200 €—will remain in place.” This decision was criticised by: the President of the German Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann, Handelsblatt, 25 February 2016, p. 30; Daniel Stelter, “Mit der Abschaffung der 500er Note ist ein Tabu gefallen”, Börsen-Zeitung, 7 May 2016, p. 4; the member of the German Council of Economic advisers, Volker Wieland, cited in: “Große Bedenken gegen Bargeldobergrenzen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 June 2016; idem, cited in: Frankfurter Neue Presse, 14 June 2016, p. 4; anonymous, Börsen-Zeitung, 6 May 2016, p. 6; “decidedly in favour of retaining the €500 banknote”, Sebastian Jost, Die Welt, 13 February 2016: “It protects the currency.”

See Malte Krüger and Franz Seitz, Costs and Benefits of Cash and Cashless Payment Instruments, (2014), p. 20–52; Christof Freimuth, “Article 128 AEUV”, in: Helmut Siekmann (ed), Kommentar zur Europäischen Währungsunion, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), at margin no 6. There are also signs that the use of digital money is no longer growing to the extent that some governments and financial institutions would like. At the moment, the growth rates of the Digital Money Index calculated by Imperial College, London University and Citigroup has come down to 1.3 per cent; see Andreas Hippin, “‘Zivilisationsaufbau’ durch digitales Bezahlen”, Börsen-Zeitung, 27 January 2016, p. 2.

Lawrence Summers, “It’s time to kill the $100 bill”, Washington Post, 16 February 2016; anonymous, “Peter Bofinger, Wirtschaftsweiser für Abschaffung des Bargelds”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 May 2015; dissenting Carl-Ludwig Thiele, Diskussion um das Bargeld: Hätte eine Abschaffung von Banknoten und Münzen wirklich Vorteile? Ifo-Schnelldienst 13/2015 of 16 July 2015, p. 3.

Kenneth Rogoff, “Costs and Benefits of Phasing out Paper Currency”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual Conference, 11 April 2014; most recently, idem, Handelsblatt Nr. 185, weekend edition 23/24/25 September 2016, p. 28 et seq., declaring the risk of insolvency of a bank with an ensuing “bail-in” a “hysteria”.

See for example: Claudio Borio, “Comment”, in: Charles Bean, Christian Broda, Takatoshi Ito, and Randall Kroszner, Low for Long? Causes and Consequences of Low Interest Rates, (Geneva: International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies - ICMB, London: Center for Economic Policy Research – CEPR-Press, 2015), Geneva Reports on the World Economy 17, p. 93 et seq.; Fritz Zurbruegg, ibid, p. 94 et seq.

Joachim Kaetzler, Börsen-Zeitung, 3 March 2016, p. 7; dissenting: Jost, note 6 above; Bernd Wittkowski, Börsen-Zeitung, 6 May 2016, p. 1; also sceptical, see Weidmann, note 6 above.

See research service of the German Federal Parliament [Deutscher Bundestag, Wissenschafltiche Dienste], note 4 above, p. 7; also cited for his critical view in: “Große Bedenken gegen Bargeldobergrenzen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 June 2016; “Verfassungswidrig?”, Frankfurter Neue Presse, 14 June 2016, p. 4.

Recent examples: Karsten Schmidt, “Die ‘Staatliche Theorie des Geldes’: Jahrhundertwerk oder Makulatur?”, in: Albrecht Weber (ed), Währung und Wirtschaft, Festschrift für Prof. Dr. Hugo J. Hahn zum 70. Geburtstag, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1997), p. 81; David Fox, François R. Velde and Wolfgang Ernst, “Monetary History between Law and Economics”, in: David Fox and Wolfgang Ernst (eds), Money in the Western Legal Tradition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 3, at 13 et seq; L. Randall Wray, “From the State Theory of Money to Modern Money: An Alternative to Economic Orthodoxy”, ibid., p. 631, at 632–636.

Friedrich Georg Knapp, Staatliche Theorie des Geldes, (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1905), p. 1: “Das Geld ist ein Geschöpf der Rechtsordnung; es ist im Laufe der Geschichte in den verschiedensten Formen aufgetreten: eine Theorie des Geldes kann daher nur rechtsgeschichtlich sein.” [Money is a creation of the legal system; in the course of history, it has emerged in most different forms: that is why a theory of money can only be a phenomenon of legal history.]

Knapp, note 18 above, p. 123, in specific for banknotes.

In essence agreeing, Frederic A. Mann, The Legal Aspects of Money, fifth edn., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 16 et seq.; Olaf R. Dahlmann, Das Recht des Geldes, (Berlin: Metzner, 1960), p. 400; Hermann Fögen, Geld- und Währungsrecht, (Munich: Beck, 1969), p. 7; Karsten Schmidt, “Vorbem. zu §§ 244 ff.”, in: J. von Staudingers, Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, Zweites Buch, 13. Bearbeitung, (Berlin: Sellier and Walter de Gruyter, 1997/8), A 3, A 12, for money signs (tokens) as consequence of the two-pronged definition (A. 11); idem, note 17 above, p. 88 & 90 with reservations.

Gustav Hartmann, Über den rechtlichen Begriff des Geldes und den Inhalt von Geldschulden, (Braunschweig: Leibrock, 1868), pp. 4, 7, 12, 48; (critical) review by Otto Karlowa, Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft vol. 11 n. 4 (1869), p. 526, but agreeing that the recognition by the legal system is essential for the virtue of being money (at 536 et seq.); see already before him: Johann Christian Ravit, Beiträge zur Lehre vom Gelde, (Lübeck: Aschenfeldt, 1862), p. 12, but less clear.

See, for example, Joseph A. Schumpeter, Das Wesen des Geldes, ed. F.A. Mann, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970), p. 56; from a legal perspective, see Frank Vischer, Geld- und Währungsrecht im nationalen und internationalen Kontext, (Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2010), p. 4, 17 et seq.; for clearly a different view, see Carl Menger, Untersuchungen über die Methode der Sozialwissenschaften, und der politischen Oekonomie, (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1883), p. 176, with comprehensive citations from (ancient) history (p. 172-174); discussion at: Helmut Siekmann, “Deposit Banking and the Use of Monetary Instruments”, in: David Fox and Wolfgang Ernst (eds), Money in the Western Legal Tradition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 489, at 510 et seq; Wray, note 17 above, pp. 631–652 with in-depth analysis of various authors and emphasizing the “government budget constraint” in view of creating money.

See, for example, Alan J. Auerbach and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Macroeconomics, second edition, (Cambridge MA, London: The MIT Press, 1998), p. 172 et seq; Frederic S. Mishkin, The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets, eleventh edition, (Harlow: Pearson, 2016), pp. 96-98; Rudolf Richter, Geldtheorie, second edition, (Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 1990), p. 103 et seq., & 108; already discussed in nineteenth century by Ravit, note 21 above, p. 527 et seq.

Also, among economists, it is consented that this functional view is a definition of economists for economic purposes; Mishkin, note 23 above, p. 95.

See, for example, Ravit, note 21 above; Hartmann, note 21 above, p. 7 & 12-17; Mann (1992), note 20 above, p. 16; Schmidt, note 20 above, Vorbem. Zu §§ 244 ff., A 11; in principle, also Charles Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspects of Money, seventh edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), note 1.67, 1.68 (p. 40 et seq.) with some adjustments; Martin Selmayr, Das Recht der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2002, p. 32 & 37; Rosa Lastra, International Financial and Monetary Law, second edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), margin n. 1.29; Siekmann, note 22 above, p. 511; disagreeing, Vischer, note 22 above; partially merely descriptive and advocating a “relative” term of money, see Hugo J. Hahn and Ulrich Häde, Währungsrecht, second edtition, (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2010), § 3 Der juristische Begriff des Geldes, but eventually also demanding state authorisation (p. 19).

Lastra, note 25 above, margin n. 1.29; drawing substantially from Mann (1992), note 20 above, p. 461.

Carl-Theodor Samm, “‘Geld’ und ‘Währung’ – begrifflich und mit Blick auf den Vertrag von Maastricht”, in: Weber, note 17 above, p. 227, at 233 [“Der gegenständliche Begriff des Geldes (...) ergibt sich aus der staatlichen Theorie des Geldes (in footnote 22 reference to Knapp), die zwinged aus der in den modernen Verfassungen verankerten Geldhoheit des Staates folgt;”]; Lastra, note 25 above, margin n. 1.42, uses almost the same words, however, without reference to Samm: “The State theory of money—recognized in modern constitutions (in footnote 55 reference to some constitutions)—has been typically construed as a necessary consequence of the sovereign power over currency”; for more details with references on the link between sovereign rights and the creation of money, see Helmut Siekmann, “The Legal Frameworks for the European System of Central Banks”, in: Frank Rövekamp, Moritz Bälz and Hanns Günter Hilpert (eds), Central Banking and Financial Stability in East Asia, (Cham-Heidelberg-New York-Dordrecht-London: Springer International Publishing, 2015), p. 43 at 46.

Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal of 26.10.2012, C 326/01, addition by Council Decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro, Official Journal of 6.4.2011, L 91/1.

Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998 on the introduction of the euro, Official Journal of 11.5.1998, L 139/1.

Freimuth, note 7 above, at margin n. 4; disagreeing, see Bernd Krauskopf, “How Euro Banknotes Acquire the Properties of Money”, in: European Central Bank (ed) , Legal Aspects of the European System of Central Banks , Liber Amicorum Paolo Zamboni Garavelli, European Central Bank , (Frankfurt am Main: ECB, 2005), p. 243, at 248: “consistent with tradition” but “does not appear to be absolutely essential”; earlier in favour of a wider understanding of the term “money”, see Samm, note 27 above, p. 234 et seq.

See, for example, RGZ 134, 73 at 76; BGH, (1953), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 897 at 108; BGHZ 58, 108 at 109; OLG Hamm, (1988), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, p. 2115; OLG Frankfurt, (1986), Juristen Zeitung, p. 1072; Joachim v. Spindler, Willy Becker & O.-Ernst Starke, Die Deutsche Bundesbank, 4th edition, (Stuttgart-Berlin-Cologne-Mainz: Kohlhammer, 1973), § 14 annotation 3 (p. 285); Fögen, note 20 above, p. 7; Schmidt, note 20 above, Vorbem. Zu §§ 244 ff., A 19, 24, 30; Jan Endler, Europäische Zentralbank und Preisstabilität, (Stuttgart-Munich-Hannover-Berlin-Weimar-Dresden: Boorberg, 1998), p. 119; Selmayr, note 25 above, p. 31 et seq., 425; Patrice de Lapasse, “The Legal Status of the Euro” in: European Central Bank (ed), note 30 above, p. 235, at 237; Angel and Margerit, note 4 above, p. 588 & 592; Freimuth, note 7 above, at margin n. 81 with minor reservations; Benjamin Beck, “Bitcoins als Geld im Rechtssinne”, (2015) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift – NJW, p. 580, at 581; disagreeing, see Christoph Herrmann, Währungshoheit, Währungsverfassung und subjektive Rechte, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), p. 315; for the historic evolution, see Krauskopf, note 30 above, pp. 246–248); Siekmann, note 22 above, p. 507.

Rogoff, above n. 8, p. 1. For the extent of their useage see note 7 above.

On its website, the Bank of England dissolves, to some extent, the content of the term legal tender, as it declares the “acceptability as a means of payment a matter of agreement between the parties”, but gives the debtor “a good defence in law” if he is sued for non-payment when he has offered to pay the due amount of money in legal tender”, cited from Proctor, note 25 above, para. 2.24, footnote 49. The status and function of legal tender in the UK is anyhow awkward as the banknotes issued by the Bank of England have the status of legal tender only in England and Wales, but not in Scotland; see Proctor, note 25 above, para 2.30.

Beck, note 31 above, at 581.

The Administrative Court of Berlin upheld, in a preliminary judgment of 24 June 2015 (docket n. 11 L 213.15), a regulation obliging the providers of taxi services to accept credit cards and to have the necessary hardware in working condition (Verwaltungsgericht Berlin, Beschluss vom 24. Juni 2015 – Az. 11 L 213.15), confirmed by the Superior Adminsitrative Court of Berlin in a judgment of 18 December 2015 (docket n. OVG 1 S 76.15) (Oberverwaltungsgericht Berlin-Brandenburg, Beschluss vom 18.12.2015 – OVG 1 S 76.15), BeckRS 2016, 40395 – beck-online.

Amending the primary law is, in principle, only possible unanimously, Article 48 TEU, even when using the “simplified” revision procedures following Article 49 paragraphs 6-7 TEU.

Koen Lenaerts and Piet van Nuffels, European Union Law , third edition, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, Thomson Reuters, 2011), margin-n. 22-007, with further references especially from the rich jurisprudence of the Court of the EU (ECJ/CJEU).

Reference in footnote 28 above.

Lenaerts and van Nuffel, note 37 above, margin-n. 22-003.

Judgment of 15 July 1964, Case 6/64 Costa/E.N.E.L., Reports of Cases 1964, 587 (594); judgment of 9 September 1978, Case 106/77 Simmenthal, Reports of Cases 1978, 630 margin n. 17: “automatically inapplicable”; BVerfGE 31, 145 (173f.); 37, 271 (277 et seq.); 73, 339 (375 et seq.); 89, 155 (175); see, for example, for more details, Hermann-Josef Blanke, Föderalismus und Integrationsgewalt - Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Spanien, Italien und Belgien als dezentralisierte Staaten in der EG, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991), p. 290; Hans D. Jarass and Saša Beljin, “Die Bedeutung von Vorrang und Durchführung des EG-Rechts für die nationale Rechtsetzung und Rechtsanwendung”, (2004) 23 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, p. 1; Burkhard Schöbener, “Das Verhältnis des EU-Rechts zum nationalen Recht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, (2011) 43 Juristische Arbeitsblätter, p. 885, at 889 et seq.

Seminal U.S. Supreme Court, Marbury vs. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 at 176 (1803); earlier already Pennsylvania District Court, (2 Dallas) 304 at 308 (1795); see, also, Article 31 of the Basic Law, the German federal constitution for the precedence of the law of the central state over the law of the decentralised entities (Länder); even their constitutional law.

See specifically BVerfGE 134, 366 at margin n. 22 and 27.

Partially disagreeing in view of the situation in Switzerland between 1930 and 1936, see Krauskopf, note 30 above, p. 248.

At least this is how it is handled in practice:see, also, Krauskopf, note 30 above, p. 244; Panagiotis Papapaschalis, “Article 128 AEUV [TFEU ]”, in: Hans von der Groeben, Jürgen Schwarze & Armin Hatje (eds), Europäisches Unionsrecht, seventh edition, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015), at margin n. 7.

Decision of the European Central Bank of 13 December 2010 on the issue of euro banknotes (recast), ECB/2010/29, Official Journal of 9. 2. 2011, L 35/26; amended by: Decision of the European Central Bank of 21 June 2013 amending Decision ECB/2010/29 on the issue of euro banknotes, ECB/2013/16, Official Journal of 6. 7. 2013, L 187/13; Decision of the European Central Bank of 29 August 2013 amending Decision ECB/2010/29 on the issue of euro banknotes, ECB/2013/27, Official Journal of 21.1.2014, L 16/51; Decision of the European Central Bank of 27 November 2014 amending Decision ECB/2010/29 on the issue of euro banknotes, ECB/2014/49, Official Journal of 21.2.2015, L 50/42.

Article 16.3 of the Draft Statute; René Smits, The European Central Bank , (The Hague-London-Boston: Kluwer, 1997), p. 205; Freimuth, note 7 above, at margin n. 87; Papapaschalis, note 45 above, margin n. 24; consenting with the result: Hahn and Häde, note 25 above), § 1 margin n. 19, 62.

This careful delineation is blurred by the—once more erroneous—official translation into German (“genehmigen” and “Genehmigung”); see, also, Papapaschalis, note 45 above, at footnote 60.

Klaus Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band II, (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1980), p. 477; Helmut Siekmann, “Article 88”, in: Michael Sachs (ed), Grundgesetz, seventh edition, (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2014), at margin n. 21; Krauskopf, note 30 above, p. 248.

Helmut Siekmann, “Einführung [introduction]” in: Siekmann (ed), note 7 above, margin n. 135, pointing out that this reservation in favour of the government had already been abolished by the allied powers in Germany after World War II and was re-introduced when establishing the Bundesbank in 1957.

Council Regulation (EC) No 975/98 of 3 May 1998 on denominations and technical specifications of euro coins intended for circulation, Official Journal of 11.5.1998, L 139/6; amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 423/1999 of 22 February 1999 amending Regulation (EC) No 975/98 of 3 May 1998 on denominations and technical specifications of euro coins intended for circulation, Official Journal of 27. 2. 1999, L 52/2; amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 566/2012 of 18 June 2012 amending Regulation (EC) No 975/98 of 3 May 1998 on denominations and technical specifications of euro coins intended for circulation, Official Journal of 29.6.2012, L 169/8.

Unclear Papapaschalis, note 45 above, at margin n. 27.

Martin Selmayr, “Article 133 AEUV [TFEU ]”, in: von der Groeben, Schwarze and Hatje (eds), note 45 above, margin n. 8, 9, 26.

See, for details, Selmayr, note 53 above, at margin n. 5, 7, who considers this article as a basis for a comprehensive “euro currency law” (margin n. 1, 5); less wide Florian Becker, “Article 133 AEUV [TFEU]”, in: Siekmann (ed.), note 7 above, Article 133 AEUV [TFEU ].

Note 29 above.

Papapaschalis, note 45 above, at margin n. 44, with the argument that the right of the ECB to authorise the issue of coins would otherwise be infringed; in effect, see, also, Selmayr, note 53 above, at margin n. 2.

Even broader Article 3 paragraph 4 TEU: “The Union shall establish an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro.”

Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98, note 29 above; Papapaschalis, note 45 above, at margin n. 1, 35.

See the references in note 51.

Part Three: Union Policies and Internal Actions, Title VIII: Economic and Monetary Policy, Chaper 2: Monetary Policy.

Étienne de Lhoneux, “The Eurosystem”, in: European Central Bank (ed), note 30 above, p. 161, at 165.

For example, Otto Sandrock, “Der Euro und sein Einfluß auf nationale und internationale privatrechtliche Verträge”, Betriebs Berater – BB, 1997, p. 1 at 11; Hahn and Häde, note 25 above, § 23 at margin n. 89 (p. 281 et seq.) but stipulating a broad competence for the Union; the differentiation is retained in Principle by Ulrich Häde, Article 133 AEUV [TFEU ], in: Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (eds), EUV/AEUV, fifth edition, (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2016), margin n. 2 but conceding a wide space of discretion to the Parliament and the Council; see, also, de Lapasse, note 31 above, at p. 236: “Monetary Law has never been supposed to govern everything.”

In so far agreeing, see de Lapasse, note 31, p. 237; Selmayr, note 53 above, at margin n. 1.

Whether the specification and unitisation of banknotes falls within the competence of the ECB, as it is handled at present supported by the majority of scholars or whether the Council would be allowed to act in this matter following Article 133 TFEU is a question in debate but not relevant for the question here, see for details of the debate Selmayr, note 53 above, at margin n. 16.

Papapaschalis, note 45 above, at margin n. 1, assumes that both paragraphs regulate legal tender although the second paragraph does not use this term explicitly.

Explicitly, Samm, note 27 above, at p. 241; Christoph Ohler, “Die hoheitlichen Grundlagen der Geldordnung”, (2009) Juristen Zeitung, p. 317, at 318; Angel and Margerit, note 4 above, p. 587; Papapaschalis, note 45 above, at margin n. 45; Selmayr, note 53 above, at margin n. 27; dissenting Herrmann, note 31 above, p. 308 et seq., however, not regarding the change in the wording of Article 133 TFEU and misunderstanding the function of section 14 paragraph 1 sentence 2 Bundesbank Act; see Freimuth, note 7 above, at margin n. 79 footnote 86, with a tendency to deny a competence of the Member States to define legal tender; probably also Jean-Victor Louis, L’Union européenne et sa monnaie, Commentaire J. Maigret, 3rd edition, (Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, Institut d’études Européennes, 2009), n. 370, p. 263.

Christoph Schaefer, “Die Ermächtigung von Mitgliedstaaten bei ausschließlicher Gemeinschaftszuständigkeit: Regelwidrigkeit in der Kompetenzordnung?”, EuR 2008, p. 721 at 735; Christian Calliess, “Article 2 AEUV [TFEU ]”, in: Calliess and Ruffert (eds), note 62 above, margin n. 10; Hans Diekmann and Carsten Bernauer, “Mögliche Rechtsfolgen für vertragliche Verhältnisse bei einer Währungsumstellung eines Mitgliedstaates der Europäischen Währungsunion”, (2012) Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht, p. 1172, at 1174; dissenting Martin Seidel, “Der Euro – Schutzschild oder Falle?“, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, – ZEI, Working Paper B 01/2010, p. 26, without proper reasoning; indirectly perhaps also Christoph Herrmann, “Griechische Tragödie – der währungsverfassungsrechtliche Rahmen für die Rettung, den Austritt oder den Ausschluss von überschuldeten Staaten aus der Eurozone”, (2010) Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, p. 413, at 415, in a brief comment without reasoning.

Article 13 para. 1 recital 6 TEU, falsely translated into German as “organ”.

For the practical handling, see the references in footnote 29.

See note 51 above.

See note 45 above.

Article 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998 on the introduction of the euro, Official Journal of 11.5.1998, L 139/1.

This result was not unanimously accepted because of an alleged lack of a suitable basis in the primary law. Article 109 l EC was interpreted only as a transitory provision for the introduction of the euro and Article 235 EC (now Article 352 TFEU) was considered as too unspecific which is still correct, even if the Commission used it. After Article 133 TFEU was enacted by the Treaty of Lisbon these doubts are now unfounded; see, for details, Selmayr, note 53 above, at margin n. 3.

References for a sceptical view on these instruments are given by Selmayr, note 53 above, at margin n. 27.

See footnote 69 above.

Smits, note 47 above, p. 204.

For more details on the (possible) violation of this principle, see Sect. 10.5 below.

Article 1 paragraph 1 and 4 TEU and Protocol (no 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, Official Journal of 26 October 2012, C 326/206.

Annette Theissen, “Die Wirksamkeit des Subsidiaritätsprinzips im Europäischen System der Zentralbanken”, Diss. Jur. Augsburg 2005, p. 110; with reservations concurring, see Freimuth, note 7 above, Art. 128 at margin n. 30.

Article 1a and Articles 10-12 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998 on the introduction of the euro, Official Journal of 11.5.1998, L 139/1.

Council Regulation (EC) No 975/98 of 3 May 1998 on denominations and technical specifications of euro coins intended for circulation, Official Journal of 11.5.1998, L 139/6.

See, for example, Giuseppe Napoletano, “The Legal Protection of the Euro as a Means of Payment”, in: European Central Bank (ed), note 30 above, p. 257, at 260; Papapaschalis note 45 above, p. 48, without seeing the problems discussed in the following.

See note 29 above.

Commission Recommendation of 22 March 2010 on the scope and effects of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (2010/191/EU), Official Journal of 30.3.2010, L 83/70.

Clearly expressed for the Federal Reserve System of the U.S.; however, limited to public cashiers, 12 USC Chapter 3 Sub-chapter XII section 411; for further references, see note 31 above.

See Sect. 10.2.

For references, see note 31 above.

See CON/2012/83, CON/2014/4 and CON/2014/37. In France, the restrictions on using cash in Articles L. 112-5, L. 112-6 and L 112-7 of the French Monetary and Financial Code are treated as a “loi de police” even if it is still a criminal offence to refuse to accept legal tender as long as it is the exact amount due, see Caroline Kleiner (2010), La Monnaie dans les Relations Privées Internationales, LGDJ: Paris, p. 67, 146, discussing in depth the various meanings of “lex monetae” pp. 94–129; see, also, ibid (2009), “Money in Private International Law: What are the Problems? What are the Solutions?”, Yearbook of Private International Law, Vol. XI, p. 565.

BverfGE 97, 350 at 370.

Malte Krüger and Franz Seitz, “Kosten und Nutzen des Bargelds und unbarer Zahlungsinstrumente”, Studie im Auftrag der Deutschen Bundesbank, (2014), p. 108.

BVerfGE 97, 350 (372).

See Rogoff, note 8 above, after assessing the various arguments in favour and against the elimination of paper money. Papier is cited in the assessment by the research service of the Federal Parliament, note 4 above, p. 7; also cited in: “Große Bedenken gegen Bargeldobergrenzen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 June 2016; “Verfassungswidrig?”, Frankfurter Neue Presse, 14 June 2016, p. 4.

A general reference to this principle is already expressed by Selmayr, note 25 above, p. 36.

Article 10 sentence 2, article 11 sentence 2 Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 above n. 29; Recital 1(a) of Commission Recommendation of 22 March 2010 on the scope and effects of the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (2010/191/EU), Official Journal of 30.3.2010, L 83/70; for further references, see Sect. 10.4.

In France, since the time of the revolution, the “code monétaire et financier” requires that a cash payment has to be accepted if it is the exact sum owed. A right for change does not exist; see Angel and Margerit, note 4 above, p. 589.

Examples are given by Angel and Margerit, note 4 above, p. 588.

See footnote 2 above. The court failed, however, to understand the monetary law dimension of the case and completely misinterpreted Section 14 of the Bundesbank Act stating the property of legal tender. Article 128 TFEU was totally ignored.