nach oben

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering

Erschienen in:

16.03.2019 | Regular Paper

Side-channel robustness analysis of masked assembly codes using a symbolic approach

verfasst von: Inès Ben El Ouahma, Quentin L. Meunier, Karine Heydemann, Emmanuelle Encrenaz

Erschienen in: Journal of Cryptographic Engineering | Ausgabe 3/2019

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

Masking is a popular countermeasure against side-channel attacks, which randomizes secret data with random and uniform variables called masks. At software level, masking is usually added in the source code and its effectiveness needs to be verified. In this paper, we propose a symbolic method to verify side-channel robustness of masked programs. The analysis is performed at the assembly level since compilation and optimizations may alter the added protections. Our proposed method aims to verify that intermediate computations are statistically independent from secret variables using defined distribution inference rules. We verify the first round of a masked AES in 22 s and show that some secure algorithms or source codes are not leakage-free in their assembly implementations.

Vorheriger Artikel Why attackers lose: design and security analysis of arbitrarily large XOR arbiter PUFs

Nächster Artikel On the verification of system-level information flow properties for virtualized execution platforms

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~wang626/project_sniffer.htm.

Balasch, J., Gierlichs, B., Grosso, V., Reparaz, O., Standaert, F.-X.: On the cost of lazy engineering for masked software implementations. In: International Conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications, pp. 64–81. Springer (2014)

Barthe, G., Belaïd, S., Dupressoir, F., Fouque, P.-A., Grégoire, B., Strub, P.-Y.: Verified proofs of higher-order masking. In: Eurocrypt 2015, number 9056 (2015)

Barthe, G., Dupressoir, F., Faust, S., Grégoire, B., Standaert, F.-X., Strub, P.-Y.: Parallel implementations of masking schemes and the bounded moment leakage model. In: Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, pp. 535–566. Springer (2017)

Bayrak, A.G., Regazzoni, F., Novo, D., Brisk, P., Standaert, F.-X., Ienne, P.: Automatic application of power analysis countermeasures. IEEE Trans. Comput. 64(2), 329–341 (2015)MathSciNetCrossRef

Beaulieu, R., Shors, D., Smith, J., Treatman-Clark, S., Weeks, B., Wingers, L.: The SIMON and SPECK families of lightweight block ciphers. IACR Cryptol. 2013, 404 (2013)MATH

Bilgin, B., Gierlichs, B., Nikova, S., Nikov, V., Rijmen, V.: Higher-order threshold implementations. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 8874, pp. 326–343. Springer (2014)

Blömer, J., Guajardo, J., Krummel, V.: Provably secure masking of aes. In: International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography, pp. 69–83. Springer (2004)

Chen, C., Inci, M.S., Taha, M., Eisenbarth, T.: Spectre: a tiny side-channel resistant speck core for fpgas. IACR Cryptol. 2015, 691 (2015)

Coron, J.-S.: Higher order masking of look-up tables. In: Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, pp. 441–458. Springer (2014)

10.

Coron, J.-S., Großschädl, J., Tibouchi, M., Vadnala, P. K.: Conversion from arithmetic to boolean masking with logarithmic complexity. In: International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption, pp. 130–149. Springer (2015)

11.

Coron, J.-S., Prouff, E., Rivain, M.: Side channel cryptanalysis of a higher order masking scheme. In: International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, pp. 28–44. Springer (2007)

12.

Eldib, H., Wang, C.: Synthesis of masking countermeasures against side channel attacks. CAV 8559, 114–130 (2014)

13.

Eldib, H., Wang, C., Schaumont, P.: Formal verification of software countermeasures against side-channel attacks. ACM Trans. Softw. Eng. Methodol. 24(2), 11 (2014)CrossRef

14.

Eldib, H., Wang, C., Taha, M., Schaumont, P.: Quantitative masking strength: quantifying the power side-channel resistance of software code. IEEE Trans. Comput. Aided Des. Integr. Circuits Syst. 34(10), 1558–1568 (2015)CrossRef

15.

Goodwill, G., Jun, B., Jaffe, J., Rohatgi, P.: A testing methodology for side-channel resistance validation. In: NIST Non-invasive Attack Testing Workshop (2011)

16.

Goubin, L.: A sound method for switching between boolean and arithmetic masking. In: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded SystemsCHES 2001, pp. 3–15. Springer (2001)

17.

Herbst, C., Oswald, E., Mangard, S.: An aes smart card implementation resistant to power analysis attacks. In: ACNS, vol. 3989, pp. 239–252. Springer (2006)

18.

Kocher, P.C.: Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, rsa, dss, and other systems. In: Annual International Cryptology Conference, pp. 104–113. Springer (1996)

19.

Microsoft Research. Z3py-python interface for the z3 theorem prover (2012)

20.

Papagiannopoulos, K., Veshchikov, N.: Mind the gap: towards secure 1st-order masking in software. IACR Cryptol. 2017, 345 (2017)

21.

Prouff, E., Rivain, M.: Masking against side-channel attacks: a formal security proof. In: Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, pp. 142–159. Springer (2013)

22.

Reparaz, O.: Detecting flawed masking schemes with leakage detection tests. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer (2016)

23.

Reparaz, O., Gierlichs, B., Verbauwhede, I.: Fast leakage assessment. In: International Conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems. Springer (2017)

24.

Ronen, E., OFlynn, C., Shamir, A., Weingarten, A.-O.: IoT Goes Nuclear: Creating a ZigBee Chain Reaction. Technical Report 1047 (2016)

25.

Shahverdi, A., Taha, M., Eisenbarth, T.: Lightweight side channel resistance: threshold implementations of simon. IEEE Trans. Comput. 66(4), 661–671 (2017)MathSciNetCrossRefMATH

26.

Standaert, F.-X.: How (not) to use Welch’s t-test in side-channel security evaluations. IACR Cryptol. 2017, 138 (2017)

27.

Strobel, D., Oswald, D., Richter, B., Schellenberg, F., Paar, C.: Microcontrollers as (in)security devices for pervasive computing applications. Proc. IEEE 102(8), 1157–1173 (2014)CrossRef

28.

Veshchikov, N.: Silk: high level of abstraction leakage simulator for side channel analysis. In: Proceedings of the 4th Program Protection and Reverse Engineering Workshop. ACM (2014)

Titel: Side-channel robustness analysis of masked assembly codes using a symbolic approach
verfasst von: Inès Ben El Ouahma
Quentin L. Meunier
Karine Heydemann
Emmanuelle Encrenaz
Publikationsdatum: 16.03.2019
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in: Journal of Cryptographic Engineering / Ausgabe 3/2019
Print ISSN: 2190-8508
Elektronische ISSN: 2190-8516
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-019-00205-7

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 3/2019

Triathlon of lightweight block ciphers for the Internet of things

On the verification of system-level information flow properties for virtualized execution platforms

Mixed-radix Naccache–Stern encryption

Why attackers lose: design and security analysis of arbitrarily large XOR arbiter PUFs

Automatic generation of HCCA-resistant scalar multiplication algorithm by proper sequencing of field multiplier operands

An automated framework for exploitable fault identification in block ciphers