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Über dieses Buch

This book examines why and how small powers link their security interests and trade agendas, and how security threats influence the facilitation and outcome of their trade activities. In doing so, it analyses the increasingly complex connections between trade and security, demonstrating how these linkages affect the overall security of four small but important states in East Asia. Focusing on the role of high levels of internal and external insecurities, marginal geo-economic size and peripheral geopolitical position, and multidimensional and multidirectional security contexts and threats, the author concludes that for every security enhancement that a linkage creates a consequent security risk is generated. In other words, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines are effectively trading their security. This innovative book will appeal to political scientists, economists, and security and trade experts.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Chapter 1. Small Powers and the Security Utility of Trade

Abstract
The strategic behaviour of small powers in the international system can be described in one word: dependence. While a single, universally accepted definition of the term ‘small power’ remains debatable, nonetheless, the extant literature reveals recurring features of their behavioural approaches to world politics.1 First, small powers clearly recognize that it is both futile and reckless to rely exclusively on their own capabilities to obtain security, let alone influence the conduct of world politics to work for their advantage (Toje 2010, 2011). Nevertheless, through concerted actions and efforts, small powers are able to steer the general course of the international politics by manipulating the workings of the system but with limited success. Since small powers do not enjoy a decisive and indispensible role in great powers’ wide range of political and military resources, their policy options are limited to either neutrality or alliance (Mares 1988; Toje 2010, 2011). Under regional hegemony, small powers are bent to pursue a policy of neutrality given the small likelihood of punishment.2 Whereas within an alliance, small powers are compelled to conscientiously follow the directives of the alliance leader and throw all their support to gain favours and avoid upsetting the latter.3 Mares (1988, p. 456) notes that those ‘located in geopolitical regions critical to maintaining a great power’s position in the international system tend to opt for alliance’.
Michael Intal Magcamit

Chapter 2. Regional Linking of security and trade: ‘APEC Way’ versus ‘ASEAN Way’

Abstract
Understanding the motives and rationales behind the small powers’ attempts at linking security and trade requires a detailed understanding of the important events that have precipitated the need for such as a strategy. The shifting political, economic and strategic conditions provide important clues about why and how weaker states use trade to solve their security concerns, and the trade-offs they make to do so. In addition, they also offer critical insights into when strategic innovation takes place, and when such an approach is more or less effective. To provide a complete overview of how the STL strategy is applied at the regional level, first, I trace the roots of these linkages in East Asia and the adjacent regions. After which, I then expound in details the dynamics behind the collective linking efforts of APEC and ASEAN members to show concrete examples of such linkages. This will highlight the types of cohabitative security threats and referents that are addressed and ‘co-habited’ into the respective trade agendas of these two organizations. Finally, a critical evaluation of the issues encountered by member states when linking security and trade is provided to illustrate their implications for the types of linkages formed.
Michael Intal Magcamit

Chapter 3. Trading in shadows: investigating Taiwan’s statist linkages

Abstract
The geopolitical complexities surrounding the cross-Strait relations prevent Taiwanese leaders from pursuing the goal of de jure sovereignty for the country. This results in the continued non-recognition of Taiwan as a legitimate state in the international community, particularly among the United Nations members. Consequently, Taiwan is forced to resign itself to the vulnerabilities and vicissitudes induced by its quasi-sovereign status that continuously contracts as China’s ‘sinicization’1 project progresses. To prevent its complete co-optation within the ‘One-China’ trajectory, the Taiwanese government has been resolute in preserving and enhancing the country’s shrinking sovereign space amid the China constraints that continue to threaten this space. The term ‘sovereign space’ refers to Taiwan’s de facto domestic and interdependence sovereignty, as opposed to any de jure international legal sovereignty.2 To do so, Taipei has vigorously promoted and actively campaigned for its right to join in multilateral and preferential trade activities.
Michael Intal Magcamit

Chapter 4. Trading in Paranoia: investigating Singapore’s statist linkages

Abstract
Singapore’s rude awakening to independence after its sudden expulsion from the former Malaysian Federation in 1965 led to its transformation as one of the most strategic entrepôts in the world. The country’s limited territorial lands and scarce natural resources, combined with huge per capita income, high population density and complex ethnic mix, gave rise to its modern-day identity as a pragmatic trading state. To ensure its continued survival after gaining independence, the Singaporean government has been relentless in preserving and enhancing its shrinking defense space amid the geographic constraints that continue to threaten this space. The term ‘defense space’ refers to Singapore’s military (hard power) and non-military (soft power) capacity to defend its survival against the backdrop of a deeply-embedded security complex. However, the Hobbesian-like environment in which the country was unexpectedly thrust into has induced a siege mentality and vulnerability fetish among the Singaporean leaders and citizens alike.
Michael Intal Magcamit

Chapter 5. Trading in vain: investigating the Philippines’ humanist linkages

Abstract
The highly imbalanced development of the Philippine economy has become an enduring threat to the country’s supposedly people-centric national security. Although the Philippines had earlier on served as a model economy for many of its neighbours, particularly during the post-war period between 1950s and 1960s, however, things went downhill beginning in the 1970s.1 Since then, the country has never quite recovered. The country’s dramatic fall from the top had earned it unenviable titles such as, ‘the sick man of Asia’, and ‘East Asia’s stray cat’ (Noland 2000; White III 2015). At the crux of the Philippines’ extremely uneven economic development is a deeply entrenched patronage system ruled and maintained by powerful Filipino oligarchs. The term ‘oligarchs’ is defined as ‘actors who command and control massive concentrations of material resources that can be deployed to defend or enhance their personal wealth and exclusive social position’ (Winters 2011, p. 6). Accordingly, the ultimate goal of the oligarchs is to continuously expand and secure their position of extreme wealth and power against all forms of threats (Bourguignon & Verdier 2000; Winters 2011).
Michael Intal Magcamit

Chapter 6. Trading in bias: investigating Malaysia’s humanist linkages

Abstract
The country’s march toward a multi-ethnic nation building has been severely undermined by enduring structural divisions, which for the longest time have separated the Bumiputeras (i.e. native Muslim Malays) from the non-Bumiputeras (i.e. Chinese, Indians and non-Malay indigenous groups). The aggressive promotion of the Bumiputera identity as the basis of Malaysian nationalism has resulted in the shrinking of the country’s diversity space. The term ‘diversity space’ refers to the capacity of all ethnic groups to participate freely in Malaysia’s political and economic affairs. Despite Malaysia’s great ethnic diversity, its national security policies and strategies remain heavily biased in favour of the Malays. In fact, Article 153 of the Malaysian Constitution states that:
Michael Intal Magcamit

Chapter 7. Small powers and trading security: lessons and outlooks

Abstract
The linkage efforts, strategies and outcomes of Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines and Malaysia reveal significant insights about the innovative approaches being adopted by small powers to solve their security concerns and the trade-offs they make to do so. Given the enormous strategic constraints that they face, the small powers in general have heavily relied on others to obtain security; favoured the status-quo; religiously adhered to international laws and institutions; and displayed high levels of paranoia.1 The insecurities induced by such constraints have fuelled the efforts toward what I call statist (state-centric) and humanist (human-centric) forms of linkages. Here, I illustrate the two-way relationship between security and trade: on the one hand, various of forms of trade have been used to promote, enhance and secure statist and humanist security referents/interests; (b) various types of security threats/issues have influenced the facilitation and outcome of trade.
Michael Intal Magcamit

Backmatter

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