Russia and the Future of Europe

Russia and Austria have traditionally had friendly, sometimes even cordial, relations, these days drawn from largely financial and business interests. Neither the current nor previous governments have shown great interest in political issues, human rights and the rule of law. When President Putin visited Vienna in 2018, Austria’s Federal President even went so far as to say that there was no loss of trust and confidence between the EU, Austria and Russia. Moreover, he did not see any reason why there should be. This is remarkable, given the breakdown of trust between most EU countries and Russia, not only because of its military escalation of the Ukraine crisis but also the deepening authoritarian character of the country’s political system.

Historically, in the second half of the nineteenth century, industrialised Belgium was one of the main investors in the then developing Russian (heavy) industry and an advocate of strong Russian ties. These emerging economic relations ended abruptly with the October Revolution and its wave of nationalisations.

The Bulgarian-Russian relationship has been controversial and complicated. Deeply rooted and historically bound attitudes, enhanced by half a century of targeted propaganda, have clashed with a practical and interest-driven approach to Bulgarian-Russian relations. This conundrum usually fails to be solved, which favours Russia.

Croatia-Russia relations were officially opened on 25 May 1992 following the Russian recognition of Croatia as an independent state. In the 2000s and early 2010s consecutive presidents of Croatia, Stjepan Mesić and Ivo Josipović, made a number of official working visits to Russia. The accession of Croatia to NATO in 2009 and the European Union in 2013 limited any possibilities for independent political cooperation with Russia, although there is still space for development of constructive bilateral relations at some stage. Indeed, it could be argued that until Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine during 2014 bilateral relations had generally been in the ascendancy. From a general perspective, the year 2014 represents a milestone in Western relations with Russia, which was immediately also reflected upon Croatia-Russia relations.

Cyprus-Russia relations are driven by interest, geopolitics and culture. Since the Republic of Cyprus’ founding, this relationship has been steadily growing, with some dramatic moments in the early 1960s to do with domestic intercommunal conflict and Turkey’s intention to change the status quo on the island. Russia saw in Cyprus a trustworthy non-aligned small state that should never come under NATO’s sphere of influence. Nicosia saw in Moscow a committed friend that would be able to thwart plans by foreign powers to divide the island. In the aftermath of Turkey’s 1974 military invasion, Russia supported the case of Cyprus in UN Security Council. Russia remains the major market for defence procurement in essential military equipment and supplies.

Despite appearances, Russia historically played a relatively minor role in Czech politics before the Second World War. The two countries never shared a border and any cultural exchange was limited to the romanticised notion of Russia as a ‘Slavic oak’ and the hosting of Russian emigrees following the 1917 Revolution. All of this changed dramatically with the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany and subsequent incorporation of Czechoslovakia into the Soviet bloc following the 1948 Communist coup. After the country’s democratisation in 1989, the Soviet Union/Russia once again became much less relevant for the Czech Republic, both politically and economically. Russia in turn retreated from public debate, becoming a symbolic representation of post-communist underdevelopment, from which the country tried to escape.

Danish-Russian relations have developed in waves through the years. Whereas most other European states are consistently either hawks or doves, the official Danish attitude towards Russia has fluctuated considerably in the post-Cold War era.

As one of the few EU Member States that has both a land and sea border with Russia, Estonia is considered to be an experienced actor in Russian affairs, especially from a small-state perspective. Estonia’s contemporary strategic vision of Russia is influenced by Russia’s aggressive stance in recent decades, Estonia’s painful historical experience with Russia, the challenges of social segregation between Estonians and Russians and potential security threats emanating from Russia. Since the 2014 annexation of Crimea and ongoing war in the Eastern Ukraine, Estonia has committed to using all of its diplomatic and media capabilities to warn Member States within the EU and NATO about Russia’s aggressive ambitions and activities. How does this anti-Kremlin radicalism influence Estonia’s position in the EU? While in the past this attitude has found more critics than sympathisers, following the Crimean annexation it is more readily accepted, even when there are many other Member States and interest groups that would prefer a softer and more cooperation-oriented relationship with Russia.

The Ukraine crisis in 2014 sounded an alarm in Helsinki and powerfully manifested a notable change in the relatively stable security policy landscape of north-east Europe. This forced Finland to re-think its relations with Russia. In doing so, Helsinki has adopted a decisive position towards Russian aggression, yet at the same time has highlighted the need to find ways of lowering tensions. As a European Union Member State, it has done so from a much stronger and more stable position than previously. Given its history and geopolitical location, Finland is well positioned to contribute to and forge a unitary position among EU members towards EU-Russia relations.

Emmanuel Macron’s initiative for a renewed political dialogue with Moscow had raised eyebrows, if not alarms or outright criticisms, in a number of European quarters. As such, it invites some reflection on its rationale and determinants as well as, more generally, on the drivers of France’s policies towards Russia.

Due to its size, geographical location and history, Germany plays a special role in European-Russian relations. The past decade’s bilateral relations have been characterised by a selective, interest-driven foreign policy, coupled with a leading role among EU Member States to forge a common position towards Moscow. German-Russian relations cover in particular issues of energy supply (Nord Stream 2) and bilateral trade relations, which include an export focus on machinery, cars and electrical engineering. While after the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 relations were said to be built on mutual values and goals, differences have become more apparent over time. Examples of this are the 2008 war in Georgia, annexation of Crimea in 2014, armed conflict in the Donbas region and open support for the Lukashenko regime following the Belarus protests of 2020. Moreover, incidents such as the August 2019 murder of a Chechen asylum seeker in Berlin, the poisoning of Alexei Navalny and subsequent destructive measures by the Russian authorities, as well as numerous cyberattacks on members of the Bundestag, have brought mutual relations to a new low point. Last but not least, the autumn of 2021 marks a possible turning point on the German-Russian agenda, as Angela Merkel’s term as chancellor runs out after more than 16 years of cooperative and confrontational policies with her counterpart Vladimir Putin. However, whether the new chancellor and coalition government will lead to a policy change towards Russia seems rather unlikely, given the relationship’s continuing oscillation between dialogue and confrontation.

While Russia’s image in the West has been traditionally negative since the Soviet era, Greece has been one of the few exceptions to the rule. Indeed, support for Russia has been recurrently high among Greeks, with 57.5% and 67% of the population, according to the most recently available data (2017), holding a favourable opinion of Russia and President Putin, respectively. Greeks’ peculiar Russophilia can be explained by the critical role that Russia played during the Greek War of Independence (1821–1829) and the cultural heritage that the two nations share due to their common Christian Orthodox faith. Greece’s special relationship with Russia has also been criticised within NATO and EU circles, as Greece was the first NATO country to purchase military material from Moscow (2007), provoking accusations of being Russia’s ‘Trojan horse’ within the EU.

Hungary has the typical national contours that feature in relations between Central and East European (CEE) EU Member States and Russia. Troublesome historical legacies, relatively minor and narrowing economic relations (except for energy) and sharp party divisions regarding the Russian nexus are generally shared features in CEE. What stands out within this setting are the inherently domestic policy patterns of bilateral relations, especially as far as interrelations between Viktor Orbán’s illiberal leanings along with Euroscepticism and Moscow’s foreign policy agenda are concerned. Viktor Orbán’s and Vladimir Putin’s mindsets partially overlap, creating some ideological foundations for an opportunistic relationship.

Ireland’s relations with Russia have been shaped by three factors: geography, the country’s neutrality and, since Ireland joined the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, EEC/EC/EU membership. Geographically, Ireland is one of the European states most distant from Russia, geo-strategically sheltered from Russia by mainland Europe and the United Kingdom. Consequently, Ireland has never had a strong sense of a Soviet or Russian threat. Geography also explains why Irish-Russian trade has been relatively limited in scale. Russia has never been central to the Irish economy and has no special economic leverage over Ireland. Ireland’s security policy of neutrality—which emerged during the Second World War and led to the rejection of possible NATO membership in 1948–1949—has, at the same time, meant that bilateral relations with Russia/Soviet Union have been free from problems arising from NATO-Soviet and now NATO-Russia tensions.

Italy has traditionally enjoyed excellent relations and strong ties with Russia, especially when compared to other EU Member States. This is due to strong mutual economic interests, but also longstanding cultural and in part political ties. While this close relationship is viewed with suspicion from some capitals in Europe, it gives Rome an edge that could actually benefit EU-Russia relations. Italy is well positioned to be a mediator in EU-Russia relations, to help restore necessary dialogue and raise the level of trust. While doing so, Rome should be more aware and bolder in protecting its domestic civil society in its countering of non-conventional security threats coming from Moscow.

Latvia has centuries-old complex and complicated relations with Russia and its political regimes. Only within the past century has Latvia fought and struggled for independence from both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Russia continues to be a formative factor for Latvia’s own historical understanding as well as its foreign and domestic politics. Acknowledging that Russia and Latvia are and will continue to be neighbours, the state policy has been based on a mixture of protecting this small Baltic country against Russian security threats, whilst at the same time maintaining economic relations.

Geopolitical concerns play an important role in Lithuania’s policies both vis-à-vis authoritarian Russia and in driving its attempts to upload bilateral issues onto the EU. Previous attempts at a pragmatic dialogue with Russia initiated by Lithuania’s officials are considered a failure. Meanwhile Russia’s aggressive policies and violation of international norms are seen as a vindication of the country’s suspicious attitude towards authoritarian Moscow and expose some EU Member States’ naiveté. The dominant view is that only democratisation of Russia can reduce tensions and allow for any normalisation of political relations.

2021 marks the 130th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Russia and Luxembourg, Russia having been one of the first countries with which Luxembourg established permanent ties. However, these relations have been strained by Russia’s 2014 military occupation of Crimea and the ongoing armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, which started in the same year.

The benefit of being on Europe’s periphery is that other parts of Europe can seem extremely distant, as with Russia, but this does not preclude contact. Situated in the middle of the Mediterranean, Malta had no foreign policy before independence in 1964, although the islands had played host to Russian diplomats from the time of Peter the Great. On independence from the UK, diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were established in 1967 and it was in Malta that Bush and Gorbachev declared the Cold War at an end in 1989.

Poland is well-known in Europe for its difficult relations with Russia, which often lead into what seems to be prejudices and biases. Yet, the long and difficult history of relations between Poland and its Eastern neighbour provides a good deal of substance in understanding why such a distrustful approach exists. For centuries Poland was threatened by Russian imperial aspirations and indeed the eastern part of Poland was part of the Russian empire. In this chapter we focus on various aspects of relations with Russia as seen from Warsaw. Rebuilding relations after the end of the Cold War proved to be difficult and the significant mounting crisis in mutual relations largely reflected Poland’s growing role in the EU’s foreign policy to build a uniform policy towards Russia and strong support for pro-Western tendencies in neighbouring countries such as Ukraine. We discuss the links between the Polish radical right-wing parties and Russia and the latter strategy aimed at undermining society’s support for EU membership and promoting ultra-conservative values. Poland strongly supported Ukraine when Russia attacked the country in February 2022 and again became one of the leaders of common and unequivocal support for Ukrainian leadership and society within the EU and in transatlantic community.

The 240th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Lisbon and Moscow, celebrated in 2019, was made possible through the efforts of two very important women with great political vision, Catherine II, Tsarina of the Russian Empire, and Queen Mary I from the Portuguese Empire. Portugal with its Atlantic vocation and Russia with its continental vocation began a long-lasting friendly relationship until an enforced break in 1917 which lasted until 1976. Following the Cold War, as the Soviet Union was collapsing in 1991, the new Russian Federation was focused on its own domestic path through an extensive transition period, whilst Portugal was initiating necessary development in the wake of Salazar’s long dictatorship through European integration. The beginning of this democratic period showed that Portugal had three very specific objectives being implemented in terms of foreign policy, none of them regarding Russia: (1) Atlanticist with NATO, (2) European with the European Union and (3) “Lusophony” (native-speaker links) with Portuguese-speaking countries and former colonies of the Portuguese-Speaking Countries Community (CPLP).

A difficult historical relationship between Romania and Russia has left Moscow ever-present in the collective memory of Romanians. This is especially true for the generations in their 40s and 50s, due to more than four decades of a communist regime imposed by Soviet troops. For older generations, Russia is even more frightening, with many issues still fresh in the memory: loss of family members, seizure of property, deportation, torture of political prisoners as well as a lack of fundamental rights and freedoms. Two other major historical events impact on this: the loss of Bessarabia (currently territory of the Republic of Moldova, part of the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP)) lost through the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 1939 and confiscation of the Romanian National Bank’s treasury—handed over to Russia for shelter in 1916 due to the advance of the Central Powers, according to the National Bank. The Romanian treasure has still not been fully recovered to this day.

After its founding, the Slovak Republic maintained its relations with Russia in continuity with previous, particularly economic relations. However, these were oriented according to the Agreement on Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation, mainly on international trade and cultural cooperation. The development of Russia's interference in Slovakia's political environment, which has resulted in the expulsion of diplomats, the import of the unapproved Sputnik V vaccine or the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, has put the unequal relationship into a different perspective. Despite these situations, there is still a certain historical legacy of a positive perception of relations with Russia by the Slovak public. However, even in the light of unjustified interference, these are at odds with Slovakia's commitments within the EU, particularly in the area of foreign policy.

Overall, Slovenia enjoys good relations with Russia and hence most Slovenians find it hard to understand why a problematic relationship exists between the European Union and the Russian Federation. However, it must be borne in mind that to date Slovenia has not faced any directly threatening issues with Russia, as is the case with many Central and Eastern European countries.

Spain’s relationship with Russia is marked by distance. Madrid as a national capital is second furthest away from Moscow within Europe. This remote geographical reality in combination with the foreign policy of both countries over the last two centuries has given rise to important consequences. Spain is, for example, the only European country that has never been either an ally or an enemy of Russia ever since the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815. There is not even a legacy connected to the Iron Curtain years. Unlike the rest of Western Europe, which had maintained diplomatic relations with the USSR since the 1940s, Spain did not formally re-establish contact until 1977, during the country’s transition from Franco’s dictatorship to democracy. Paradoxically, the dictator’s hard anti-communist stance and Soviet Union’s policy at that time of welcoming thousands of Republicans (mostly children) in exile meant that no particular feelings of hostility existed among democratic forces. Furthermore, the range of nuclear-armed SS Missiles was barely enough to reach Spain, which consequently helped to reduce bilateral tensions in the Cold War’s final phase.

Historically a string of wars, not unusual among neighbouring countries, has characterised relations between Sweden and Russia. More recently mock attacks by Russian bomber planes in 2013 against Stockholm and southern Sweden is seen by many to show that Russia sees Sweden as a potential enemy. The aggression against Ukraine in 2014 reinforced this negative attitude and Sweden has been a strong proponent of continued sanctions. Sweden has no trade dependence on Russia and has seen Nord Stream as harmful for the EU. This negative view is shared by both government and the population.

The Netherlands boasts long historical ties with Russia. Commercial links go back to medieval times, but it was especially during the long reign of Tsar Peter the Great (1682–1725), who established Russia as a European power, that relations intensified. This process was spurred by the visit of Peter and his retinue, or ‘Grand Embassy’, to the Dutch Republic in 1697, as part of a European tour to forge a coalition against the Ottomans and draw inspiration from modern societies.

Diplomatic relations at embassy level between the Republic of Albania (then People’s Republic of Albania) and the Russian Federation (then Union of Socialist Soviet —USSR) were established for the first time in 1956, a year after Albania became a founding member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Settled times between the two countries lasted only 5 years, as in 1961 their diplomatic relations came to an end, albeit Albania maintained support for the Warsaw Pact, not formally withdrawing until 1968. Three decades later, in 1991, diplomatic relations between the two countries were reinstated, when pluralist Albania recognised the Russian Federation as rightful heir to the USSR. In broad terms, relations between the two countries have been kept at a basic level, with no exchange of top-level delegations between the two countries for a considerable number of years. Moreover, Albania has not ratified the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Russia.

Events of the last few years have shown that Russia is no longer ready to follow the Western consensus when it comes to Bosnia, including EU enlargement and the general orientation towards liberal democracy. What we see in Bosnia and in the wider region of the Western Balkans is an emergence of a new geopolitical marketplace. This has become even more obvious with the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Collateral damage from the geopolitically divided world on smaller and more fragile nations and states such as Bosnia is becoming increasingly obvious. The increasingly fierce competition between Russia and the West has its trickle-down and spoiler effects on previous arrangements and power constellations in specific regions of the world, as exemplified by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia simply wants to prevent Bosnia and Herzegovina from joining NATO and the EU at any price. The West needs to send a strong message to Putin and Russia that it stands behind its partners and will strengthen its support to a unified, multi-ethnic, functional and democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Georgian-Russian relations have historically been hierarchic due both to evident differences in state capabilities and Russia’s expansionist foreign policy aimed at subjecting smaller neighbours to its power. Considering Georgia as part of its privileged interest, Russia disregards Georgia’s sovereign right to determine its own foreign policy path.

Iceland has a solid trade relationship with Russia in spite of some current confrontations. Iceland’s closest cooperation with Russia takes place within various regional organisations, specially regarding the Arctic. In the wake of Iceland’s economic collapse in October 2008, a Russian bailout was considered but the loan never materialised. Iceland did not hesitate to take part in the sanctions against Russia in 2014 and Iceland takes part in most of its allies’ statements regarding worries about human rights and democracy in Russia, along with increased Russian military activity within the Arctic. Media coverage on Russia in Iceland mainly revolves around international politics, security and human rights issues. There have been no publicly known incidents of Russia attempting to interfere and influence Icelandic domestic politics.

The Western Balkan region has long been a ‘chessboard’ for geopolitical games between Russia and the West. A prolonged EU membership process for the region and current enlargement fatigue provide a unique opportunity for Russia to strengthen its position in the region still further, thereby undermining EU and NATO roles. As such, the Western Balkans remains a vulnerable region on the periphery of Europe where Russia can extend its influence, strengthen alliances with specific countries, gain supporters and maximise its leverage, even to the point of competing with the West. While Russian economic investment cannot compete with EU investments and funds dedicated to the region, Russian propaganda media outlets in some countries (for instance, Serbia) portray the EU as weak, inefficient and politically unable to deliver in the Western Balkans. This propaganda campaign has been highly effective due to the EU’s inability to be more vocal in its promotion of assistance provided to the Western Balkans.

Relations between Russia and Liechtenstein are not particularly close. There are no bilateral agreements between the two states and not even a free trade agreement. The bulk of diplomatic exchange is mainly within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), but overall this is very little, albeit diplomatic relations do exist. Indeed, the former prime minister of Liechtenstein, Markus Büchel, used to be Honorary Consul for Russia. This function is currently held by Klaus Tschütscher, also a former Liechtenstein prime minister. In view of Liechtenstein’s otherwise little-developed political relations with Russia, this apparently close contact of Russia with parts of Liechtenstein’s political elite is surprising. There is also a Russian Consular Centre in the country’s capital Vaduz. Liechtenstein does not have a representation in Russia; however, its citizens may make use of the Swiss representation for all consular questions.

The relationship between Montenegro and Russia represents an extremely complex challenge, that Montenegro, as a small country, has been faced with over a significant period of time. From 1997, after the ruling party split, the leadership of Montenegro decided to start orienting itself more towards the West, gradually moving in favour of national independence as opposed to any form of state union. Montenegro’s foreign policy priorities were defined in 2006: securing its position as a sovereign state, ensuring a European perspective, securing a reliable alliance within NATO and promoting stable cooperation with countries in the region and key world players.

Despite proclaimed and actual good bilateral relations of the two “friendly countries and brotherly nations”, the lack of strategic determination and interest to commit to alliance beyond customary relations has contributed to a certain level of estrangement of both countries from one another. Russian actions were aligned predominantly with its aspirations to exert influence over and dominate the Balkan region in political terms, but then again North Macedonia has never been high on the Russian agenda as other countries in the region. In effect, North Macedonia has been going on and off the Russian radar, depending on developments in the global balance of powers, problems of regional context and severe internal distress.

Norway’s policy towards Russia has so far been guided by three ideas—reassurance, engagement and deterrence. This approach has been determined by four structural factors. The first is the geographical proximity—the two countries share a 198 km long border in the High North. The second is the obvious disparity of potentials—in territorial terms Norway is a mid-size, European country with 5.4 million inhabitants, while Russia’s territory stretches over 10 time zones and its population is almost 30 times bigger than Norway’s. The third is historical experience shaping perception of Russia. Russia is viewed as both an important regional partner with whom one needs to work together in addressing common challenges and a possible source of strategic threat to Norway. Fourth and finally, the economic relationship is also influenced by the fact that both countries are important energy producers and exporters, which puts some limits on their trade, despite the geographical proximity. While the first two factors are undeniable facts, the next two may change, although they have proved to be relatively stable. In the following chapter we will reflect over current trends in both the political and economic relationships between the two countries as well as the perceptions of Russia among Norwegians.

What is Russia to Serbia? Is the country a centuries-old friend, an ally and honest mediator? Or is this in truth a subversive actor and someone who has selfish motives? The relationship between Serbia and Russia has been through phases of cooperation and reliance, but also distancing, when Belgrade was looking for allies in the West. Over the past 15 years, in the context of resolving the status of Kosovo with EU-mediated dialogue (2011–), Serbia’s political representatives have increasingly relied on Moscow’s political support and to some extent military backing, with Russia using this as leverage over Serbia’s political elites. The tension that was transferred from Russia’s relations with the West (Ukrainian crisis, sanctions regime, war in Syria, political crisis in Belarus) Belgrade had tried to overcome, facing less and less understanding in its relationship with the EU. Yet, at a time of increased international competition and confrontation, Serbia remains a country open for cooperation with Moscow.

Switzerland has a unique position in the geopolitics of Europe. Whereas it is firmly anchored in the Western, liberal-democratic international community, the country is not a member state of either the European Union or NATO. Since the Congress of Vienna in 1814/1815, ‘permanent neutrality’ has been a core principle of Swiss foreign policy, enjoying broad public support. This neutrality is not passive, but combined with humanitarian engagement and good offices aimed at strengthening cooperative security.

Relations between Turkey and Russia can be thought of as a pendulum swinging from conflict to compromise and back, depending on their colliding or overlapping interests on different issues. Historically, the two countries have been strategic partners in terms of their military, economic and political interests, especially after the Cold War, but never close allies. While current relations are stronger than ever, they have been transactional, compartmentalised and asymmetrically in favour of Russia, more highly personalised than institutionalised. Hence, relations have been assessed as ‘adversarial relationship and cooperation’, ‘cooperative or strategic rivalry’ and ‘competitive cooperation’.

Whilst the UK and Russia lack a common border, they nevertheless have a long history of interaction, often tense or hostile in nature, dating back as far as the imperial era when interests clashed over the Ottoman Empire and India. Following the Second World War, having fought alongside the Soviets from 1941, the UK became a key ally of the USA in the Cold War. Its end with collapse of the Soviet Union was a moment of optimism for a renewed relationship with Russia, but regrettably the difficulties soon returned. The UK has frequently objected to Russian intelligence activities, as well as being critical of its human rights record, an increasingly authoritarian political system and hostile activity in its region. The Litvinenko (2006) and Skripal (2018) poisonings were particularly harmful to relations.

Since the restoration of Ukraine’s independence in 1991, relations between Moscow and Kyiv had never been easy, but at least they were peaceful until February 2014. Today, it is very much a case of an aggressor and its victim, with 78% of Ukrainians convinced that a state of war exists between Russia and Ukraine.