2001 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Stable Coalition Structures with Fixed Decision Scheme
verfasst von : Guillaume Haeringer
Erschienen in: Economics with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Enthalten in: Professional Book Archive
Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.
Wählen Sie Textabschnitte aus um mit Künstlicher Intelligenz passenden Patente zu finden. powered by
Markieren Sie Textabschnitte, um KI-gestützt weitere passende Inhalte zu finden. powered by
This paper studies the stability of coalition structures when coalitions must choose an alternative in a one-dimensional space, using a fixed decision scheme. This decision scheme depends on the preferred alternative of all agents in the coalition. We assume that the number of agent is finite. Hence, when an agent, or a group of agent, leaves a coalition and enter in another coalition, this will affect the outcome of the decision scheme in the former and the new coalitions. We provide in this paper sufficient conditions for the existence of stable coalition structures, for two stability concepts, namely C-stability and Tiebout-stability. The model presented here can be understood as a local public good economy with horizontal differentiation.