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2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Revocation in Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation

verfasst von : James Alderman, Christian Janson, Carlos Cid, Jason Crampton

Erschienen in: Information Security and Cryptology

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

The combination of software-as-a-service and the increasing use of mobile devices gives rise to a considerable difference in computational power between servers and clients. Thus, there is a desire for clients to outsource the evaluation of complex functions to an external server. Servers providing such a service may be rewarded per computation, and as such have an incentive to cheat by returning garbage rather than devoting resources and time to compute a valid result.
In this work, we introduce the notion of Revocable Publicly Verifiable Computation (RPVC), where a cheating server is revoked and may not perform future computations (thus incurring a financial penalty). We introduce a Key Distribution Center (KDC) to efficiently handle the generation and distribution of the keys required to support RPVC. The KDC is an authority over entities in the system and enables revocation. We also introduce a notion of blind verification such that results are verifiable (and hence servers can be rewarded or punished) without learning the value. We present a rigorous definitional framework, define a number of new security models and present a construction of such a scheme built upon Key-Policy Attribute-based Encryption.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Security of Direct Anonymous Authentication Using TPM 2.0 Signature
Nächstes Kapitel Private Aggregation with Custom Collusion Tolerance
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Fußnoten
1
Note that if a server is not given \(RK_{F,x}\) then it too cannot learn the output.
 
2
In some instantiations, it may not be necessary to issue entirely new evaluation keys to each entity. In Sect. 4, we only need to issue a partially updated key for example.
 
3
We do not need to provide a \(\mathsf {Verify}\) oracle since this is a publicly verifiable scheme and \(\mathcal {A}\) is given verification keys (thus we also avoid the rejection problem).
 
4
This is due to the selective IND-sHRSS game that we base the construction upon. Since this is used in a black-box manner however, a stronger primitive may allow this game to be improved accordingly.
 
5
Following Parno et al. we restrict our attention to Boolean functions, and in particular the complexity class \(NC^1\) which includes all circuits of depth \(\mathcal {O}(\log n)\). Thus functions we can outsource can be built from common operations such as AND, OR, NOT, equality and comparison operators, arithmetic operators and regular expressions.
 
6
\(\mathbb {T}\) could be a counter that is maintained in the public parameters or a networked clock.
 
7
If input privacy is required then a predicate encryption scheme could be used in place of the KP-ABE scheme.
 
Literatur
1.
Alderman, J., Janson, C., Cid, C., Crampton, J.: Revocation in publicly verifiable outsourced computation. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2014/640 (2014). http://​eprint.​iacr.​org/​
2.
Attrapadung, N., Imai, H.: Attribute-based encryption supporting direct/indirect revocation modes. In: Parker, M.G. (ed.) Cryptography and Coding 2009. LNCS, vol. 5921, pp. 278–300. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
3.
Carter, H., Lever, C., Traynor, P.: Whitewash: outsourcing garbled circuit generation for mobile devices. In: Payne, Jr. C.N., Hahn, A., Butler, K.R.B., Sherr, M. (eds.) Proceedings of the 30th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2014, pp. 266–275. ACM (2014)
4.
Choi, S.G., Katz, J., Kumaresan, R., Cid, C.: Multi-client non-interactive verifiable computation. In: Sahai, A. (ed.) TCC 2013. LNCS, vol. 7785, pp. 499–518. Springer, Heidelberg (2013)
5.
Gennaro, R., Gentry, C., Parno, B.: Non-interactive verifiable computing: outsourcing computation to untrusted workers. In: Rabin, T. (ed.) CRYPTO 2010. LNCS, vol. 6223, pp. 465–482. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
6.
Gentry, C.: Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices. In: Mitzenmacher, M. (ed.) STOC, pp. 169–178. ACM (2009)
7.
Goldwasser, S., Gordon, S.D., Goyal, V., Jain, A., Katz, J., Liu, F.-H., Sahai, A., Shi, E., Zhou, H.-S.: Multi-input functional encryption. In: Nguyen, P.Q., Oswald, E. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2014. LNCS, vol. 8441, pp. 578–602. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)
8.
Goyal, V., Pandey, O., Sahai, A., Waters, B.: Attribute-based encryption for fine-grained access control of encrypted data. In: Juels, A., Wright, R.N., di Vimercati, S.D.C. (eds.) Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2006, pp. 89–98. ACM (2006)
9.
Green, M., Hohenberger, S., Waters, B.: Outsourcing the decryption of ABE ciphertexts. In: 2011 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX Security Symposium, San Francisco, CA, USA, August 8–12. USENIX Association (2011)
10.
Parno, B., Raykova, M., Vaikuntanathan, V.: How to delegate and verify in public: verifiable computation from attribute-based encryption. In: Cramer, R. (ed.) TCC 2012. LNCS, vol. 7194, pp. 422–439. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)
11.
Yao, A.C.-C.: How to generate and exchange secrets (extended abstract). In: FOCS, pp. 162–167. IEEE Computer Society (1986)
Metadaten
Titel
Revocation in Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation
verfasst von
James Alderman
Christian Janson
Carlos Cid
Jason Crampton
Copyright-Jahr
2015
Buch
Information Security and Cryptology

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-16744-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-16745-9

Copyright-Jahr: 2015

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16745-9_4