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15.01.2022

Science, Technology and Institutional Change in Knowledge Production: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Framework

verfasst von: Ozgur Aydogmus, Erkan Gürpinar

Erschienen in: Dynamic Games and Applications

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Abstract

We model the interaction between science and technology using an evolutionary game theoretic framework. Conflictual rather than synergistic relation between science and technology is assumed, in which they rely on openness and secrecy as alternative behavioral norms. We argue that science-driven technology and intellectual property extension to basic science blur the distinction between openness and secrecy, which result in competition and tension between them. We first discuss why two-player static games are insufficient to model the interaction between science and technology. Then, we show that there are different dynamical outcomes in multiplayer settings, including coexistence in which both of these strategies survive. Finally, we discuss how the stable equilibria of the evolutionary game are related to the codification of knowledge, and intellectual property rights policies that affect the balance between open culture and exclusive control rights.

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1
Note that when both agents choose withhold, each agent may yield net benefits greater than or equal to 0. The net benefit is proportional to the amount of the knowledge leakage between agents. Yet, this amount is assumed to be sufficiently small; hence, we take \(f_0=0\) as in [54]
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Science, Technology and Institutional Change in Knowledge Production: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Framework
verfasst von
Ozgur Aydogmus
Erkan Gürpinar
Publikationsdatum
15.01.2022
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Dynamic Games and Applications
Print ISSN: 2153-0785
Elektronische ISSN: 2153-0793
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-021-00416-w

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