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2020 | Buch

Security and Defence in Europe


Über dieses Buch

This book argues that security and defense have never been true priorities in the European Union, and have constantly been marginalized by the elites since the Soviet Union collapsed and the Warsaw Pact disintegrated. Despite the official rhetoric, only a few tangible results can be presented concerning the operational readiness of European forces, and the EU’s inability to act was proven during the crises in the Balkans, NATO has experienced similar problems, as the majority of its members are EU countries. Both organizations have declared their resolve concerning the security and defense of their nations and territories, but, unfortunately, little has been done to lend these statements credence.

In this context, the book analyzes several aspects of EU security and defense, including: the EU – NATO relationship, common defense policy and strategy, common capability building, common understanding of strategic changes, common operational planning and centrally synchronized exercises based on operational planning, etc. The member states have helped to make EU/NATO effective organizations, but unfortunately their individual interests and priorities constitute real challenges. This aspect should be discussed and addressed by political and military elites, scholars, analysts, students and the general public alike.



Security Issues

Three Energy Streams of Security Culture – A Theoretical Research Model in Security Sciences
The chapter presents the theoretical framework of the transdisciplinary and multidisciplinary model by the name of security culture; a model which may be helpful in conducting research within the discipline of security sciences. The security culture model comprises non-military and military factors that provide people with the opportunity to raise security, both on an individual and a collective scale. The concept of security culture constitutes, among others, the scientific axis of a Polish academic journal Kultura Bezpieczeństwa. Nauka – Praktyka – Refleksje [Security Culture. Science – Practice – Review]. The security culture model, as presented in the journal, bases on the concept of the influence exerted on reality by three energy streams of security culture. These streams include: the mental-spiritual stream, the stream of organizational and legal interactions (split into multiple ‘beams’), and the stream of energy related to the material reality, that represents the physical design of social reality.
Juliusz Piwowarski
The EU Defence Against a New Type of Threat: Corruption. The Norwegian Legal Responses an Example to Be Followed
The oil industry is a key element in the Norwegian economy, and is also one of the sectors most vulnerable to corruption. Nevertheless, Norway is among the world’s least corrupt countries. This paper attempts to identify the causes of this phenomenon by analysing Norwegian criminal legislation and case law from the most recent bribery cases in Norway and abroad, that the author, being Spanish, wants to take as a model. The conclusion is that the differences between the countries lie not so much in the responses of the respective criminal law systems to the phenomenon of corruption, which do not present major differences, but rather in the willingness to prosecute, the effectiveness of the systems of control and accountability, the ease of access to information, and levels of financial transparency. Reducing the regulatory and bureaucratic complexity of administrative contracting procedures and establishing regulations outside the criminal law framework, such as company guidelines that set the tone for what is and is not “undue profit”, are proposed as ways of combating corruption. Ultimately, the solution lies in the ethical and political commitment of a particular country, and goes hand in hand with a culture of integrity.
Pilar Otero
European Cybersecurity: Future Challenges from a Human Rights Perspective
This article briefly analyzes what challenges lay ahead for European cybersecurity policies and strategies, particularly referring to Human Rights application and development.
Luis A. García Segura
The Refugees Issue in the frame of the European Security: A Realistic Approach
A series of considerations on the refugee crisis in Europe are offered in order to find more pragmatic and sensible solutions. Without loosing, as a main idea, the humanitarian duties we all have in front of people in difficult situations and in troubles, a global problem like this one cannot be solved without a minimum control and an adequate immigration policy. Keeping in mind the following considerations as priorities, including: not eluding the distinction between refugees and migrants, keeping them as close as possible to their home countries, and helping in the stabilisation and development of their own states, which is the best way to prevent massive displacements. Integrating over 1 m of displaced people should not undermine civilizational roots of the host countries. And, last but not least, we cannot close our eyes to a series of security challenges faced by Europe, such as a higher level of delinquency, drug addiction, people-smugglers, or infiltration of terrorists.
J. Martín Ramírez
The Meta-Tragedy of the Commons. Climate Change and the Securitization of the Arctic Region
The object of this paper is to analyze the current race for the securitization of the Arctic region. This situation is presented as a case of meta-tragedy of the Commons, as it embodies a tragedy within another tragedy. Or, in other terms, the international race for the vast resources of the Arctic is serving as an obstacle to achieve a broad consensus to tackle down the unusually devastating impact of the global warming phenomenon on that fragile, distant but globally essential ecosystem. Due to the complexity of the Arctic scenario, the preference for intergovernmental fora and the ambiguous interests and roles of its players, the inadequate trinomial between an ecological global tragedy, an economic individual business and a collective security race will tend to subsist and to increase its tragic effects over the environment.
Pablo A. Mazurier, Juan José Delgado-Morán, Claudio A. Payá-Santos

Defence Aspects of European Union

From the European Defence Community to Permanent Structured Cooperation
The steps taken last year to establish the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) may remind us of the efforts made by several countries after the Second World War to build a European Defence Community (EDC). Here I assess the measures taken by London, Paris, Brussels, Bonn and Washington, and recall the wars of Indochina and Korea. Though widely considered a failure, the EDC project in fact led to the foundation of a new institution, the Western European Union (WEU), which has complemented NATO’s objectives for many years.
Javier Jiménez-Ugarte
The Permanent Structured Cooperation in the European Union. Its Real Potential Value
For about more than a decade, the European Union (EU) has been dealing with particular dedication with security and defense issues. In particular, these issues have become increasingly relevant since the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The Treaty of Lisbon, which was ratified in 2009, established the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) as successor to the ESDP and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), whose particularities and potential will be the main object of this work.
The gestation of the PESCO has taken nine years, and until 2016 the advances had been constant but moderate. That year all change, the process accelerated, and on December 11th, 2017 no less than 25 countries of the Union have signed their participation in it. What happened in 2016 to motivate the impulse received by PESCO?
In short, PESCO has not focused on aspects of operational commitment but on military capabilities and on achieving further development of the defense industry of the countries of the European Union. For all this, the signatory countries have committed themselves to increase their defense budgets and to participate cooperatively in joint weapons programs.
In this context, the Permanent Structured Cooperation and the commitments it implies for its members are perhaps the best way not only to reinforce and technologically update the military capabilities of the countries of the EU and to develop their defense industries, but also to contribute to give new impetus to the process of political integration by favoring employment and the interrelation of its citizens. And not only will these be the benefits of the PESCO, which would be more than sufficient reason for its creation, but it will also contribute very substantially to strengthening the capabilities of NATO, of which most of the countries of the Union are a part, and on which the defense of our continent depends at the moment.
Eduardo Zamarripa
Untangling the Separate Concepts of Security and Defence in the Context of Brexit
Brexit process is so dynamic, that until the very last moment nobody can be sure on what terms - and if at all – shall this EU-UK divorce be concluded. Hence, at this stage all the analysis on the subject, what form shall or should take after Brexit the currently functioning concepts of security and defence, should rather be treated as an intellectual exercise. The issue of untangling these separate concepts is equation with plethora unknowns and variables. Different perspective on security and defence comes largely out of different view on the scale of threats and potential benefits specific only for a given country. Each EU member state has its own interests and those interests will be the iceberg over which will the attempts to consolidate the concepts would crash. The result of the ongoing negotiation process, and in consequence synchronization and later merging the separate concepts of security and defence, will be an outcome of careful and multidimensional analysis and a compilation of time, arduous talks and butterfly effect and will not show itself in its full scale even after 29th March 2019. It refers even to such matters as new lingua franca within the possible new community in which English would be no longer the mother tongue of any of its member state’s nation. And that can change much more than we can imagine.
Jacek Ochman
Why Nations Fail. The Relevance of Stability and Culture for European and Global Security
Failed nations and border instability are two clear threats to European and global security. This chapter analyzes the multiple causes that produce the failure of a country or a government, with special emphasis on cultural and narrative aspects, usually disregarded. In any event, it is a complex phenomenon that cannot be simplistically reduced to a single reason or cause, as is sometimes done by the academic literature. Nor is it so clear what can be understood as a “failure” at this stage. The paper also argues that the time has come to close the map of the world, putting a limit on the creation of new nations. There are different reasons: firstly, they can become new failed states; secondly, the survival of multicultural states must be encouraged, without falling into the temptation of breaking the already existing borders; thirdly, it is necessary to rationalize and stabilize the functioning of the world, favoring supranational organizations and rethinking the existence of small nations, which can only survive as tax havens or serve as a covert colony of other larger countries.
Alberto J. Gil Ibáñez
The Future of Security and Defense of Europe. EU vis-a-vis NPT, CTBT, and Ban Treaty
The following short review of international developments has the intention to clarify the role of the EU on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and ultimate goal of “World Free from Nuclear Weapons”:
European Union is a complex non-coherent group of countries, as far as the nuclear capabilities and nuclear policies/diplomacy of its member states, are concerned. The following factual information shed lights on the status quo:
  • Two members, the United Kingdom (UK) and France, at least till full realization of Brexit, are nuclear weapon states parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT){12} and permanent members of United Nations (UN) Security Council. They are exempted from any safeguards inspection of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and EURATOM, which are applied to other members of the European Union (EU).
  • Nuclear weapons are part of the national security strategies of UK and France, and the modernization of nuclear weapons is a main part of their nuclear doctrine.
  • The genuine calls upon UK and France in the context of national policies of the EU Non- nuclear weapon State parties to the NPT, usually echoed in international arena, have been mostly disregarded.
  • The perseverance of France and UK on the modernization of its nuclear arsenal, billion -pound investment of Trident, assumed required future nuclear tests, are in full contravention with the CTBT. Therefore, the EU declared position supporting the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO 2018) is in question.
  • Among the EU members, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Germany have the deployed nuclear weapons of the United States on their territories, in contravention with article I and II of the NPT.
  • Not all members of the EU are party to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The harsh public criticism of EU members of NATO by the current US Government leaves no doubt of more US aggressive security policies vis-à-vis EU.
  • The Extended Deterrence Strategy of NATO and United States (USA) contradicts the obligations of EU members and USA under articles I and II of the NPT.
  • The Permanent Strategic Cooperation (PESCO) as well as recent EU attempts to establish a Security and Defense Union, in the context of Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), parallel to NATO, is a new important development but it is not yet clear how effective the assumed independent function might be.
  • All EU members except Austria and Ireland boycotted the negotiation on and voting against the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) {11}, so called Ban Treaty.
  • Some members are very active in nuclear fuel cycle, including vast uses ofnuclear power plants, such as France, which is at one extreme side, and Austria, banning nuclear activities, even for peaceful purposes, which is at the other extreme side of the EU.
A. A. Soltanieh

Outer Borders of Europe

Security in the Northern European Flank
Security in the European northern flank has always been about balancing different sets of demands set by powerful actors. The current environment stems from Russian actions in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine. These, in turn, are (mostly) rooted in problematic confrontational relations between Russia and the US and NATO. Another set of challenges stem from the vulnerabilities of modern societies, as well as risks to the Baltic Sea environment, China’s interest in the Arctic, nuclear weapons in the near neighbourhood, the weaknesses of the EU’s common defence, and NATO’s role in the region. A number of activities are being carried out to meet these challenges, varying from traditional multilateral, trilateral and bilateral initiatives (the list is long) to grass-root level activities by officials, non-government organizations and academia.
The complexity of the challenges necessitates a comprehensive understanding for planning successful responses. NATO and the EU have taken steps in the right direction in attempting to promote science’s role in decision-making. Yet, more needs to be done, so that security-political understanding, and planning, is based on scientific knowledge. The Nordic countries are in a position to lead by example.
Katariina Simonen
How Can Europe Cope with Challenges and Risks at Its Southern Flank?
Southern Europeans are concerned with terrorism and migration coming from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) where the population growth has far outstripped that of Europe.
The MENA region has witnessed a rise in jihadist extremism and radicalization causing a series of deadly terrorist attacks in Europe. Meanwhile, Europe has also to deal with the return of its foreign fighters formerly belonging to the now disbanding Islamic State.
During the Summit of the Southern Europian Union (EU) countries in Rome in January 2018, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain requested the EU to protect its Southern borders while redoubling the fight against human trafficking and new forms of slavery.
Over the last three years, the significant migration and refugee crisis has seen Greece and Italy as the major arrival and transit points: that is causing a heavy burden for both countries which Europe needs to relieve.
The EU should be mindful of an excessive securitization of its migration policy and instead complement such measures with a wider reform of the EU’s asylum and immigration systems, to allow for regular and legal migration channels into Europe.
The EU must also help the MENA countries to find a path to peace and development. The EU is currently perceived both as the home of former colonial masters and as the greatest supporter of free trade and liberal democracy. It is now high time for Europe to definitely drop the colonial legacy and appear and act as a reliable promoter of freedom and civilization.
Giorgio Spagnol
Maritime Dimension in the Fight Against Illegal Migration on the Western Mediterranean Route
The Morocco-Spain route has been a widely used migratory route for many years. This route is called the Western Mediterranean route and since 2017, has experienced and increase in the migration flows and illegal trafficking of humans throughout Europe.
The aim of this chapter is to show an analysis of the migratory flows which arrive by sea in Spain. It focuses on the illegal migration, the human trafficking and the different maritime operations that are being carried out in the fight against this problem as well as on the importance of multidimensional cooperation in order to cope with this challenge.
Marta Fernandez-Sebastian
Eastern Flank of EU and NATO – Challenge and Opportunity
The Eastern Flank (EF) is a widely understood space occupied by states located on the most eastern end of the EU and NATO, which consists of: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. On the other side of the border there are Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. The EF states and their neighbors are the object and at the same time the subject of conflicting political concepts to define the present and future of Europe. The economy of EF countries is classified as emerging or developed, and shows an upward trend at the level of 2.4% (Lithuania) to 5.1% (Poland) per year. The sense of security risk forced the governments of the EF countries to be interested in defense, because so far this field was marginalized. Shock caused by annexation of Crimea by Russia and its armed interference in Donbas in Ukraine, as well as a long time of fruitless discussions on the NATO and EU forum made the governments of EF aware that the credible defense starts at home.
Jerzy Biziewski


Russia’s A2/AD Policy as a Balancing Strategy vs NATO Enlargement
In 1995, the Atlantic Alliance published a highly controversial report that foresaw future NATO enlargements in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO opened its doors to former Soviet Union’s allies. At that moment, Russia suspended all its cooperation with the alliance, and Moscow adopted a revisionist and aggressive security policy towards NATO. Step by step and little by little, the Kremlin initiated a reconfiguration of its security doctrine with the aim of dismantling the advantage achieved by NATO through its different enlargements (1999, 2004, 2009 and 2017). The most significant measure undertook by Russia has been the launching of an anti-access anti-denial (A2/AD) strategy based on the establishment of five main defensive enclaves: Kaliningrad, Saint Petersburg, South Ossetia/Abkhazia (Georgia), Crimea and Tartus (Syria). Using long-rate anti air, anti-shipping and surface-to-surface missiles Russia has overshadowed the strategic advantage obtained by NATO with aforementioned enlargements. Thus, this chapter will analyze the past, the present and overall the future of the Russia-NATO relationship.
Alberto Priego
NATO-EU Cooperation
Milestones and Challenges Ahead
In June 1996, NATO member nations attending the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in session of Foreign Affairs Ministers agreed that the Western European Union (WEU) would oversee the creation of the European Security Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO structures. When the role of the WEU was incorporated in the EU a new approach was taken for cooperation with the Declaration on a European Security and Defense Policy (ESPD) that defined NATO-EU relations as a strategic partnership. On 16 December 2002, the “Berlin Plus” arrangements were signed and they strengthened cooperation between the two organizations, allowing EU led operations to make use of NATO assets and capabilities. They also provided a formal framework for NATO-EU joint missions. To date, the EU has conducted two operations with support of NATO. The first one was called EUFOR Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and was finished in 2003. Since 2004, the second operation under the Berlin Plus arrangements is EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Althea has the aim to implement the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and to maintain a safe and secure environment. As a result of political barriers the cooperation within Berlin Plus arrangements was suspended. Nevertheless, the informal cooperation between NATO and the EU since then has been constructive and beneficial.
The 8th of July of 2016, the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of NATO signed in Warsaw a Joint Declaration, first of its kind, that marks the importance of furthering strengthening of the EU-NATO cooperation. Common set of proposals on the implementation of the Joint were established on December 6th 2016 and on December 5th 2017. Three progress reports on the implementation of the two common set of proposals has been published, the latest the 8th of July 2018. In this report it is stated: “The two organizations continue to face common security challenges: this only reinforces the need for further strengthening cooperation.” Further cooperation will be advantageous for both organizations and as the Secretary General of NATO mentioned in his lecture in the CESEDEN (Defense College, Madrid) on the 25th of January 2018, “it has the potential to be a win-win for the EU, for NATO and for the transatlantic relationship. But to realize this potential, we need coherence between NATO and EU efforts on capability development. Nations should not be presented with conflicting requirements and priorities… We cannot have two sets of forces, one for NATO and one for the EU”.
Federico Yaniz
EU-NATO Relations: Between Necessity and Strategic Uncertainty
Although relations between the European Union and NATO are not new, they began almost two decades ago, their scarce practical actions and their more informal than formal qualities have caused them to go quite unnoticed until now. Therefore, in this current situation, in which Europe finds itself between the need to reinforce security guarantees as a consequence of the growing range of challenges it must face and the uncertainty deriving from the crumbling –or at least deep transformation- of the structures that had characterized the liberal order since the end of the Second World War and, even more so if possible, since the Cold War, structures in which the Atlantic Alliance must be included as well as the transatlantic relations as a whole. Hence, the analysis of what is to be expected in the future of relations between the EU and NATO seems to be more appropriate than ever A future that, despite the renewed efforts that have been made since 2016, does not seem very promising at least until the political resolve appears that has been lacking until now and that has been converted in the lack of financing and human resources that are needed for calls of cooperation to be translated into effective actions.
A future that, despite the renewed efforts that have been made since 2016, does not seem very promising at least until the political resolve appears that has been lacking until now and that has been converted in the lack of financing and human resources that are needed for calls of cooperation to be translated into effective actions.
Gracia Abad-Quintanal
Rough Times Ahead for NATO
There are three structural reasons that have not much to do with the person of Donald Trump that explain why NATO will have hard times to survive. First, alliances only make sense in times of war. Against all odds and against what Realists had predicted, NATO remained into existence after the Cold War. This is an anomaly in international politics that in all likelihood will end in the demise of NATO. Second, the major factor of change in international politics in general, according to Realists, is the shifting balance of power between the major powers in the world. These days, the most important shift is the rise of China and the relative decline of the US, especially economically. This change has implications for foreign policy. The odds are that China will become more assertive, first in the region and thereafter maybe globally. US foreign policy will probably become more isolationist, which has immediate repercussions for US allies. US allies - including NATO allies - will be left more on their own. Third, European defense integration does not stand still, on the contrary. It can become a serious alternative for NATO.
Tom Sauer
Security and Defence in Europe
herausgegeben von
J. Martín Ramírez
Dr. Jerzy Biziewski
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