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Erschienen in:
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2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

4. Social Norms and Extortion Rackets

verfasst von : Áron Székely, Giulia Andrighetto, Luis G. Nardin

Erschienen in: Social Dimensions of Organised Crime

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Norms, in their many forms, are all around us. The social world that we inhabit is saturated with them. As others have elegantly put it, ‘from forceps to grave, human life is wrapped in a tightly woven tapestry of rules, standards, and expectations that govern every aspect of social behaviour’ (Anderson & Dunning, 2014). Not only are norms widespread, but they also have powerful effects on our individual and social behaviour, often for the better but sometimes for the worse (Ellickson, 1991; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich et al., 2001). Actions taken within the context of protection rackets are arguably not exempt. Domain-specific norms, regarding paying or supporting behaviour, and domain-general norms such as reciprocity and fairness may shape behaviour there too.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Basic Dynamics of Extortion Racketeering
Nächstes Kapitel Legal Norms Against the Italian Mafia
Fußnoten
1
Cialdini et al. (1990) refer to ‘social norms’ as ‘injunctive norms’; the two are essentially identical. Researchers in social psychology, drawing on the work of Cialdini and colleagues, typically use the term injunctive norms (e.g. Anderson & Dunning, 2014).
 
2
Although Ellickson defines social norms as ‘welfare maximising’ (1991, p. 167), and thus fits this consideration, his definition is far from a naïve functionalist one. His definition is, for instance, compatible with social norms that at first glance appear to contradict it (see Chap. 15).
 
3
Clearly, it is not straightforward to define what is a harmful social norm and what is not. This could depend on whether one subscribes to, for instance, a utilitarian view of ethics. Nevertheless, the examples presented have a strong element of harm to them.
 
4
Recent work however argues for a primarily peer convention account, as opposed to marriage market convention account, of female genital cutting (Shell-Duncan, Wander, Hernlund, & Moreau, 2011) and another questions the entire convention aspect involved (Efferson, Vogt, Elhadi, Ahmed, & Fehr, 2015).
 
5
A part of this information comes from the two interviews conducted with an Addiopizzo committee member.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Social Norms and Extortion Rackets
verfasst von
Áron Székely
Giulia Andrighetto
Luis G. Nardin
Copyright-Jahr
2016
Buch
Social Dimensions of Organised Crime

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-45167-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-45169-5

Copyright-Jahr: 2016

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45169-5_4