Security, Economics and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Morality

Keeping or Surrendering the Bomb

verfasst von: Liang Tuang Nah

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Buchreihe : New Security Challenges

Enthalten in: Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" , Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Über dieses Buch

This book seeks to elucidate the decisions of states that have chosen to acquire nuclear arms or inherited nuclear arsenals, and have either disarmed or elected to retain their warheads. It examines nuclear arms policy via an interconnected framework involving the eclectic use of national security based realism, economic interdependence liberalism, and nuclear weapons norms or morality based constructivism. Through the various chapters examining the nuclear munitions decisions of South Africa, Ukraine and North Korea, a case is built that a state’s leadership decides whether to keep or give up “the Bomb” based on interlinked security, economic and norms governed motivations. Thereafter, frameworks evaluating the likelihood of nuclear proliferation and accessing the feasibility of disarmament are then applied to North Korea and used to examine recent Iranian nuclear negotiability. This book is an invaluable resource for international relations and security studies scholars, WMD analysts and post graduate or undergraduate candidates focusing on nuclear arms politics related courses

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Chapter 1. Introduction

Abstract

This chapter provides an outline of what this book intends to accomplish, including brief descriptions of each chapter’s objectives and arguments. It states that national security–based realism, economic interdependence–based liberalism and nuclear proliferation–based moral and social constructivism work together in an interconnected framework to account for nuclear arms acquisition/retention as well as full or attempted nuclear disarmament decisions of Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Ukraine and North Korea. Additionally, the framework also applies to the nuclear policy of Iran.

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Chapter 2. Theories, Conceptual Model, Initial Case Analysis and Excluded Considerations

Abstract

Chapter 2 will explain the theories used, flesh out the eclectic realist–liberalist–constructivist conceptual model mentioned in Chap. 1, validate the earlier mentioned nation state case studies chosen for analysis and clarify any exclusions in this book’s research (e.g. why certain case studies or proliferation causational routes are not considered).

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Chapter 3. South Africa as a Classic Nuclear Armament and Disarmament Exemplar

Abstract

This chapter will examine the strongest case for endogenous nuclear disarmament, South Africa, by establishing the historical background of the South African nuclear weapons programme, analysing the strategic impetus and decisional frameworks promoting nuclear weapons development and explaining the security-based realist, economic liberalist and social constructivist reasons for President de Klerk to decommission the clandestine nuclear arms programme in 1989. Hence, this chapter should provide a pre- and post-disarmament examination of the motivations driving South African nuclear arms policy along with relevant evidence buttressing the aforementioned tripartite theory framework.

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Chapter 4. Fiercely Negotiated Ukrainian Nuclear Disarmament

Abstract

Turning to Ukraine, this chapter will cover analysis considering realist, liberalist and constructivist factors in the debates between those supporting nuclear disarmament and those who advocated the retention of nuclear arms, and elaborate on what the leadership in Kiev successfully obtained through negotiations, to satisfy the security-based realist and economics-based liberalist requirements of the Ukrainian parliament such that it would approve total disarmament. As with the chapter on South Africa, content substantiating this book’s tripartite theory framework will be provided.

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Chapter 5. Contentious North Korean Disarmament Prospects

Abstract

This chapter examines the final principal case, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). As with Chaps. 3 and 4, the realist, economic liberalist and social constructivist reasons paving the road to atomic arms development, from the Korean War to the twenty-first century, will be discussed. Thereafter, North Korea’s role as a split-outcome disarmament/rearmament case will surface as the realist, liberalist economic interdependence and social constructivist factors behind the steps towards nuclear disarmament during the 2007–2008 period will be explored. After deconstructing the nuclear armaments policy decisions made by Pyongyang, explanatory models supporting both arms building and nascent arms decommissioning, using the trilateral theoretical framework, will be derived.

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Chapter 6. Policy Relevant Tripartite Theory Nuclear Policy Models and Their Application to North Korea

Abstract

This chapter will consolidate all the findings of the South African, Ukrainian and North Korean exemplars to identify common and unifying frameworks accounting for nuclear arms development/retention and disarmament/relinquishment. To validate the arms development model, it will be used to evaluate contemporary realities concerning the North Korean nuclear munitions programme in order to assess how entrenched the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) nuclear weapons building efforts really are. Thereafter, factoring in disarmament intransigence or resistance on Pyongyang’s part, disarmament model efficacy will be tested by using it to formulate a disarmament-based strategy or approach that can best address the Kim regime’s realist, liberalist and constructivist concerns, leading to negotiative progress regarding Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programme that facilitates regional stability.

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Chapter 7. Conclusion: Can the Tri-theoretic Models Explain the Iranian Case?

Abstract

Lastly, this chapter deconstructs the case of Iran where the relinquishment of most of Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities as part of a deal that Tehran signed with the West in July 2015 will be used as a contemporary test case supporting the realist–liberalist–constructivist framework accounting for nuclear non-proliferation policy, even as Tehran has yet to build any nuclear warheads.

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Backmatter

Titel: Security, Economics and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Morality
verfasst von: Liang Tuang Nah
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-62253-8
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-62252-1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62253-8