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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

11. State-Owned Enterprises in the TPP Agreement

verfasst von : Mitsuo Matsushita

Erschienen in: Paradigm Shift in International Economic Law Rule-Making

Verlag: Springer Singapore

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Abstract

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are enterprises owned by states or governments for the purpose of accomplishing some governmental purposes. Chapter 17 of the TPP provides the rules designed to require the Parties of the TPP to subject SOEs in their jurisdictions to disciplines as provided for in Chapter 17 so that behaviors of SOEs would not be harmful to private enterprises in the market of the Parties and would not be unduly disruptive of the operation of free market there. Chapter 17 defines SOEs as enterprises which primarily engage in commercial activities and in which Parties (a) own 50% or more of their stocks, (b) control 50% or more of voting rights through the ownership of share or (c) have the right to appoint more than one half of their governing bodies such as board of directors. Commercial activities are defined as activities oriented toward profit-making. Chapter 17 directs Parties to ensure that SOEs within their respective jurisdiction operate according to commercial activities and that Parties would not provide to SOEs financial assistance on non-commercial basis in their jurisdictions. All of such directives are designed to ensure that SOEs within the TPP act just like private enterprises and, therefore, the level playing field between SOEs and private enterprises is created. However, Chapter 17 provides many exceptions to the general rules. Exceptions consist of those of general nature and country-specific ones. In fact, about 70% of the whole pages (about 100 pages) is devoted to those exceptions. Chapter 17 is subject to review in 5 years after the TPP takes effect including whether to expand its scope or not. Therefore, it is expected that there may be substantial changes in future. Although Article XVII of the GATT stipulates rules of SOEs, its scope is limited to export and import trade. It is worthwhile that Chapter 17 in the TPP is the first international agreement which provides for and elaborates on comprehensive and detailed rules on SOEs and, in this sense, significant.

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Fußnoten
1
For a detailed analyses see Capobianco, A. and H. Christiansen (2011), “Competitive Neutrality and State-Owned Enterprises: Challenges and Policy Options”, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers, No. 1, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://​dx.​doi.​org/​10.​1787/​5kg9xfgjdhg6-en, (last accessed January 3, 2017).
 
2
See Przemyslaw Kowalski, Max Büge, Monika Sztajerowska and Matias Egeland, OECD Trade Policy Paper No. 147, 22-Mar-2013, available at http://​www.​oecd.​org/​officialdocument​s/​publicdisplaydoc​umentpdf/​?​cote=​TAD/​TC/​WP(2012)10/​FINAL&​docLanguage=​En (last accessed January 3, 2017); see also Julien Chaisse, Untangling the Triangle: Issues for State-controlled Entities in Trade, Investment, and Competition Law, in Julien Chaisse and Tsai-yu Lin, International Economic law and Governance (Oxford University Press, 2016).
 
3
See for example Xiaolei Sun; Jianping Li; Yongfeng Wang and Woodrow W. Clark, (2014), China's Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments in overseas energy: The energy security perspective, Energy Policy, 65, (C), 654–661.
 
4
For a critical analyses of the use of the international regime by SOEs see Julien Chaisse and Dini Sejko, Investor-State Arbitration Distorted – When the Claimant Is a State, in n Leïla Choukroune (ed), Judging the State in International Trade and Investment Law: Modern Sovereignty, the Law and the Economics (London: Springer, Series International Law and the Global South: Perspectives from the Rest of the World, n Leïla Choukroune (Ed), Judging the State in International Trade and Investment Law: Modern Sovereignty, the Law and the Economics (London: Springer, Series International Law and the Global South: Perspectives from the Rest of the World, 2016).
 
5
See Sherry Stephenson and Gary C. Hufbauer, Services and state-owned enterprises, in Pierre Sauvé and Martin Roy (eds.), Research Handbook on Trade in Services, (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016). The authors discuss the market distortive governmental practices that grant advantages to SOEs and their implications for trade and investment in the services sector.
 
7
Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, United States, Viet Nam.
 
8
As one of such rulings decided by the Panel and the Appellate Body, see United States—Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, Pane Report, WT/DS379/R, adopted March 25, 2011; Appellate Body Report, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted March 25, 2011.
 
9
There are a number of writings on predatory pricing. Among them, one of the representative works is: William Landes, ‘The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Econ at Chicago’ (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics 163–34.
 
10
Article 3.2 of the Antidumping Agreement (Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994) states that: ‘With regard to the effect of the dumped imports on prices, the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product of the importing Member….’.
 
11
Article 3.4 of the Antidumping Agreement states: ‘The examination of the impact of the dumped import on the domestic industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry including actual and potential decline in sales profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments. This list is not exhaustive nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance.’.
 
12
There are many cases in which Panels and the Appellate Body dealt with the issue of non-attribution. Only some of the recent cases are cited: WTO/Panel Report, China—definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on X-Ray Security Inspection Equipment from the European Union, WT/DS425/R, Feb. 26, 2013; WTO/Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/ABV/R, May 18, 2011; WTO/Panel Report, Ukraine—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Certain Passenger Cars, WT/DS468/R, June 26, 2015; WTO/Appellate Body Report, China—Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States, WT/DS414/ AB/R, Feb. 13, 2012.
 
13
On state-trading, see articles published in Thomas Cottier and Petros C Mavroidis (eds), State Trading in the Twenty-First Century (University of Michigan Press, 1988) 1.
 
14
See generally Qingjiang Kong, The “state-led-economy” issue in the BIT negotiations and its policy implications for China, China-EU Law J (2016) 5: 13.
 
15
Although the EU/Japan FTA negotiation is a bilateral negotiation, the EU is the largest trade entity in the world and Japan is the third largest economy in terms of GDP. So a negotiation and conclusion of FTA between the EU and Japan is something close to a Mega-FTA negotiation.
 
16
See Julien Chaisse, ‘The Shifting Tectonics of International Investment Law: Structure and Dynamics of Rules and Arbitration on Foreign Investment in the Asia-Pacific Region’ (2015) 47(3) George Washington International Law Review 563–638.
 
17
See generally C.L. Lim, Deborah K. Elms, Patrick Low, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: A Quest for a Twenty-first Century Trade Agreement, (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
 
18
See Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU (formerly Article 81(3) TEC) available here http://​eur-lex.​europa.​eu/​legal-content/​EN/​TXT/​?​uri=​URISERV%3Al26114 (last accessed January 3, 2017).
 
19
Van Bael and Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community, Fifth Edition (Kluwer Law International, 2010) 17, et seq. Van Bael and Bellis states, in Page 17, that: ‘The basic definition…is that “the concept of an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed. … From this definition, it is clear that the key to determining the scope of the term “undertaking” is to identify whether an entity is engaged in form of “economic activity”. The European Courts have applied a broad definition to this concept, describing an “economic activity” as an activity consisting in offering goods and services on a given market….’.
 
Metadaten
Titel
State-Owned Enterprises in the TPP Agreement
verfasst von
Mitsuo Matsushita
Copyright-Jahr
2017
Verlag
Springer Singapore
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-6731-0_11