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Über dieses Buch

This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-workshop proceedings of the 24 th International Workshop on Securit Protocols, held in Brno, Czech Republic, in April 2016.

The 13 thoroughly revised papers presented together with the respective transcripts of discussions have been carefully reviewed. The theme of the workshop was Evolving Security - considering that security protocols evolve with their changing requirements, their changing mechanisms and attackers' changing agendas and capabilities.



Invisible Security

In the last decades, digital security has gone through many theoretical breakthroughs, practical developments, worldwide deployments and subtle flaws in a continuous loop. It is mainly understood as a property of a technical system, which is eventually built as a tangible piece of technology for common people to use. It has therefore been assessed in terms of its correctness because it may easily go wrong, of its usability because it may be difficult to interact with, and of its economics because it may be inconvenient to deploy, maintain or re-deploy.
In line with the theme “Evolving Security” of this year’s Security Protocols Workshop, our view is that the shape of security as outlined above is in fact getting more and more multifaceted as we write. It was at the same event last year when we depicted an additional facet of security that is its being beautiful [1], namely inherently desirable for its users. Here, we further observe that security should be invisible in the sense that the user’s perceived burden of complying with it be negligible. Through a few past, present and (advocated) future examples, this position paper supports invisibility as yet another desirable facet of security.
Giampaolo Bella, Bruce Christianson, Luca Viganò

Invisible Security (Transcript of Discussion)

I’m presenting joint work with Luca Viganò and Bruce, and it’s all going to be about what I like to call invisible security.
Giampaolo Bella

Man-in-the-Middle Attacks Evolved... but Our Security Models Didn’t

The security community seems to be thoroughly familiar with man-in-the-middle attacks. However, the common perception of this type of attack is outdated. It originates from when network connections were fixed, not mobile, before 24/7 connectivity became ubiquitous. The common perception of this attack stems from an era before the vulnerability of the protocol’s context was realised. Thanks to revelations by Snowden and by currently available man-in-the-middle tools focused on protocol meta-data (such as so-called “Stingrays” for cellphones), this view is no longer tenable. Security protocols that only protect the contents of their messages are insufficient. Contemporary security protocols must also take steps to protect their context: who is talking to whom, where is the sender located, etc.
In short: the attacker has evolved. It’s high time for our security models and requirements to catch up.
Hugo Jonker, Sjouke Mauw, Rolando Trujillo-Rasua

Man-in-the-Middle Attacks Evolved... but Our Security Models Didn’t (Transcript of Discussion)

Hi everyone. My name is Hugo Jonker. I’m from the Open University in the Netherlands.
Hugo Jonker

The Price of Belief: Insuring Credible Trust?

Today, the majority of distributed system users are not systems programmers, nor do they aspire to be. The problem with existing access control mechanisms is not that they don’t work, it is that users despise them and will not interact with them in the way the security model requires. We argue that this is not primarily a user-education issue; instead the user interface needs to be re-factored in a way that will involve a radical change to the way security is modelled.
Paul Wernick, Bruce Christianson

The Price of Belief: Insuring Credible Trust? (Transcript of Discussion)

I’m going to endorse several of the things other people have already said.
Bruce Christianson

Defending Against Evolving DDoS Attacks: A Case Study Using Link Flooding Incidents

Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks are constantly evolving. Over the last few years, we have observed increasing evidence of attack evolution in multiple dimensions (e.g., attack goals, capabilities, and strategies) and wide-ranging timescales; e.g., from seconds to months. In this paper, we discuss the recent evolution of DDoS attacks and challenges of countering them. In particular, we focus on the evolution one of the most insidious DDoS attacks, namely link-flooding attacks, as a case study. To address the challenges posed by these attacks, we propose a two-tier defense that can be effectively implemented using emerging network technologies. The first tier is based on a deterrence mechanism whereas the second requires inter-ISP collaboration.
Min Suk Kang, Virgil D. Gligor, Vyas Sekar

Defending Against Evolving DDoS Attacks: A Case Study Using Link Flooding Incidents (Transcript of Discussion)

In this presentation I’ll talk about the evolution of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks and, of course, the evolution of the adversary who launches them, and finally how to defend against them.
Virgil D. Gligor

The Evolution of a Security Control

The evolution of security defenses in a contemporary open-source software package is considered over a twelve year period. A qualitative analysis style study is conducted that systematically analyzes security advisories, codebase revisions and related discussions. A number of phenomena emerge from this analysis that provide insights into the process of managing code-level security defenses.
Olgierd Pieczul, Simon N. Foley

The Evolution of a Security Control or Why Do We Need More Qualitative Research of Software Vulnerabilties? (Transcript of Discussion)

Hi, my name is Olgierd Pieczul and this is a joint work with Simon Foley. Inspired by the theme of today’s workshop we decided to look at evolution of security controls and vulnerabilities.
Olgierd Pieczul, Simon N. Foley

Novel Security and Privacy Perspectives of Camera Fingerprints

Camera fingerprinting is a technology established in the signal processing community for image forensics. We explore its novel security and privacy perspectives that have been so far largely ignored, including its applications in privacy intrusion, in handling new socio-technical problems such as revenge porn, and in building a novel authentication mechanism – any photo you take are you.
Jeff Yan

Novel Security and Privacy Perspectives of Camera Fingerprints (Transcript of Discussion)

I will talk about three very simple ideas about camera fingerprints. I didn’t have time to put all the details in my slides, so please feel free to ask for any clarification or any question anytime. I didn’t realize until it was too late that my laptop charger didn’t work, and Ross came to my rescue just a while ago. I borrowed his charger and did some quick-hack slides.
Jeff Yan

Exploiting Autocorrect to Attack Privacy

Text prediction algorithms present in many devices use machine learning to help a user type but they also present the opportunity to leak information about the user. This raises privacy and security concerns for users that are trying to remain anonymous. We present an attack inspired by IND–CPA to demonstrate how autocorrect could be used to identify a user. We show that, with prior knowledge of the user, they could be identified with as little as 512 kB of written text with a probability of 95%.
Brian J. Kidney, Jonathan Anderson

Exploiting Autocorrect to Attack Privacy (Transcript of Discussion)

So motivation here: Ms. X contacts a journalist with some classified information, a classic whistle blower.
Brian J. Kidney

SMAPs: Short Message Authentication Protocols

There is a long history of authentication protocols designed for ease of human use, which rely on users copying a short string of digits. Historical examples include telex test keys and early nuclear firing codes; familiar modern examples include prepayment meter codes and the 3-digit card verification values used in online shopping. In this paper, we show how security protocols that are designed for human readability and interaction can fail to provide adequate protection against simple attacks. To illustrate the problem, we discuss an offline payment protocol and explain various problems. We work through multiple iterations, or ‘evolutions’, of the protocol in order to get better tradeoffs between security and usability. We discuss the limitation of verifying such protocols using BAN logic. Our aim is to develop usable human-friendly protocols that can be used in constrained offline environments. We conclude that protocol designers need to be good curators of security state, and also pay attention to the interaction between online and offline functions. In fact, we suggest that delay-tolerant networking might be a future direction of evolution for protocol research.
Khaled Baqer, Johann Bezuidenhoudt, Ross Anderson, Markus Kuhn

SMAPs: Short Message Authentication Protocols (Transcript of Discussion)

What I’d like to do first is to highlight the background and motivation for the payment project that we’re working on at Cambridge.
Khaled Baqer, Ross Anderson

Explicit Delegation Using Configurable Cookies

Password sharing is widely used as a means of delegating access, but it is open to abuse and relies heavily on trust in the person being delegated to. We present a protocol for delegating access to websites as a natural extension to the Pico protocol. Through this we explore the potential characteristics of delegation mechanisms and how they interact. We conclude that security for the delegator against misbehaviour of the delegatee can only be achieved with the cooperation of the entity offering the service being delegated. To achieve this in our protocol we propose configurable cookies that capture delegated permissions.
David Llewellyn-Jones, Graeme Jenkinson, Frank Stajano

Explicit Delegation Using Configurable Cookies (Transcript of Discussion)

This is really just very preliminary research around delegation, and in the context of the Pico Project it’s all about replacing passwords.
David Llewellyn-Jones

Red Button and Yellow Button: Usable Security for Lost Security Tokens

Currently, losing a security token places the user in a dilemma: reporting the loss as soon as it is discovered involves a significant burden which is usually overkill in the common case that the token is later found behind a sofa. Not reporting the loss, on the other hand, puts the security of the protected account at risk and potentially leaves the user liable.
We propose a simple architectural solution with wide applicability that allows the user to reap the security benefit of reporting the loss early, but without paying the corresponding usability penalty if the event was later discovered to be a false alarm.
Ian Goldberg, Graeme Jenkinson, David Llewellyn-Jones, Frank Stajano

Red Button and Yellow Button: Usable Security for Lost Security Tokens (Transcript of Discussion)

My name is Frank Stajano and, with my colleagues Ian Goldberg, Graeme Jenkinson, David Llewellyn-Jones, I’m going to speak about something we originally thought of last year. Ian Goldberg is a cryptographer and privacy specialist at the University of Waterloo in Canada.
Frank Stajano

Detecting Failed Attacks on Human-Interactive Security Protocols

One of the main challenges in pervasive computing is how we can establish secure communication over an untrusted high-bandwidth network without any initial knowledge or a Public Key Infrastructure. An approach studied by a number of researchers is building security though involving humans in a low-bandwidth “empirical” out-of-band channel where the transmitted information is authentic and cannot be faked or modified. A survey of such protocols can be found in [9]. Many protocols discussed there achieve the optimal amount of authentication for a given amount of human work. However it might still be attractive to attack them if a failed attack might be misdiagnosed as a communication failure and therefore remain undetected. In this paper we show how to transform protocols of this type to make such misdiagnosis essentially impossible. We introduce the concept of auditing a failed protocol run and show how to enable this.
A. W. Roscoe

Detecting Failed Attacks on Human-Interactive Security Protocols (Transcript of Discussion)

This talk is about is detecting failed attacks, in other words, how to let protocols evolve, or how to evolve protocols so that at least in the particular class of protocol, if somebody does try to attack it, there’s a very good chance you’ll be able to detect this attack has happened, rather than perhaps suppose it was some innocent communications glitch.
A. W. Roscoe

Malicious Clients in Distributed Secret Sharing Based Storage Networks

Multi-cloud storage is a viable alternative to traditional storage solutions. Recent approaches realize safe and secure solutions by combining secret-sharing with Byzantine fault-tolerant distribution schemes into safe and secure storage systems protecting a user against arbitrarily misbehaving storage servers.
In the case of cross-company projects with many involved clients it further becomes vital to also protect the storage system and honest users from malicious clients that are trying to cause inconsistencies in the system. So far, this problem has not been considered in the literature. In this paper, we detail the problems arising from a combination of secret sharing with Byzantine fault-tolerance in the presence of malicious clients, and provide first steps towards a practically feasible solution.
Andreas Happe, Stephan Krenn, Thomas Lorünser

Malicious Clients in Distributed Secret Sharing Based Storage Networks (Transcript of Discussion)

Malicious clients in distributed storage networks. The presentation will be split up into two parts. In the initial part, we’re going to talk about distributed storage networks that use secret-sharing, and in the second part I’m going to introduce malicious clients, their possible attack vectors and how to protect against those attack vectors.
Andreas Happe

Reconsidering Attacker Models in Ad-Hoc Networks

Our paper aims to move the research of secrecy amplification protocols for general ad-hoc networks to more realistic scenarios, conditions and attacker capabilities. Extension of the current attacker models is necessary, including the differentiation based on types of attacker’s manipulation with a node, monitoring capabilities and movement strategies. We also aim to propose suitable secrecy amplification protocols that can reflect the new attacker models in different examined scenarios, utilising genetic programming and manual post-processing.
Radim Ošťádal, Petr Švenda, Vashek Matyáš

Reconsidering Attacker Models in Ad-Hoc Networks (Transcript of Discussion)

Our scenario assumes a network of lightweight communicating nodes. These nodes form an ad-hoc network of devices that are limited with respect to computation power, with respect to storage, and also with respect to the amount/frequency/speed of communication.
Petr Švenda


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