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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

3. Single Plant Protection: A Game-Theoretical Model for Improving Chemical Plant Protection

verfasst von : Laobing Zhang, Genserik Reniers

Erschienen in: Game Theory for Managing Security in Chemical Industrial Areas

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

In this chapter, we introduce a game theoretic model for protecting a chemical plant from intelligent attackers. The model is named Chemical Plant Protection Game, abbreviated as “CPP Game” [1]. The CPP Game is developed based on the general intrusion detection approach in chemical plants. To this end, the general intrusion detection approach is firstly introduced. We develop and explain the CPP Game by modelling its players, strategies, and payoffs. Afterwards in Sect. 3.3, different equilibrium concepts are used to predict the outcome of the CPP Game [2]. An analysis of the inputs and outputs of the game is provided in Sect. 3.4, from an industrial practice point of view [3]. Finally, conclusions are drawn at the end of this chapter.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Intelligent Interaction Modelling: Game Theory

Nächstes Kapitel Single Plant Protection: Playing the Chemical Plant Protection Game with Distribution-Free Uncertainties

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Titel: Single Plant Protection: A Game-Theoretical Model for Improving Chemical Plant Protection
verfasst von: Laobing Zhang
Genserik Reniers
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Game Theory for Managing Security in Chemical Industrial Areas
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-92617-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-92618-6

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92618-6_3

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