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Erschienen in: Journal of Business Ethics 3/2017

17.10.2015

Social Norms and CSR Performance

verfasst von: Steven F. Cahan, Chen Chen, Li Chen

Erschienen in: Journal of Business Ethics | Ausgabe 3/2017

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Abstract

Some institutional investors (e.g., pensions, universities, and religious, charitable, and not-for-profit institutions) are exposed to social norms and public scrutiny. Prior research indicates that these norm-constrained institutions engage in negative screening and invest less in firms operating in ‘sin’ industries. We examine whether social norms also motivate these institutions to engage in positive screening—where they invest more in firms with better corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance—and CSR-related activism—where they promote improvements in the CSR of existing investees. We find that firms with superior CSR performance have greater ownership by norm-constrained institutions, consistent with positive screening, and we use a natural experiment to establish causality. We also find that increases in the shareholdings of norm-constrained institutions are associated with subsequent improvements in CSR, consistent with activism. Further, we rule out an alternative explanation for our results where the positive screening and activism are ‘profit-driven’ rather than driven by social pressure. Thus, our results suggest that the influence of social norms on stock markets is more pervasive than documented in the prior literature.

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Fußnoten
1
Our sample includes all types of institutional investors, not just those funds that follow a socially responsible investment (SRI) strategy, e.g., the Calvert Social Index funds. That is, we are interested in how social norms affect investment decisions of institutions in general. Thus, our study differs from studies that focus on SRI funds (e.g., Renneboog et al. 2008). Unlike SRI funds, in the absence of social norms, it is difficult to predict why some institutions would prefer firms with good CSR performance more than other institutions.
 
2
Exceptions include Borghesi et al. (2014) who find a negative relation between CSR performance and institutional ownership and Chen and Gavious (2015) who find that CSR performance and institutional ownership are unrelated.
 
4
For example, firms with good corporate governance (1) provide strong internal monitoring mechanism that serve as a substitute for institutions’ costly monitoring activities (e.g., Bushee and Noe 2000), (2) exhibit higher firm value, better operating performance, and potentially less wasteful investment (e.g., Gompers et al. 2003; Brown and Caylor 2006; Larcker et al. 2007), and (3) can reduce the possibility of losses due to managerial fraud or negligence (e.g., Del Guercio, 1996).
 
5
Kim et al. (2012) excluded the human rights area in constructing CSR scores because this area was added from 2002. However, we include this area for two reasons: (1) as stated in KLD’s ratings definitions, ratings in this area were mostly taken from the former non-US operations and community category, which have been embedded in the net score before 2002, and (2) to the extent that investors may view human rights as an important aspect of firms’ CSR performance, a CSR score including this area will reflect a more complete CSR image of firms.
 
6
We also compute a second measure of CSR performance that excludes the KLD product category since this category include indicators such as quality, R&D/innovation, and product safety, which may be correlated with firms’ financial performance. Our results are unchanged using this alternative measure.
 
7
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) include banks and insurance companies in their definition of norm-constrained. Brickley et al. (1988) and Chen et al. (2007) argue that banks and insurance companies may be less independent due to existing or potential business relationships with investee firms so we exclude them from our main tests. In sensitivity tests, we include banks and insurance companies as norm-constrained institutions and our results hold.
 
8
Similar to Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), we argue that while certain mutual funds and hedge funds may specially practice socially responsible investing, other mutual and hedge funds still focus solely on achieving financial goals.
 
9
We removed a small number of fund managers for which we do not have sufficient information to make an accurate classification.
 
10
In this setting, financial and stock performance, and reputation can control for good management which is relevant since good management and CSR performance could be related. However, we note that, in our tests, good management is unlikely to be an omitted correlated variable as that would require that norm-constrained institutions are more interested in good management than other institutions.
 
11
The mean institutional holdings in our sample is higher compared with the mean holdings in the full dataset from the CDA Spectrum database, which is 28 % for shareholdings and 12 % for shareholdings with voting rights. This implies that firms covered by KLD attract more institutional ownership than other firms, on average.
 
12
We include the CG*NormCon interaction as a control variable to ensure that our variable of interest, CSR*NormCon, is not capturing a general preference among norm-constrained institutions for firms with good governance.
 
13
For example, the UN’s PRI website encourages signatories to consider principles of responsible investing both before they invest and later as on-going, active shareholders. See http://​www.​unpri.​org/​signatories/​become-a-signatory/​.
 
14
The t test shows the mean of CSR performance for our treatment sample increases by 0.415 after 2012, and it is significant at the 5 % level.
 
15
The results are robust when we include the year fixed effects in the model or use shareholdings with voting rights as a dependent variable.
 
16
With respect to the institutional ownership measure, since there is a large difference in the mean and standard deviations of the IO measures between norm-constrained and non-norm-constrained groups, we use the natural log of the IO measures in our tests and find the results in Tables 4 and 5 still hold. We also include banks and insurance companies in the norm-constrained group (NormCon = 1) and recalculate the IO measure. These findings are also qualitatively similar.
 
17
To rule out possibilities that results in Table 5 may be affected by observations with zero changes in CSR performance, we estimate Eq. (3) again while requiring the dependent variable \(\Delta CSR_{t}\) to be non-zero. The untabulated results show no statistically significant difference from those reported in Table 5.
 
18
In an untabulated analysis, we investigate whether the effectiveness of shareholder activism on CSR performance vary with the economic conditions. Hong et al. (2012) finds firms do good only when they have sufficient financial slack. We find that the positive association between changes in CSR performance and current and previous changes in ownership by norm-constrained institutions is less pronounced in recessionary periods than expansionary periods, consistent with shareholder activism being affected by economic conditions.
 
19
Our results remain similar if we relax this criterion to at least 2 or 3 years.
 
20
In the shareholder activism analyses, we use voting share ownership (IOV) in Eq. (3) because voting shares more closely reflect the institution’s influence. On the other hand, we use common shareholdings IO in Eq. (5) to examine whether institutional shareholdings change in response to previous changes in CSR performance. Our results are still hold if we replace IO with IOV in Eq. (5).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Social Norms and CSR Performance
verfasst von
Steven F. Cahan
Chen Chen
Li Chen
Publikationsdatum
17.10.2015
Verlag
Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in
Journal of Business Ethics / Ausgabe 3/2017
Print ISSN: 0167-4544
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-0697
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2899-3

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