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2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

3. Salient Features of the ICT Sector

verfasst von : Kalpana Tyagi

Erschienen in: Promoting Competition in Innovation Through Merger Control in the ICT Sector

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

This chapter discusses at length special industry-specific economic factors—such as network effects, customer lock-in, path-dependency, multi-sided platforms, convergence, market envelopment and consumerisation—issues that merit special consideration while reviewing mergers and evaluating merger remedies in the high technology sector.

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Fußnoten
1
For a discussion on how online advertising optimises the spending of the advertising firm, see Chap. 17 Big Data and Merger Control.
 
2
Joseph Farrell and Paul Klemperer, ‘Coordination and Lock-in: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects’ in Mark Armstrong and Robert H Porter (eds), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 3(North Holland 2007).
 
3
Carl Shapiro and Hal R Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy (Harvard Business School Press 1999).
 
4
Arthur C Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (4th ed, London: Macmillan and Co. 1932).
 
5
Michael L Katz and Carl Shapiro, ‘Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility’ (June 1985) 75(3) The American Economic Review 424.
 
6
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F.Supp. 2d 30,36, 38–39(D.D.C. 2000).
 
7
For a detailed discussion on indirect network effects and two-sided platforms, see Chap. 17 Big Data and Merger Control.
 
8
See Chap. 2 (Ir) relevant Markets in the High Technology Sector?.
 
9
David S Evans and Richard Schmalensee, ‘The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms’ (Spring 2007) 3(1) Competition Policy International 151, 155.
 
10
Stuart Minor Benjamin and James B Speta Telecommunications Law and Policy (4th edn, California Academic Press 2015)10.
 
11
T-Mobile Austria/Tele.ring (Case COMP/M.3916) Commission Decision 2007/193/EC [2007] OJ C193/44, para 76.
 
12
Ibid.
 
13
Stuart Minor Benjamin and James B Speta Telecommunications Law and Policy (4th edn, California Academic Press 2015)10–12.
 
14
Ibid.
 
15
OECD, Barriers to Entry, DAF/ COMP (2005) 42, 19 <https://​www.​oecd.​org/​fr/​concurrence/​abus/​36997651.​pdf> accessed 06 January 2019.
 
16
OECD, Roundtable on Two-Sided Markets: Note by the Delegation of the European Commission, DAF/COMP/WD (2009)69, 15.
 
17
David S Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Catalyst Code: The Strategies Behind the World’s Most Dynamic Companies (Harvard Business School Press 2007) 53.
 
18
David S Evans and Richard Schmalensee, ‘The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms’ (Spring 2007) 3(1) Competition Policy International 151, 152.
 
19
Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, ‘Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report’ (2006) 37(3) The RAND Journal of Economics 645, 659; Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, ‘Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets’ (2003) 1(4) Journal of the European Economics Association 990, 990–91.
 
20
Gregory J Werden, ‘Network Effects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons from the Microsoft Case’ (2001) 69 Antitrust Law Journal 108.
 
21
Sarah Philips, ‘A brief history of Facebook’ The Guardian (London, 25 July 2007) <https://​www.​theguardian.​com/​technology/​2007/​jul/​25/​media.​newmedia> accessed 06 January 2019.
 
22
Ibid.
 
23
Orkut was a social networking site like Facebook.
 
24
Sarah Philips, ‘A brief history of Facebook’ The Guardian (London, 25 July 2007) <https://​www.​theguardian.​com/​technology/​2007/​jul/​25/​media.​newmedia> accessed 06 January 2019.
 
25
Lauren Orsini, ‘The Rise and Fall of Orkut-Google’s decade long social media experiment’ Readwrite, Social (Online, 03 June 2014) <http://​readwrite.​com/​2014/​06/​30/​the-rise-and-fall-of-orkut-googles-decade-long-social-media-experiment/​> accessed 06 January 2019.
 
26
Michael L Katz and Carl Shapiro, ‘Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities’ (1986) 94(4) Journal of Political Economy 825.
 
27
Myles Udland, ‘The number one key to Apple’s success? It was second’ Business Insider (Online 8 June 2015) < https://​www.​businessinsider.​com.​au/​apple-second-mover-advantage-2015-6> accessed 06 January 2019.
 
28
Venkatesh Shankar and Gregory Carpenter, ‘The Second-Mover Advantage’ Kellogg Insight <https://​insight.​kellogg.​northwestern.​edu/​article/​the_​second_​mover_​advantage> accessed 06 January 2019.
 
29
Ibid.
 
30
Fernando Suarez and Gianvito Lanzolla, ‘The Half-Truth of First-Mover Advantage’ Harvard Business Review (Online April 2005 Issue) <https://​hbr.​org/​2005/​04/​the-half-truth-of-first-mover-advantage> accessed 06 January 2019.
 
31
Thomas R Eisenmann, Geoffrey Parker and Marshall W Van Alstyne, ‘Platform Envelopment’ (27 July 2010) Harvard Business School Working Paper 07-104 <https://​doi.​org/​10.​1002/​smj.​935> accessed 06 January 2019, at p. 3.
 
32
Ibid., at p. 1.
 
33
Ibid., at p. 2.
 
34
ARM/Giesecke & Devrient/ Gemalto/ JV (Case COMP/M.6564) [2012] OJ C368/9, para 150.
 
35
Gregory J Werden, ‘Network Effects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons from the Microsoft Case’ (2001) 69 Antitrust Law Journal 108.
 
36
Ibid.
 
37
Jonathan B Baker, ‘Can Antitrust Keep Up?: Competition Policy in high-tech markets’ (1 December 2001) Brookings <https://​www.​brookings.​edu/​articles/​can-antitrust-keep-up-competition-policy-in-high-tech-markets/​> accessed 06 January 2019.
 
38
Michael L Katz and Carl Shapiro, ‘Antitrust in Software Markets’ in Jeffrey A Eisenach and Thomas M Lenard (eds) Competition, Innovation and the Microsoft Monopoly (Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999) <http://​faculty.​haas.​berkeley.​edu/​shapiro/​software.​pdf> accessed 06 January 2019.
 
39
See Sect. 3.3 Qwerty-nomics, Customer Lock-in and Path Dependency.
 
40
Michael L Katz and Carl Shapiro, ‘Antitrust in Software Markets’ in Jeffrey A Eisenach and Thomas M Lenard (eds) Competition, Innovation and the Microsoft Monopoly (Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999) <http://​faculty.​haas.​berkeley.​edu/​shapiro/​software.​pdf> accessed 06 January 2019.
 
41
Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt, ‘Assessing the Effects of Intellectual Property Rights in Network Standards’ in Josef Drexl(ed), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2008)80.
 
42
Jonathan B Baker, ‘Can Antitrust Keep Up?: Competition Policy in high-tech markets’ (1 December 2001) Brookings <https://​www.​brookings.​edu/​articles/​can-antitrust-keep-up-competition-policy-in-high-tech-markets/​> accessed 06 January 2019.
 
43
Ilene Knable Gotts, Scott Sher and Michelle Lee, ‘Antitrust Merger Analysis in High-Technology Markets’ (December 2008) 4(2) European Competition Journal 463, 476–77.
 
44
Michael L Katz and Carl Shapiro, ‘Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities’ (1986) 94(4) Journal of Political Economy 825, 827.
 
45
Facebook/WhatsApp (Case No COMP/M.7217) [2014] OJ/C 417/4.
 
46
W Brian Arthur, ‘On Competing Technologies and Historical Small Events: The Dynamics of Choice Under Increasing Returns’ (1983) IIASA Working Paper, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria <http://​pure.​iiasa.​ac.​at/​2222/​> accessed 06 January 2019.
 
47
Ibid.
 
48
United States v. Oracle Corporation, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098(N.D. Cal. 2004), Plaintiff’s Complaint 16–20.
 
49
Paul A David, ‘Clio and the economics of QWERTY’ (1985) 75(2) American Economic Review 332, 339–40.
 
50
Ibid., pp. 337–38.
 
51
Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Privacy and competitiveness in the age of big data: The interplay between data protection, competition law and consumer protection in the Digital Economy’ (March 2014) 29–30 <https://​secure.​edps.​europa.​eu/​EDPSWEB/​webdav/​shared/​Documents/​Consultation/​Opinions/​2014/​14-03-26_​competitition_​law_​big_​data_​EN.​pdf> accessed 06 January 2019.
 
52
Ibid., p.29.
 
53
Alexandre de Streel, ‘Remedies in the European Electronic Telecommunications Sector’ in Damien Geradin (ed.), Remedies in Network Industries: EC Competition Law vs. Sector-specific Regulation (Intersentia, 2004) 67, 68.
 
54
Michael Rosenthal, ‘Mergers in the Telecommunications Sector: An overview of EU and national case law’ (6 April 2012) N° 44678 e-Competitions 2.
 
55
Nokia/Navteq (Case COMP/ M.4942) [2009] OJ C13/8, para 126.
 
56
Google/Motorola Mobility (Case COMP/M 6381) [2012] OJ C075/01, para 27.
 
57
Google/Motorola Mobility (Case COMP/M 6381) [2012] OJ C075/01, para 28–29.
 
58
Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Privacy and competitiveness in the age of big data: The interplay between data protection, competition law and consumer protection in the Digital Economy’ (March 2014) 28 <https://​secure.​edps.​europa.​eu/​EDPSWEB/​webdav/​shared/​Documents/​Consultation/​Opinions/​2014/​14-03-26_​competitition_​law_​big_​data_​EN.​pdf> accessed 06 January 2019.
 
59
Alexandre de Streel, ‘Remedies in the European Electronic Telecommunications Sector’ in Damien Geradin (ed.) Remedies in Network Industries: EC Competition Laws vs. Sector-specific Regulation (Intersentia 2004) 67, 95; Michael Rosenthal, ‘Mergers in the Telecommunications Sector: An overview of EU and national case law’ (6 April 2012) N° 44678 e-Competitions 2.
 
60
Thomas F Dapp, ‘The future of (mobile) payments: New (online) players competing with banks: New (online) players competing with banks’ [20 December 2012] DB Research: Current Issues in Global financial markets <<https://​www.​dbresearch.​com/​PROD/​RPS_​EN-PROD/​PROD000000000045​3744/​The_​future_​of_​%28mobile%29_​payments%3A_​New_​%28online%29_​play.​PDF> accessed 06 January 2019.
 
61
Apple/Beats (Case No COMP/M.7290) [2014] OJ C260/08.
 
62
United States v. Oracle Corporation, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098(N.D. Cal. 2004).
 
63
Kyle Russell, ‘How Apple Became the Dominant Force in Enterprise’ Business Insider (Online, 19th February 2014) < http://​www.​businessinsider.​com/​why-apple-is-dominating-enterprise-2014-2?​IR=​T> accessed 06 January 2019.
 
64
Jake O’Donnell, ‘Apple Enterprise Support, Services Questioned and Business Push’ Search Mobile Computing (Online, 24 November 2014) <http://​searchmobilecomp​uting.​techtarget.​com/​news/​2240235266/​Apple-enterprise-support-services-questioned-amid-business-push> accessed 06 January 2019.
 
65
To capitalise the value associated with their products and services, firms increasingly employ a ‘brand extension’ strategy that launch new products using the brand names associated with their successful product offerings. Apple extended its brand from the consumer to the enterprise segment. By offering a valuable solution, including productivity apps, it offered a valuable proposition to the enterprise segment, which had earlier enjoyed great success in the consumer segment.
 
66
Larry Dignan, ‘Between the Lines, Apple’s Enterprise Strategy: Steady as Consumerization goes’ Between the Lines (London, 25 May 2012) <http://​www.​zdnet.​com/​article/​apples-enterprise-strategy-steady-as-consumerization-goes/​> accessed 06 January 2019; David J Teece, ‘Business Models, Business Strategy and Innovation’ (2010) 43(2, 3) Long Range Planning 172.
 
67
Introduction of Apple’s iPhones and iPad is widely believed to have led to the BYOD movement in offices, law firms and consulting firms. See Kyle Russell, ‘How Apple Became the Dominant Force in Enterprise’ Business Insider (Online, 19th February 2014) < http://​www.​businessinsider.​com/​why-apple-is-dominating-enterprise-2014-2?​IR=​T> accessed 06 January 2019.
 
68
Alexander Roth, ‘Was ist eigentlich Consumerization of IT?’ PCWelt (Online, 13 September 2014) <https://​www.​pcwelt.​de/​ratgeber/​Business-privates-Was-ist-eigentlich-Consumerization-of-IT-6069567.​html> accessed 06 January 2019.
 
Metadaten
Titel
Salient Features of the ICT Sector
verfasst von
Kalpana Tyagi
Copyright-Jahr
2019
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58784-3_3