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While researchers in business ethics, moral philosophy, and jurisprudence have advanced the study of corporate agency, there have been very few attempts to bring together insights from these and other disciplines in the pages of the Journal of Business Ethics. By introducing to an audience of business ethics scholars the work of outstanding authors working outside the field, this interdisciplinary special issue addresses this lacuna. Its aim is to encourage the formulation of innovative arguments that reinvigorate the study of corporate agency and stimulate further cross-fertilization of ideas between business ethics, law, philosophy, and other disciplines.
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- Rethinking Corporate Agency in Business, Philosophy, and Law
- Springer Netherlands
- Journal of Business Ethics
Print ISSN: 0167-4544
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-0697
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