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Open Access 29.08.2024

Short-run impact of electricity on social capital: evidence from a rural electricity program

verfasst von: Ngawang Dendup, Dil Bahadur Rahut, Yayue Xiao

Erschienen in: Empirical Economics | Ausgabe 1/2025

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Abstract

Der Artikel untersucht die kurzfristigen Auswirkungen der Stromversorgung auf das Sozialkapital im ländlichen Bhutan und konzentriert sich dabei auf Vertrauen, soziale Interaktionen und Engagement. Die Studie stützt sich auf Daten der Bhutan Living Standard Survey von 2012 und ein bivariates Probit-Modell und kommt zu dem Schluss, dass Strom insgesamt keine Auswirkungen auf das Sozialkapital hat, sondern heterogene Auswirkungen aufweist. Weibliche und elektrifizierte Haushalte zeigen positive Wechselwirkungen mit sozialen Interaktionen und Gefühlen der Nähe sowie Vertrauen in Nothilfe und Kreditaufnahme. Die Studie untersucht auch die zugrunde liegenden Mechanismen, wie die Einführung von Elektrogeräten, und schließt mit einer Diskussion über die Relevanz dieser Ergebnisse für politische und entwicklungspolitische Prioritäten.
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1 Introduction

Household access to electricity in developing countries is increasing, partly due to United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 7, namely “affordable and clean energy." According to World Bank (2022), the number of people without access to electricity declined from 1.2 billion in 2010 to 759 million in 2019. In developing countries, electricity enables households to adopt technology for both home production and leisure. Supporting this conventional wisdom, the electricity impact literature suggests that electricity improves female labor participation (Dinkelman 2011; He 2019), contributes to environmental conservation by displacing carbon dioxide emissions (Dendup 2022), reduces household (or indoor) air pollution (Barron and Torero 2017) and increases household income or expenditure (Thomas et al. 2020a). In this study, we examine the impact of electricity on noneconomic outcome social capital, particularly focusing on trust, social interactions and engagement. Whether the provision of electricity is benign or detrimental to social capital is an empirical question, and this is the approach we take in this study.
Social capital is a broad concept that encompasses various aspects of social cohesion. In general, it includes interpersonal relationships such as commitment to associations, network formation, and trust within and between networks (Dasgupta 2005; Putnam 1995). Trust is crucial in enforcing social contracts and overcoming market failures when enforcing such contracts is challenging. Additionally, trust promotes collective action, while networks facilitate the flow of information. However, social capital and interpersonal relationships are susceptible to external shocks. One such external shock in rural communities is electricity provision (and the development of similar infrastructure). In rural developing countries, electricity access enables households to adopt simple technology such as television, radio, and phone. Such technology allows households to consume more media and information. Information that is customarily used to flow through private networks within communities or households may flow through television, radio, and telephones after electrification. Households may also be exposed to media related to crime, robbery, violence, generosity behaviors, government propaganda, etc., which may affect individuals’ perceived level of trust. However, the impact of electricity on social capital will be largely determined by the nature of the information (and related media).
In this study, we examine the impact of electricity on social capital using household-level data from Bhutan. In the context of Bhutan, understanding the impact of electricity on social capital serves as important policy feedback. For approximately the last half century, Bhutan had followed a unique economic development philosophy that is commonly called gross national happiness (GNH), which places a proper balance between economic development, environmental conservation, cultural preservation and good governance. In fact, community vitality is one of the nine domains that defines the economic development philosophy of Bhutan.1 In addition, Bhutan achieved universal electricity coverage in 2015 (Dendup 2022); thus, understanding the impact of electricity on both economic and noneconomic outcomes will help in devising complementary policies and realigning development priorities. Furthermore, Bhutan is situated in the eastern part of the Himalayas and is characterized by a unique mountainous topology with elevations ranging from 200 to 7000 ms above sea level (asl), which has led residents to adopt a peculiar way of living, such as embracing nonmaterialistic ways of life. The overall concept of the GNH economic development policy is closely related to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals; therefore, understanding the impact of electricity on social capital is equally important and relevant in other settings.
We use the 2012 Bhutan Living Standard Survey (BLSS) by leveraging the social capital module to construct outcome variables. For identification, we exploit variation in household electrification status. However, identifying the impact of electricity is challenging, as electricity provision confounds unobservables, including those of political importance (Dendup 2022; Dinkelman 2011). In addition, once electricity arrives in a community, connecting to the grid is also an endogenous household decision. To overcome the issue of endogenous electricity provision, we estimate a bivariate probit model using a plausibly exogenous land gradient as an instrument that affects who receives electricity provision. In mountainous regions with limited plains, such as Bhutan, the cost of expanding electricity provision increases with a gradient (Duflo and Pande 2007; Dendup 2022), which determines who receives electricity provision and access to related infrastructure development programs (Dendup 2022; Dinkelman 2011). Our first-stage results show that the land gradient is correlated with electricity provision.
Our results show that in the short run, the effect of electricity on social capital is not distinguishable from zero. However, we find evidence of the heterogeneous effect of electricity on our measures of social capital. The heterogeneous results suggest that female-headed and electrified households are positively correlated with social interactions and feelings of closeness in the community than the male-headed and unelectrified households. Similarly, a greater share of female and electrified households is positively correlated with social interactions. The heterogeneous results of trust also show that electrified and female-headed households are positively correlated with the trust that others will help during an emergency and in terms of borrowing and lending money. However, the results largely depend on the validity of the land gradient instrument. In observational studies such as ours, it is difficult to exclude the possibility of violation of instrument exogeneity. Hence, we also conduct sensitivity tests on our results, following Conley et al. (2012). The sensitivity test results show that our results remain consistent even under mild deviation from instrument exogeneity. In addition, we use a matching method as the alternative identification strategy to estimate the effect of electricity on social capital; the results are comparable with the bivariate probit results.
We also empirically explore the underlying mechanism to understand why electricity provision has no effect on social capital. The effect of electricity provision on social capital operates through the adoption of technology or the use of basic electrical appliances. We examine whether electricity provision induces households to adopt appliances; our results show that the effect of electricity on the adoption of television, radio, and phones is not distinguishable from zero in the short term. In Bhutan, the majority of rural electrification projects were implemented from 2008 to 2013. During the data collection periods of the 2012 BLSS, it is likely that households would have only recently obtained an electricity connection. On the other hand, the appliance adoption results show that the adoption of basic cooking appliances is positively correlated with electricity provision. However, our data show that the adoption of electrical cooking appliances does not completely replace the use of traditional cooking fuel firewood2 Therefore, we interpret our results as indicating a short-term effect of electricity on social capital. Our result is consistent with findings from field experiments conducted in Kenya by Lee et al. (2020), who reported no effect of electricity on numerous outcomes in the short term.
This study contributes to both the electricity and social capital literature within the field of economics. In the electricity literature, our study builds upon previous research, particularly that of Dinkelman (2011), which examines the impact of electricity on female labor outcomes in South Africa using a land gradient as an instrument; the study reports a positive effect on female labor outcomes. Our study is also related to the existing electricity literature that examines the effect of electricity on health (Barron and Torero 2017), income, expenditure (Thomas et al. 2020b), firm output (Rud 2012), education (Lipscomb et al. 2013), and carbon emissions and firewood substitution (Dendup 2022). Similarly, a field experiment by Lee et al. (2020) reported significant effects on various energy-related outcomes in Kenya, including the use of electricity for lighting and expenditures on kerosene; however, the authors observed no significant impact on employment, health, or test scores. The current study enhances the extensive literature on the impact of electricity by offering evidence of the impact of electricity on social capital, which is a dimension that has thus far remained unclear in the existing electricity literature.
In the social capital literature, two main branches of literature have emerged. One strand delves into the effects of social capital on broadly defined indicators of welfare, for instance, the effect of social capital on health (Cao et al. 2022), crime (Buonanno et al. 2009; Stuart and Taylor 2021), human capital formation (Lee and Bell 2013; Agénor and Dinh 2015), income, gross domestic product (Knack and Keefer 1997; Tenzin et al. 2015), sustainable agriculture business (Lang et al. 2023), trade (Korovkin and Makarin 2023) and firm output (Miguel et al. 2005). Conversely, the other strand of social capital literature focuses on the impact of policies or events on social capital. Our study aligns with this latter category and is closely linked with the seminal work by Olken (2009), which examines the impact of radio and television on social capital in Indonesia, and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), which investigates the impact of the slave trade on trust. In Olken (2009), trust (as an indicator of social capital) is measured in terms of general trust and trust in neighbors, people in the village, the government, the president, the village head, and the village parliament. Similarly, in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), trust is measured in terms of trust in relatives, neighbors, local councils, intragroup, and intergroups. Our study contributes to these seminal works by introducing two additional measures of trust, namely trust in terms of (1) lending money and (2) taking care of children.
Similarly, in Olken (2009), social engagement is measured in terms of group membership and participation. Our study further contributes to the exploration of social engagement by providing new evidence of the influence of electricity on social capital on broad measures, including having friends, willingness to help in the community, a sense of togetherness, and general interactions. In addition, numerous studies have examined the effects of media technologies, such as Facebook on social interaction (Allcott et al. 2020), television on civic engagement (Durante et al. 2019), and mobile phones on social mobilization or coordination (Manacorda and Tesei 2020). In our study, instead of focusing on a single technology, we assess the impact of a key technology enabler, namely electricity. Given that electricity enables households to adopt various media and related technologies, our results contribute to understanding the overall effect of technology on our measures of social capital.
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 discusses social capital and related literature, Sect. 3 describes the data and background, and Sect. 4 describes the econometric model. The results are reported in Sect. 5. Section 6 describes mechanism results and Sect. 7 concludes the paper.
Social capital is a multidisciplinary concept defined in numerous ways. Many empirical studies have utilized the concept of social capital, which includes the basic features of institutions and organizations, such as trust. Some studies have associated social capital with social networks and social engagements. Additionally, social capital is understood as behavioral norms of reciprocity that may promote collective action. In general, social capital includes various features of social organizations and behavioral norms. For instance, according to Dasgupta (2005), social capital can be understood as an interpersonal social network that includes the components of social networks, trust, and reciprocity. On the other hand, according to Putnam (1995), social capital may be more concisely understood in terms of the features of institutions, i.e., trust and social networks. Therefore, in this study, we use broad definitions of social capital, including indicators of trust and network and social engagement. Trust is helpful in making social contracts more credible, facilitating economic transactions, and minimizing monitoring costs, both in public and private domains. Similarly, social networks serve as a medium for information that may be useful in addressing market failures (when the cost of information is high). External factors can affect social capital, particularly those that interfere with local norms and social networks. For instance, in Africa, the descendants of those who experienced the slave trade exhibit lower levels of trust (Nunn and Wantchekon 2011). Rural infrastructure development programs, such as electricity, can also affect social capital through technology adoption.
Numerous empirical studies have explored how information technology, or the diffusion of information, influences social capital. According to the framework proposed by Barbera and Jackson (2020), which is relevant in terms of explaining incentives or motivation for prosocial behavior, information and trust play vital roles in addressing coordination and collective action problems. The authors posit that the success of (collective) action relies on the proportion of individuals participating in the undertaking, which is influenced by anticipated rewards, associated costs, and beliefs about others’ engagement. The propensity of others to make an engagement decision is private, but information within networks helps to gauge others’ propensity to engage (in action). Private information both within and between networks and subsequent trust help individuals decide whether to contribute to activities that benefit society. The relation between social capital and electricity is evident once we stipulate that electricity is a technology enabler (in rural developing countries) and that technology plays a pivotal role in information diffusion, as well as in building trust in terms of others propensity to contribute to undertakings.
It is evident from the above-mentioned simple conceptual framework that technology adoption may be either benign or destructive, depending upon how such technology interacts with local norms, culture, interference with local communication systems and types of information. In theory, the adoption of media appliances such as television and radio could result in a tradeoff between social participation and time spent using television and radio. Past studies that have examined the effect of media technology have reported mixed results. A study by Olken (2009) in Indonesia reported that television and radio network expansion resulted in households making a trade-off between the time spent using television and the time spent using the radio with social participation. As a result, the same study reported that increased time spent using television and radio resulted in a reduction in social participation and reduced the level of self-reported trust. Similarly, Durante et al. (2019) reported that exposure to commercial television in Italy at a younger age is associated with a lower level of social participation. In another study, using data from the European Value Study and World Values Surveys from 36 OECD countries, (Campante et al. 2022) reported an insignificant correlation between television penetration rates and aggregate measures of social capital. However, the same study reported evidence of different effects on the different measures of social capital. While the authors reported no significant effect of television penetration rates on total numbers of members, the membership status of parties/unions or self-reported interest in politics, they did report a significant and negative correlation between political party activity and trust. The authors associated these results with the crowding out effect of entertainment content on political information. On the other hand, Bruni and Stanca (2008) reported a positive relationship between television viewing and time spent with family but a negative relationship with time spent with friends, colleagues and churches.
DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) reported that voter participation increases due to television news, while Gentzkow (2006) reported that voter turnout decreased during the 1950-1990 period after the introduction of television in the USA, when television content was mostly dedicated to entertainment. Similarly, Strömberg (2004) reported that a greater percentage of radio listeners is associated with a greater percentage of voter turnout. Similarly, the effect of exposure to reconciliation messages via radio in Rwanda depicts a higher level of inter ethnicity trust (Blouin and Mukand 2019). The difference in effects across space, time and technology seems to be explained by the type of information disseminated. For instance, a study by Dendup and Arimura (2019) showed that exposure to health and conservation information via television is positively correlated with the use of electricity and gas as cooking fuel in Bhutan. Similarly, entertainment television has reduced the voter turnout in Sweden (Ellingsen and Hernæs 2018), suggesting that the effect of information technology depends on the type of information viewers are exposed to.
Furthermore, evidence suggests that mobile phone adoption helps in facilitating coordination. For instance, Manacorda and Tesei (2020) reported that text and voice messages increased the mobilization of anti-government protests in Africa between 1998 and 2012. Similarly, in Russia, the diffusion of independent television channels also has a significant negative effect on voter turnout, suggesting the successful coordination of boycotting an election (Enikolopov et al. 2011). In addition, many studies have focused on examining the effect of the internet on social capital and health. A field experiment conducted by Allcott et al. (2020) showed that those in the treatment group who deactivated Facebook for a month spent more time with family members than the control group. Similarly, Braghieri et al. (2022) reported a negative effect of staggered Facebook rollout across universities in the U.S. on mental health. The effect of the increase in the use of high-speed internet on mental health has a negative effect on younger cohorts, and the effect is even stronger for females (Golin 2022). The evidence of the effect of the internet on interactions and health suggests that the effect of electricity on social capital may also operate via its impact on mental health and social interactions.
Electricity provision also enables households to adopt simple (electrical) cooking appliances such as electric cookers and water boilers. The replacement of traditional cooking fuel through the adoption of cooking appliances reduces households’ dependence on firewood (which is one of the primary cooking fuels used in developing countries). Previous studies in Bhutan have reported that rural households tend to adopt such appliances (Dendup 2022). In developing countries such as Bhutan, firewood is traditionally collected in groups involving family members and friends from the neighborhood3 The replacement of traditional cooking fuel with electrical appliances is likely to reduce the number of traditional social interactions experienced during the process of firewood collection. Thus, the effect of electricity on social capital through the adoption of cooking appliances and the subsequent replacement of firewood collection can be determined by how much firewood is being replaced by cooking appliances and how the time saved from engaging in firewood collection affects other forms of social engagement.

3 Background and data

3.1 Background

Bhutan’s rural electrification program began as early as 1980 (Dendup 2022; Dendup and Arimura 2019); however, due to a lack of proper infrastructure, household accessibility remained low. All the electricity supplied to households in Bhutan is generated through hydropower plants; the country has no fossil fuel or nuclear power plants. The majority of the rural electrification project was implemented during the 10th Five-Year Plan (2008–2013) by a newly elected democratic government (during that period). In 2015, Bhutan achieved universal rural electrification4 The Japan International Corporation Agency (JICA) was the primary agency providing technical and financial assistance for the rural electrification program in Bhutan at this time. Prior to the involvement of the JICA, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) was one of the primary development partners for the rural electrification program in Bhutan.
Whether the households within community have option to connect to electricity in Bhutan was largely determined by the cost of building electrification-related infrastructure. The official rural electrification document (JICA 2005, chapter 13) reports that households located closer to roads and those that had better economic opportunities were initially prioritized.5 In addition, according to the BPC, which is the agency responsible for supplying electricity in Bhutan, the cost of building infrastructure and supplying electricity to particular communities played a crucial role. The BPC suggested that they target areas that could be connected at minimal cost, which was largely determined by the land gradient6 Kumar and Rauniyar (2018) also suggested that when the ADB was involved in the rural electrification program in Bhutan before the JICA stepped in, the BPC provided electricity to villages that required minimal costs.
Bhutan is one of the most mountainous countries in South Asia and has no plains. The elevation in Bhutan ranges from 200 ms to 7000 ms asl. The differences in the land gradient among the villages affect whether the community receives electricity. As the land gradient increases, the feasibility of dam construction decreases (Duflo and Pande 2007).7 In addition, high-elevation and mountainous regions in Bhutan lack the basic infrastructure for developing rural electrification infrastructure, such as substations and distribution networks, thereby increasing the cost of supplying electricity. It has also been reported that the land gradient is an important determinant of whether a community receives electricity in South Africa (Dinkelman 2011).
In rural Bhutan, there are differences among communities in terms of access to natural resources such as water, high-value plants, and forest products. Some communities focus on farming crops, while others concentrate on raising animals, shaping their distinct ways of life. However, communities in rural Bhutan are generally small, with close and strong connections. These social ties are cherished and nurtured through social gatherings and community festivals. At the same time, such social engagements and interactions are often confined within communities with similar topography. Therefore, although Bhutan has varied topographies, the effect of differences in land gradient on social connections and interactions may primarily occur through electricity provision.

3.2 Data and variables

In this study, we use the 2012 Bhutan Living Standard Survey (BLSS) conducted by the National Statistics Bureau of Bhutan. In the 2012 BLSS, information about social capital was collected, which we use as the main outcome variables. The surveys were conducted in all 20 districts of Bhutan, including both urban and rural areas; thus, the surveys are nationally representative. Sample households were randomly selected from each of the subdistricts of the respective districts; there are 205 subdistricts in Bhutan.8
In this study, we use a rural subsample since there is no variation in household electrification status in urban areas. In the 2012 BLSS, approximately 4986 rural households were surveyed. However, we could not merge approximately 643 households from the social capital module data; thus, our final sample size consists of 4343 households. We also use geographic information at the subdistrict level to compute the instrumental variable, namely the average land gradient of the subdistrict. However, in our dataset, such information is not available. Thus, we compute the instrumental variable land gradient from a 90-meter Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) global digital elevation model using ArcGIS software. The unit of the land gradient is degrees, where zero degrees indicate plains, and a value closer to 90 degrees suggests a mountainous region. In Bhutan, the minimum average land gradient is approximately 2 degrees, while the average maximum land gradient is approximately 73 degrees.9
In the 2012 BLSS, data were collected through face-to-face interviews, and the primary respondents were heads of household. In this study, we use questions related to trust, social interactions and social engagement to construct indicators of social capital. We first categorize the indicators of social capital into three groups: (1) trust, (2) social interactions and (3) social engagement. We use four different questions about trust to create each binary indicator of trust from social capital questions. We use six different questions to create binary variable indicator of social interactions and network density. Similarly, we use three questions to construct binary indicators of social engagement. In the social capital module, questions about group membership were also implemented; however, due to the high nonresponse rate, we do not use them in our study.
To create the indicators of the trust outcome variable, we use both directly and indirectly elicited questions about trust. First, we create binary indicators of trust using the following indirect question about trust: “If you suddenly needed a small amount of money, how many people beyond your household would be willing to lend you the money?" We create a binary variable that indicates level of trust in terms of lending money if households reported that they could turn to at least one person in their neighborhood. To measure trust in terms of the term of taking care of children, we create a binary variable with a value of 1 if households reported that neighbors could “definitely" or “probably" take care of their children and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, we create binary variables of trust based on the following two direct questions: (1) “Do you agree or disagree that most people who live in this neighborhood can be trusted?" and (2) “Do you agree or disagree that in this neighborhood, one has to be alert as someone will exploit you?" The respondents were presented with five options: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree and strongly disagree. We create a binary variable with a value of 1 if households reported that they “strongly agree" or “agree somewhat" and 0 otherwise.
To construct the outcome variables related to social interaction or network density, we use information pertaining to the number of friends, the number of people willing to help in the neighborhood, the feeling of closeness within the community and general information about social interactions. Information about the number of friends was collected through the following question “About how many friends do you have these days? These are people you feel at ease with, can talk to about private matters or call on for help". Information about the number of people willing to help in the neighborhood was collected through the following question: “How well do people in your neighborhood help each other these days?" Households were asked to choose from a scale ranging from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating always helping and 5 indicating never helping. We create a binary variable with a value of 1 if households reported “always helping", “helping most of the time" or “helping sometimes" and 0 otherwise. We also construct another outcome variable pertaining to the sense of closeness in the neighborhood using the following question: “How strong is the feeling of togetherness or closeness in your neighborhood?" Using the responses to this question, we create a binary variable with a value of 1 if the household reported that it felt “very close" or “somewhat close" to others and 0 otherwise. The outcome variables for interactions were collected from the following three questions: (1) “In the last month, how many times have you met with people in a public place either to talk or have food or drinks?", (2) “In the last month, how many times did people visit you in your home?" and (3) “In the last month, how many times have you visited people in their homes?" For each of the above-mentioned questions, we create a binary variable with a value of 1 if the households responded that they interacted one time or more and 0 otherwise.
According to our data, the closest questions regarding the measure of social engagement were elicited through willingness to contribute to community activities and whether the household had contributed in the past 12 months. Specifically, we create binary variables for willingness to contribute in terms of time and money based on the question “If a community activity did not directly benefit you but had benefits for many others in the neighborhood, would you contribute your time to this activity? The same question was also administered for the contribution in terms of money, which we use also in our study. Similarly, we use the question “In the past 12 months, have you worked with others in your neighborhood to do something for the benefit of the community?" to create a binary variable indicating households that had participated in community activity in the past 12 months.10
Our variable of interest, namely electricity, is a binary variable indicating whether households are connected to grid electricity. In our sample, approximately 83% of the households reported being connected to grid electricity. All the summary statistics of the outcome variables and controls are reported in Table 1.
Table 1
Definition and summary statistics
 
Definition
Mean
SD
Outcome variable: trust
Trust that at least one neighbor would lend me money
0.915
0.495
Trust that neighbors would take care of my children
0.763
0.425
Neighbors can be trusted
0.861
0.346
Trust that neighbors would not take advantage
0.269
0.444
Outcome variable: social interaction and network density
Have close friends
4.631
6.645
People in neighborhood help each other
0.668
0.471
Feeling of togetherness is strong in neighborhood
0.580
0.494
I met with people in an open space
0.541
0.498
Others visited me at home
0.764
0.425
I visited others at their home
0.713
0.452
Outcome variable: social engagement
Willing to contribute time for community activities
0.900
0.299
Willing to contribute money for the community activities
0.699
0.459
Worked for community in past 12 months
0.221
0.416
Appliance ownership
TV
1 if household owns a television set
0.498
0.500
Radio
1 if household owns a radio
0.420
0.494
Phone
1 if household owns a mobile phone
0.907
0.290
Rice cooker
1 if household owns a rice cooker
0.727
0.429
Curry cooker
1 if household owns a curry cooker
0.610
0.488
Water boiler
1 if household owns a water boiler
0.535
0.499
Control variable
Electricity
1 if household is electrified
0.826
0.379
Age
Age of head of household
49.120
15.320
Female
1 if household head is female
0.345
0.475
Education
Level of education of household head
1.823
3.911
Read/write
Household head can read and write
0.341
0.474
Household size
Household size
4.786
2.221
Female share
Share of female household members
0.202
0.305
Expenditure (ln)
Monthly expenditure
7.002
1.018
Market (ln)
Distance to the nearest market in hours
\(-\)0.485
1.450
Road (ln)
Distance to nearest road in hours
\(-\)0.316
1.843
Gradient
Average land gradient in each subdistrict
23.870
4.4 00

4 Estimation strategy

Electricity infrastructure developments are seldom randomized, and unobservables confound the effect of electricity provision. In particular, there are two different levels of selection issues in electricity infrastructure provision. First, at the community or village level, whether the community receives electricity provision is determined by political importance (Dinkelman 2011; Dendup 2022). Second, once the community is electrified, whether households choose to connect to the grid is a household or individual-level decision (Dendup 2022; Litzow et al. 2019). However, selection at the household (or individual) level is of less concern in our case because our data show that only approximately 4% did not connect to electricity once a community was electrified.
To overcome endogenous electricity provisions due to unobserved omitted variables such as political importance, we estimate a bivariate probit model using the land gradient (at the subdistrict level) as an instrument. We estimate the following econometric model:
$$\begin{aligned}&\text {electricity}_{ij}=\alpha + \gamma \text {gradient}_{j}+\mathbf {X_{id}\theta }+\delta _d+\eta _{ij} \end{aligned}$$
(1A)
$$\begin{aligned}&\text {SC}_{ij}=\alpha +\beta \text {electricity}_{ij} +\mathbf {X_{ij}\theta }+\delta _d+\epsilon _{ij} \end{aligned}$$
(1B)
where electricity\(_{ij}\) is a binary variable indicating whether household i in subdistrict j is connected to electricity, SC\(_{ij}\) is one of the measures of social capital of household i in subdistrict j, and gradient\(_j\) is an average land gradient of subdistrict j. In the electricity equation, \(\gamma \) captures the correlation between the land gradient and electricity provision. In the social capital equation, the coefficient of interest \(\beta \) captures the effect of electricity on (one of the measures of) social capital (SC\(_{ij}\)), and \(\delta _d\) is the district fixed effect. The vector X includes other controls, and \(\eta \) and \(\epsilon \) represent error terms of the electricity and social capital equations, respectively.
Following Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) and Olken (2009), the vector of control includes individual, household and community-level information measured at the subdistrict level. Individual-level control variables include age, age squared, gender, level of education of the head of household and whether the head of the household can read and write. In Bhutan, there is a monastic education system; thus, even if a head of household reported zero years of schooling, he or she may be able to read and write. To capture this effect, we also control for whether household heads can read or write. Household covariates include distance to the nearest market, distance to the nearest road, household size, share of female household members and per capita monthly household expenditure. We also include district fixed effects in our model to control for differences at the district level. In particular, district fixed effects control for differences in local culture and social norms specific to particular regions that may also affect social capital.
In our bivariate probit model, the vectors of the controls are very similar to those of Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) and Olken (2009). However, in our model, we do not control for living condition fixed effects to capture the effect of income or wealth, as in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). Instead, in our model, we directly control for monthly capita household expenditures as a proxy for income. Similarly, Olken (2009) controlled for whether the subdistrict faces north, east or south. However, Bhutan has irregular terrain, with peaks, valleys, and slopes that obscure the sun’s position, making it difficult to determine direction based on landmarks or natural cues. Hence, we do not control for such fixed effects; however, district fixed effects capture such differences. In addition, both Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) and Olken (2009) controlled for ethnicity fragmentation and religion fixed effects. In the 2012 BLSS, such important information was not collected. We assess the impact of such important variables on parameter estimates in our study; we will return to this discussion in Sect. 5.1.
The results of bivariate probit models depend on the validity of the instrument. It is assumed that the instrument is sufficiently correlated with the endogenous variables (which can be verified from the electricity equation results). In addition, we assume that the instrument is exogenous and that the effect of the instrument on the outcome only operates through the endogenous variable, electricity provision. It is difficult to exclude the possibility of the violation of this assumption in observational studies such as this. At the same time, similar to other observational studies, we encounter the challenge of finding purely exogenous instruments. We conduct sensitivity tests for the main results under the mild deviation of the exogeneity assumption of the instrument, which we discuss in detail under Sect. 5.2.

5 Results

The average partial effect of electricity on trust is reported in Table 2, social interaction and network density in Table 3, and social engagement in Table 4. All the results reported in Table 2 through Table 4 are estimated using a land gradient as an instrument; however, the results of the electricity equation are not reported for brevity purposes, except for the binary outcome variable indicating whether an individual trusts others in terms of lending and borrowing money, which is shown in Column 1 of Table 2. All the coefficients of the bivariate probit models, along with the coefficients of the electricity equation, are reported in the Appendix A in Table A1 through Table A3. The coefficient of the land gradient is negative and significant at the 1% significance level, indicating that as the land gradient increases, communities are less likely to receive electricity provision due to the higher cost of building electricity infrastructure, as discussed in Sect. 3. In addition, the results also show that the land gradient is sufficiently correlated with the endogenous variable of electricity provision.
Table 2
Effect of electricity on trust
 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Electricity
Social Capital Equation
Trust that at least one neighbor would lend me money
Trust that neighbors would take care of my children
Neighbors can be trusted
Trust that neighbors would not take advantage
Electricity
 
\(-\)0.0229
\(-\)0.0057
\(-\)0.0719*
0.0370
 
(0.0372)
(0.0555)
(0.0435)
(0.0814)
Gradient
\(-\)0.0095**
    
(0.0045)
    
Age
0.0039*
0.0026
0.0055**
0.0069***
0.0023
(0.0021)
(0.0024)
(0.0026)
(0.0026)
(0.0023)
Age\(^2\)
\(-\)0.0000
\(-\)0.0000
\(-\)0.0000**
\(-\)0.0001**
\(-\)0.0000
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
Female
0.0636**
0.0520
\(-\)0.0147
0.0417
0.0142
(0.0321)
(0.0331)
(0.0328)
(0.0364)
(0.0319)
Education
0.0059***
0.0072***
0.0007
0.0029
\(-\)0.0021
(0.0022)
(0.0021)
(0.0023)
(0.0022)
(0.0020)
Read/Write
0.0289**
0.0042
0.0159
0.0069
0.0282*
(0.0143)
(0.0148)
(0.0178)
(0.0170)
(0.0149)
Household size
0.0038
0.0095***
\(-\)0.0014
0.0034
0.0038
(0.0026)
(0.0028)
(0.0033)
(0.0030)
(0.0029)
Female share
\(-\)0.0344
\(-\)0.0297
0.0322
\(-\)0.0323
\(-\)0.0239
(0.0492)
(0.0491)
(0.0517)
(0.0545)
(0.0497)
Expenditure (ln)
0.0218***
0.0282***
0.0049
0.0139*
0.0277***
(0.0084)
(0.0078)
(0.0087)
(0.0085)
(0.0075)
Market (ln)
\(-\)0.0353***
\(-\)0.0374***
\(-\)0.0190***
\(-\)0.0299***
\(-\)0.0111*
(0.0075)
(0.0070)
(0.0064)
(0.0072)
(0.0065)
Road (ln)
\(-\)0.0587***
\(-\)0.0473***
\(-\)0.0417***
\(-\)0.0503***
\(-\)0.0078
(0.0111)
(0.0100)
(0.0086)
(0.0093)
(0.0056)
District FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
4,343
4,343
4,343
4,343
4,343
F-Statistics F(1,4312)= 51.88 (p Value=0.000)
In Column 1, we report the coefficient of electricity in Eq. 1A of the outcome variable “trust that at least one neighbor would lend me money," and in Columns 2 through 5, we report the coefficients of Equation 1B for all the trust outcome variables. The coefficients reported in Columns 1 through 5 are average partial effects estimated from the result of the bivariate probit models. Standard errors in parentheses are estimated using the delta method. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. The full bivariate probit results, along with the results of the electricity equation, are reported in the Appendix in Table A1
Table 3
Effect of electricity on social interaction and network density
 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Have close friends
People in neighborhood help each other
Feeling of togetherness is strong in neighborhood
I met with people in open spaces
Others visited me at home
I visited others at their home
Electricity
\(-\)1.5046
\(-\)0.0512
0.0098
0.1472*
\(-\)0.0650
\(-\)0.0845
(1.8941)
(0.0619)
(0.1095)
(0.0780)
(0.0609)
(0.0657)
Age
0.0146
0.0047*
0.0063***
\(-\)0.0001
\(-\)0.0005
0.0009
(0.0415)
(0.0024)
(0.0024)
(0.0025)
(0.0025)
(0.0023)
Age\(^2\)
\(-\)0.0002
\(-\)0.0000*
\(-\)0.0001***
\(-\)0.0000
0.0000
\(-\)0.0000
(0.0004)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
Female
\(-\)0.4264
0.0093
0.0409
0.0171
0.0996***
0.1019***
(0.3787)
(0.0351)
(0.0389)
(0.0327)
(0.0370)
(0.0363)
Education
\(-\)0.0372
0.0045*
0.0026
0.0040*
0.0049*
0.0065**
(0.0314)
(0.0023)
(0.0027)
(0.0022)
(0.0025)
(0.0026)
Read/Write
0.2168
\(-\)0.0104
0.0094
0.0512***
0.0221
0.0117
(0.2627)
(0.0177)
(0.0200)
(0.0182)
(0.0194)
(0.0205)
Household size
0.1864***
0.0039
0.0046
0.0106***
0.0152***
0.0104***
(0.0687)
(0.0030)
(0.0035)
(0.0034)
(0.0032)
(0.0036)
Female share
\(-\)0.5687
0.0060
\(-\)0.0504
0.0069
\(-\)0.1015*
\(-\)0.1159**
(0.4842)
(0.0526)
(0.0577)
(0.0491)
(0.0555)
(0.0554)
Expenditure (ln)
0.3818***
0.0133
0.0316***
0.0411***
0.0532***
0.0455***
(0.1154)
(0.0090)
(0.0114)
(0.0097)
(0.0091)
(0.0094)
Market (ln)
\(-\)0.1861
\(-\)0.0309***
\(-\)0.0209***
\(-\)0.0242***
\(-\)0.0320***
\(-\)0.0265***
(0.1248)
(0.0069)
(0.0073)
(0.0076)
(0.0069)
(0.0074)
Road (ln)
0.0749
\(-\)0.0335***
\(-\)0.0217***
\(-\)0.0253***
\(-\)0.0364***
\(-\)0.0288***
(0.1429)
(0.0079)
(0.0074)
(0.0063)
(0.0082)
(0.0083)
District FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
4,343
4,343
4,343
4,343
4,343
4,343
F-Statistics F(1,4312)= 51.88 (p Value=0.000)
The coefficients reported in Columns 1 through 5 are average partial effects estimated from the result of the bivariate probit models. Standard errorsin parentheses are estimated using the delta method. ***\(p<\)0.01, **\(p<\)0.05, *\(p<\)0.1. The full bivariate probit results, along with the results of the electricity equation, are reported in the Appendix in Table A2
The average partial effects of different measures of trust are reported in Columns 2 through 5 (of Table 2). In Columns 2 through 5 (of Table 2), the outcome variables are binary variables indicating whether respondents trust that others are willing to lend them money, whether households trust that their neighbors could help take of their children, whether households trust their neighbors and whether respondents trust that their neighbors will not exploit them. The effects of electricity on all the measures of trust are not distinguishable from zero except for the indicators of whether households trust their neighbors; this coefficient is negative and marginally significant at the 10% significance level.
In Columns 1 through 6 of Table 3, the average partial effects of different measures of social interactions and network density are reported. In Column 1, the outcome variable is the number of close friends.11 In Column 2, the outcome variable is a binary variable indicating whether neighbors are always willing to help. In Column 3, the outcome variable is a binary variable indicating whether the community has a strong feeling of togetherness, and in Columns 4 through 6, the outcome variables are binary variables indicating whether in the month prior to the survey, the respondent (usually the head of the household) had met others in public places for leisure, whether others had visited the household and whether the respondent had visited others’ home. The effects of electricity on the indicators of social interaction and network density are not distinguishable from zero except for whether people had met in public places for leisure. The coefficient of the outcome variable of whether they had met in public places for leisure is positive and marginally significant at the 10% significance level, suggesting a positive correlation between electricity and social interactions. Similar to other South Asian countries, Bhutan is also a patriarchal society. The majority of household chores, including cooking, are performed by women. Traditional cooking with firewood is time-consuming, and women spend a substantial amount of time in the kitchen. Therefore, one possible explanation for the positive relationship between electricity and the time spent meeting others in public places for leisure could be attributed to the time saved from the adoption of electrical appliances, as shown in Sect. 6. We report the results of social engagement in Table 4. The level of social engagement in our study is captured by the willingness to contribute time and money for community activities and whether the household reported engaging in work for the community in the 12 months preceding the survey. The coefficient of electricity is not distinguishable from zero for all three measures of social engagement.12
Table 4
Effect of electricity on social engagement
 
(1)
(2)
(3)
Willing to contribute time for community activities
Willing to contribute money for community activities
Worked for community in past 12 months
Electricity
\(-\)0.042
\(-\)0.134
\(-\)0.046
(0.036)
(0.086)
(0.097)
Age
0.006***
0.006**
0.002
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.002)
Age\(^2\)
\(-\)0.000***
\(-\)0.000**
\(-\)0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Female
0.085***
0.059*
0.060**
(0.033)
(0.035)
(0.027)
Education
0.006***
0.009***
0.004**
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.002)
Read/write
0.015
0.041**
0.021
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.015)
Household size
0.011***
0.016***
0.013***
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
Female share
\(-\)0.097**
\(-\)0.078
\(-\)0.108***
(0.049)
(0.051)
(0.040)
Expenditure (ln)
0.031***
0.090***
0.050***
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.009)
Market (ln)
\(-\)0.031***
\(-\)0.039***
\(-\)0.012**
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.006)
Road (ln)
\(-\)0.044***
\(-\)0.028***
\(-\)0.005
(0.010)
(0.009)
(0.005)
District FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
4,343
4,343
4,343
F-Statistics F(1,4312)= 51.88 (p Value=0.000)
The coefficients reported are average partial effects estimated from the result of the bivariate probit models. Standard errors in parentheses are estimated using the delta method. ***\(p<\)0.01, **\(p<\)0.05, *\(p<\)0.1. Fstatistics are used to test for weak instruments. The full bivariate probit results, along with the results of the electricity equation, are reported in the Appendix in Table A3
Overall, these results suggest that the effect of electricity on social capital is not distinguishable from zero. This result is consistent with the field experiment results from Kenya by Lee et al. (2020), who showed that the effect of electricity on almost all household-level outcome variables is insignificant in the short run except for lighting and basic appliance adoption. The interpretation of our results requires a great deal of caution. As discussed in Sect. 3, the majority of rural electrification in Bhutan was implemented in 2008; thus, we suspect that when the 2012 BLSS was implemented, most households may have only recently obtained their electricity connection. Therefore, we interpret our results as the effect of electricity on social capital in the short run. However, one of the weaknesses of the BLSS data is that our data do not allow us to investigate the effect based on the number of months or years that households have been electrified. In addition, the instrumental variable results are local average treatment effect (LATE) (Angrist and Imbens 1995); thus, our results represent the effect of electricity on households affected by the instrumental variable and do not represent an average effect on the population.
Furthermore, we estimate the effect of electricity on social capital using the matching method. The details of the matching estimation procedure are discussed in Appendix A, and the results are reported in the Appendix in Fig. 1. The matching results are consistent with the bivariate probit results both in terms of the level of significance and the sign of the coefficients (except for two outcome variables).13

5.1 Assessing potential bias from unobservables

As discussed in Sect. 4, we are not able to control for ethnicity fictionalization and religion, as in the seminal papers by Olken (2009) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011).14 Therefore, despite our attempt to control for the carefully chosen controls that may affect social capital, our results reported in Table 2 through Table 4 may be biased by above omitted variables. In this subsection, we formally assess the potential bias from unobservables using selection on observables, following Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). The idea is similar to Altonji et al. (2005), where observables are used to measure the potential bias due to unobservables.
We consider two regression models and denote \({\widehat{\gamma }}^R\) as the coefficient of variable electricity, in which the regression model is estimated by controlling for the restricted set of controls, and we denote \({\widehat{\gamma }}^F\) as the coefficient of electricity, in which the regression is estimated by controlling for the full set of controls; we will refer to these models as the reduced-form and full models, respectively, in this subsection. Our goal is to compute the ratio \({\widehat{\gamma }}^F/({\widehat{\gamma }}^R - {\widehat{\gamma }}^F)\). This ratio captures the extent to which the effect of selection on unobservables relative to the selection on observables should be attributed to the fact that the estimated effect, for instance, \(\beta \) in Equation 1B, is entirely due to unobservables. To see the idea of this test, consider the case where \(({\widehat{\gamma }}^R - {\widehat{\gamma }}^F)\) is small. This suggests that the selection on observables has less effect, meaning that the effect of the unobservables should be very strong to attribute that the observed effect is entirely due to unobservables.
In our restricted model, we estimate a linear regression model by excluding the variables of education, distance to roads and distance to the market. In the full model, we control for the same set of control variables that we control for in Eqs. 1A and 1B, including district fixed effects. The results are reported in Table 5. Except for the outcome variable, whether others visited the household or not, the ratio is greater than 1.5. This suggests that to attribute the effect of electricity on social capital is entirely due to unobservables, the effect of unobservables should be greater than 1.5 times. For instance, the coefficient of trust for neighbors is approximately 7% (marginally significant) at the 10% significance level. To attribute that the observed effect of 7% is entirely due to unobservables, the effect of unobservables should be approximately 40 times greater, which we believe is not reasonable.
Table 5
Assessing bias from unobservables using selections on observables
Outcome Variable
Control excluded in reduced- form model
Controls in full model
\(\frac{{\widehat{\gamma }}^F}{({\widehat{\gamma }}^R - {\widehat{\gamma }}^F)}\)
Trust
Trust that at least one neighbor would lend me money
Education, road and market
All
4.02
Trust that neighbors would take care of children
Education, road and market
All
2.94
Neighborhoods can be trusted
Education, road and market
All
39.87
Trust that neighbors will not take advantage
Education, road and market
All
25.39
Social interaction and network
People in neighbors help each other
Education, road and market
All
11.53
Feeling of togetherness is strong in neighborhood
Education, road and market
All
1.46
I met with people in open spaces
Education, road and market
All
1.60
Others visited me at home
Education, road and market
All
4.01
I visited others at their home
Education, road and market
All
0.48
Social engagement
Contributed time for community activities
Education, road and market
All
18.94
Contributed money for community activities
Education, road and market
All
10.53
Worked for community in past 12 months
Education, road and market
All
3.15
The \({\widehat{\gamma }}^R\) and \({\widehat{\gamma }}^F\) are estimated by linear regression model. In the reduced-form model, \({\widehat{\gamma }}^R\) is estimated by excluding education, distance to road and distance to market, and \({\widehat{\gamma }}^F\) is estimated by controlling same set of controls are that used in Eqs. 1A and 1B

5.2 Instrument validity

The validity of our results depends on the credibility of the instrument used. The coefficient of the instrumental variable land gradient shown in Column 1 of Table A1 suggests that the land gradient is strongly correlated with endogenous electricity provision. To formally test for weak instruments, we estimate an instrumental variable regression. The F-Statistic is F(1,4312) = 51.88 (p value = 0.000), which is greater than the Yogo–Stock critical value of 3.2 that is required when the number of instruments is one. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are weakly correlated with endogenous variables. On the other hand, it is challenging to find a purely exogenous instrument in observational studies such as ours; hence, it is difficult to exclude the possibility that our instrument does not violate the instrument exogeneity. While the discussion presented in Sect. 3 reinforces the confidence in the instrument used, testing the violation of the instrument exogeneity assumption is difficult because it involves the unobserved error term. Therefore, we conduct a sensitivity test on the instrumental variable results under mild deviation from the exclusion restriction of the instrument.
Following Conley et al. (2012), to determine the sensitivity of our results under mild deviation from the exclusion restriction, we consider the following linear regression model:
$$\begin{aligned}&\text {SC} =\textbf{X} \theta + \gamma Z + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$
(2A)
$$\begin{aligned}&\text {electricity} =\textbf{Z}\Pi +\eta \end{aligned}$$
(2B)
where instrument Z is added to the structural equation of social capital. Note that the results reported in Table 2 through Table 4 are estimated by imposing the assumption that \(\gamma = 0\) in Equation 2A. By allowing instrument Z to directly affect our measures of social capital, we determine the sensitivity of the result under the mild deviation of \(\gamma \) from zero in the structural equation. Following Conley et al. (2012), the estimation procedure involves specifying the maximum and minimum values for \(\gamma \); we follow the same procedure by choosing \(\gamma _{min}=-0.001\) and \(\gamma _{max} = 0.001\), transforming the outcome variables accordingly and jointly re-estimating Eqs. 1A and 1B.
The sensitivity results of the instrumental variable results are reported in Table 6. Overall, the upper and lower bounds include the average partial effect of bivariate probit. However, some of the bounds range between positive and negative, suggesting that the effect of electricity on social capital can range from positive to negative. At the same time, many of the coefficients of electricity are insignificant; those that are significant are only marginally significant at the 10% significance level. It is likely that the large range of bounds of the sensitivity result when applying (Conley et al. 2012) in our setting possibly captures the effect of marginally or insignificant bivariate probit results. Based on this result, it is less likely that our bivariate probit results may not be biased due to the violation of instrument validity. In the next subsection, we examine the heterogeneous effect.
Table 6
Sensitivity of effect of electricity on social capital under deviation from exclusion restriction
 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Trust that at least one neighbor would lend me money
Trust that neighbors would take care of my children
Neighbors can be trusted
Trust that neighbors would not take advantage
Have close friends
Electricity
0.2509
0.0158
0.1813
\(-\)0.3073
\(-\)1.5046
Lower bound
0.171
0.135
0.00408
\(-\)1.005
\(-\)15.14
Upper bound
0.704
0.882
0.600
\(-\)0.209
\(-\)3.299
 
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
People in neighborhood help each other
Feeling of togetherness is strong in neighborhood
I met with people in open spaces
Others visited me at home
I visited others at their home
Electricity
\(-\)0.0229
0.1242
0.4644
0.4937
0.1577
Lower bound
\(-\)0.219
0.494
0.175
\(-\)0.519
\(-\)1.253
Upper bound
0.125
1.475
1.056
0.852
0.202
 
(11)
(12)
(13)
Willing to contribute time for community activities
Willing to contribute money for community activities
Worked for community in past 12 months
Electricity
\(-\)0.037
\(-\)0.422
0.132
Lower bound
\(-\)0.207
\(-\)0.374
\(-\)0.432
Upper bound
0.776
0.357
0.059
Notes: The coefficient corresponding to the variable electricity is estimated using the instrumental variable by controlling for the same set of covariates as that used in Tables 2, 3 and 4. Conley et al. (2012) is designed for linear models and we estimate the linear model using the land gradient as the instrument in the first-stage regression model. The upper and lower bounds are the bounds estimated for the effect of electricity on the outcome variable under a mild deviation from the exclusion restriction assumption. The lower and upper bounds are estimated by choosing \(\gamma _{min} = -0.001\) and \(\gamma _{max}=0.001\), except for in Columns (5) and (6). In Columns (5) and (6), we restrict our priors to \(\gamma _{min} = 0\) and \(\gamma _{max}=0.006\). Note that the results of the linear model cannot be directly compared with the average partial effect reported in the results of Tables 2, 3 and 4; this is because the results reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4 are the partial effect of bivariate probit models. However, our test allows us to examine the sensitivity of coefficient of electricity under a mild deviation from instrument exogeneity

5.3 Heterogeneity

The bivariate probit results may not be able to detect the effect of electricity on social capital if the effect differs by household type. We examine the heterogeneous effect by (1) female-headed households, (2) the share of females, (3) household size, (4) expenditure and (5) the level of education of the household head. To estimate the heterogeneity, we first interacted electricity with variable female. Since the interaction variable is also endogenous variables, we interact the instrumental variables with female and use as instruments for the endogenous interaction variables. Therefore, we have three equations to estimate, which requires us to estimate multivariate probit models. However, when we estimate the multivariate probit model, our model does not converge. Therefore, we estimate instrumental variable regression. The results of the heterogeneity of trust are reported in Table 7, those of social interactions are reported in Table 8, and those of social engagement are reported in Table 9. In all tables, the coefficients of interaction variables are estimated from separate instrumental variable models by controlling for the same set of controls as that used in Eqs. 1A and 1B.
Table 7
Heterogeneity of the effect of electricity on trust
 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Trust that at least one neighbor would lend me money
Trust that neighbors would take care of children
Neighbors can be trusted
Trust that neighbors would not take advantage
electricity \(\times \) Female
0.3997**
\(-\)0.0752
\(-\)0.0683
0.0024
(0.1987)
(0.1880)
(0.1988)
(0.1858)
electricity \(\times \) female share
0.4303**
\(-\)0.0984
\(-\)0.0920
\(-\)0.0739
(0.2143)
(0.1980)
(0.2081)
(0.1948)
electricity \(\times \) hhsize
\(-\)0.1108
0.0771
0.1132
\(-\)0.0361
(0.0991)
(0.1101)
(0.1167)
(0.1714)
electricity \(\times \) expenditure
0.0881
0.1113
\(-\)0.0155
\(-\)0.0686
(0.1122)
(0.1765)
(0.1589)
(0.2335)
electricity \(\times \) education
\(-\)0.0597
0.4623
0.1083
0.0910
(0.2961)
(0.6381)
(0.5127)
(0.5292)
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
District FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Number of obs
4,343
4,343
4,343
4,343
Each coefficient of the interaction variable is estimated from a separate regression model. The outcome variables are binary, requiring us to estimate multivariate probit models. However, the multivariate probit models do not converge. Thus, we report the results from the instrumental variable regression models. The instrumental variable regression model are estimated using the land gradient as the instrument. The interaction variables are also endogenous variables, and we use the interaction of the instrument and the variable (interacted with electricity) as an instrument for the endogenous interaction variable, following the same procedure as that used in the linear models. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subdistrict level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All the models are estimated by controlling for the same set of controls as that included in the bivariate probit models in Tables 2, 3 and 4
Table 8
Heterogeneity of the effect of electricity on social interaction and network density
 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Have close friends
People in neighborhood help each other
Feeling of togetherness is strong in neighborhood
I met with people in open spaces
Others visited me at home
I visited others at their home
Electricity \(\times \) female
4.6825
0.0992
0.6137**
0.1165
0.5365*
0.7912***
(3.0978)
(0.1734)
(0.2516)
(0.2398)
(0.2821)
(0.3031)
Electricity \(\times \) female share
4.8835
0.0539
0.6306**
0.1667
0.6255**
0.8725***
(3.2554)
(0.1855)
(0.2732)
(0.2558)
(0.3090)
(0.3223)
Electricity \(\times \) hhsize
1.4859
0.1069
0.3176
\(-\)0.3992**
\(-\)0.1281
0.2070
(2.3414)
(0.1333)
(0.1941)
(0.1660)
(0.1765)
(0.2027)
Electricity \(\times \) expenditure
\(-\)6.5419**
0.0330
\(-\)0.4099*
0.1910
0.1616
0.2271
(2.9459)
(0.1983)
(0.2285)
(0.2579)
(0.2738)
(0.1972)
Electricity \(\times \) education
\(-\)5.4395
\(-\)0.2948
\(-\)0.8089
1.4850
1.1892
1.0400
(7.2425)
(0.4829)
(0.8918)
(1.3364)
(0.9361)
(0.8455)
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
District FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Number of obs
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
Each coefficient of the interaction variable is estimated from a separate regression model. The outcome variables are binary, requiring us to estimate multivariate probit models in our heterogeneity models. However, the multivariate probit models do not converge. Thus, we report the results from the instrumental variable regression models. The coefficients reported are from the instrumental variable regression models using the land gradient as the instrument. The interaction variables are also endogenous variables, and we use the interaction term of the instrument and the variable (interacted with electricity) as an instrument for the endogenous interaction variable, following the same procedure as that used in the linear models. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subdistrict level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All the models are estimated by controlling for the same set of controls as that included in the bivariate probit models in Tables 2, 3 and 4
The trust outcome results reported in Table 7 suggest that electrified and female headed households are more likely to trust that others are willing to help them with borrowing and lending money based on the results reported in Column 1 (of Table 7). Similarly, our results also suggest that electrified and larger shares of female household members are more likely to trust that others are willing to help in terms of borrowing and lending money. One possible explanation is that in Bhutan, women traditionally do not work outside the home. As a result, women in Bhutan participate in more local official meetings and social gatherings. Thus, females are more likely to observe the donations and contributions made by others. Similarly, while at home, females are likely to experience more donation solicitation or alms offerings (which used to be practiced widely). As a result, we expect our result is capturing the reciprocity of their generous behavior.
The heterogeneous results of social interaction reported in Table 8 suggest that female-headed households and electrified households are positively correlated with the outcome variables “others visited me at home" and “I visited others at home". The cooking appliance adoption reported in Table 10 suggests a positive correlation between electricity and the adoption of rice cookers and curry cookers. Therefore, one plausible explanation is that the adoption of cooking appliances may save time on household chores, which are culturally performed by women in South Asia and Bhutan. This saved time may result in increased visitation among households for leisure purposes. Our results also suggest that electrified and female-headed households are more likely to engage in social interactions than are nonelectrified and male-headed households; these households are also positively correlated with a sense of togetherness in the community. However, electrified and richer households are negatively correlated with the number of close friends and the feeling of closeness, based on the results of Columns 1 and 3 (reported in Table 8). Richer households are likely to adopt more electrical appliances and may spend more time using television or radio or being online, resulting in fewer friends. Similarly, the results reported in Table 10 are positively correlated with the adoption of television, radio and phone use. Therefore, one plausible explanation is that richer households are associated with higher levels of information and media consumption; our results likely capture such an effect. Overall, our results show some evidence of the heterogeneous effect of electricity on social capital. In the next section, we explore the mechanism of the effect of electricity on social capital.15
Table 9
Heterogeneity effect of electricity on social engagement
 
(1)
(2)
(3)
Willing to contribute time for community activities
Willing to contribute money for community activities
Worked for community in past 12 months
Electricity \(\times \) female
0.1370
0.0778
0.1173
(0.1177)
(0.2115)
(0.1986)
Electricity \(\times \) female share
0.1388
0.1469
0.0902
(0.2215)
(0.1255)
(0.2189)
Electricity \(\times \) hhsize
0.0563
\(-\)0.0628
0.1035
(0.1462)
(0.1055)
(0.1381)
Electricity \(\times \) expenditure
\(-\)0.1872
0.0997
\(-\)0.3974*
(0.2296)
(0.1318)
(0.2393)
Electricity \(\times \) education
\(-\)0.5835
\(-\)0.0336
\(-\)1.0035
(0.7164)
(0.3918)
(0.8668)
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
District FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Number of obs
4343
4343
4343
Each coefficient of the interaction variable is estimated from a separate regression model. The outcome variables are binary, requiring us to estimate multivariate probit models in our heterogeneity models. However, the multivariate probit models do not converge. Thus, we report the results from the instrumental variable regression models. The interaction variables are also endogenous variables, and we use the interaction term of the instrument and the variable (interacted with electricity) as an instrument for the endogenous interaction variable, following the same procedure as that used in the linear models. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subdistrict level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All the models are estimated by controlling for the same set of controls as that included in the bivariate probit models in Tables 2, 3 and 4

6 Mechanism

The bivariate probit results of no effect of electricity on social capital are consistent with the evidence from Kenya by Lee et al. (2020), who reported that electricity has no effect on the number of outcome variables in the short run. In this section, we examine why we do not observe an impact of electricity on social capital. Electricity provision in developing countries enables households to adopt and use technology for household production, media consumption and entertainment. As discussed in Sect. 2, the adoption and use of simple technology, such as television, radio, mobile and cooking appliances, is likely to affect our outcome variable social capital by interfering with local social norms and cultures. For instance, Jensen and Oster (2009) reported that media consumption in India has reduced the acceptance level of (self-reported) domestic violence against women. Similarly, the expansion of television and radio networks and the subsequent amount of time spent on television and radio use has reduced household participation in community activities in Indonesia (Olken 2009). Therefore, for electricity to affect our outcome variable social capital, households must adopt basic electrical appliances such as radio, television, phone, etc., that will enable them to consume media and information.
Similarly, in rural Bhutan, the majority of households traditionally use firewood for cooking; thus, the adoption of simple cooking appliances such as rice cookers, curry cookers and water boilers is likely to reduce the household dependence on firewood. Firewood collection is usually conducted in a group; thus, the adoption of such cooking appliances is likely to affect social interactions in rural Bhutan.16 In the BLSS data, information about the adoption of electrical appliances was collected. Using this appliance adoption information, in this section, we empirically examine whether electrified households adopted electrical appliances that would affect social capital.
To examine this mechanism, we estimate the following appliance ownership model:
$$\begin{aligned} \text {electricity}_{ij}&=\alpha + \gamma \text {gradient}_{d}+\mathbf {X_{ij}\theta }+\eta \end{aligned}$$
(3A)
$$\begin{aligned} \text {appliance}_{ij}&=\alpha +\beta \text {electricity}_{ij} +\mathbf {X_{ij}\theta }+\epsilon \end{aligned}$$
(3B)
where we use the land gradient as an instrument for endogenous electricity provision. We also control for the same set of controls as that used in Eqs. 1A and 1B. We estimate six different appliance adoptions, including the adoption of television, radio, phone and three different basic cooking appliances. The effect of information and media consumption on social capital is largely determined by the types of television programs and information that households are exposed to. Depending on the type of information that the household is exposed to through appliance adoption, such as television, radio and phone, the levels of trust, social interaction and engagements are likely to be affected positively or negatively. Similarly, the effect of cooking appliance ownership on social capital will be largely determined by the amount of firewood displaced by the adoption of cooking appliances.
The results are reported in Table 10. The effects of electricity on the adoption of television, radio and phones are not distinguishable from zero. This result may suggest that one of the possible explanations for the lack of an effect of electricity on social capital is that the adoption of media and information-consuming appliances are not distinguishable from zero. Nevertheless, the results of the adoption of the three basic cooking appliances are positive and significant. However, our data show that the adoption of cooking appliances does not completely replace firewood consumption. For instance, 77% of the households that have adopted rice cookers also reported that they still use firewood, 75% of those that reported using curry cookers also reported still using firewood, and 72% of those who reported using water boilers also reported still using firewood. We also examine the heterogeneous effect of appliance adoption by female-headed households, the share of female household members, household size, household expenditure and level of education. The results are reported in Table 11. The results suggest that female-headed households are positively correlated with the adoption of television, radio and cooking appliances.
Table 10
Effect of electricity on appliance adoption
 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
TV
Radio
Phone
Rice cooker
Curry cooker
Water boiler
Electricity
0.0761
0.0996
\(-\)0.0071
0.3640***
0.5513***
0.4860***
(0.0792)
(0.1015)
(0.0447)
(0.0197)
(0.0500)
(0.0716)
Age
0.0052*
0.0122***
0.0034*
0.0028*
0.0014
0.0009
(0.0027)
(0.0025)
(0.0020)
(0.0016)
(0.0020)
(0.0023)
Age\(^2\)
\(-\)0.0000*
\(-\)0.0001***
\(-\)0.0000*
\(-\)0.0000*
\(-\)0.0000
\(-\)0.0000
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
Female
0.0260
0.1246***
0.0947***
0.0245
0.0035
0.0198
(0.0349)
(0.0347)
(0.0316)
(0.0261)
(0.0308)
(0.0306)
Education
0.0102***
\(-\)0.0050*
0.0065***
0.0060***
0.0093***
0.0167***
(0.0023)
(0.0026)
(0.0021)
(0.0019)
(0.0021)
(0.0023)
Read/Write
0.0506***
0.0624***
0.0525***
0.0248**
0.0316**
0.0276*
(0.0165)
(0.0185)
(0.0152)
(0.0106)
(0.0136)
(0.0155)
Household size
0.0321***
0.0121***
0.0181***
0.0055***
0.0040
0.0116***
(0.0036)
(0.0033)
(0.0032)
(0.0021)
(0.0026)
(0.0030)
Female share
\(-\)0.0031
\(-\)0.1828***
\(-\)0.0926*
\(-\)0.0135
0.0326
0.0170
(0.0494)
(0.0520)
(0.0474)
(0.0371)
(0.0454)
(0.0448)
Expenditure (ln)
0.1033***
0.0483***
0.0563***
0.0404***
0.0448***
0.0814***
(0.0098)
(0.0085)
(0.0079)
(0.0060)
(0.0066)
(0.0080)
Market (ln)
\(-\)0.0276***
\(-\)0.0096
\(-\)0.0379***
\(-\)0.0250***
\(-\)0.0252***
\(-\)0.0242***
(0.0068)
(0.0062)
(0.0068)
(0.0052)
(0.0058)
(0.0064)
Road (ln)
\(-\)0.0615***
\(-\)0.0104
\(-\)0.0486***
\(-\)0.0439***
\(-\)0.0406***
\(-\)0.0376***
(0.0068)
(0.0075)
(0.0097)
(0.0078)
(0.0076)
(0.0076)
District FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Number of obs
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
The coefficients reported in Column 1 through 6 are average partial effects estimated from the results of the bivariate probit models. Standard errors reported in parentheses are estimated using the delta method. ***\(p<\)0.01, **\(p<\)0.05, * \(p<\)0.1. The full bivariate probit results, along with the results of the electricity equation, are reported in the Appendix in Tables A4 and A5
Table 11
Heterogeneity of effect of electricity on appliance ownership
 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
TV
Radio
Phone
Rice cooker
Curry cooker
Water boiler
Electricity \(\times \) female
0.5335**
0.5594*
0.0648
0.3590*
0.4962*
0.4377
(0.2618)
(0.3063)
(0.1170)
(0.2049)
(0.2892)
(0.3484)
Electricity \(\times \) female share
0.5311*
0.6062*
0.0801
0.3907*
0.5006
0.4701
(0.2749)
(0.3247)
(0.1263)
(0.2217)
(0.3097)
(0.3782)
Electricity \(\times \) hhsize
\(-\)0.2239
\(-\)0.5393**
\(-\)0.1961**
\(-\)0.1961
\(-\)0.2112
\(-\)0.4476*
(0.2066)
(0.2354)
(0.0966)
(0.1356)
(0.1887)
(0.2528)
Electricity \(\times \) expenditure
0.2863
0.2343
\(-\)0.1218
0.0935
0.3485
0.8240**
(0.2170)
(0.2899)
(0.1034)
(0.1611)
(0.3156)
(0.3401)
Electricity \(\times \) education
\(-\)0.6382
\(-\)0.2488
\(-\)0.3610
0.4060
1.2822
0.9186
(0.6554)
(0.6169)
(0.2559)
(0.5926)
(1.1535)
(1.0482)
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
District FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Number of obs
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
The coefficients reported are from the instrumental variable regression models using the land gradient as the instrument. The interaction variables are also endogenous variables, and we use the interaction term of the instrument and the variable (interacted with electricity) as an instrument for the endogenous interaction variable, following the same procedure as that used in the linear models. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subdistrict level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All the models are estimated by controlling for the same set of controls as that included in the bivariate probit models in Tables 2 and 3

7 Conclusion

There are many situations where the social contract remains incomplete. In such situations, social capital can help in enforcing and establishing credible social contracts. However, social capital can be affected by external shocks such as electricity provision through appliance adoption and increased media consumption. In this study, we examine the effect of electricity provision on social capital, particularly self-reported levels of trust, social interactions and social engagements. We use nationally representative 2012 BLSS data. To identify the effect of electricity on social capital, we exploit the difference in the electrification status of rural households.
However, electricity provision and the development of the related infrastructure are often confounded by unobservable factors such as political importance and self-selection in obtaining connections. In this study, we address endogenous electricity provision using a plausibly exogenous land gradient as an instrument. The strong correlation between the land gradient and electricity provision suggests that electricity provision is correlated with the land gradient. However, in observational studies such as ours, it is challenging to find a purely exogenous instrument, and it is not possible to exclude the possible violation of instrument exogeneity. Therefore, we also conduct sensitivity tests of our results following Conley et al. (2012). Our results show that under a mild deviation from the exclusion restriction assumption, our results still lie within the lower and upper bounds of the sensitivity results of Conley et al. (2012). Furthermore, following the literature, we control for carefully chosen control variables. We also assess the effect of unobservables using selection on observables and it is less unlikely that the effect of electricity on social capital is driven by unobservables.
The bivariate probit results suggest that the effect of electricity on social capital is not distinguishable from zero for numerous measures of trust and social interaction and social engagements. However, we interpret our results as the short-term effect of electricity on social capital considering the implementation of the rural electrification program in Bhutan. In Bhutan, major works on rural electrification started in 2008; thus, it is likely that electrified households may have obtained their electricity connection immediately prior to the 2012 BLSS. As a result, households may not have had sufficient time to adjust their household budget to adopt appliances and related technology that would interfere with local norms and, subsequently, with our measures of social capital. Therefore, we can carefully conclude that in the short run, we do not find evidence of an effect of electricity on social capital. We also examine the effect of electricity on social capital using the matching method and find that the effect from nearest neighbor matching is consistent with the bivariate probit results.
We also examine the heterogeneous effect of electricity on social capital by female-headed households, share of female household members, household size, household expenditure (or income) and level of education of the head of household. Our results suggest that the impact of electricity on social capital is heterogeneous. Compared with unelectrified male-headed households, electrified and female-headed households are positively correlated with self-reported closeness in community and social interactions. Our results also show a heterogeneous effect of expenditure (or household income); however, we do not observe a heterogeneous effect by the level of education of the head of household.
We further explore the underlying mechanism that affects the effect of electricity on social capital. Electricity provision in developing countries enables households to adopt technology. For instance, electricity enables households to adopt information- and media-consuming appliances such as television, radios and phones. Similarly, providing electricity also enables households to adopt basic electrical cooking appliances such as rice cookers, curry cookers and water boilers. The adoption of such cooking appliances is likely to affect households’ dependence on firewood and subsequently impact their social interactions. Our results suggest that in the short run, media adoption and information-consuming appliances are not distinguishable from zero. On the other hand, our results show that the adoption of cooking electrical appliances is positively correlated with electricity provision. However, our data also show that electrical cooking appliances do not completely replace firewood consumption.
Fig. 1
Treatment of electricity from nearest neighbor matching and average partial effect from bivariate probit. Note: Bivariate probit results are the results reported in Table 2 through Table 4 of the manuscript. NNM stands for nearest neighbor matching. For matching purposes, we use the same set of variables that we controlled for in the bivariate probit model. The points in the figure represent the point estimates, and the lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. The 95% confidence intervals for the nearest neighbor matching are computed based on the Abadie-Imben standard error. In the figure, we exclude the outcome “have close friends” for esthetic purposes. The average treatment effect for “have close friends” is \(-\)0.001 with a 95% confidence interval of [\(-\)0.049, 0.047]
Bild vergrößern
Overall, our results show that in the short run, the effects of electricity on social capital, particularly self-reported trust, social interaction and social engagement, are not distinguishable from zero. Our results also show that in the short run, the effects of electricity on the adoption of media and information-consuming appliances are also not distinguishable from zero. On the other hand, we observe that households adopt basic electric cooking appliances; however, our data show that such appliances do not completely replace firewood. The results also show that the effect of electricity is heterogeneous. One of the limitations of our data is that our measures of social capital are self-reported. Thus, it is likely that our outcome variable may have also been affected by social desirability bias and other inherent issues that are typically related to self-reported outcome variables. In addition, Bhutan is characterized by different topographies and unique village-level characteristics. However, as the BLSS data do not provide village identifiers, we could not control for such differences in our study.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank two anonymous referees for their suggestions for improvement. Ngawang Dendup would like to thank the National Statistics Bureau of Bhutan for sharing the BLSS and social capital survey data. The authors would also like to thank Dr. Pankaj Thapa of the Royal University of Bhutan for sharing the geographic information system data. Ngawang Dendup also used the secondary data collected for the research supported by JSPS grant number 20K13498 and JSPS grant number 23K12479; thus, Ngawang Dendup would like to thank JSPS for the support. All errors are ours, and the opinions expressed do not reflect the opinions of the funding agency or affiliated institutes of the authors.
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Anhänge

Appendix A

Table 12
Bivariate probit results of electricity and trust outcome
 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Trust that at least one neighbor would lend me money
Electricity
Trust that neighbors would take care of my children
Electricity
Neighbors can be trusted
Electricity
Trust that neighbors would not take advantage
Electricity
Electricity
\(-\)0.2003
 
\(-\)0.0265
 
\(-\)0.4584
 
0.1471
 
(0.3315)
 
(0.2592)
 
(0.2821)
 
(0.3255)
 
Gradient
 
\(-\)0.0513**
 
\(-\)0.0521**
 
\(-\)0.0514**
 
\(-\)0.0515**
 
(0.0249)
 
(0.0242)
 
(0.0247)
 
(0.0246)
Age
\(-\)0.0068
0.0218*
0.0116
0.0214*
0.0229**
0.0218*
0.0044
0.0218*
(0.0124)
(0.0115)
(0.0089)
(0.0116)
(0.0114)
(0.0115)
(0.0089)
(0.0115)
Age\(^2\)
0.0000
\(-\)0.0002
\(-\)0.0001
\(-\)0.0002
\(-\)0.0002**
\(-\)0.0002
\(-\)0.0000
\(-\)0.0002
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
Female
\(-\)0.0181
0.3532**
\(-\)0.2942***
0.3454**
\(-\)0.0750
0.3578**
\(-\)0.0206
0.3585**
(0.1430)
(0.1760)
(0.1127)
(0.1749)
(0.1302)
(0.1763)
(0.1265)
(0.1758)
Education
0.0199**
0.0323***
\(-\)0.0174**
0.0317***
\(-\)0.0131*
0.0330***
\(-\)0.0146*
0.0290**
(0.0101)
(0.0119)
(0.0075)
(0.0120)
(0.0079)
(0.0120)
(0.0079)
(0.0129)
Read/Write
\(-\)0.1747**
0.1578**
\(-\)0.0289
0.1579**
\(-\)0.1070
0.1585**
0.0767
0.1660**
(0.0760)
(0.0784)
(0.0719)
(0.0784)
(0.0821)
(0.0783)
(0.0599)
(0.0800)
Household size
0.0557***
0.0204
\(-\)0.0201
0.0208
0.0016
0.0209
0.0106
0.0202
(0.0154)
(0.0143)
(0.0124)
(0.0143)
(0.0132)
(0.0142)
(0.0112)
(0.0142)
Female share
\(-\)0.0013
\(-\)0.1928
0.2713
\(-\)0.1855
\(-\)0.0140
\(-\)0.2015
\(-\)0.0514
\(-\)0.2042
(0.2054)
(0.2688)
(0.1739)
(0.2682)
(0.1930)
(0.2704)
(0.1936)
(0.2694)
Expenditure (ln)
0.0868**
0.1194***
\(-\)0.0553**
0.1193***
\(-\)0.0238
0.1182***
0.0836***
0.1232***
(0.0376)
(0.0451)
(0.0256)
(0.0453)
(0.0330)
(0.0454)
(0.0300)
(0.0459)
Market (ln)
\(-\)0.0675**
\(-\)0.1935***
0.0377*
\(-\)0.1934***
\(-\)0.0061
\(-\)0.1937***
\(-\)0.0024
\(-\)0.1947***
(0.0277)
(0.0397)
(0.0206)
(0.0398)
(0.0264)
(0.0398)
(0.0275)
(0.0394)
Road (ln)
0.0175
\(-\)0.3215***
0.0150
\(-\)0.3205***
\(-\)0.0141
\(-\)0.3218***
0.0378
\(-\)0.3211***
(0.0303)
(0.0628)
(0.0228)
(0.0625)
(0.0257)
(0.0627)
(0.0243)
(0.0622)
District FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
The coefficients of the bivariate probit models are reported in the above table. The results of the outcome variables of trust and endogenous electricity provision are jointly estimated using the land gradient as the instrument, where Equations 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6, and 7 and 8 are jointly estimated. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the subdistrict level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Table 13
Bivariate probit result electricity and social interaction and network density
 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
People in neighborhood help each other
Electricity
Feeling of togetherness is strong in neighborhood
Electricity
I met with people in open spaces
Electricity
Others visited me at home
Electricity
I visited others at their home
Electricity
Electricity
\(-\)0.1988
 
0.0333
 
0.5105*
 
\(-\)0.2878
 
\(-\)0.3356
 
(0.2426)
 
(0.3715)
 
(0.2703)
 
(0.2726)
 
(0.2638)
 
Gradient
 
\(-\)0.0519**
 
\(-\)0.0520**
 
\(-\)0.0528**
 
\(-\)0.0499*
 
\(-\)0.0493**
 
(0.0245)
 
(0.0252)
 
(0.0244)
 
(0.0255)
 
(0.0251)
Age
0.0089
0.0215*
0.0143*
0.0215*
\(-\)0.0079
0.0222*
\(-\)0.0135
0.0207*
\(-\)0.0063
0.0215*
(0.0081)
(0.0116)
(0.0074)
(0.0117)
(0.0083)
(0.0114)
(0.0085)
(0.0117)
(0.0074)
(0.0116)
Age\(^2\)
\(-\)0.0001
\(-\)0.0002
\(-\)0.0002**
\(-\)0.0002
0.0000
\(-\)0.0002
0.0001
\(-\)0.0002
0.0000
\(-\)0.0002
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
Female
\(-\)0.1149
0.3474**
0.0226
0.3483*
\(-\)0.0497
0.3289*
0.2528*
0.3475**
0.2481**
0.3458**
(0.1108)
(0.1747)
(0.1095)
(0.1788)
(0.1093)
(0.1711)
(0.1290)
(0.1750)
(0.1176)
(0.1760)
Education
0.0035
0.0322***
\(-\)0.0020
0.0322***
0.0037
0.0309***
0.0045
0.0315***
0.0110
0.0323***
(0.0073)
(0.0119)
(0.0080)
(0.0120)
(0.0068)
(0.0117)
(0.0082)
(0.0118)
(0.0083)
(0.0118)
Read/Write
\(-\)0.1087*
0.1576**
\(-\)0.0206
0.1577*
0.1216**
0.1693**
0.0109
0.1607**
\(-\)0.0251
0.1583**
(0.0567)
(0.0783)
(0.0616)
(0.0826)
(0.0594)
(0.0796)
(0.0647)
(0.0781)
(0.0657)
(0.0779)
Household size
0.0060
0.0210
0.0087
0.0209
0.0295***
0.0222
0.0558***
0.0214
0.0319***
0.0208
(0.0103)
(0.0142)
(0.0111)
(0.0145)
(0.0112)
(0.0138)
(0.0121)
(0.0143)
(0.0117)
(0.0141)
Female share
0.1048
\(-\)0.1877
\(-\)0.1082
\(-\)0.1883
0.0785
\(-\)0.1644
\(-\)0.3499*
\(-\)0.1836
\(-\)0.3804**
\(-\)0.1767
(0.1720)
(0.2678)
(0.1607)
(0.2707)
(0.1644)
(0.2627)
(0.1929)
(0.2678)
(0.1746)
(0.2676)
Expenditure (ln)
\(-\)0.0003
0.1196***
0.0676**
0.1194***
0.1034***
0.1177***
0.1693***
0.1222***
0.1263***
0.1198***
(0.0279)
(0.0449)
(0.0335)
(0.0450)
(0.0323)
(0.0456)
(0.0325)
(0.0447)
(0.0301)
(0.0446)
Market (ln)
\(-\)0.0355*
\(-\)0.1935***
\(-\)0.0064
\(-\)0.1933***
\(-\)0.0214
\(-\)0.1886***
\(-\)0.0371
\(-\)0.1937***
\(-\)0.0173
\(-\)0.1943***
(0.0209)
(0.0401)
(0.0235)
(0.0398)
(0.0247)
(0.0404)
(0.0237)
(0.0398)
(0.0223)
(0.0396)
Road (ln)
0.0098
\(-\)0.3208***
0.0335
\(-\)0.3209***
0.0187
\(-\)0.3216***
0.0129
\(-\)0.3221***
0.0313
\(-\)0.3221***
(0.0222)
(0.0625)
(0.0239)
(0.0628)
(0.0232)
(0.0616)
(0.0224)
(0.0629)
(0.0231)
(0.0627)
District FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
The coefficients of the bivariate probit models are reported in the above table. The results of the outcome variables social interactions, network density and endogenous electricity provision are jointly estimated using the land gradient as the instrument, where Eqs. 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6, and 7 and 8 are jointly estimated. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the subdistrict level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Table 14
Bivariate probit results of social engagement
 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Electricity
Willing to contribute time for community activities
Electricity
Willing to contribute money for community activities
Electricity
Worked for community in past 12 months
Electricity
 
\(-\)0.336
 
\(-\)0.579
 
\(-\)0.200
 
(0.294)
 
(0.378)
 
(0.416)
Gradient
\(-\)0.051**
 
\(-\)0.050**
 
\(-\)0.051**
 
(0.024)
 
(0.024)
 
(0.024)
 
Age
0.022*
0.023**
0.022*
0.015*
0.022*
0.005
(0.012)
(0.011)
(0.012)
(0.009)
(0.012)
(0.010)
Age\(^2\)
\(-\)0.000
\(-\)0.000***
\(-\)0.000
\(-\)0.000*
\(-\)0.000
\(-\)0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Female
0.351**
0.265*
0.341**
0.108
0.355**
0.209*
(0.174)
(0.135)
(0.172)
(0.119)
(0.181)
(0.112)
Education
0.032***
0.010
0.032***
0.027***
0.032***
0.012
(0.012)
(0.011)
(0.012)
(0.009)
(0.012)
(0.008)
Read/write
0.152*
\(-\)0.061
0.146*
0.116*
0.159**
0.070
(0.079)
(0.083)
(0.078)
(0.060)
(0.079)
(0.062)
Household size
0.021
0.064***
0.021
0.062***
0.021
0.053***
(0.014)
(0.016)
(0.014)
(0.013)
(0.014)
(0.012)
Female share
\(-\)0.195
\(-\)0.539***
\(-\)0.175
\(-\)0.262
\(-\)0.197
\(-\)0.443***
(0.267)
(0.197)
(0.262)
(0.169)
(0.274)
(0.167)
Expenditure (ln)
0.121***
0.101***
0.121***
0.335***
0.121***
0.201***
(0.045)
(0.038)
(0.044)
(0.036)
(0.045)
(0.036)
Market (ln)
\(-\)0.194***
\(-\)0.020
\(-\)0.195***
\(-\)0.086***
\(-\)0.194***
\(-\)0.022
(0.040)
(0.028)
(0.040)
(0.026)
(0.040)
(0.025)
Road (ln)
\(-\)0.321***
0.029
\(-\)0.319***
0.015
\(-\)0.320***
0.027
(0.062)
(0.031)
(0.062)
(0.031)
(0.063)
(0.026)
Constant
1.201
0.312
1.161
\(-\)1.517***
1.193
\(-\)2.432***
(0.789)
(0.509)
(0.778)
(0.495)
(0.798)
(0.448)
District FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
The coefficients of the bivariate probit models are reported in the table. The results of the outcome variables social engagement and endogenous electricity provision are jointly estimated using the land gradient as the instrument, where Equations 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6 are jointly estimated. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the subdistrict level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Table 15
Bivariate probit result of electricity and appliance adoption
 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
TV
Electricity
Radio
Electricity
Phone
Electricity
Electricity
0.2822
 
0.3242
 
\(-\)0.0694
 
(0.3025)
 
(0.3351)
 
(0.4419)
 
Gradient
 
\(-\)0.0519**
 
\(-\)0.0538**
 
\(-\)0.0531**
 
(0.0242)
 
(0.0248)
 
(0.0243)
Age
0.0153
0.0236**
0.0350***
0.0210*
0.0029
0.0217*
(0.0097)
(0.0117)
(0.0083)
(0.0116)
(0.0110)
(0.0117)
Age\(^2\)
\(-\)0.0001
\(-\)0.0002*
\(-\)0.0003***
\(-\)0.0002
\(-\)0.0001
\(-\)0.0002
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
Female
0.0303
0.3815**
0.3235***
0.3502**
0.4300***
0.3510**
(0.1196)
(0.1764)
(0.1114)
(0.1741)
(0.1664)
(0.1754)
Education
0.0325***
0.0312***
\(-\)0.0237***
0.0316***
0.0186
0.0319***
(0.0078)
(0.0120)
(0.0086)
(0.0119)
(0.0143)
(0.0119)
Read/Write
0.1608***
0.1545**
0.1657***
0.1598**
0.2896***
0.1589**
(0.0589)
(0.0772)
(0.0595)
(0.0787)
(0.0910)
(0.0784)
Household size
0.1148***
0.0247*
0.0343***
0.0211
0.1494***
0.0200
(0.0120)
(0.0149)
(0.0101)
(0.0143)
(0.0196)
(0.0143)
Female share
0.0301
\(-\)0.2392
\(-\)0.5470***
\(-\)0.2044
\(-\)0.6363***
\(-\)0.1915
(0.1698)
(0.2695)
(0.1648)
(0.2687)
(0.2362)
(0.2690)
Expenditure (ln)
0.3598***
0.1334***
0.1293***
0.1193***
0.3855***
0.1172***
(0.0334)
(0.0475)
(0.0269)
(0.0450)
(0.0415)
(0.0447)
Market (ln)
\(-\)0.0682***
\(-\)0.1973***
0.0142
\(-\)0.1946***
\(-\)0.0986***
\(-\)0.1924***
(0.0234)
(0.0396)
(0.0218)
(0.0403)
(0.0313)
(0.0396)
Road (ln)
\(-\)0.1721***
\(-\)0.3220***
0.0407*
\(-\)0.3178***
\(-\)0.0215
\(-\)0.3200***
(0.0248)
(0.0626)
(0.0237)
(0.0637)
(0.0411)
(0.0625)
District FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
The coefficients of the bivariate probit models are reported in the above table. The results of the adoption of cooking appliances and endogenous electricity provision are jointly estimated using the land gradient as the instrument, where Equations 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and 5 and 6 are jointly estimated. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subdistrict level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Table 16
Bivariate probit result of electricity and appliance adoption
 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Rice cooker
Electricity
Curry cooker
Electricity
Water boiler
Electricity
Electricity
3.2173***
 
2.6498***
 
2.0779***
 
(0.1651)
 
(0.2289)
 
(0.3258)
 
Gradient
 
\(-\)0.0516**
 
\(-\)0.0529**
 
\(-\)0.0550**
 
(0.0252)
 
(0.0240)
 
(0.0255)
Age
0.0025
0.0223**
\(-\)0.0031
0.0209*
\(-\)0.0025
0.0204*
(0.0112)
(0.0114)
(0.0093)
(0.0112)
(0.0097)
(0.0114)
Age\(^2\)
\(-\)0.0000
\(-\)0.0002
\(-\)0.0000
\(-\)0.0002
0.0000
\(-\)0.0001
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
Female
\(-\)0.1118
0.3267*
\(-\)0.1515
0.3612**
\(-\)0.0231
0.3474**
(0.1698)
(0.1726)
(0.1291)
(0.1749)
(0.1188)
(0.1744)
Education
0.0211
0.0314***
0.0312***
0.0293**
0.0617***
0.0310***
(0.0136)
(0.0118)
(0.0093)
(0.0115)
(0.0092)
(0.0117)
Read/Write
0.0725
0.1457*
0.0769
0.1607**
0.0692
0.1573**
(0.0748)
(0.0760)
(0.0634)
(0.0752)
(0.0646)
(0.0783)
Household size
0.0275*
0.0212
0.0104
0.0186
0.0433***
0.0201
(0.0141)
(0.0143)
(0.0119)
(0.0145)
(0.0125)
(0.0144)
Female share
0.0481
\(-\)0.1664
0.2467
\(-\)0.1928
0.1296
\(-\)0.1838
(0.2513)
(0.2626)
(0.1984)
(0.2643)
(0.1775)
(0.2671)
Expenditure (ln)
0.2314***
0.1252***
0.1576***
0.1240***
0.3115***
0.1185***
(0.0338)
(0.0463)
(0.0302)
(0.0462)
(0.0331)
(0.0458)
Market (ln)
\(-\)0.0220
\(-\)0.1978***
\(-\)0.0311
\(-\)0.1927***
\(-\)0.0441*
\(-\)0.1921***
(0.0269)
(0.0388)
(0.0248)
(0.0392)
(0.0247)
(0.0399)
Road (ln)
\(-\)0.0657***
\(-\)0.3210***
\(-\)0.0473*
\(-\)0.3176***
\(-\)0.0619**
\(-\)0.3182***
(0.0254)
(0.0629)
(0.0268)
(0.0633)
(0.0294)
(0.0636)
District FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
4343
The coefficients of the bivariate probit models are reported in the above table. The results of the adoption of cooking appliances and endogenous electricity provision are jointly estimated using the land gradient as the instrument, where Equations 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and 5 and 6 are jointly estimated. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subdistrict level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Matching

The bivariate probit results depend on the validity of the instrument. While instrument exogeneity and exclusion restriction assumptions are not testable, it is not possible to exclude the possibility of violation of this important assumption. Therefore, we use the matching method as an alternative identification strategy. The effect of electricity on social capital \(\tau = Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)\), where potential outcomes \(Y_i(1)\) and \(Y_i(0)\) are the level of social capital of household i under treatment and control, respectively. For the treated households, potential outcome \(Y_i(0)\) is unobserved (similarly, \(Y_i(1)\) is not observed for the control household). We use nearest neighbor matching using the Mahalanobis distance metric with replacement to identify similar households in terms of observed characteristics. For the purpose of matching, we use the same set of control variables, including the district fixed effects used in Eqs. 1A and 1B. The inclusion of district fixed effects ensures that treated (or control) household i is matched from the same district. This procedure ensures that matched households are more comparable in terms of observed characteristics. The results are reported in Fig. 1.
In Fig. 1, we report the average treatment effect from nearest neighbor matching and the average partial effect from bivariate probit reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4. The 95% intervals of the average treatment effect from the matching are computed based on the Abadie-Imben standard error. Overall, the results show that the signs of both the average treatment effect (of matching) and the average partial effect (of bivariate probit results) are consistent except for the those of the two outcome variables. Based on this result, we do not find evidence that our bivariate probit results may be biased due to violation of the validity of the instrument.
Fußnoten
1
Gross national happiness is the economic development philosophy of Bhutan. It has four pillars: sustainable economic development, the preservation of cultural values, the conservation of the natural environment and good governance. These four pillars are further divided into nine domains: education, improving living standards, health, psychological wellbeing, community vitality, cultural diversity and resilience, time use, good governance and ecological diversity. For a detailed discussion about the concept of GNH, refer to Ura (2015).
 
2
Firewood is commonly used for cooking and heating purposes in developing countries. As discussed in Sect. 2, firewood collection involves social interaction and information sharing.
 
3
The first and second authors of this paper have extensive experience living and working in rural parts of Bhutan. In addition, the authors have observed that in rural Bhutan, a traditional labor-sharing system is intensely practiced, in which households jointly collect firewood on a rotational basis. In this process, the authors observed the occurrence of extensive information sharing and cheap talk along with firewood collection.
 
4
According to the 2016 Annual Report of Utility Company, Bhutan Power Corporation (BPC), which is responsible for the distribution of electricity in Bhutan, less than 1% of households did not have access to electricity in 2016.
 
5
It was learned from the Ministry of Economic Affairs that during the 2008–2013 period, the elected government connected all the subdistricts with roads. Road accessibility did not influence the timing at which communities or villages received grid connections. Furthermore, during our discussion with BPC engineers, there was no mention of the above-mentioned criteria; instead, they emphasized that cost and budget availability were the main drivers.
 
6
In mountainous countries such as Bhutan, as the land gradient increases, infrastructure such as roads becomes limited, which affects the cost of building infrastructure.
 
7
Duflo and Pande (2007) reported that in India, agricultural dam feasibility decreases with the increasing land gradient. In Bhutan, it was learnt from utility engineers that as the gradient increases, the height and volume of water decrease, making communities less likely to receive local hydropower plants, which are usually used for supplying electricity in Bhutan.
 
8
The subdistricts in Bhutan are called gewogs, and the districts are called dzongkhags.
 
9
The maximum average land gradient is computed as the average of the maximum land gradient of each subdistrict.
 
10
Both the BLSS questionnaire and social capital survey questionnaire are publicly available from the National Statistics Bureau webpage at the following: https://​www.​nsb.​gov.​bt/​wp-content/​uploads/​2020/​10/​BLSS-2012-Report.​pdf.
 
11
We treat the number of friends as a continuous variable, and the results reported are from the instrumental variable regression model.
 
12
As a robustness check, we also estimated the all the models by including five different additional wealth indicators as controls: modern wall, modern roof, glass-fitted window, flush toilet, and access to piped drinking water. All the coefficients are comparable with those reported in Table 2 through Table 4.
 
13
Another concern is that land gradient may be directly correlated with social networks and engagement, thereby violating the exclusion restriction assumption. To test this possibility, we classify households into 10 deciles by land gradient. We then estimate regression models for social networks and engagement, including deciles as control variables (by treating the first decile as the base category). The coefficients are insignificant, suggesting that it is plausible that the level of social network and engagement are similar between those living in lower and higher land gradients.
 
14
Bhutan is a homogeneous society, with the majority of the population following Buddhism. Therefore, we assume that the effect of such variables in Bhutan’s context could be negligible or small.
 
15
The heterogeneity results of the social engagements are reported in Table 9; however, we do not find any significant heterogeneous effect.
 
16
As far as we are concerned, the firewood collection system in rural Bhutan has not been documented. However, the first and second authors have substantial experience living in rural Bhutan and have seen that the firewood collection process in rural Bhutan involves social interaction, as the process is usually carried out in a group and involves much information sharing and cheap talk.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Short-run impact of electricity on social capital: evidence from a rural electricity program
verfasst von
Ngawang Dendup
Dil Bahadur Rahut
Yayue Xiao
Publikationsdatum
29.08.2024
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in
Empirical Economics / Ausgabe 1/2025
Print ISSN: 0377-7332
Elektronische ISSN: 1435-8921
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-024-02632-w