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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

SCA-Resistance for AES: How Cheap Can We Go?

verfasst von : Ricardo Chaves, Łukasz Chmielewski, Francesco Regazzoni, Lejla Batina

Erschienen in: Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2018

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This paper introduces a novel AES structure capable of improving the robustness against power analysis attacks while allowing for a very compact structure with a potentially negligible area and performance impact. The proposed design is based on a low entropy masking scheme, where half of the time the true value and half of the time the complemented value are used to mask the power consumption variation. The obtained experimental results suggest that the area overhead for the protection against power analysis is as low as 5% LUT increase with a performance degradation of about 10%. When compared with the state of the art supported on FPGAs, efficiency improvements above 6 times and a throughput improvement of at least two times higher are achieved.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Improved Related-Tweakey Boomerang Attacks on Deoxys-BC

Nächstes Kapitel Cryptanalysis of 1-Round KECCAK

We can notice that the strongest leakage for the unprotected implementation happens slightly later than for the protected one, but we do not have an explanation of this situation.

http://www.riscure.com/.

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Titel: SCA-Resistance for AES: How Cheap Can We Go?
verfasst von: Ricardo Chaves
Łukasz Chmielewski
Francesco Regazzoni
Lejla Batina
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2018
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-89338-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-89339-6

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89339-6_7

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