Skip to main content

2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

5. Sequential and Simultaneous Auctions

verfasst von : Asunción Mochón, Yago Sáez

Erschienen in: Understanding Auctions

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

In Chap. 4, we studied the main multi-unit auction models in which identical items are offered in a single auction. However, the seller also has the option of offering multiple items, both homogeneous and heterogeneous, in different auctions. These auctions may be performed at the same time (simultaneous auctions) or one after another (sequential auctions). In this chapter, we will present these two alternatives.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Fußnoten
1
For the auctions to be sequential, the time considered between one auction and the next must be short enough that the bidders do not discount the profits obtained in the previous periods.
 
2
Supporters of sequential auctions claim that they are easy to implement and reduce the risk of collusion.
 
3
In 1981, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) awarded seven satellite communication licenses through ascending sequential auctions.
 
4
Ashenfelter [3] empirically analyzed sequential auctions of wines and art and observed that the final items were auctioned off at lower prices than the first ones.
 
5
The seller could also offer M categories or types of items in M auctions, with a different quantity of items per category. This situation is described later in this chapter.
 
6
This auction model was introduced for the first time in 1994 to award radio spectrum licenses in the USA and Professor Paul Milgrom’s contributions were of major relevance (see [18, 48], or [51]).
 
7
Simultaneous dynamic auctions can have either continuous bidding or discrete bidding (in rounds). In this book we will only focus on those examples in which bidders submit their bids by discrete rounds.
 
8
The seller could also offer M categories or types of items in M auctions, with a different quantity of items per category. This situation is described later in the next section.
 
9
Setting the bid increment is not a trivial decision because it affects the duration of the auction and the bidding strategy. In radio spectrum auctions, the bid increment is often 5 % of the highest standing bid.
 
10
The items would be complements if \(v_{i,1+2} > v_{i,1} + v_{i,2}\), see Chap. 7.
 
11
The seller could have set an activity rule whereby this participant could no longer continue bidding for this item in later rounds.
 
12
Some of these rules are as follows: the payment mechanism, the bid increments, the number of rounds to be performed per day, the information that is made public after each round, etc.
 
13
If the seller includes the withdrawal rule but without a penalty, there might be an incentive for bidders to distort their bids.
 
14
In this example, the seller would obtain an additional revenue equal to the penalty paid by the first bidder for his bid withdrawal.
 
15
The eligibility points per bidder at the beginning of the auction can be calculated based on their financial situation, the market share, or the deposit done.
 
16
In this example we are assuming that bidders must always bid up to 100 % of their EP in order to keep the same eligibility in the next round. Nevertheless this percentage could be lower, at least in the first rounds, thus giving more flexibility to the bidders.
 
Literatur
3.
Zurück zum Zitat O. Ashenfelter. How auctions work for wine and art. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3:23–26, 1989.CrossRef O. Ashenfelter. How auctions work for wine and art. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3:23–26, 1989.CrossRef
18.
Zurück zum Zitat P. Cramton. The fcc spectrum auctions: An early assessment. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 17(3):229–252, 1997. P. Cramton. The fcc spectrum auctions: An early assessment. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 17(3):229–252, 1997.
48.
Zurück zum Zitat R.P. McAfee and J. McMillan. Analyzing the airwaves auction. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10:159–176, 1996.CrossRef R.P. McAfee and J. McMillan. Analyzing the airwaves auction. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10:159–176, 1996.CrossRef
51.
Zurück zum Zitat P. Milgrom. Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction. Journal of Political Economy, 108:245–272, 2000.CrossRef P. Milgrom. Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction. Journal of Political Economy, 108:245–272, 2000.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
Sequential and Simultaneous Auctions
verfasst von
Asunción Mochón
Yago Sáez
Copyright-Jahr
2015
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08813-6_5