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2021 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Shared-Dining: Broadcasting Secret Shares Using Dining-Cryptographers Groups

verfasst von : David Mödinger, Juri Dispan, Franz J. Hauck

Erschienen in: Distributed Applications and Interoperable Systems

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

We introduce a combination of Shamir’s secret sharing and dining-cryptographers networks, which provides \((n-|\text {attackers}|)\)-anonymity for up to \(k-1\) attackers and has manageable performance impact on dissemination. A k-anonymous broadcast can be implemented using a small group of dining cryptographers to first share the message, followed by a flooding phase started by group members. Members have little incentive to forward the message in a timely manner, as forwarding incurs costs, or they may even profit from keeping the message. In worst case, this leaves the true originator as the only sender, rendering the dining-cryptographers phase useless and compromising their privacy. We present a novel approach using a modified dining-cryptographers protocol to distributed shares of an (nk)-Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. All group members broadcast their received share through the network, allowing any recipient of k shares to reconstruct the message, enforcing anonymity. If less than k group members broadcast their shares, the message cannot be decoded thus preventing privacy breaches for the originator. We demonstrate the privacy and performance results in a security analysis and performance evaluation based on a proof-of-concept prototype. Throughput rates between 10 and 100 kB/s are enough for many real applications with high privacy requirements, e.g., financial blockchain system.
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Metadaten
Titel
Shared-Dining: Broadcasting Secret Shares Using Dining-Cryptographers Groups
verfasst von
David Mödinger
Juri Dispan
Franz J. Hauck
Copyright-Jahr
2021
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78198-9_6

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