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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

7. State-led Growth and Domestic Debts

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Abstract

This chapter deals with China’s trap in a mounting debt burden, especially why and how government debts grow so fast. Beijing’s single-minded policy of pushing for GDP growth has created incentives for bureaucrats and cadres to initiate novel ways to generate more and more GDP for personal deeds. Projects best suited for government are land-intensive, capital-intensive but relatively low-tech city-building ones. Local governments then need money. They cash coffers from land leases and hoard newly nationalised land a collateral whereby money loans to be made from state-owned banks. As their investment returns are too low to pay off debts, many local governments face bankruptcy.

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Fußnoten
1
By definition, soft-budget constraint applies to a situation in which the strict control between expenditure and earnings of a firm is relaxed, meaning that business loss-making is tolerated. Typically, losses are met by the nanny state.
 
2
Lei, Chengyao, ‘Dailichengben, Waibuxing Yu Woguo Difangzhengfu Tourongzipingtai Guodujuzhai’, Hongguan Jingji Yanjiu (Macroeconomics Research), 10 (2011): 10-15.
 
3
Ibid.
 
5
China’s terms of land leasing are as follows: (1) residential leases for 70 years, (2) industrial leases for 50 years, (3) non-profit welfare leases (such as education, technology and culture) for 50 years and (4) services business leases (such as entertainment and retail) for 40 years.
 
6
Anon., ‘2016Quanguo Tudi Churang Shouru Chao 3.7 Wanyi’ (The Total Income of Land Leases Is Over 3.7 Trillion Yuan in 2016), vide: http://​www.​linkshop.​com.​cn/​web/​archives/​2017/​369127.​shtml, available on 25 January 2017.
 
7
Song, Qinghui, ‘Zhongguo Yunyingde Jichang Dangzhong 70% Doushi Kuisunde’ (70 Percent of China’s Airports Are Losing Money), vide: http://​www.​sohu.​com/​a/​77808747_​112589, available on 28 May 2016.
 
8
Ibid.
 
9
Li Xiaohong, Zhongguo Difangzhengfu Zhaiwude Xiangzhuang Yu Guimo Cedu’(The Current Situation and Scale of Local Government Debt in China), PhD Dissertation, Zhejiang University, 2017.
 
10
Zhao, Peng, ‘Caizhengbu: 27 Wanyi Zhengfuzhai Fengxian Kekong’ (Ministry of Finance: Risk of Government Debt of 27 Trillion Yuan is Under Control), vide: http://​finance.​ce.​cn/​rolling/​201705/​05/​t20170505_​22552193.​shtml, available on 5 May 2017.
 
11
Ibid.
 
12
Chen, Liu, ‘Gesheng Difang Zhengfu Yinxing Zhaiwu Guimo Zhiduoshao?’ (What Is the Scale of Implicit Government Debts in All Provinces?), wallstreetcn.com, vide: https://​wallstreetcn.​com/​articles/​351179, available on 8 February 2018.
 
13
See ‘Caizhengbu Guanyu Jianjue Zhizhi Difangzhengfu Weifaweigui Juzhai Ezhi Yinxingzhaiwu Zengliang Qingkuangde Baogao’ (The Report of the Ministry of Finance on Resolutely Preventing Local Governments from Illegally Raising Implicit Debts), vide: http://​yuan.​luan.​gov.​cn/​4663967/​6776891.​html
 
14
See Li, Xunlei, ‘Weilai Wunian Jiujing Shi Quganggan, Wenganggan Haishi Jiaganggan’ (Will the Leverage be Lower, Stable or Higher in the Next Five Years), vide: http://​finance.​ifeng.​com/​a/​20160910/​14872523_​0.​shtml, available on 10 September 2016.
 
15
See Ran, Xuedong, ‘Zhongguo Zengjia Chizilvde Kongjian Qishi Bingbuda’ (The Space for China to Increase Deficit Rate Is Little), vide: https://​www.​toutiao.​com/​i633043294856255​9489, available on 15 September 2016.
 
16
Jiang, Chao, Liang, Zhonghua and Jinliu Li, ‘Jiejue Zhongguode Zhaiwu Wenti, Fazhan Zhijie Rongzi Shi Fangxiang’ (Direct Financing May Solve China’s Debt Problem), vide: http://​sc.​stock.​cnfol.​com/​gushiyaowen/​20171128/​25682149.​shtml, available 28 November 2017.
 
17
See ‘Caizhengbu: Qunian Sijidu Zhongyang Zhengfu Zhaiwu Yu’e Yue 12 Wanyi Renminbi’ (Ministry of Finance: the Debt Balance of Central Government for 2016 Was 12 Trillion Yuan), vide: http://​finance.​jrj.​com.​cn/​2017/​03/​27160722232530.​shtml, available on 27 March 2017.
 
18
Chen, Yueshi, ‘Linbie Zhonghao: Yao Zhongdian Fangzhi Mingsiji Shike’ (Parting Words: We Should Focus on Preventing a Dramatic Minsky Moment), The Paper, vide: http://​www.​thepaper.​cn/​newsDetail_​forward_​2032279, available on 19 March 2018.
 
Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Feng, Xingyuan. 2013. Local Government Debt and Municipal Bonds in China: Problems and a Framework of Rules. The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 31 (2): 23–53.CrossRef Feng, Xingyuan. 2013. Local Government Debt and Municipal Bonds in China: Problems and a Framework of Rules. The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 31 (2): 23–53.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Li, Shiyu, and Shuanglin Lin. 2011. The Size and Structure of China’s Government Debt. The Social Science Journal 48 (3): 527–542.CrossRef Li, Shiyu, and Shuanglin Lin. 2011. The Size and Structure of China’s Government Debt. The Social Science Journal 48 (3): 527–542.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
State-led Growth and Domestic Debts
verfasst von
Yazhuo Zheng
Kent Deng
Copyright-Jahr
2018
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92168-6_7